Nikolas Zane Goodson v. State ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-18-00018-CV
NO. 09-18-00019-CV
NO. 09-18-00020-CV
NO. 09-18-00021-CV
NO. 09-18-00022-CV
____________________
NIKOLAS ZANE GOODSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 17-30377, 17-30378, 17-30379, 17-30380, & 17-30381
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Nikolas Zane Goodson appeals from orders denying his petitions
for an order of nondisclosure in five causes under the pre-2015 version of section
411.081 of the Government Code. See Act of May 25, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch.
1146, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2792, 2792-93 (amended 2015) (current version at
Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.0725). We affirm.
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Procedural Background
On November 3, 2014, after Goodson entered guilty pleas, the County Court
at Law No. 4 in Montgomery County (the trial court) entered Orders of Deferred
Adjudication for Goodson in cause number 14-299576 on one count of evading
arrest, and in cause numbers 14-299577 and 14-299575 on two counts of burglary
of a vehicle. In each case, the trial court deferred adjudication, ordered community
supervision for a period of fifteen months, and a fine of $500 in each case. The trial
court entered an order in each matter. The trial court dismissed the charge of criminal
trespass in cause number 14-299414, and dismissed the charge of failure to identify
or giving false information in cause number 14-299578. The documents in the
appellate record include the orders of dismissal and a “Motion to Dismiss” signed
by the Assistant District Attorney for Montgomery County. The dismissal orders are
signed by the trial court. Both Motions to Dismiss include the following statement
“The Defendant was convicted in another case. 14-299575[.]” The Orders state:
The foregoing motion having been presented to me on this the
3[rd] day of Nov[.], A.D. 2014 and the same having been considered,
it is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that said
above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is hereby
dismissed.
2
On February 5, 2016, three orders of Dismissal Upon Completion of Deferred
Adjudication Community Supervision were entered in cause numbers 14-299576,
14-299577, and 14-299575. Each of the orders stated, in relevant part:
Defendant is informed that he IS eligible to petition the Court for
an order of non-disclosure.
If eligible for an order on non-disclosure, the earliest date the
Defendant will be eligible to file the petition is immediately[.]
On November 16, 2017, Goodson filed five Petitions for [An] Order of
Nondisclosure for the offenses in cause numbers 14-299576, 14-299577, 14-299575,
14-299414, and 14-299578 (the “Nondisclosure Petitions”). In his Nondisclosure
Petitions, Goodson alleged that all conditions of section 411.081 of the Texas
Government Code had been met and that issuance of an order of nondisclosure
would be in the best interest of justice. Regarding the offenses charged in cause
numbers 14-299414 and 14-299578, Goodson argued that the orders dismissing the
charges “referenc[e] Cause No. 14-299575 as a case in which Petitioner was
‘convicted’[]” and that the dismissals give a “false impression” that Goodson was
convicted in 14-299575. Goodson argued that
If an order of Nondisclosure in 14-299575 is issued, but this
dismissal is not also non-disclosed, a false impression would be created
for anyone that read the dismissal in this case, that Petitioner was
actually convicted in 14-299575, thus defeating the purpose of a
nondisclosure being granted in 14-299575 only, but not including this
dismissal, which implies a conviction occurred in that case.
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The State filed an answer to the Nondisclosure Petitions opposing the request and
arguing that “entry of an order of nondisclosure is not in the best interest of justice,
because: [] the petitioner was placed on probation for 3 offenses, and as part of the
plea agreement 2 additional cases were dismissed.”
The trial court held a hearing on the Nondisclosure Petitions wherein
Goodson’s attorney argued that Goodson “finished all the[] deferred
adjudications[]” and
. . . on the two dismissals, the dismissals referred to one of the
deferred adjudications and actually states that he was convicted in that
case, which he was never convicted in that case. He was placed on
deferred. He completed his deferred, and it was dismissed. So those
would be connected papers that if allowed to continue to exist would
imply that he got convicted in one of these cases that we’re actually
asking -- in other words, it wouldn’t be a full nondisclosure if that cause
number is still hanging out there as though he had been convicted in
both of those dismissals.
The State argued that “the spirit of [the statute] is if you have multiple offenses then
this doesn’t apply to you[]” and that “in the interest of justice, having multiple
deferred and dismissals would kind of [] go against the spirit of the nondisclosure
laws.”
The trial court signed orders denying the Nondisclosure Petitions. Goodson
filed requests for finding of facts and conclusions of law in all five causes. The trial
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in all matters and the trial
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court found that as four of the cases—evading arrest, failure to identify by giving
false or fictitious information, and two offenses for burglary of a vehicle—arose out
of the same criminal episode, and the trial court found that the offense of criminal
trespass arose out of a separate criminal episode. The court also concluded:
The petitioner is not granted an order of nondisclosure in cause
numbers 17-30377, 17-30378, and 17-30379 pursuant to Texas
Government Code section 411.0725 because this court has found that
granting such an order is not in the interest of justice[.]
Goodson timely appealed.
