In the Interest of J.G and O.G., Children v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-23-00879-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.G. and O.G., Children
From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2022-PA-00949
Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 27, 2024
AFFIRMED
Appellants Father and Mother appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights
to their children, J.G. and O.G. 1 Father and Mother challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) became involved
in the underlying case in February 2022, when the Department received a referral alleging Mother
was abusing illegal drugs. The children remained in the home while the family participated in
family-based safety services (“family-based services”). However, Father did not engage in family-
1
To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we refer to the parents
as “Father” and “Mother” and we refer to the children using their initials or as “the children.” See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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based services, and the Department received another referral in May 2022 alleging domestic
violence in the home after Father was arrested for aggravated assault on a member of Mother’s
family.
On June 14, 2022, the Department filed a petition seeking temporary managing
conservatorship of the children and termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. On
August 30, 2023, the trial court held a bench trial. The trial court heard testimony from: Tilisa
Fields, the Department’s caseworker; Mother; and Father.
On September 5, 2023, the trial court signed an order terminating Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights to the children. The trial court terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights
based on statutory grounds (E), (O), and (P) in subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O), (P). The trial court also found it was in the
children’s best interests to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2). Father and Mother appeal.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the
Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate
grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Clear and convincing evidence requires “proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well-established standards of
review. See id. §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006)
(conducting a factual sufficiency review); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)
(conducting a legal sufficiency review).
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“In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental
rights, we must ‘look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was
true.’” In re J.L.B., No. 04-17-00364-CV, 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Nov. 1, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).
“[A] reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding
if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “A corollary to this requirement
is that a [reviewing] court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
“In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental
rights, we ‘must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found
to be clear and convincing.’” J.L.B., 2017 WL 4942855, at *2 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
“A [reviewing court] should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable
factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 266. “The [reviewing] court must hold the evidence to be factually insufficient if, in
light of the entire record, the disputed evidence contrary to the judgment is so significant that a
reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of the ultimate
finding.” In re M.T.C., No. 04-16-00548-CV, 2017 WL 603634, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Further, in a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony. HealthTronics, Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 382 S.W.3d
567, 582 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.). This is because “the trial judge is best able to observe
and assess the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility, and to sense the ‘forces, powers, and
influences’ that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal.” Coburn v.
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Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 823 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) (quoting In re A.L.E.,
279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). We, therefore, defer to
the trial court’s judgment regarding credibility determinations. Coburn, 433 S.W.3d at 823–24.
BEST INTEREST
Father and Mother argue the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a
finding that termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
When considering the best interest of a child, we recognize the existence of a strong
presumption that the child’s best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In
re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). However, we also presume that prompt and permanent
placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.307(a).
In determining whether a parent is willing and able to provide the child with a safe
environment, we consider the factors set forth in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code. 2
2
These factors include:
(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-
home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child;
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention
by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home;
(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child [or] the
child’s parents . . . ; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s
family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance
abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the
perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family
to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an
appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to
effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether
the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills . . . ; and (13) whether an adequate social
support system . . . is available to the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
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See id. § 263.307(b). We also consider the Holley factors. 3 See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,
371–72 (Tex. 1976). These factors are not exhaustive. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).
“The absence of evidence about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from
reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest,
particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of
the child.” Id. In analyzing these factors, we must focus on the best interest of the child, not the
best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).
Evidence that proves one or more statutory ground for termination may also constitute
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (holding
same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1) grounds and best interest, but such
evidence does not relieve the State of its burden to prove best interest). “A best-interest analysis
may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well
as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet.
denied). “A trier of fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct and determine
whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” Id.In determining the best interest of a child, two factors the trial court considers are “whether
there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access
to the child’s home; [and] . . . whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family
or others who have access to the child’s home[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.307(b)(7), (8).
3
These factors include: (1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s present and future emotional and physical needs; (3) any
present or future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking
custody; (5) the programs available to assist the individuals seeking custody to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the
plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(8) the parent’s acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and
(9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also In
re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 n.9 (Tex. 2013).
