Dinesh B. Patel v. Patel & Patel, CPA Narendra Patel And Nilakumari Patel ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 25, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00769-CV
DINESH B. PATEL, Appellant
V.
PATEL & PATEL, CPA; NARENDRA PATEL; AND NILAKUMARI
PATEL, Appellees
On Appeal from the 368th District Court
Williamson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22-0865-C368
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Dinesh B. Patel appeals an order granting traditional and no-
evidence summary judgment in favor of Appellees Narendra Patel, Nilakumari Patel,
and Patel & Patel, CPA.1 We affirm.
1
The Supreme Court of Texas transferred this case from the Third Court of Appeals. See
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. In cases transferred by the high court from one court of appeals
to another, the transferee court must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the
transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court’s decision otherwise would
BACKGROUND
This case began in October 2017 when Bhanukant R. Patel2 sued Appellant
asserting claims related to Falcon Hospitality, Inc., a close corporation the two had
formed to pursue a hotel business venture. Bhanukant (the minority shareholder)
alleged that Appellant (the majority shareholder) had deprived Bhanukant of his fair
share in the hotel business and the corporation. In December 2017, Appellant
countersued Bhanukant, alleging claims related to the hotel business. Additionally,
Appellant alleged that (1) he and Bhanukant had entered into an equal partnership
and owned “a 50% pro rata interest in” real property located at a shopping center in
Corpus Christi; (2) he recently found out that Bhanukant had sold some or all of the
real property without Appellant’s knowledge; and (3) Bhanukant had failed to
distribute 50% of the proceeds to Appellant and had distributed some of the proceeds
to Appellees.
In November 2018, Appellant filed “Defendant’s First Amended Answer,
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims, and Third Party Petition”.3 In this petition,
Appellant asserted (1) several affirmative defenses; (2) several counterclaims
against Bhanukant; and (3) third party claims against Appellees for breach of
fiduciary duty, quantum meruit, violations of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (TUFTA), conspiracy, and money had and received. Appellant sought, among
other things, damages, “forfeiture and disgorgement of [Appellees’] ill-gotten gains,
and accounting, and turnover of the [real property] transactions and disposition of
have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
2
Bhanukant is not a party to this appeal.
3
In this pleading, Appellant named (in addition to Appellees) three other entities as third
party defendants. However, these entities are neither parties to this appeal nor relevant to the
disposition of this appeal. Thus, to not unnecessarily complicate things, we refrain from naming
them in our discussions of pleadings, motions, and the trial court’s order granting traditional and
no-evidence summary judgment.
2
assets.” He additionally sought declaratory relief relating to the claims asserted
against Bhanukant and Appellees.
Appellees filed an answer in February 2019, asserting (1) a general denial; (2)
“affirmative defenses of estoppel, failure of consideration, laches, release, statute of
limitations, waiver and failure to mitigate”; and (3) a counterclaim for attorney’s
fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 37.009 for
defending against Appellant’s request for declaratory relief.
In March 2022, Appellees and Bhanukant jointly filed a “Traditional and No
Evidence Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against” Appellant. Appellees
asserted they were entitled to a traditional summary judgment on all of Appellant’s
claims because (1) he knew of his claims no later than 1994 so that the applicable
statute of limitations has barred each of his claims; and (2) he admitted he cannot
show he has been damaged by Appellees’ conduct.
Appellees further contended they were entitled to a no-evidence summary
judgment because Appellant has no evidence (1) that “any party owed him a
fiduciary duty and has no evidence that anyone breached any fiduciary duty to him,
and there is no evidence of causation or damages related to this claim”; (2) “of any
element of quantum meruit”; (3) “of any element of a TUFTA claim”; (4) “of two
or more persons having a meeting of the minds, any unlawful act (an underlying
tort), or damages”; and (5) that Appellees “hold[] money which in equity and good
conscience belongs to him.” Appellees also moved for a no-evidence summary
judgment on Appellant’s asserted affirmative defenses, claiming there is no evidence
of one or more elements of each of Appellant’s defenses.
