Jerry-Jacob James Corona v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
JERRY-JACOB JAMES CORONA, § No. 08-23-00116-CR
Appellant, § Appeal from the
v. § 81st/218th Judicial District Court
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § of Atascosa County, Texas
Appellee. § (TC# 22-01-0002-CRA)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jerry-Jacob James Corona was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon and sentenced to 16 years.1 He raises three issues on appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following a confrontation at a bar, Appellant worried that he was being followed home.
He parked in a parking lot for a while to see if anyone was following him, so they would not find
out where he lived. While in the parking lot, Appellant saw a black SUV that he had seen at a stop
sign after he left the bar. He could not see through the windows of the SUV but, believing it to be
1
This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent they might conflict with our own. See
Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
the men from the bar, he drove his Dodge Ram pickup beside the SUV, revved his engine and
yelled “Take care, homeboy.” Appellant then left the parking lot.
The SUV, however, was occupied not by the men from the bar, but by Erica Hutton, a
mother who was waiting for her daughter’s call to pick her up after a dance. She believed the truck
was being driven by rowdy teenagers and she ignored it.2 Once her daughter called, she left the
parking lot and began to drive to her daughter’s friend’s house.
When Appellant saw Hutton’s black SUV behind him, he turned around and began
following it, convinced that it was the men from the bar. Hutton stopped at a stop sign, and as she
began to turn, Appellant hit her from behind, causing her SUV to spin. Appellant’s vehicle then
struck a stop sign, knocking it over and deploying his air bags. Hutton estimates that Appellant
was going 20–25 miles an hour. 3 Appellant characterized the action as a PIT (precision
immobilization technique) maneuver, that was only meant to send a message to leave him alone
and not hurt the SUV’s occupants.
When Hutton got out of her vehicle, Appellant realized that she was not the men from the
bar, and he got in his truck and left the scene. Pictures in evidence showed that the SUV’s
passenger side taillight was broken, and the bumper was damaged and scratched. Hutton testified
that she was not injured and did not seek medical treatment.
On January 10, 2024, Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
with penalty enhancements for two prior felony convictions. An attorney was appointed to
represent him. At a docket call on July 19, 2022, Appellant told the trial court that he wanted to
2
Hutton said that Appellant drove by her a second time in the parking lot while Appellant stated that he left the
parking lot after yelling at Appellant. The two agreed, however, that Appellant left the parking lot first.
3
The accident reconstruction expert did not give an opinion of Appellant’s speed at the time of the accident. Appellant
argued he was driving 15 miles an hour.
2
represent himself. After Appellant explained that he did not trust his attorney, the judge allowed
his attorney to withdraw, but denied his self-representation request and appointed another attorney
for him. At the same hearing, Appellant told the court that he was ready for trial. The judge
explained to him, however, that he had a backlog of 144 cases on his docket because of COVID-
19, and the priority for trial settings are the oldest cases where the defendant is incarcerated. On
November 16, 2022, Appellant again requested to represent himself. After a lengthy hearing at
which the trial court attempted to persuade Appellant of the risks of self-representation, the trial
granted his request but retained his appointed attorney as a stand-by counsel to provide advice to
Appellant if requested.
Appellant, Hutton, and law enforcement officers testified at trial. Appellant did not dispute
that he hit Hutton’s vehicle with his truck. He argued that he was justified in doing so because of
his mistaken belief that the SUV was driven by men harassing and threatening him. He also argued
that his truck was not a deadly weapon because the collision could not have caused death or serious
bodily injury. Officers testified that a PIT maneuver is highly dangerous that could involve risk of
injury or death and that even trained officers are not allowed to use it. The officers also testified
that vehicle accidents, even those caused by slow-speed impacts, can cause serious bodily injury
or death.
The court found Appellant guilty. The State waived one of the enhancement paragraphs for
a prior felony conviction and the trial court sentenced him to 16 years. Appellant, represented by
appointed counsel on appeal,4 raises three issues: (1) the district clerk refused to file his pro se
4
Appointed counsel originally filed an Anders brief, but after some filings by Appellant, withdrew that brief and filed
Appellant’s brief on the merits. Despite that turn of events, Appellant has continued to make his own filings, including
a Reply Brief. Because defendants cannot have hybrid representation, we consider only those issues raised in the brief
filed by his attorney. Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc) (declining to consider
the 26 extra issues raised in a represented appellant’s pro se brief).