Issue
In a single issue, Goodson argues that the trial court erred in denying his
Nondisclosure Petitions for an order of nondisclosure because the State cited no
authority for its argument that the offenses were “multiple” and because the
judgments dismissing cause numbers 14-299414 and 14-299578 erroneously state
that he was “convicted” in cause number 14-299575. Appellant also argues that the
State presented no evidence that denying the petitions would be in the interest of
justice. Appellant further argues that the State’s errors cannot otherwise be
corrected.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a petition for nondisclosure under an abuse
of discretion standard. See White v. State, No. 01-15-00294-CV, 2015 Tex. App.
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LEXIS 12316, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (citing Jackson v. State, No. 14-13-00747-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 12307,
at **3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.));
Wills v. State, No. 09-14-00373-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11100, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Oct. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its
discretion only if it has acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner, or has acted
without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). An appellant bears the burden
of producing a record that shows the trial court abused its discretion. Simon v. York
Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, and we indulge every legal
presumption in favor of the judgment. Ginn v. NCI Bldg. Sys., Inc., 472 S.W.3d 802,
837 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.) (citing Holley v. Holley,
864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)). No abuse
of discretion is shown if some evidence of substantive and probative character exists
to support the trial court’s decision. Id.
When findings of fact are filed and are unchallenged, they are entitled to the
same weight as a jury’s verdict. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696
(Tex. 1986). They are binding on an appellate court unless the contrary is established
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as a matter of law, or there is no evidence to support the finding. Id. (citing Swanson
v. Swanson, 228 S.W.2d 156, 158 (1950)). We review de novo the conclusions of
law drawn by the trial court from the facts to determine their correctness. See BMC
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).
Analysis
The record shows that the offenses at issue occurred in 2014. The statute in
effect at that time provided that
. . . if a person [] placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision under Section 5, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal
Procedure, subsequently receives a discharge and dismissal under
Section 5(c), Article 42.12, and satisfies the requirements of Subsection
(e), the person may petition the court that placed the defendant on
deferred adjudication for an order of nondisclosure under this
subsection. . . . After notice to the state, an opportunity for a hearing,
and a determination that the person is entitled to file the petition and
issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice, the court shall
issue a[] [nondisclosure] order . . . .
Act of May 25, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1146, § 1(d), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2792,
2792-93 (amended 2015). Here, the trial court’s findings of fact do not show that
Goodson was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for the
offenses charged in cause numbers 14-299414 and 14-299578, and the record shows
that each was dismissed. The Legislature determined the class of persons eligible for
an order of nondisclosure, and we are bound to construe the statute as it is written.
See Wills, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11100, at *5 (citing Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First
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State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 636-37 (Tex. 2010)). Under the statute in
effect at the time, the record does not support a conclusion that Goodson was eligible
to petition for an order of nondisclosure for the offenses charged in cause numbers
14-299414 and 14-299578 because nothing indicates that he was placed on deferred
adjudication community supervision in those cases. See Act of May 25, 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 1146, § 1(d), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2792, 2792-93 (amended 2015).
At the hearing, the State’s attorney argued that “in the interest of justice,
having multiple deferred and dismissals would kind of [] go against the spirit of the
nondisclosure laws.” The trial court found that the criminal charges in cause
numbers 14-229576, 14-299577, and 14-299575 arose out of the same criminal
episode and that Goodson pleaded guilty to such offenses. The trial court also
concluded that granting nondisclosure orders was not in the interest of justice. We
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact. See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 696. On
this record, Appellant has not shown that the trial court acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably in its ruling. See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42; see also White, 2015
Tex. App. LEXIS 12316, at **13-14 (no error in denying petition for nondisclosure
as appellant had not shown it was outside the trial court’s discretion to determine
that a nondisclosure order was not in the interest of justice).
8
Appellant cites no legal authority in support of his argument that
nondisclosure was required because no other remedy was available to correct “the
State’s errors” in cause numbers 14-299414 and 14-299578 wherein it implied that
he was previously convicted in cause number 14-299575. Appellant failed to
adequately brief this argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Fredonia State Bank v.
Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994). 1
1
The appellate record gives no indication whether Goodson filed a motion to
enter judgment nunc pro tunc or a motion to reform the judgment with the trial court
that heard the criminal cases in cause numbers 14-299414 and 14-299578 (the two
cases that Goodson alleges erroneously state that he was “convicted” in cause
number 14-299575). If such was a clerical error, he may have been able to seek a
nunc pro tunc order from the convicting court. See State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306,
309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (explaining that a trial court may modify, correct or set
aside judgments and orders through motions for new trial, motions to arrest
judgment and motions for judgment nunc pro tunc) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 30, 33,
& 36); Alvarez v. State, 605 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (explaining
that a trial court may enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical error in a
judgment). Assuming without deciding that the record supported a corrected or
reformed judgment of the criminal judgments for cause numbers 14-299414 and 14-
299578, Goodson should have addressed that request in a different forum and
directly to the criminal trial court. We may not reform his criminal judgments
because they are not before us in this proceeding (nor were they before the trial court
in the Nondisclosure Petitions). See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993).
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We overrule Appellant’s issue, and we affirm the orders of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on September 7, 2018
Opinion Delivered October 18, 2018
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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