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“[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the child.” In re J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). “A factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-
being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent.” In re D.M.,
452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
Here, the children came into the Department’s care due to concerns of Mother’s illegal
drug use and concerns of domestic violence in the home. Mother was arrested and charged with
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. The Department attempted to leave
the children with the parents while the family participated in family-based services. However,
Father did not engage in family-based services and was arrested in May 2022 for aggravated
assault against a member of Mother’s family. The children were present during each parent’s
arrest. See In re S.L.W., No. 04-22-00425-CV, 2023 WL 28451, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Jan. 4, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (alteration omitted) (“A parent’s criminal activities and
history are relevant to a best-interest analysis.”). Father was on federal probation when he was
arrested for aggravated assault, and he was incarcerated to serve out the remainder of his federal
sentence following his arrest. Mother’s criminal charge is still pending, and she was arrested again
in May 2023 for failure to appear in court.
A. Father
To address the concerns that led to removal, the Department created a service plan for
Father. According to his service plan, Father was required to show proof of stable housing and
employment, complete a drug assessment and follow all recommendations, pass random drug tests,
participate in individual counseling, complete a psychological evaluation and follow all
recommendations, and participate in and complete parenting classes and classes on domestic
violence for offenders. Tilisa Fields, the Department’s caseworker, testified she went over the
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service plan with Father, Father understood what his services required, and Father signed the plan.
Father told Fields he did not agree with some of the services.
Father was incarcerated from May 2022 to March 2023, serving the remainder of his
federal sentence following the domestic violence incident where he was charged with aggravated
assault. “As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability
endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (citing In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)). “A parent’s lengthy absence from a child’s life during [the
child’s] early years due to incarceration creates an ‘emotional vacuum’ that threatens the child’s
emotional well-being and indicates that the parent-child relationship is not a proper one.” In re
J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted); see also In re J.J.O., No. 04-18-00425-CV, 2018 WL 5621881, at *2
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Criminal conduct, prior
convictions, and incarceration affect[] a parent’s life and his ability to parent, thereby subjecting
his child[ren] to potential emotional and physical danger.”). Father was unable to visit the children
and did not participate in his services while he was incarcerated.
Fields testified Father has not provided her with a paystub showing proof of stable
employment. Father told Fields that he works as a tattoo artist and cannot provide a paystub
because he is paid “under the table” in cash. Father testified that he has worked as a tattoo artist
for approximately sixteen years and started up again when he was released from prison in
March 2023. Father stated he earns approximately $850 per week.
The trial court heard contradicting testimony on whether Father has stable housing. Father
testified he lives with his mother. Fields, on the other hand, testified that Father has had three
different addresses in the five months since his release. According to Fields, Father’s most recent
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address is a motel. The trial court could have discredited Father’s testimony that he lives with his
mother and, instead, was entitled to believe Fields’s testimony that Father was currently living in
a motel and has not shown proof of stable housing since his release from prison. See
HealthTronics, Inc., 382 S.W.3d at 582 (holding the trial court in a bench trial is the sole judge of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony).
Father completed the drug assessment, and it was recommended that Father engage in
outpatient drug treatment. However, Father was discharged from outpatient drug treatment for
lack of engagement. Father submitted to the first drug test requested by the Department but has
not submitted to any other drug tests since. In a written order, the trial court ordered both parents
to submit to a drug test at the Bexar County courthouse on August 9, 2023. Father failed to appear
for this drug test because he claimed he did not have an identification card and did not think he
would be allowed to submit to the test without an identification card. See In re A.M.L., No. 04-
19-00422-CV, 2019 WL 6719028, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (“The trial court also could have reasonably inferred that [a parent’s] failure to appear
for drug testing indicated that [the parent] was avoiding testing because [the parent] was using
drugs.”).
Fields testified Father was unsuccessfully discharged from his first referral for individual
counseling; however, Fields and Father both testified that within the last month Father was actively
engaged with his second referral for individual counseling. Father testified he enjoys and believes
he is benefitting from the counseling sessions.
