Ex Parte: Joseph Rodriguez v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§ No. 08-23-00154-CR
EX PARTE § Appeal from the
JOSEPH RODRIGUEZ, § 210th Judicial District Court
Appellant. § of El Paso County, Texas
§ (TC# 20220D00564)
CONCURRING OPINION
I agree with the denial of Rodriguez’s pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus but for
different reasons. As I construe his position, Rodriguez contends the statutes providing for 17-
year-olds to be prosecuted and convicted as adults are unconstitutional on their face and as applied
to him in that they cause (1) punishment as an adult upon conviction, and (2) pretrial confinement
in an adult facility rather than a juvenile facility. Before addressing the merits of Rodriguez’s
challenges, I would examine whether they are cognizable in the extraordinary procedural vehicle
through which he raises them. In general, the cognizability of a constitutional challenge to a statute
through a pretrial writ of habeas corpus turns on whether success would result in the defendant’s
immediate release.1
1
See Ex parte Couch, 629 S.W.3d 217, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (per curiam) (recognizing that a “pretrial writ
application is not appropriate when resolution of the question presented, even if resolved in favor of the applicant,
would not result in immediate release.”) (citing Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)); see
PUNISHMENT AS AN ADULT
To the extent Rodriguez bases his writ application on potential punishment in light of the
sentencing scheme resulting from prosecuting a 17-year-old as an adult, “[t]he constitutionality of
the sentencing statute will become an issue only if” Rodriguez “is found guilty . . . and
unconstitutionally sentenced, at which time he may raise his complaint on direct appeal.” Ex parte
Ragston, 402 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013), aff’d sub nom. Ragston
v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619–20
(discussing bringing issues via habeas corpus versus post-conviction appeals). Thus, if
Rodriguez’s present challenge regards his potential punishment as an adult if convicted, that as-
applied challenge is premature. See State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 919 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (holding that defendant’s as-applied challenge to the death penalty statute was
premature where he had neither been convicted or sentenced to death). Moreover, any challenge
to the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme is not cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas
corpus. For “even if resolved in the defendant’s favor, [the question presented] would not result in
[his] immediate release.” Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Accordingly, I would affirm the denial of his writ application and refrain from addressing the
merits of Rodriguez’s purported challenge to the statutory sentencing scheme in the appeal before
us.
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN AN ADULT FACILITY
To the extent Rodriguez bases his writ application on his pretrial detention in an adult
facility, I understand it as a constitutional challenge to his conditions of confinement. Rodriguez
also Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Except when double jeopardy is involved, pretrial
habeas is not available when the question presented, even if resolved in the defendant’s favor, would not result in
immediate release.”).
2
has not cited any cases for the proposition that being detained in an adult facility as a 17-year-old
prior to trial violates the Eighth Amendment. Nor am I aware of any.
A violation of one’s Eighth Amendment rights in terms of conditions of confinement
requires proof that a person is being deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).2 In his briefing, Rodriguez asserts he is
“locked up with adult criminals for an offense alleged to have occurred when he was a child” while
awaiting trial and deprived of “the opportunities for rehabilitation and protections available in the
juvenile system,” thereby raising the possibility that he will be too “hardened” to be rehabilitated
if he has to remain in the adult system much longer. Even if Rodriguez is correct that an adult
facility deprives 17-year-olds of more appropriate rehabilitative options and protections offered in
the juvenile system, what we must assess is whether this constitutes an Eighth Amendment
violation. And Rodriguez has not shown how the conditions of his confinement rise to such a level.
Accordingly, I would uphold the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s application for a
pretrial writ of habeas corpus.
LISA J. SOTO, Justice
April 22, 2024
Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
Soto, J., concurring
(Do Not Publish)
2
For example, to prove a claim of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment in the “prison-conditions”
context, an incarcerated person must demonstrate that: (1) the deprivation alleged was “sufficiently serious”; and (2)
the prison official’s conduct constituted an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834, (1994). Thus, an Eighth Amendment violation may occur when a prison official acts in “wanton disregard”
for an inmate’s welfare in depriving them of a fundamental need, such as food, warmth, exercise or medical care.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104 (1976) (recognizing that an Eighth
Amendment violation may be premised upon a deliberate indifference to an inmate’s “serious medical needs”).
3