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motions while he was represented by an attorney; (2) he was denied a speedy trial; and (3) he was
assessed court costs without a hearing about his ability to pay.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The district clerk’s refusal to file pro se motions
Before November 16, 2022, and while Appellant was still represented, he sent motions to
the district clerk for filing. Rather than file them, the clerk gave them to Appellant’s attorney.
Appellant argues that the clerk’s refusal to file the motions violated his right to due process.
The State contends that Appellant did not preserve error for appeal because he did not raise
the issue with the trial court and obtain a ruling. Appellant did, however, tell the trial court of his
complaint. For example, once pro se, he filed the statement, “I don’t believe the District Clerk
retained any of my pro se motions filed between April 2022 to November 16th, 2022 . . . .” The
trial court informed Appellant that his pleadings had not been filed because he was not the attorney
of record and that he could file them then since his attorney had been discharged. Ultimately,
though, the issue is not whether he preserved his complaint for appeal, but whether he demonstrates
any reversible error.
“In a criminal proceeding, a clerk of the district or county court shall [] receive and file all
papers . . . .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.21(a)(1) (emphasis added). Even if the clerk
believes that a party has no right to file a pleading, he or she cannot refuse to file it. “Any ruling
regarding the propriety of pleadings must be made by the district judge, not by the clerk.” In re
Bernard, 993 S.W.2d 453, 454–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (O’Connor, J., concurring opinion). If true, the district clerk would have violated her duty
to file Appellant’s motions. Yet that violation is not, as Appellant claims, a ground for challenging
his conviction. There is no procedure to appeal the clerk’s violation of her duty to file pleadings.
4
The remedy is therefore a mandamus action. Deleon v. Dist. Clerk, 187 S.W.3d 473, 474
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (per curiam) (granting mandamus and directing the clerk to file relator’s
application because the inability to appeal the clerk’s refusal could not be appealed and had no
adequate remedy at law).
But even if cognizable on direct appeal, Appellant must show that it would be reversible
error. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a), (b). Under either harm standard (constitutional or other error),
Appellant’s claimed error does not meet the standard. First, even if the clerk had filed Appellant’s
motions, the court could have disregarded them. Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[A] trial court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a
defendant who is represented by counsel.”); Goodwin v. State, No. 14-12-00274-CR, 2013 WL
980173, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 12, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (trial court did not err in refusing to rule on defendant’s pro se motion
for speedy trial because he was represented by an attorney). Second, Appellant’s brief does not
specify what pro se motions were not filed and what meritorious issues, if any, that they raised.
Third, Appellant filed several motions after his attorney was discharged that were apparently like
the motions he had attempted to file before. At a pretrial hearing on December 5, 2022, he informed
the trial court “[B]asically all of my motions since, you know, may have virtually all been alike
and they continually bring up the same facts.” These motions were eventually heard and ruled on.
In short, the clerk’s refusal to file Appellant’s motions when he initially tried to file them did not
contribute to his conviction or affect his substantial rights because he filed motions making the
same requests at a time when the trial court was able to and did consider and rule on them.
Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
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B. Speedy trial
Both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions as well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
guarantee a defendant a right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10;
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05; Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–26
(1967); State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Balderas v. State, 517
S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When a defendant claims that the right to a speedy trial
has been violated, courts analyze and weigh four factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for
the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 767.
Courts must weigh the strength of each of the Barker factors and then balance their relative
weights considering the State’s and the defendant’s conduct. Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The evidentiary burden differs depending on the Barker factor at stake.
The State carries the burden to justify the length of the delay. Id. at 280. The defendant carries the
burden to show the delay is “presumptively prejudicial” and to prove he or she asserted his right
and suffered prejudice. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113–14; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. In reviewing the
trial court’s analysis of the Barker factors, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Lopez, 631
S.W.3d at 113–14; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 767–68. Factual components are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, but we review legal components de novo. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113–
14. Consequently, we defer to explicit or implicit findings if they are supported by the record and
sustain the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 114; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 767–68. Engaging in the Barker
speedy-trial analysis on appeal requires us to assess each factor individually yet balance them
holistically. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768.