Father did not complete his parenting classes or his classes addressing domestic violence
for offenders. Exposure to domestic violence was one of the Department’s primary concerns when
it removed the children. Despite the children witnessing domestic violence between the parents,
Father told Fields he didn’t need to take the domestic violence classes and they wouldn’t make
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him a better parent. See In re L.M.W., No. 04-22-00577-CV, 2023 WL 2357706, at *7 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Mar. 6, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding unresolved domestic violence
between the parents supports a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interest). “A parent’s abusive or violent conduct can produce a home environment
that endangers a child’s well-being.” In re A.H., No. 04-15-00416-CV, 2015 WL 7565569, at *7
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Evidence of the parents’ history
of domestic violence supports the trial court’s best[-]interest[] findings.”). The trial court heard
testimony that domestic violence between the parents occurred in the children’s presence. See
J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (“[E]ndangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the
child.”); see also In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.) (holding exposure to domestic violence supports the trial court’s finding that termination is
in the child’s best interest even when the child is not the intended victim of the violence). The
trial court also heard testimony that Father assaulted a member of Mother’s family at the apartment
complex where the children were living. Further, Fields testified that Father would get angry and
become aggressive in his demeanor when she encouraged him to do the services he did not want
to do. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that Father’s refusal to address his domestic
violence and anger issues poses an emotional and physical danger to the children. See A.H.,
2015 WL 7565569, at *7.
Fields testified that Father only attended about half of his visits with the children. See In
re R.B., 200 S.W.3d 311, 316–17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (signifying a parent’s
missed visits serve as an example of acts or omissions indicating termination is in the children’s
best interests). Fields did not believe the children have bonded with Father, but she stated Father’s
relationship with the children has improved and they are now familiar with him. While Father was
appropriate during most of the visits, there was one incident where Father attempted to feed the
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children Cheetos early in the morning. When the Department suggested Father bring different
food for a visit that early, Father responded that “he didn’t need anyone to tell him how to take
care of his kids.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.307(b)(10), (12) (stating whether a parent
demonstrates adequate parenting skills and a parent’s willingness and ability to cooperate with and
facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision as best-interest factors considered by the trial
court).
Although Father had been out of prison since March 2023—five months before trial—he
did not reengage in counseling until the month before trial and did not take his psychological
evaluation until the day before trial. Father admitted that he only started some of his services the
week of trial. When pressed on why he delayed his services, Father stated: “I still got a personal
life on my side to deal with” and that he is trying to fit his services in his schedule. Father further
stated: “I’m fresh out [of prison]. It’s not going [to] happen overnight within a month, . . . I just
need time.” Based on this testimony, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Father
is unwilling to prioritize the needs of his children over his own desires, and that Father’s
unwillingness to timely engage in his services could reflect an unwillingness to timely attend to
the children’s needs. See id. § 263.307(b)(11) (stating “the willingness and ability of the child’s
family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time”
is a best-interest factor considered by the trial court).
Father asked the court to focus on his recent improvements rather than looking at his past
mistakes. While Father’s recent engagement in services is not without merit, “evidence of
improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value
of a long history of . . . irresponsible choices.” J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346. Accordingly, the trial
court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests.
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B. Mother
To address the concerns that led to removal, the Department also made a service plan for
Mother. According to her service plan, Mother was required to show proof of stable housing and
employment, complete a drug assessment and follow all recommendations, pass random drug tests,
participate in individual counseling, complete a psychological evaluation and follow all
recommendations, and participate in and complete parenting classes and classes on domestic
violence for victims. The trial court heard testimony that Mother has only successfully completed
her psychological evaluation and drug assessment.
“Evidence of a parent’s unstable lifestyle can . . . support a factfinder’s conclusion that
termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.). Fields testified Mother does not have stable housing or employment.
Mother conceded she does not have stable employment and has struggled to find a job, but she
claimed to have a home. However, the trial court could have disbelieved Mother’s testimony
regarding her home and found Fields’s testimony more credible. See In re E.A.M.V., No. 04-18-
00866-CV, 2019 WL 1923214, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 1, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (explaining a trial court could have disbelieved a parent’s testimony, and we defer to the
factfinder on witness credibility issues). While Mother testified that she wants her children back,
she stated: “I know that right now I’m not . . . stable for them.”
