Noel Life v. County of El Paso, Texas ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
NOEL LIFE, § No. 08-23-00192-CV
Appellant, § Appeal from
v. § 41st Judicial District Court
COUNTY OF EL PASO, TEXAS, § of El Paso County, Texas
Appellee. § (TC# 2021DCV4345)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Noel Life appeals the trial court’s order granting Appellee County of El Paso,
Texas’s plea to the jurisdiction, denying her motions for summary judgment, and dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction. Because Life has not pleaded a cause of action for which the County’s
immunity has been waived, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2019 and 2020, Life complained to the County’s sheriff’s office that the owner of the
stables where she kept her horse was mistreating animals.1 She alleges that the sheriff’s office
ignored her reports, and the stable owner continued abusing animals, including her horse.
1
Though Life refers to the stable owner as “the assailant,” the County is the only named defendant in this suit.
On December 9, 2020, Life told the County’s sheriff’s office that the stable owner shot and
poisoned her horse. The animal welfare officer who responded believed the horse was colicky and
reported those concerns to a veterinarian, who then treated the horse for colic. Life was dissatisfied
with that veterinarian’s treatment and sought treatment from a second veterinarian, who informed
her that the horse would not survive.2 Life claims she verified through independent toxicology
testing that her horse tested positive for arsenic, which she says confirmed her complaints about
the stable owner and the animal welfare officer’s misdiagnosis.
Life asserted a claim against the County for $77,300, which the Commissioners’ Court
denied. She then sued the County in El Paso District Court, asserting various claims related to her
horse’s death, including various violations of state and federal laws and constitutional violations.
The County filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the County retained immunity because,
among other things, Life did not allege a waiver of immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act
(TTCA). The TTCA does not apply to intentional torts, and Life failed to provide the County with
requisite statutory notice. Life moved for summary judgment in several separate motions. The
court granted the County’s plea to the jurisdiction, denied Life’s motions for summary judgment,
and dismissed the suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Shortly thereafter, Life filed a motion to recuse the presiding judge based on her prior
employment with the El Paso County Attorney’s office and sought to vacate the dismissal order.
Life then appealed the dismissal.3
2
It is not clear from the record exactly when Life’s horse died; however, the record suggests a possible date of
December 9, 2020.
3
After filing her notice of appeal, Life also filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Answer: Opposition to Dismissal,
DWOP” with the trial court. To be clear, there is nothing in the record that suggests Life’s case was dismissed for
want of prosecution.
2
ANALYSIS
We understand Life’s argument on appeal to be that the trial court erred in granting the
County’s plea to the jurisdiction because the County does not have immunity for the various claims
she has asserted and that the dismissal order is void because of the presiding judge’s conflict of
interest. But because the County contends Life’s appellate brief is substantively defective and fails
to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure’s briefing requirements, we consider that
issue first.
A. Life has substantially complied with appellate briefing requirements.
The County argues Life inadequately briefed her appeal. Though Life proceeds pro se, she
is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney and required to comply with all applicable laws
and rules of procedure. In Interest of M.D.G., 527 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no
pet.); see also Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. 1978) (“Litigants who
represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be
given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel.”); Zavala v. Franco, 622 S.W.3d
612, 617–18 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (discussing standards for pro se litigants). To
present an issue for appellate review, a brief must, among other things, “state concisely and without
argument the facts pertinent to the issues or points presented”; “state concisely all issues or points
presented for review”; and “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (g), (i). The briefing
requirements are not satisfied by merely uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by
citations to legal authority. Jonson v. Duong, 642 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no
pet.). However, we construe briefs “liberally, but reasonably, . . . so that the right to appeal is not
3
lost by waiver.” Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732
(Tex. 2020).
Here, Life’s brief contains a statement of the case, issues presented, a statement of facts, a
summary of the argument, and an argument section which includes separate citations to legal
authorities. It is clear from her brief that she has attempted to comply with what Rule 38.1 requires.
Although Life does not strictly follow all of Rule 38.1’s requirements, the record is relatively
small, and the appeal is straight-forward: Life is contesting the County’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Thus, we exercise our discretion and address her complaints on appeal. See Fox v. Wardy, 318
S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) (citing Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am.
Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994)) (addressing merits of pro se litigant’s appeal
despite lack of record citations).
B. Life has not established the trial court erred in granting the County’s plea to the
jurisdiction.
Life appeals the trial court’s order granting the County’s plea to the jurisdiction and
dismissing her case for want of jurisdiction. The County maintains immunity because Life has not
pleaded a cause of action for which its immunity has been waived.
Governmental units, like the County, are immune from lawsuits except where the
Legislature expressly waives that immunity. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009).
Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Mission Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 636 (Tex. 2012). In a suit against a governmental entity, the
plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the
case. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We construe
pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378
(Tex. 2009). However, when a plaintiff’s pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of
4
jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without affording the plaintiff an opportunity
to amend her pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. We review a trial court’s denial of a plea to
the jurisdiction de novo. Id. at 226.
Here, Life alleges various negligent acts and intentional torts, and seeks monetary damages
from the County. We construe Life’s pleadings liberally; however, it is Life’s burden as the
plaintiff suing a governmental entity to establish a waiver of immunity. Id. She has not attempted
to do so. Even accepting all allegations as true and construing the pleadings liberally in Life’s
favor, she has not pleaded a cause of action for which the County’s immunity has been waived.
For example, the TTCA does waive immunity “subject to restrictions, in the following three areas:
‘use of publicly owned automobiles, premises defects, and injuries arising out of conditions or use
of property.’” Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Johnson, 572 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Tex. 2019) (quoting
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224). None of Life’s allegations suggest that her alleged injuries were the
result of the County’s operation of a motor vehicle, premises defects on the County’s property, or
the condition of tangible, personal or real property for which the County was responsible. And the
TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.057(2); Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 204 n.4 (Tex. 2020).
Thus, Life’s pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
at 227. Without a waiver of immunity, the County retains its immunity from suit, and the trial court
properly dismissed Life’s suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.4
Finally, Life argues the dismissal order is void because the trial court judge should have
recused herself based on a purported conflict of interest. Life takes issue with the fact that the
4
Because we agree that Life has not pleaded a cause of action for which the County’s immunity has been waived, we
do not reach whether Life provide the County with the requisite notice provision of the TTCA. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a); TEX. R. APP. P. § 47.1.
5
judge worked for the County Attorney’s office from October 1997 through December 2008 and
contends the judge thus has a conflict of interest that prevents her from rendering an unbiased
opinion in the case. However, Life filed a motion for recusal after the trial court dismissed the case
for want of jurisdiction, so there is no ruling on that motion in the record. A denial of a motion to
recuse may be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment for abuse of discretion. Scown v. City of
Alpine, 271 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.). However, here, there is no order
on her motion for us to review.5
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Life’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the County’s plea
to the jurisdiction and dismissing Life’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
LISA J. SOTO, Justice
February 28, 2024
Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
5
We also note that Life’s motion does not meet the formal or substantive requirements of Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 18a. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a (pertaining to recusal and disqualification of judges).
6