On April 8, 2022, Appellant filed “Defendant’s First Supplement to
3
Counterclaim and Third Party Claim” to “plead[] the discovery rule.”4 That same
day, he filed a response to Appellees’ and Bhanukant’s joint motion for traditional
and no-evidence summary judgment which mainly consisted of argument
unsupported by authorities and evidence. With regard to Appellees’ no-evidence
motion, Appellant only claimed that (1) his declaration raised a fact issue “on the
existence of a partnership between himself and Bhanukant;” (2) “[e]stablishment of
a partnership, and the associated fiduciary duties that go along with it (or at a
minimum a fact issue regarding the same), disposes of the majority of the motion for
summary judgment;” and (3) the agreement to create a partnership gives rise to a
breach of fiduciary duty claim and the no-evidence motion on that claim must be
denied. Appellant failed to address all the elements of his breach of fiduciary duty
claim that Appellees challenged in their no-evidence motion. Further, Appellant did
not address any other claims the movants attacked on no-evidence grounds — he
neither addressed the challenged elements nor did he point to any evidence in support
of the challenged elements.
With regard to Appellees’ traditional summary judgment motion, Appellant
argued that limitations cannot be a basis for granting Appellees’ traditional summary
judgment because (1) pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section
16.069, “even if the claim is otherwise barred by limitations[,] it is considered timely
if brought within thirty days from the date the answer was required” and there is at
least a fact issue “that the counterclaim arises out of the same transactions and
occurrences as in [sic] the Plaintiff’s claim”; and (2) “the grounds presented as
4
Later that same day, Appellees filed a supplemental counterclaim stating that Appellant’s
“cause of action against them is groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. Third Party
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs seek recovery of their costs and reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees through trial and an appeal.” On April 20, 2022, Appellees nonsuited this
counterclaim.
4
evidence that [Appellant] knew or should have known of a cause of action — which
is actually the only basis for the traditional motion on limitations grounds — are
frivolous.” Appellant did not point to any evidence to support his arguments.
Appellant further contended that lack of damages cannot be a basis for
traditional summary judgment because (1) Appellees incorrectly claimed he
“admitted he has no damages”; and (2) he “testified in his deposition very clearly
that his damage claim was based on Bhanukant selling the joint venture asset without
his knowledge and kept all the money.” Appellant also contended that Appellees
improperly moved for traditional summary judgment on his affirmative defenses
because (1) “[a] party is not required to present evidence on its affirmative defenses
before the Plaintiff has even put on a shred of proof”; (2) “[t]he defenses are
irrelevant if there’s no proof”; and (3) “an affirmative defense could be submitted to
the jury based entirely on cross examination of the plaintiff, who has yet to testify.”
Appellant cited no authority or evidence in support of his contentions.
A few days later, Appellees and Bhanukant filed a reply to Appellant’s
response. On April 18, 2022, the trial court signed an order stating that Bhanukant’s
and Appellees’ “Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment shall be GRANTED and that [Appellant] shall take nothing on all of his
claims against those defendants. Summary judgment is further GRANTED on
[Appellant]’s affirmative defenses . . . .”
On April 20, 2022, Appellees filed a “Motion for Attorney’s Fees and
Severance” stating that (1) they “would show that the only remaining cause of action
in this lawsuit with regard to the three parties between said parties is the request by”
Appellees for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 37.009; (2) they “would show that they are entitled to
recover their costs and attorney’s fees in defending the lawsuit asserted against them
5
by” Appellant; and (3) once the trial court exercises its discretion in determining
whether or not to award costs and attorney’s fees, “the only remaining cause of
action in this lawsuit is Bhanukant’s [] cause of action against” Appellant and that
“action is a complete cause of action in and of itself and can and should stand alone
as a separate lawsuit pertaining to a dispute between Bhanukant” and Appellant.
Appellees requested the trial court award them attorney’s fees and costs, sever the
remaining claims between Bhanukant and Appellant as asserted in Bhanukant’s First
Amended Original Petition, and make these remaining claims the subject of a
separate suit with its own docket number.
The trial court held a hearing on Appellees’ motion on June 2, 2022. The trial
court signed an order awarding attorney’s fees to Appellees pursuant to section
37.009 on June 21, 2022. That same day, the trial court also signed an order granting
severance and stating that (1) “all claims and defenses by and between [Appellant]
and [Appellees] are severed into a new lawsuit” and assigned a new cause number;
(2) “[b]y this severance order, all claims and defenses between [Appellant and
Appellees] will have been disposed, and all relief not expressly granted as between
these four parties (only) is denied”; and (3) “[b]y this Order, the Order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of [Appellees] and the Order on their motion for
attorney’s fees will be final and appealable.”