One of the primary concerns prompting the Department to remove the children was
Mother’s illegal substance abuse. See In re K.M., No. 04-08-00037-CV, 2008 WL 2923655, at *2
(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 30, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding a parent’s illegal
substance abuse “places her children in emotional and physical danger”). “Illicit drug use is
relevant to multiple Holley factors, including the children’s emotional and physical needs now and
in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, Mother’s
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parental abilities, the stability of Mother’s home, and the acts or omissions which may indicate an
improper parent-child relationship.” In re A.N., No. 04-19-00584-CV, 2020 WL 354773, at *3
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Mother completed her drug
assessment, and it was recommended that she engage in outpatient drug treatment. The trial court
heard testimony that Mother was in her third attempt at outpatient drug treatment, and she has not
successfully completed treatment despite starting eight months before trial. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 263.307(b)(11). Although Mother submitted three drug tests from her outpatient treatment,
Fields testified that Mother has never drug tested for the Department. See A.M.L., 2019 WL
6719028, at *4 (“The trial court also could have reasonably inferred that [a parent’s] failure to
appear for drug testing indicated that [the parent] was avoiding testing because [the parent] was
using drugs.”). As mentioned above, the trial court ordered both parents to take a drug test at the
Bexar County courthouse. Although Mother was at a status hearing the day she was ordered to
take her drug test, Mother failed to submit to this test because she claimed to have COVID-19.
Mother never made up the drug test.
When making a best interest determination, the trial court considers “the willingness and
ability of the [parent] to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with
and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 263.307(b)(10). At the time of trial, Mother had not completed individual counseling, parenting
classes, or her domestic violence classes. Mother’s minimal effort to engage in or complete her
services indicates an unwillingness to effect positive environmental and personal changes within
a reasonable period of time. See id. § 263.307(b)(11). Her unwillingness to engage in her domestic
violence classes is particularly significant considering the children’s prior exposure to domestic
violence. See id. § 263.307(b)(12)(E) (providing a best-interest factor is “whether the child’s
family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including providing the child . . . with . . .
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protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the violence may not be directed at the
child”).
The trial court also heard testimony that Mother still has a pending charge for possession
of illegal substances with the intent to deliver and she was incarcerated during the pendency of the
case for failure to appear in court. The trial court was permitted to “consider the instability that
results from incarceration in its best[-]interest analysis” and how such incarceration “can
negatively impact a child’s living environment and emotional well-being.” J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d at
56.
There was evidence indicating the children have a bond with Mother, that Mother deeply
cares for the children, Mother did not miss visits, and she attended medical appointments with the
children. However, the trial court could have nevertheless formed a firm belief or conviction that
termination was in the children’s best interests because of Mother’s unwillingness to engage in
services and address the issues that led to the children’s removal. See In re N.M.H., No. 04-18-
00264-CV, 2018 WL 3998598, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 22, 2018, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (affirming the trial court’s termination order even though the children had a bond with
Mother).
C. The Children
The children have been placed with the same foster family since September 12, 2022. Both
children have been diagnosed with autism and are currently engaged in speech therapy and
occupational therapy. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(1) (listing “the child’s age and
physical and mental vulnerabilities” as a factor to be considered by the trial court in determining
the child’s best interest). According to Fields, the foster parents are meeting all the children’s
medical needs. See S.D., 980 S.W.2d at 764 (holding it was in the children’s best interests to place
them “in a stable environment where they can receive proper care for their special needs”). Mother
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recognized the children are “good” and “comfortable” with their foster placement, have a bond
with the foster parents, and “are real close to them.”
In contrast, Fields testified she does not believe the parents have made the necessary
changes to address the Department’s concerns leading to removal. She further opined that she
does not believe either parent has shown they can take care of the physical and emotional needs of
the children or that they can provide a safe and stable environment for the children.
The trial court heard ample evidence that the children were removed because of concerns
with Mother’s illegal drug use and domestic violence between Father and Mother. The testimony
at trial showed that neither Father nor Mother had addressed these concerns and have made
minimal effort in their services. Having reviewed the record and considered all the evidence in
the appropriate light for each standard of review, we conclude the trial court could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights were in the
children’s best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108;
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; see also generally In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014)
(recognizing a reviewing court need not detail the evidence if affirming a termination judgment).
Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s
best-interest findings.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the
children.
Irene Rios, Justice
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