Michele Warner v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 25, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-23-00176-CR
MICHELE WARNER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 183rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1725517
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises out of a traffic stop and the warrantless search of a
passenger’s purse. The passenger moved to suppress the evidence discovered in that
search, but the trial court denied her motion, implicitly finding that the search was
not unreasonable. We uphold the trial court’s ruling because the record supports an
implied finding that the search was conducted as an incident of the passenger’s
lawful arrest.
BACKGROUND
An officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle after witnessing the vehicle
commit several moving violations. The vehicle contained two people: appellant was
the passenger, and her friend was the driver. Both individuals claimed that appellant
was the owner of the vehicle, but neither supplied the officer with any proof of
registration. They supplied their identification instead, and upon processing that
identification, the officer discovered that appellant had an outstanding warrant for
her arrest.
The officer asked appellant to step out of the vehicle, and when she did, he
placed her in handcuffs and advised her about the outstanding warrant. However, he
did not formally arrest appellant because he was still waiting on confirmation of the
warrant. In the meantime, the officer escorted appellant to the backseat of his patrol
car and he detained her there.
The officer then returned to the passenger side of the vehicle, where he found
two purses on the floorboard near the place where appellant had previously been
seated. The officer asked the driver to whom the purses belonged, and the driver
(who is male) said that they belonged to appellant. The officer then removed the
purses and placed them on the trunk of the vehicle. At the time of the removal, the
officer did not suspect that the purses contained evidence of a crime, but he planned
to search them as an incident of appellant’s arrest.
Before searching the purses, the officer returned to the driver and requested
his consent to search the vehicle. When the driver responded that the vehicle did not
belong to him, the officer repeated his request. The driver gave the same response
as before, which prompted the officer to make his request for a third time, while
stressing that his request was simply calling for a yes or no answer. On that last
request, the driver affirmatively gave the officer his consent to search the vehicle.
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Before searching anything, the officer returned to appellant and informed her
that the driver had given his consent to search the vehicle. Appellant did not object
to a search or to the driver giving his third-party consent. Instead, appellant told the
officer about the existence of a sunflower bag, which she claimed was not her own,
even though it was within a purse belonging to her.
The officer then searched appellant’s purses, one of which contained the
sunflower bag, and inside that bag he found methamphetamine. The officer also
searched the vehicle, but after finding no contraband there, he released the vehicle
to the driver.
Appellant was then charged with possession of the methamphetamine, which
she moved to suppress. After an evidentiary hearing, in which only the officer
testified, the trial court denied appellant’s motion. Appellant then pleaded guilty to
the charged offense, and the trial court sentenced her to time already served.
ANALYSIS
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecution defended the
warrantless search with three separate legal theories. The first theory was that the
driver had given his third-party consent. The second theory was that discovery of the
methamphetamine was inevitable. And the third theory was that the search was
conducted as an incident of appellant’s arrest.
When making its ruling denying the motion to suppress, the trial court did not
indicate which theory or theories it had credited. Nor did it sign any findings of fact
or conclusions of law. In the absence of such findings or conclusions, appellant
challenges all three legal theories in her sole complaint on appeal. We only address
the third theory because it fully supports the trial court’s ruling. See Tex. R. App. P.
47.1.
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We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard. See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, as
well as to its resolution of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation
of credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo purely legal questions and mixed
questions of law and fact not turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Id. Also, when, as in this case, the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact
in ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of
fact supported by the record. Id.The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable” searches
and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches are generally
regarded as unreasonable, subject to notable exceptions, such as searches incident to
arrest. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
There are two types of searches incident to arrest. See Price v. State, 662
S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973)). The first is a search made of the person, or of property “immediately
associated with the person of the arrestee.” Id. These searches are “unqualified” and
“are always justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, upon no more justification than the arrest itself.” Id. The second is a
search made of the area within the control of the arrestee. Id. These types of searches
are not unqualified, and before a warrantless search may be conducted of such areas,
an arresting officer may be required to show that he had reason to believe that the
arrestee could possibly gain access within that area to a weapon or other evidence.
Id.4
The facts of this case implicate the first type of a search incident to arrest. The
officer searched a purse, which has long been treated under our law as an object
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee. See Stewart v. State, 611
S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“In the instant case, we believe that the
search of the purse is better characterized as a search of items immediately associated
with the person of the appellant.”); Martin v. State, 565 S.W.3d 814, 822 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Thus, a search incident to arrest may
include the arrestee’s purse.”). The officer also had ample reason to believe that the
purse belonged to appellant: he found the purse on the front-passenger floorboard
where appellant had previously been seated; the driver, who is male, identified the
purse as belonging to appellant, the only female occupant in the vehicle; and
appellant referenced the purse when she disclaimed ownership of the sunflower bag
within it. Because the purse belonged to appellant, a lawful arrestee, the officer’s
search of it was reasonable, even though the purse was not physically attached to
appellant at the time of the search. See Carrasco v. State, 712 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (“The object need not be physically attached to the arrestee.”);
e.g., Curry v. State, 831 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
pet. ref’d) (upholding an officer’s warrantless search of a brown paper bag that the
arrestee dropped while fleeing from police).
Appellant suggests that the search was invalid because she had merely been
detained, not arrested. But there was affirmative testimony from the officer that, at
the time of the search, he had already received confirmation of the warrant, which is
what he had sought to effectuate the formal arrest. In any event, if an officer has
probable cause to arrest, as the officer here did, then a search incident to arrest is
valid if conducted immediately before or after a formal arrest. See State v. Ford, 537
S.W.3d 19, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“If an officer has probable cause to arrest, a
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search incident to arrest is valid if conducted immediately before or after a formal
arrest.”).
Appellant also argues that the search was invalid because she was handcuffed
and safely secured in the backseat of the patrol car, meaning she was beyond the
reach of her purse, and therefore, she could not access any weapons or evidence it
might contain. Appellant invokes Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) and
Marcopoulos v. State, 548 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.
ref’d), but both of those cases dealt with searches of the broader area of the arrestee’s
control—in particular, the inside of a motor vehicle. Those searches accordingly
implicated the second type of a search incident to arrest. Because appellant’s case,
by contrast, implicates the first type—concerning objects immediately associated
with the person of the arrestee—we conclude that Gant and Marcopoulos do not
apply here. See State v. Drury, 560 S.W.3d 752, 756–59 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2018, pet. ref’d) (concluding that Gant did not support the suppression of evidence
discovered from the warrantless search of an object immediately associated with an
arrestee’s person).
Based on the foregoing, we need not address appellant’s arguments
concerning the driver’s third-party consent or whether the discovery of the
methamphetamine was inevitable.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Zimmerer and Wilson.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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