Appellant filed a timely appeal.
ANALYSIS
Appellant presents three issues on appeal which we address below.5
5
Although Appellant lists four issues in his analysis section, he only presents three issues
because what he designates as issue one is merely a recitation of the moving party’s burden when
moving for traditional summary judgment and the standard of review for traditional summary
judgment.
6
I. Summary Judgment
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting (1)
traditional summary judgment based on limitations because Appellees “were in a
fiduciary position and did not negate the discovery rule”; (2) traditional summary
judgment based on a lack of damages because Appellant “did not admit he was not
damaged and presented substantial evidence of damages resulting from receiving no
proceeds, not even his initial investment, from the sale of the joint venture property”;
and (3) no-evidence summary judgment because Appellant “presented substantial
evidence, far more than a scintilla, on each of his causes of action against” Appellees.
A. Standard of Review
We review grants of summary judgment de novo. JLB Builders, L.L.C. v.
Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021); First United Pentecostal Church of
Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Tex. 2017). In conducting our review,
we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable
inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s
favor. Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 219; Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d
656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Our review is limited to the issues presented to the trial court
because “[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer
or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 676 (Tex. 1979).
When the trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the
basis for the ruling, we must affirm if any of the grounds presented are meritorious.
W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). If an appellant does not
challenge every possible ground for summary judgment, we will uphold the
summary judgment on any of the unchallenged grounds. Durham v. Accardi, 587
7
S.W.3d 179, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Agarwal v.
Villavaso, No. 03-16-00800-CV, 2017 WL 3044545, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July
13, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Quick v. Greenblum, No. 03-13-00213-CV,
2013 WL 10924665, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.
op.).
When a party moves for both traditional and no-evidence summary
judgments, we consider the no-evidence motion first because if the non-movant did
not produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged
elements, a no-evidence summary judgment is proper and there is no need to address
the challenge to the traditional motion because it necessarily fails. Parker, 514
S.W.3d at 219; Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013);
Childress v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-19-00284-CV, 2020 WL 5099773, at *4
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we first review
each claim under the no-evidence standard and any claims that survive our no-
evidence review will be reviewed under the traditional standard. See Parker, 514
S.W.3d at 219; Childress, 2020 WL 5099773, at *4.
In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant asserts that there
is no evidence of one or more essential elements of the claim or defense for which
the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial. Kamas v. Bay Mountain Fund I,
LLC, No. 14-22-00612-CV, 2023 WL 8196276, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Nov. 28, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of
material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. Kamas, 2023 WL 8196276,
at *4; see also Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006).
We sustain a no-evidence challenge when (a) there is a complete absence of
evidence of a vital fact, (b) the trial court is barred by rules of law or of evidence
8
from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence
conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248;
Ross Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 612 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, no pet.). Evidence is more than a scintilla if it rises to a level that would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merriman, 407
S.W.3d at 248; Kamas, 2023 WL 8196276, at *4. If the evidence does no more than
create a mere surmise or suspicion and is so slight as to necessarily make any
inference a guess, it is no evidence. Ross Stores, Inc., 612 S.W.3d at 688.
A party moving for traditional summary judgment meets its burden by proving
there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 220. A defendant moving for
summary judgment must disprove at least one of the essential elements of each of
the plaintiff’s causes of action or conclusively establish all the elements of an
affirmative defense. Ayanbadejo v. Settles, No. 14-22-00204-CV, 2023 WL
6451185, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem.
op.). A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as to
the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 816 (Tex. 2005); Ayanbadejo, 2023 WL 6451185, at *2.
B. Application
We begin by considering whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees’
no-evidence summary judgment motion. Appellees moved for no-evidence
summary judgment on all of the claims Appellant asserted against them — breach
of fiduciary duty, quantum meruit, violations of the TUFTA, conspiracy, and money
had and received — challenging one or more elements of each claim. However,
Appellant in his summary judgment response did not address any of these claims he
9
asserted against Appellees. Instead, he only argued that (1) his attached declaration
raised a fact issue “on the existence of a partnership between himself and
Bhanukant;” (2) “[e]stablishment of a partnership, and the associated fiduciary
duties that go along with it (or at a minimum a fact issue regarding the same),
disposes of the majority of the motion for summary judgment;” and (3) the
agreement to create a partnership gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim and
the no-evidence motion on that claim must be denied.