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(1) Length of delay
The length of the delay is significant because the longer a defendant must wait for trial, the
more prejudicial the delay is. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(en banc). “Generally, a delay of eight months to a year, or longer, is presumptively prejudicial
and triggers a speedy trial analysis.” Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114.
“The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is measured from the time the defendant
is arrested or formally accused.” Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Since Appellant was not arrested prior to his indictment, the starting point for determining the
length of the delay is January 10, 2022, the date of his indictment. Trial was held on February 17,
2023. The State does not dispute that this delay of just over 13 months is presumptively prejudicial.
(2) Reason for delay
In balancing the factors, the court assigns different weights to the reasons for the delay:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence
or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with
the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
Appellant’s arraignment was originally scheduled for February 1, 2022, but did not occur
until July 19, 2022. Part of that delay is attributed to Appellant’s health (an illness). The rest of the
delay between arraignments is unexplained by the record.5 Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314 (“In the
absence of an assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on
the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.”). The State is also
5
In its brief, the State asserts that aside from Appellant’s illness, the delay was because of “his counsel’s scheduling
conflicts, and disagreements he had with his attorney.” These reasons do not appear in the record.
7
accorded a reasonable period to prepare for trial. See State v. Vasquez, No. 08-16-00089-CR, 2018
WL 4178462, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 31, 2018, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(six-month delay acceptable); Rivero v. State, No. 08-02-00191-CR, 2004 WL 42625, at *4
(Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (agreeing that State is
entitled to some time, but finding ten months was too long and would count against the State, but
not heavily). Therefore, the first six months of the delay cannot be attributed to the State.
Appellant’s trial was originally scheduled for August 15, 2022. But at the arraignment on
July 19, 2022, less than a month before trial, at Appellant’s insistence, the trial court discharged
Appellant’s attorney, appointed a new attorney to represent him, and reset the trial to
November 28, 2022. The court also explained that because of the backlog caused by COVID-19,
there were 144 cases on his docket and the rules required that he give priority to the oldest cases
where the defendants were in jail. Since the change in attorneys was done at Appellant’s request,
it does not weigh against the State. Holmes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1996, no pet.) (delays from appointment of new counsel cannot be counted against the State). The
additional delay caused by overcrowded courts weighs against the State but only slightly. Barker,
407 U.S. at 531; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. And we are not blind to the effect of COVID-19
on court dockets. State v. Elizondo, No. 04-21-00489-CR, 2022 WL 3047103, at *3 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Aug. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“However, courts
that have considered the impact of the pandemic on speedy-trial rights have nearly all
countenanced additional delays resulting from the pandemic.”).
The trial was reset again to January 17, 2023. Between the time of the arraignment and this
trial setting, the court also resolved a motion for a competency evaluation requested by Appellant’s
8
attorney.6 “[D]elays related to competency evaluations do not count against the State.” Lopez, 631
S.W.3d at 112–13. At the next pretrial hearing, the court granted Appellant’s request to proceed
pro se and the trial was again reset—this time to February 6, 2023—so that Appellant could have
a hearing on his pretrial motions that he could, at that point, urge pro se. Because this delay
stemmed from Appellant’s request, it is not weighed against the State. Finally, on January 10,
2023, Appellant waived the jury trial, so the case was taken off the jury trial docket and reset for
the final time to February 17, 2023.
In sum, of all the reasons for the delay, only the delay caused by overcrowded courts can
be weighed against the State, but only slightly. Most of the delay counts against Appellant.
(3) Appellant’s assertion of the right
Appellant was responsible for asserting his right to a speedy trial. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at
282. The State argues that he never asserted his rights. We find that he did. Even while represented,
when Appellant was allowed to address the Court, he stated that he demanded a speedy trial and
stated he was ready to proceed. Once Appellant’s request to represent himself was granted, he filed
and urged motions for a speedy trial.
(4) Prejudice to the defendant
An accused’s right to a speedy trial is meant to protect three interests: “1) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and 3) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 652 (citing Barker,
407 U.S. at 532). Whether a defendant is prejudiced by a delay is analyzed by how the delay affects
these interests.
6
The record before us does not include the evaluation, but the trial court noted that they waited for the results of the
evaluation for several weeks and that the results had been filed.
