Maxie D. Green, D/B/A a to Z Bail Bonds v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  •                   In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-21-00013-CV
    ___________________________
    MAXIE D. GREEN, D/B/A A-Z BAIL BONDS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 30th District Court
    Wichita County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 190,340-A
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion on Remand by Chief Justice Sudderth
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
    Introduction
    This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and involves
    appellant Maxie D. Green d/b/a A-Z Bail Bonds’s challenge to summary judgment for
    the State on its bond-forfeiture claim. Green asserts that the State’s own evidence raised
    three fact issues: (1) whether Green received proper notice of the pretrial hearing at
    issue; (2) whether the criminal defendant’s name was called at the courthouse door; and
    (3) whether the criminal defendant called was the same person who signed the bond.
    In the first appeal, we concluded that the State’s evidence showing that the criminal
    defendant’s name was called “at the courtroom door” did not conclusively prove that it
    was called “at the courthouse door.”1 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 22.02. Thus,
    we sustained Green’s second issue, reversed the summary judgment, and remanded the
    case for trial. On petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    held that Article 22.02 requires only substantial compliance and that calling a
    defendant’s name “at the courtroom door” suffices as a matter of law. Green v. State, 
    670 S.W.3d 633
    , 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    overruled Green’s second issue and remanded the case for us to address Green’s
    1
    The case facts are set out in our previous opinion. See Green v. State, No. 02-21-
    00013-CV, 
    2021 WL 5747148
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 2, 2021) (mem. op.),
    rev’d and remanded, 
    670 S.W.3d 633
     (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
    2
    remaining issues. 
    Id.
     We overrule Green’s remaining issues and affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    Standard of Review
    Although they are criminal actions, bond-forfeiture cases are reviewed on appeal
    using the same rules as civil suits. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 44.42, 44.44; Benson
    v. State, 
    476 S.W.3d 136
    , 138 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. ref’d). In a summary
    judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant established that no genuine
    issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 
    289 S.W.3d 844
    , 848 (Tex. 2009). We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v.
    Joachim, 
    315 S.W.3d 860
    , 862 (Tex. 2010). We take as true all evidence favorable to the
    nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the
    nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 
    249 S.W.3d 392
    , 399 (Tex. 2008); Provident Life
    & Accident Ins. v. Knott, 
    128 S.W.3d 211
    , 215 (Tex. 2003). The movant’s own summary
    judgment evidence can create an issue of fact. Keever v. Hall & Northway Advertising, Inc.,
    
    727 S.W.2d 704
    , 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.); see Luke v. Unifund CCR Partners,
    No. 2-06-444-CV, 
    2007 WL 2460327
    , at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2007,
    no pet.) (mem. op.).
    We will affirm a summary judgment only if the record establishes that the movant
    has conclusively proved all essential elements of the movant’s cause of action (or
    defense, as the case may be) as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.,
    3
    
    589 S.W.2d 671
    , 678 (Tex. 1979). If the movant fails to establish its entitlement to a
    traditional summary judgment, the burden of proof never shifts to the nonmovant.
    Draughon v. Johnson, 
    631 S.W.3d 81
    , 87–88 (Tex. 2021).
    Applicable Law
    The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the statutory framework for bond-
    forfeiture proceedings:
    Bail bonds and personal bonds are forfeited in the following manner: The
    name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door,
    and if the defendant does not appear within a reasonable time after such
    call is made, judgment shall be entered that the State of Texas recover of
    the defendant the amount of money in which he is bound, and of his
    sureties, if any, the amount of money in which they are respectively bound,
    which judgment shall state that the same will be made final, unless good
    cause be shown why the defendant did not appear.
    Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 22.02; see also Hernden v. State, 
    865 S.W.2d 521
    , 523
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no pet.) (holding bond-forfeiture cases are “entirely
    statutory”).
    The essential elements of the State’s bond-forfeiture claim are the bond and
    judgment nisi, which is the judicial declaration of the bond forfeiture. Alvarez v. State,
    