Because Appellant did not address any claims Appellees attacked on no-
evidence grounds — he neither presented argument regarding the challenged
elements nor did he point to any evidence in support of the challenged elements, we
conclude the trial court did not err in granting Appellees’ no-evidence summary
judgment motion. See Childress, 2020 WL 5099773, at *7 (quoting Burns v.
Canales, No. 14-04-00786-CV, 2006 WL 461518, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)) (finding that trial court did not
err in granting no-evidence summary judgment because nonmovant did not meet his
burden to file a written response that raises issues preventing summary judgment
when he “did not present understandable argument as to how there was a genuine
issue of material fact, nor did he point to evidence or authority to support any such
argument”).
Additionally, Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s grant of no-evidence
summary judgment consists of the following conclusory statements in his appellate
brief:
Dinesh presented substantial evidence, far more than a scintilla, on
each of his causes of action against the Third Party Defendants
Dinesh’s claims against the Third Party Defendants included breach of
fiduciary duty and assisting (i.e., aiding and abetting) breach of
Bhanukhant’s fiduciary duty. In his declaration Dinesh described the
10
basis for the fiduciary duty claim. The CPAs were his wife’s brother
and sister. For decades he relied on them completely for all of his
financial affairs. Clearly there was evidence on each element of the
fiduciary duty claim against the Third Party Defendants.
Although Appellant seems to assert, without citing any authority, that Appellees
owed him a fiduciary duty (and assuming for the sake of argument that Appellees,
in fact, owed him a fiduciary duty), he does not explain how Appellees breached any
alleged fiduciary duty and how any breach caused him damages.6 Appellees argued
in their no-evidence motion with regard to Appellant’s breach of fiduciary duty
claim that he “has no evidence any party owed him a fiduciary duty and has no
evidence that anyone breached any duty to him, and there is no evidence of causation
or damages related to this claim.” On appeal, an “appellant must demonstrate that
each and every ground alleged in the motion and asserted to the trial court in support
of summary judgment was insufficient to support the ruling.” Quick, 2013 WL
10924665, at *2. Here, Appellant failed to do so.
Further, Appellant fails to challenge the grant of summary judgment on his
remaining claims: quantum meruit, violations of the TUFTA, conspiracy, and
money had and received. But “the appellant must show that none of the grounds
asserted in the motion will support summary judgment; if the appellant fails to
challenge each ground for summary judgment that was advanced in the trial court,
we will affirm the summary judgment on the basis of the unchallenged ground.” Id.;
see also Agarwal, 2017 WL 3044545, at *3 (“if an appellant does not challenge
every possible ground for summary judgment, we will uphold the summary
judgment on the unchallenged grounds”); Young v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
No. 03-15-00261-CV, 2016 WL 4091294, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2016,
6
“Generally, the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty are (1) the existence of a
fiduciary duty, (2) breach of the duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages.” Parker, 514 S.W.3d at
220.
11
pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (same).
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting Appellees’ no-
evidence summary judgment motion, and we overrule Appellant’s first issue.7
II. Attorney’s Fees
In his second and third issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees in favor of Appellees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code section 37.009.
A. Governing Law
The Declaratory Judgments Act provides that in any proceeding under the Act
“the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are
equitable and just.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009; Yowell v. Granite
Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020). “The plain language of the Act
authorizes courts to award equitable and just fees in any proceeding under the Act;
it does not require the trial court to consider or render judgment on the merits of that
claim.” Yowell, 620 S.W.3d at 355 (emphasis in original); see also Bocquet v.
Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998) (“the Declaratory Judgments Act entrusts
attorney fee awards to the trial court’s sound discretion”). Under section 37.009, a
trial court may exercise its discretion to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party,
the nonprevailing party, or neither. Feldman v. KPMG LLP, 438 S.W.3d 678, 685
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Barshop v. Medina Cnty.
Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637 (Tex. 1996) (“the
award of attorney’s fees in declaratory judgment actions is clearly within the trial
court’s discretion and is not dependent on a finding that a party ‘substantially
7
We need not address Appellant’s contentions regarding the trial court’s grant of
traditional summary judgment. See Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 219; Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248;
Childress, 2020 WL 5099773, at *4.
