El Paso County v. Juana M. Avila ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
COUNTY OF EL PASO, § No. 08-23-00173-CV
Appellant, § Appeal from the
v. § 448th Judicial District Court
JUANA M. AVILA, § of El Paso County, Texas
Appellee. § (TC# 2015DCV1531)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The County of El Paso (the County) appeals an order denying its plea to the jurisdiction.
Appellee Juana M. Avila sued the County alleging it had breached a settlement agreement it
reached with her following the settlement of an employment-related lawsuit from which the
County was not immune. In its sole issue on appeal, the County asserts Avila failed to meet her
evidentiary burden of showing she fulfilled all conditions precedent necessary to trigger a breach
by the County. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Avila began employment with the County in 1999 as a cashier at the County Clerk’s Office.
Avila remained in that position until 2012 when she was terminated. Following her termination,
Avila filed an original petition against the County for violations of the Family & Medical Leave
Act of 1993 (FMLA). The case was removed to federal court and set for a jury trial. On September
19, 2013, the County and Avila entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims
(the Settlement Agreement), which compromised and settled the pending wrongful termination
lawsuit.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Avila agreed to settle her entire claim for the
aggregate sum of $65,000. Among other terms and conditions, the County agreed to reinstate Avila
“within a reasonable time to an available position of employment with the County subject to her
approval and the approval of the official or department head overseeing the job selected.” In
seeking reinstatement, the Settlement Agreement required Avila to be qualified for the available
position and imposed on her the responsibility to seek employment with the County. Upon
reinstatement, Avila would receive 420.14 hours of sick leave as additional consideration subject
to certain restrictions. In exchange, Avila acknowledged she “hereby releases and forever
discharges” the County “for any and all damages stemming from the above-mentioned incident.”
Following settlement, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal requesting the court
dismiss the pending case. However, the stipulation provided that the court would have and retain
supplemental or ancillary jurisdiction, or both, for purposes of enforcing the settlement agreement
between the parties. On September 26, 2013, the federal district court entered an order dismissing
the case.
On May 6, 2015, Avila filed suit against the County asserting the County breached the
Settlement Agreement by failing to reinstate her to an available position. Avila requested damages
and attorney’s fees. Avila further alleged that all conditions precedent to the filing of the action
have been fulfilled.
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In October 2019, the County filed its plea to the jurisdiction asserting Avila failed to plead
sufficient jurisdictional facts to establish a waiver of immunity. The County asserted it had fulfilled
every provision of the Settlement Agreement showing that Avila was reinstated on October 10,
2017, and that she received the precedent payment. The County attached as evidence to its plea a
copy of the Settlement Agreement, Avila’s new hire letter, and an excerpt from Avila’s deposition.
In response to the plea, Avila asserted the County was never immune from the underlying
claims of the Settlement Agreement and, therefore, it could not create immunity by contracting
with her to release her claims. Avila attached to her response her own affidavit where she averred
that she had applied for rehire with the County by applying 17 times to publicly posted positions,
yet she was not even given interviews. 1 Further, she attested to her belief that the amount of time
that passed from when she applied and when she was ultimately re-hired was not reasonable. In
addition to her own affidavit, Avila attached to her response the full deposition transcripts of
herself and two other employees with the County.
Following a hearing on the plea, the trial court issued an order denying the County’s plea
to the jurisdiction. This interlocutory appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
51.014(a)(8). In a single issue on appeal, the County asserts the trial court erred in denying the
plea to the jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plea to the jurisdiction is a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court hearing
the case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). A court cannot decide
a case in the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852
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From produced discovery, Avila showed she applied for positions with the County an additional 12 times.
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S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). As subject matter jurisdiction will not be presumed, the plaintiff
has the burden of pleading facts to establish its existence. Id. at 443–44, 446. “Whether a pleader
has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law reviewed de novo. Likewise, whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional facts
establishes a trial court’s jurisdiction is also a question of law.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We look only to the plaintiff’s pleadings and the
evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry while eschewing examination of the merits of the
case. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). The court of appeals credits
as true all evidence favoring the nonmovant and draws all reasonable inferences and resolves any
doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
Texas counties enjoy governmental immunity from suit which, to the extent it applies,
deprives a court of its subject matter jurisdiction. Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638
(Tex. 2004). “The party suing the governmental entity must establish the state’s consent, which
may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express legislative permission.” City of Dallas
v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2011).
ANALYSIS
In its sole issue, the County asserts the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction
because Avila failed to establish a valid waiver of immunity. The County asserts Avila failed to
sufficiently plead any cause of action that pierces the County’s immunity. Furthermore, the County
contends evidence shows, as a matter of law, the County fulfilled every obligation it had under the
Settlement Agreement and did not breach that agreement. In opposing, Avila asserts she
sufficiently plead a waiver of immunity because, by the County entering into the Settlement
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Agreement, it agreed to settle classes of claims from which it was not immune, and it cannot now
claim immunity from suit in an action alleging a breach of the settlement agreement.
Avila argues the Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Lawson is controlling. See Texas A
& M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tex. 2002) (plurality opinion). In Lawson,
a former employee sued a state university alleging the university breached a settlement agreement
it had entered with the employee to settle his wrongful termination lawsuit. Id. at 518–19.
Lawson’s original suit asserted the university violated the Whistleblower Act after it terminated
his employment. Id. at 518. Lawson and the university subsequently reached a settlement
agreement where one of the terms obligated the university to confirm to potential employers that
he had been employed with the university as an “assistant professor.” Id. at 519. Lawson alleged
the university breached the settlement agreement by telling a potential employer that Lawson had
been an “instructor,” and further refused to elaborate on what was meant by that designation. Id.
