David Blair v. the Housing Authority of the City of Dallas, TX Roseland Estates ( 2023 )

Affirm and Opinion Filed September 14, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00357-CV
DAVID BLAIR, Appellant
V.
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS, TX –
ROSELAND ESTATES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-01421-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Breedlove
Opinion by Justice Reichek
In this eviction case, pro se appellant David Blair appeals the county court at
law’s default judgment awarding possession of certain property to the Housing
Authority of the City of Dallas, Texas – Roseland Estates (“DHA”). For reasons
that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On March 4, 2020, DHA filed a sworn complaint for forcible detainer in
justice court against appellant and “all other occupants” of an apartment DHA leased
to appellant. DHA alleged appellant violated the terms of his lease by pointing a
shotgun at another resident on DHA property. Appellant was served but did not
answer, and the justice court awarded possession of the property to DHA. Appellant,
who also represented himself the trial court, appealed to the county court at law by
filing a statement of inability to pay. He filed an answer, and the case was eventually
set for a jury trial on April 19, 2022. The trial court’s judgment, signed that day,
recites that appellant did not appear for trial. The judgment orders that DHA is
entitled to possession of the leased premises and awards it attorney’s fees of $1,100
and court costs.
On April 19, appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment,
supported by his unsworn declaration. In his motion, appellant stated his failure to
appear was due to accident or mistake rather than conscious indifference. According
to appellant, he arrived in the courtroom three minutes after the court granted
judgment for DHA. He was late because of difficulty “securing parking” and a delay
at security. He claimed he had several meritorious defenses, among them that he did
not breach the lease and had the right to defend himself, his property, and others.
DHA did not respond to appellant’s motion to set aside the default judgment
or otherwise controvert the factual allegations about conscious indifference in
appellant’s motion. The motion to set aside was overruled by operation of law. This
appeal followed.
On December 8, 2022, this Court notified appellant that his brief failed to
comply with Rule 38 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant was
notified that his brief was deficient because it did not contain: (1) a complete list of
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all parties; (2) a table of contents; (3) an index of authorities; (4) a concise statement
of the case; (5) the issues presented for review; (6) a concise statement of facts
supported by record references; and (7) a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of
the argument supported by appropriate citations to authorities and the record. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. We cautioned appellant that failure to file an amended brief
within ten days may result in dismissal of the appeal. Appellant did not file an
amended brief.1
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se
litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with
applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair
advantage over a litigant represented by counsel. Id. at 212. When a party fails to
adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Id.Despite the deficiencies of appellant’s brief, we can identify three issues and
will address them to the extent necessary to resolve this appeal. Appellant contends
(1) his conduct at the apartment was in defense of himself and others and was a result
of DHA’s failure to address complaints about other residents; (2) he was denied his
right to a jury trial; and (3) the county court did not hold a hearing on his motion to
set aside the default judgment.
1
In addition, appellant did not request a reporter’s record and thus the appellate record
does not include a reporter’s record of the trial in the county court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c).
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This is a direct appeal from the county court’s default judgment. Before the
default judgment can be set aside, appellant must satisfy the Craddock v. Sunshine
Bus Lines, Inc. standard. Charles v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 05-18-01139-
CV, 2019 WL 6317867, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.); see Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939).
Under Craddock, appellant must show: (1) his failure to appear was not intentional
or the result of conscious indifference; (2) he has a meritorious defense; and (3) the
granting of a new trial will not operate to cause delay or injury to DHA. Charles,
2019 WL 6317867, at *1.
We first address whether the trial court was required to hold a hearing on
appellant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, which is equivalent to a motion
for new trial.2 Generally, a hearing on a motion for new trial is not mandatory.
Carson v. El Capitan Apartments, No. 05-13-01481-CV, 2015 WL 169879, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court is required to
conduct a hearing on a motion for new trial only when the motion presents a question
of fact upon which evidence must be heard. Id. Here, because appellant’s
allegations in support of his motion for new trial were uncontroverted, the trial court
was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. See Estate of Pollack
2
The county court’s docket sheet shows that a hearing on appellant’s motion was scheduled for the
afternoon of June 13, 2022. Appellant states in his brief that the hearing was to be held virtually and that
he logged on, but no hearing was held. DHA did not file an appellate brief. We will therefore accept this
factual statement as true. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g).
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v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 391–92 (Tex. 1993); Tactical Air Defense Servs.,
Inc. v. Searock, 398 S.W.3d 341, 348–49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); see
also In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716, 721 (Tex. 2021) (if movant’s
uncontroverted factual allegations are sufficient under Craddock, it is an abuse of
discretion to deny motion for new trial).
Appellant also complains that he was not afforded a jury trial despite having
requested one. A party who fails to appear at trial after filing an answer waives the
right to a jury trial. Bradley Motors, Inc. v. Mackey, 878 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.
1994) (per curiam); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 220 (“Failure of a party to appear for trial
shall be deemed a waiver by him of the right to a trial by jury.”).
Finally, we construe appellant’s brief to contend that he had meritorious
defenses to eviction. This is just one of the Craddock elements. Appellant has not
argued in this Court that he satisfied all three Craddock elements, and as a result,
has not met his burden to show the trial court erred in not setting aside the default
judgment. See Stewart v. C.L. Trammell Props., Inc., No. 05-14-01027-CV, 2005
WL 2234607, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 15, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (because
appellant raised only meritorious defense element of Craddock on appeal, this Court
could not conclude trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for new trial).
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We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
220357f.p05 /Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
DAVID BLAIR, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at
Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00357-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-01421-
D.
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF Opinion delivered by Justice
THE CITY OF DALLAS, TX – Reichek. Justices Partida-Kipness
ROSELAND ESTATES, Appellee and Breedlove participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY
OF DALLAS, TX – ROSELAND ESTATES recover its costs of this appeal from
appellant DAVID BLAIR.
Judgment entered this 14th day of September 2023.
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