Tyler Ray McNatt v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

NUMBER 13-23-00282-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
TYLER RAY MCNATT, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 36TH DISTRICT COURT
OF ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
A jury found appellant Tyler Ray McNatt guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2), (b). McNatt
was placed on community supervision, which the trial court subsequently revoked. By a
single issue, McNatt argues that his sentence of five years’ incarceration constitutes cruel
or unusual punishment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
McNatt was indicted on charges of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, alleged to have
occurred on or about March 20, 2018. Following a jury trial in 2021, wherein the jury
returned a not guilty and guilty verdict, respectively, McNatt was sentenced to five years’
confinement, probated for five years.
In June 2023, the State filed an amended motion to revoke McNatt’s community
supervision, alleging McNatt had failed to report to his probation officer October 2022
through May 2023, failed to submit to random urinalysis testing November 2022 through
May 2023, and was in arrears. McNatt pleaded true to the allegations, and the trial court
determined the allegations to be true, revoked McNatt’s community supervision, and
sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal ensued.
II. PUNISHMENT
An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim
embodied in state and federal constitutional bans on cruel or unusual punishment and
based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime
and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13
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(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted.”). A successful challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and
requires a finding of “gross disproportionality.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23 (citing
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d).
However, to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly
disproportionate or cruel or unusual, a defendant must present to the trial court a “timely
request, objection, or motion” stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a); see Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“It is
well settled that almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may be waived by the
failure to object.”); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, pet. ref’d) (concluding defendant had failed to preserve disproportionate-
sentencing complaint); see also Adams v. State, No. 13-09-00334-CR, 2010 WL
2783745, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 15, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (concluding the same where appellant was sentenced to
forty years’ imprisonment for evading arrest, enhanced by his felony habitual offender
status). “To state the obvious, an unpreserved grossly disproportionate sentencing
argument cannot conceivably persuade this Court and is thus frivolous.” Trevino v. State,
676 S.W.3d 726, 732–33 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.).
At no time prior to the appeal did McNatt argue that the sentence imposed was
disproportionate to the offense charged or in violation of his constitutional rights.
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Accordingly, McNatt failed to preserve his complaint for review. See TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28. We overrule McNatt’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
11th day of July, 2024.
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