In considering the university’s plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity, the Texas Supreme
Court held that Lawson had been entitled to sue the university for violating the statute prior to
entering into the settlement agreement. Id. at 521. Explaining how the waiver of immunity
extended from Lawson’s whistleblower claim to his later breach of settlement claim, the Supreme
Court stated, “when a governmental entity is exposed to suit because of a waiver of immunity, it
cannot nullify that waiver by settling the claim with an agreement on which it cannot be sued.” Id.
The Court added, “[o]nce the Legislature has decided to waive immunity for a class of claims, the
inclusion of settlements within the waiver is consistent with that decision.” Id. at 522; see also
Hughes v. Tom Green County, 573 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2019) (reaffirming Lawson stating,
“Lawson provides that a governmental entity cannot create immunity for itself by settling a claim
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for which it lacks immunity only to assert immunity from suit in a subsequent action to enforce
the government’s agreement”).
Avila contends this case meets the standard set by Lawson and the County cannot “nullify
that waiver by settling the claim with an agreement on which it cannot be sued.” Lawson, 87
S.W.3d at 521–22. The County does not contest that it was not immune from Avila’s original suit
for wrongful termination and violation of FMLA. Moreover, the County acknowledges that it
would not be immune from a suit for breach of the settlement agreement which stems from
underlying claims it was not immune. Rather, the County’s complaint is that it did not breach the
Settlement Agreement with Avila, as a matter of law, because it completed all it was required to
do after Avila completed all her conditions precedent. For this reason, it asserts that Avila failed
to plead a cause of action waiving its immunity.
Only a few years ago, however, this Court rejected the County’s same argument, which
was accompanied by similar background facts. See County of El Paso v. Mijares, 630 S.W.3d 169,
171 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. denied). In Mijares, the case concerned two former employees
of the County who filed suit against the County in 2012 for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and retaliation for filing complaints. Id. Like this case, the County did not contest that it was
not immune from the asserted claims and entered into a settlement agreement with the two
plaintiffs. Id. The settlement agreement called for monetary payments to each plaintiff. A specific
contract term also provided that each “will be re-hired to a position of employment with the County
subject to [plaintiff’s] approval and the approval of the official or department head overseeing the
job selected.” Id. In 2016, the Mijares plaintiffs filed suit against the County asserting breach of
the settlement agreement among other claims. Id. Plaintiffs’ petition alleged all conditions
precedent were fulfilled and that they applied for vacant positions which they were qualified for
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with the County, but they were not rehired. Id. In responding, the County filed a plea to the
jurisdiction asserting it owed no unconditional contractual obligation to rehire either plaintiff. Id.
at 172. After the trial court denied the County’s plea, we affirmed the ruling on appeal. Id.
This Court held that “the waiver of immunity in this dispute was established before this
suit was ever filed.” Id. at 174 (citing Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 521 (“[W]hen a governmental entity
is exposed to suit because of a waiver of immunity, it cannot nullify that waiver by settling the
claim with an agreement on which it cannot be sued.”)). Because the County conceded its
immunity had been waived as to the plaintiffs’ original employment-related claims, we concluded
the same waiver of immunity carried forward to the subsequent claims of breach of settlement
agreement. Id. Furthermore, although the County’s arguments relied on a proper interpretation of
the settlement agreements and whether there existed an unconditional obligation to rehire
plaintiffs, we reasoned that “[i]mmunity from suit [did] not turn on the validity of the settlement
agreement [that was] sued on.” Id. (quoting Lawson, 87 S.W.3d at 523). As Lawson had explained,
“[o]nce the Legislature has decided to waive immunity for a class of claims, the inclusion of
settlements within the waiver is consistent with that decision.” Lawson, 87 S.W. 3d at 522.
Here, the County attempts to distinguish our holding in Mijares by pointing out it had not
rehired either plaintiff of the case. But here, it contends it “promptly reinstated” Avila. The County
argues Avila confuses conditions precedent with conditions subsequent contending that Avila’s
assertion that she was not reinstated within a reasonable time is an argument that “ignores the
conditions precedent of approval of an official or department head overseeing the job selected and
that she must be qualified for the position.” The County asserts that because the Settlement
Agreement is “plain on its face” as to this provision, that we must interpret this dispute as a matter
of law. We disagree.
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Similar to Mijares, Avila sufficiently pleaded that all conditions precedent were fulfilled.
Mijares, 630 S.W. 3d at 173 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 54). Moreover, like in Mijares, the County’s
argument similarly depends on the County’s contentions about the proper interpretation of the
Settlement Agreement. Although the County’s argument urges that its obligation to rehire Avila
was not triggered until she completed all her conditions precedent, and thus it had no unconditional
obligation to rehire, this argument still “depend[s] heavily on [the County’s] contentions about the
proper interpretation of the settlement agreements.” Id. at 174. Responding, Avila contends the
distinction that she was eventually reinstated is relevant to the extent of her damages, but it is not
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry of this case. Consistent with Mijares, we agree with Avila.
We conclude the County’s immunity has been waived with respect to Avila’s pleaded claim
for breach of the settlement agreement. To the extent there remains a dispute over the merits of
her claim and the extent of damages, if any, we express no opinion as those issues exceed the scope
of our jurisdictional inquiry.
We overrule the County’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
March 27, 2024
Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
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