In the Interest of M.J., C.J., S.Y., G.M., and N.M., Children v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-24-00107-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., C.J., S.Y., G.M., AND N.M., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-711766-22
Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a bench trial at which Mother appeared through her attorney, the trial
court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Andrew, Bryan, Carol, David, and
Emily.1 The trial court found grounds under Subsections (D) (endangering conditions
or surroundings), (E) (endangering conduct), and (O) (noncompliance with court
order). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial court further
found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.
See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Mother appealed.2
Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief concluding
that her appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016)
(order) (approving use of Anders procedure in termination-of-parental-rights appeals
because it strikes an important balance between the parent’s constitutional right to
counsel on appeal and counsel’s obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals).
1
We use aliases to identify the children, and we identify family members by
their relationship to the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App.
P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
In addition to terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court also
terminated (1) Andrew and Bryan’s father’s parental rights to Andrew and Bryan and
(2) David and Emily’s father’s parental rights to David and Emily. The trial court
appointed Carol’s father as her sole managing conservator. None of the three fathers
appealed.
2
Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record and showing why there are no arguable grounds to advance
on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Taylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective
& Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied).
Mother’s counsel has certified that he has provided Mother with a copy of his Anders
brief and informed her of her right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se
response.
We gave Mother until May 13, 2024, to notify us if she wished to file a pro se
response to counsel’s Anders brief. We received no response. The Department filed a
letter response in which it agreed with Mother’s counsel that Mother had no
meritorious grounds to advance on appeal.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must independently examine the record to
determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80,
109 S. Ct. 346, 350 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. Our review of the record and
counsel’s Anders brief assures us that any issue that Mother might raise would be
frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Mother’s counsel remains appointed in this case through any proceedings in
the Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved of these duties. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at
27; In re J.W., No. 02-22-00161-CV, 2022 WL 15076379, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Oct. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g).
3
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: July 11, 2024
4