12
prevailed’”).
B. Declaratory Judgment Claim Pleaded against Appellees
In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erroneously awarded
attorney’s fees to Appellees pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
section 37.009 because he only “requested declaratory judgment against
Bhanukhant” and “there was never a declaratory judgment claim by or against the
appellees, and thus no basis to award fees.” Appellant contends that Appellees were
not shareholders in Falcon Hospitality, Inc. or partners in the Corpus Christi real
property joint venture so that “[n]othing about the declaratory judgment claim has
ever impacted them in any manner.”
In his live pleading, Appellant alleged that Bhanukant had (1) sold some or
all of the Corpus Christi joint venture real property without Appellant’s knowledge,
(2) failed to distribute 50% of the proceeds to Appellant, and (3) distributed some of
the proceeds to Appellees. He asserted some claims against Bhanukant only, some
against Appellees only, and some against both Appellees and Bhanukant. He also
under the heading “Declaratory Action” stated as follows:
Pursuant to Section 37.004 of the TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND
REMEDIES CODE, Defendant seeks a declaratory judgment that (1)
his management of Falcon was within the business judgment rule; (2)
Defendant breached no duties to Plaintiff; (3) Defendant is an owner of
and entitled to his pro-rata share of the profits and proceeds with respect
to the JV, including but not limited to that from the possession and
disposition of the JV’s assets; (4) Defendant is entitled to an
accounting; (5) Defendant’s ownership in the JV entitles Defendant to
recover from Plaintiff his pro-rata share of all profits realized from the
JV and all associated interest upon such profits; (6) Pursuant to TEX.
R. CIV. P. 91a, Plaintiff has no claim or cause of action for oppression
of minority rights under Texas law regarding FHI; and (7) Plaintiff’s
incurring of and acknowledged debt to Defendant regarding the
transfers entitles Defendant to recover from Plaintiff the full amount of
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such transfers and all associated interest upon the such amounts.
Additionally, pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE Chapter
37, Defendant requests that the Court grant his reasonable and
necessary attorney fees and costs.
Considering the claims Appellant specifically pleaded against Appellees and that he
asked for an accounting and for Appellees to return proceeds from the real property
sale they allegedly had received from Bhanukant, Appellant’s requested declaratory
relief affected not just Bhanukant but Appellees as well.
With regard to the requested relief under number 3, Appellant asked for a
declaration that he “is an owner of and entitled to his pro-rata share of the profits
and proceeds with respect to the J[oint] V[enture], including but not limited to that
from the possession and disposition of the J[oint] V[enture]’s assets.” Because
Appellant asserted in his pleading that Appellees received some or all of the proceeds
from the sale of the real property, such a declaration would affect Appellees’
interests. Additionally, Appellant in his pleading demanded an accounting from
Appellees. Thus, the requested relief under number 4 — asking the court to declare
that he “is entitled to an accounting” — would affect Appellees.
Therefore, we disagree with Appellant that the trial court erroneously awarded
Appellees attorney’s fees under section 37.009 because he only “requested
declaratory judgment against Bhanukhant” and “there was never a declaratory
judgment claim by or against the appellees, and thus no basis to award fees.”
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
C. Abuse of Discretion
In his third issue, Appellant argues that “[e]ven if the Declaratory Judgments
Act could provide a basis for recovery of fees, it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to award fees to Appellees based on their gross misconduct as fiduciaries
of Appellant.” In that regard, Appellant contends he presented evidence at the
14
hearing on Appellees’ motion for attorney’s fees that established the following
“inequitable conduct on the part of” Appellees: “they made false statements in a
declaration, abruptly terminated a decades-long personal and professional
relationship with appellant, concealed information about the joint venture properties,
received proceeds from the joint venture properties from their brother Bhanukhant,
and refused to provide information related to Falcon.”
However, Appellant fails to support his argument with appropriate citations
to the record and authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring that an
appellant’s “brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions
made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). He further fails
to explain (applying the applicable standard of review) why the trial court’s
attorney’s fees award was an abuse of discretion when the court already rejected all
of Appellant’s claims against Appellees, including breach of fiduciary duty, by
granting Appellees’ summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Hassan.
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