Carlos Alexander Castillo Crespo v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 18, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00903-CR
CARLOS ALEXANDER CASTILLO CRESPO, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 434th Judicial District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21-DCR-095018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Carlos Alexander Castillo Crespo of continuous
sexual abuse of a child and assessed punishment at imprisonment for 65 years. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b).1 In a single issue on appeal, appellant argues
that the jury’s exposure to a National Adoption Day event, in which the Children’s
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The trial court pronounced sentence that appellant was guilty of “continuous aggravated
sexual assault of a child,” but the State brought the error to the trial court’s attention, and the
sentence was corrected.
Advocacy Center participated, violated his right to a fair trial and improperly
influenced the jurors. We affirm the judgment as challenged on appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant met I.M. and I.M.’s mother in 2017.2 Appellant and I.M.’s mother
began dating, and appellant eventually moved in with I.M. and I.M.’s mother. In
2021, I.M.’s mother came home early from work and found appellant on top of
her daughter, I.M., in bed; both of them were clothed and there was a pillow in
between them. When I.M.’s mother attempted to confront appellant, he
immediately left, and she called the police. Appellant gave a custodial interview
after his arrest, during which he waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the
continuous sexual abuse of I.M., who was 13-years old at the time of trial. I.M.
testified that appellant sexually abused her on multiple occasions, beginning when
she was 8-years old.
Appellant was charged by indictment with continuous sexual abuse of I.M.
During opening statements, appellant’s attorney conceded that “the evidence is
very likely overwhelming of [appellant’s] guilt.” After the jury found appellant
guilty and during the punishment phase, appellant admitted to having “romantic”
feelings for I.M.; he further admitted to having sex with I.M. and acknowledged
that I.M. was in elementary school at the time. Appellant requested a mistrial
based on the jury’s exposure to the Adoption Day event, which the trial court
denied.
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To protect her identity, the complainant is referenced by using a pseudonym. See Tex.
Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8 cmt.;
McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
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II. ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the jury’s exposure to the Adoption
Day event, in which the Children’s Advocacy Center participated, violated his
right to a fair trial and improperly influenced the jurors.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
We review a trial court’s denial of a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See
Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. The ruling must
be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.“The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the essence of the Sixth
Amendment right to be tried by impartial, indifferent jurors whose verdict must be
based upon the evidence developed at trial.” Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 117
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Easley v. State, 424
S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When a defendant claims reversible error
based on external juror influence, as here, the defendant must show either actual or
inherent prejudice. See Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117. Appellant relies solely on the
latter—inherent prejudice—and does not argue actual prejudice.
To determine inherent prejudice, we look to whether “an unacceptable risk is
presented of impermissible factors coming into play.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.
560, 570 (1986). The test is whether there is a “reasonable probability that the
conduct or expression interfered with the jury’s verdict.” Howard, 941 S.W.2d at
117. Inherent prejudice “rarely occurs and is reserved for extreme situations.” Id.B. Analysis
Appellant asserts he was subject to inherent prejudice based on the jury’s
exposure to the Adoption Day event on the same floor of the courthouse as his
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trial.
During the guilt phase of trial, the trial court held a hearing outside the
presence of the jury on appellant’s motion for mistrial and continuance. In his
motion, appellant alleged that the jurors were exposed to a celebratory event—
including balloons, face-paintings, and refreshments—in the courthouse, which
allegedly prejudiced appellant and violated his right to a fair trial. See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. According to appellant, holding such a huge event, especially in a
location that the jurors were required to walk through, tainted the jury or at least
gave the impression that the court was not truly impartial but rather favored
complainants. Additionally, it was noted that the director of the Children’s
Advocacy Center was the first witness called at trial, and the Children’s Advocacy
Center had a booth at the event. This allegedly might have given the director
additional credibility in the jurors’ eyes.
The State argued that the Children’s Advocacy Center was only one of 13
organizations participating in the event. More importantly, the State argued there
was no prejudice to appellant in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt,
including appellant’s own confession and appellant’s counsel conceding to the
jury during his opening statement that it would likely find appellant guilty.
Although the trial court noted for the record there was a celebration for National
Adoption Day going on in the courthouse on the day of appellant’s trial, the trial
court denied appellant’s motion for mistrial and continuance.
There is no allegation that appellant’s trial was ever mentioned at the event,
and the circumstances in the present case are far less extreme than other cases in
which no inherent prejudice was found. See Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117(concluding that twenty uniformed officers appearing in court did not constitute
inherent prejudice); Parker v. State, 462 S.W.3d 559, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston
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[14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (concluding that 60-70 spectators all wearing purple in
the courtroom “to show support for the State and to make statements against family
violence” did not establish inherent prejudice).
We conclude that the record does not reveal an unacceptable risk of
impermissible factors affecting the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.
/s/ Charles A. Spain
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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