Horace Shaw v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 20, 2024
    In the
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    Nos. 05-22-01219-CR
    05-22-01220-CR
    HORACE SHAW, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. F22-00304-M and F22-00305-M
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
    Opinion by Justice Carlyle
    Mr. Shaw waived his right to a jury trial and entered an open guilty plea to
    two charges of manslaughter for a drunken car wreck that killed a pregnant mother
    and her newborn baby boy, who was delivered by emergency caesarian section at
    thirty-six weeks the night of the crash. Despite facing up to twenty years’
    incarceration the way the case was charged, and up to forty had the state exercised
    its prerogative, the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years. We affirm in this
    memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    Mr. Shaw’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders
    brief that professionally examines the record and applicable law then concludes the
    instant appeal is frivolous and without merit. See generally Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967). Specifically, counsel analyzes potential issues concerning the (1)
    venue, (2) applicable statute of limitations, (3) appointment of counsel, (4) charging
    instruments, (5) waiver of the right to a jury, (6) sufficiency of the evidence, (7)
    objections and rulings, (8) admonitions, (9) validity of the sentence, (10) effective
    assistance of counsel, and (11) performed duties of appointed counsel.
    Counsel certifies that he has provided Mr. Shaw with a copy of the brief and
    his motion to withdraw. On August 15, 2023, this Court advised Mr. Shaw of his
    right to file a pro se response to his counsel’s Anders brief. See Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining right to file pro se response
    to an Anders brief). The State filed a response in which it also concluded there were
    no non-frivolous grounds for Mr. Shaw’s appeals.1
    Mr. Shaw filed a pro se response challenging his counsel’s Anders brief and
    motion to withdraw. Although the Anders brief examines eleven different avenues
    for potentially reversible error and finds none, Mr. Shaw’s response focuses on
    effective assistance of trial counsel. The Anders brief filed by Mr. Shaw’s appellate
    1
    Although the text of the State’s letter identifies the appellant as “Bobby Carl Jessie,” this
    appears to be a typo as the remainder of the document (1) references Horace Shaw and the correct
    appellate case numbers at issue, (2) contains an accurate reference to the Anders brief in this case,
    and (3) contains the correct name of the trial court judge, the trial court, the sentences imposed,
    and relevant facts.
    –2–
    counsel concludes his trial counsel was not ineffective because he actively cross-
    examined the State’s witnesses and presented witnesses and argument at
    punishment. The record supports this conclusion and shows his counsel also (1)
    introduced testimony that Mr. Shaw lacked a criminal history; (2) introduced
    testimony of Mr. Shaw’s career in Dallas as a firefighter paramedic for twelve years;
    (3) introduced evidence in support of Mr. Shaw’s character, including letters from a
    pastor and a retired district court judge and live testimony from his supervisor, two
    additional pastors, a chaplain with the Dallas Fire Department, three co-workers,
    family members, and friends; (4) clarified facts that without clarification could have
    prejudiced Mr. Shaw’s interests; and (5) made two timely objections at the
    punishment hearing, one of which was sustained and the other of which caused the
    State to withdraw its question.
    Notably, the record shows these cases were filed by information and the state
    only charged Mr. Shaw with manslaughter for which the sentences could only run
    concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.03(a). Had the state charged Mr. Shaw with
    intoxication manslaughter, also a second-degree felony, the judge could have
    ordered the sentences to run consecutively, opening Mr. Shaw up to a potential forty
    years in prison. See id. §§ 3.01, 3.03, 49.08. The fact that the state initiated the cases
    by information the same day Mr. Shaw entered into his plea agreement provides the
    basis for an inference that counsel was involved in negotiations before that time and
    –3–
    assisted in securing the manslaughter charge and consequent lower sentencing
    exposure.
    Mr. Shaw’s pro se response cites Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte
    for the proposition that his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
    failing to preserve error and that this failure constitutes a nonfrivolous ground for
    appeal. 
    865 F.2d 59
     (3d Cir. 1989). While Mr. Shaw correctly cited a case involving
    ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to preserve error, he does not
    point us to any alleged unpreserved error in these cases where he pleaded guilty to
    manslaughter. Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs, we hold
    pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to
    comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Chambers v. State, 
    261 S.W.3d 755
    , 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). Under the circumstances, the
    absence of citations to the record constitutes briefing waiver and leaves us with
    nothing to review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 (g) & (i); Hill v. State, No. 05-16-01512-
    CR, 
    2018 WL 1516889
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
    op.).
    Mr. Shaw further argues his counsel (1) filed an Anders brief that is frivolous
    and “amount[s] to no counsel at all,” (2) constructively denied him the right to
    appellate counsel, (3) failed to conduct a sufficient investigation “that potentially
    would have produced some more favorable facts and evidence” to his appeal, (4)
    was ineffective because he accepted the State’s version of facts as true without
    –4–
    personally conducting an investigation, and (5) denied him equal protection under
    the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While several of these
    arguments correctly cite to cases standing for relevant propositions of law, Mr. Shaw
    cites to neither the record nor to facts that would enable us to apply the facts to the
    precedents he cites. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 (g) & (i). The absence of citations to
    facts or the record leaves us with nothing to review. Eldorado Homeowners’ Ass’n,
    Inc. v. Clough, No. 05-22-00198-CV, 
    2024 WL 20170
    , at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    Jan. 2, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).2
    We have reviewed the record, the Anders brief filed by Mr. Shaw’s counsel,
    Mr. Shaw’s challenges thereto, and the letter response filed by the State. See Bledsoe
    v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (identifying appellate
    courts’ duties in Anders cases). We conclude counsel’s amended brief meets the
    requirements of Anders v. California, presents a professional evaluation of the
    record, and shows why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See High
    v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    , 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (determining
    whether brief meets requirements of Anders). We agree the appeal is frivolous and
    without merit, and we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the
    appeal.
    2
    We note that ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal rarely find sufficient evidentiary
    support in the record. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.07 provides a procedural mechanism
    for claimants like Mr. Shaw to submit evidence to create a trial court record with evidence of his claims for
    further review.
    –5–
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
    221219f.u05
    /Cory L. Carlyle//
    221220f.u05
    CORY L. CARLYLE
    Do Not Publish                           JUSTICE
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    –6–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    HORACE SHAW, Appellant                        On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-22-01219-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F22-00304-M.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 20th day of February, 2024.
    –7–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    HORACE SHAW, Appellant                        On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-22-01220-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F22-00305-M.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 20th day of February, 2024.
    –8–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-22-01220-CR

Filed Date: 2/20/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/28/2024