9
A defendant has the burden of showing prejudice. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 826
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc). We agree that Appellant was prejudiced by the fact that he was
incarcerated pending trial.7 But Appellant did not present evidence of any other specific ways he
was prejudiced and, most significantly, he made no allegations that his ability to present a defense
was impaired by the delay. The prejudice from pretrial incarceration “is not sufficient alone to
establish the right to dismissal.” Wade v. State, No. 02-21-00125-CR, 2023 WL 2534468, at *10
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 292, (2023).
(5) Balancing the factors
Our balance of the four Barker factors is de novo. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. That
de novo review is guided by these cautionary comments from the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals:
Because dismissal of the charges is a radical remedy, a wooden application of the
Barker factors would infringe upon “the societal interest in trying people accused
of crime, rather than granting them immunization because of legal error.” Thus,
courts must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to
ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s
actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial has been infringed. The constitutional
right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges.
Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1966) (footnotes
omitted)).
The length of the delay, Appellant’s assertion of his rights, and the fact that he was
incarcerated pending trial all weigh in his favor. Even so, because all the reasons for the delay
except for overcrowded courts can be ascribed to Appellant or to neither party, and because
Appellant made no showing of specific prejudices or harm from the delay besides pretrial
7
His requests for a bond reduction were denied.
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incarceration, we hold that Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated by the approximately
13-month delay between his indictment and trial.
Appellant’s second issue is overruled.
C. Court costs
After trial, a bill of costs was filed showing court costs and fees in the amount of $315. The
judgment orders Appellant, “[u]pon release from confinement, . . . to proceed without unnecessary
delay to the District Clerk’s office . . . to pay or make arrangements to pay any fines, court costs,
reimbursement fees, and restitution due.” Appellant argues that the judgment is void because the
trial court violated his due process rights by not making an on-the-record inquiry into his ability
to pay.
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to inquire about a defendant’s
ability to pay before making orders regarding the payment of costs: “[D]uring or immediately after
imposing a sentence in a case in which the defendant entered a plea in open court . . . a court shall
inquire on the record whether the defendant has sufficient resources or income to immediately pay
all or part of the fines or costs.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15(a-1). If the court makes a
finding of inability to pay, the court has the discretion to allow costs to be paid later or “at
designated intervals,” to be “discharged by performing community service;” to be waived, or a
combination of any of these options. Id. at 42.15(a-1)(1)–(4).8
The point of the inquiry is to determine whether a defendant can “immediately pay.”
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15(a-1). Even though the trial court did not make the inquiry
on the record, it implicitly found that Appellant lacked enough funds to immediately pay and
8
Our sister court has held that Article 42.15(a-1) is a category 2 Marin right and can be raised for the first time on
appeal. Cruz v. State, No. 14-21-00454-CR, 2023 WL 3236888, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 4, 2023,
pet. granted). Because of our resolution of the issue, we need not decide today if preservation is necessary for appeal.
11
instead ordered an option provided to it by Article 42.15—to make a payment on a later date to be
arranged after Appellant is released.
If the trial court’s findings about Appellant’s ability to pay were necessary for appeal, the
remedy would be to remand the case for the trial court to make those findings, not hold that the
judgment is void, as Appellant urges. Sloan v. State, 676 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2023, no pet.) (in a case with similar facts, declining to remand because it would be “a gratuitous
inquiry when the resultant determination already is apparent from the record would amount to an
unnecessary exercise and a waste of judicial resources.”); Gates v. State, No. 02-23-00004-CR,
2024 WL 482436, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (same); Carter v. State, No. 01-23-00739-CR, 2024 WL 3707829, at *8
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 8, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding that court’s failure to conduct inquiry was not reversible error because “the
effect of the language in the judgment is to implement one of the options that Article 42.15(a-1)
and (b) allows a trial court to select for defendants who do not have sufficient resources to
immediately pay a fine and costs.”). We choose not to remand when the trial court has already
implicitly found that Appellant does not have the ability to immediately pay.
Appellant also argues that the trial court had a duty to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the costs are an undue hardship under Article 43.035(a). Unlike the inquiry under
Article 42.15, the court does not have a sua sponte duty to make this inquiry right after sentencing.
Instead, the court has continuing jurisdiction to hold such a hearing when a defendant notifies the
court that he is having trouble making payments. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.035(b), (e).
The defendant has not made that request of the trial court and his eligibility for any relief because
of an undue hardship is not before us.
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We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice
September 13, 2024
Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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