    861 S.W.2d 878
    , 880–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). When moving for summary judgment
    on a bond forfeiture, the State must conclusively prove three facts: (1) a valid bond; (2)
    the failure of the defendant to appear at a criminal hearing at which his presence is
    required; and (3) the calling of the defendant’s name distinctly at the courthouse door.
    Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888 (op. on reh’g); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 22.02. “A
    4
    judgment nisi is prima facie proof that the statutory requirements have been satisfied
    and the burden is on the defendant to affirmatively show otherwise.” Tocher v. State,
    
    517 S.W.2d 299
    , 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (citing Thompson v. State, 
    31 Tex. 166
    , 168
    (1868) (“This court will presume that the judgment nisi was taken in accordance with
    the statutory requirements, unless it affirmatively appears otherwise.”)).
    If the State meets its burden, “[t]he burden then shifts to the respondent to show
    good cause as to why the defendant did not appear.” Green, 670 S.W.3d at 637 (citing
    Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888). The good-cause element “operates like an affirmative
    defense in that the defendant admits he failed to appear but asserts he has good cause
    which excuses his failure to do so.” Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888.
    Application
    Green does not dispute that the bond at issue was valid or that the criminal
    defendant did not appear. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
    State’s evidence was sufficient to show that the criminal defendant’s name was called at
    the courthouse door. Green, 
    670 S.W.3d 637
    –38. Thus, the only remaining question is
    whether the criminal defendant had good cause for failing to appear. See 
    id. at 637
    .
    Green contends in his first issue that the State failed to prove that he received
    notice of the hearing at issue. He contends in his third issue that the State failed to
    prove that the criminal defendant called was the same person who had signed the bond.
    Because the issues concern the criminal defendant’s good cause for failing to appear,
    Green, not the State, had the burden of proof. See Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888.
    5
    Issue 1—Hearing Notice
    In his first issue, Green contends that the State’s motion for summary judgment,
    “on its own,” raised a fact issue concerning whether the criminal defendant or Green
    received notice of the hearing. According to Green, the State must prove that the “bail
    bondsman [received] notice of the hearing so he [could] get the Defendant there,” and
    the State’s summary-judgment motion “did not conclusively establish” that he or the
    criminal defendant received notice.
    Green, however, failed to plead his hearing-notice defense or raise it in his
    summary-judgment response. The good-cause element “operates like an affirmative
    defense.” See id. If a nonmovant relies on an affirmative defense to oppose a summary-
    judgment motion, he must plead it and come forward with summary-judgment evidence
    sufficient to raise a fact issue on each element of the defense to avoid summary
    judgment. Brownlee v. Brownlee, 
    665 S.W.2d 111
    , 112 (Tex. 1984); see also Tex. R. Civ. P.
    94 (requiring defendants to specifically plead affirmative defenses or “any other matter
    constituting an avoidance”); see, e.g., Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888 (noting that appellant
    pleaded multiple defenses and offered summary-judgment evidence that he did not
    receive notice to appear). By failing to raise the hearing-notice defense with the trial
    court, Green waived it. We overrule his first issue.
    Issue 3—Criminal Defendant’s Identification
    In his third issue, Green contends that the State failed to prove that the criminal
    defendant called at the hearing was the same person who had signed the bond.
    6
    According to Green, the State could have offered fingerprint, handwriting, or
    eyewitness evidence “to link the bail bond with the person who was to be in court on
    the date in question.” Green’s argument consists of one paragraph and cites no
    authority.
    An appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and concise argument” that includes
    appropriate citations to legal authority and the appellate record. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
    “[A]ppellate courts have no duty—or even the right—to perform an independent
    review of the record and the applicable law to determine whether there was error; we
    cannot make the party’s arguments for [hi]m, and then adjudicate the case based on the
    arguments we have made on [his] behalf.” Craaybeek v. Craaybeek, No. 02-20-00080-CV,
    
    2021 WL 1803652
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
    (internal quotations omitted). Although an appellant can raise a general challenge to
    the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, “the appellant must also support the issue
    with argument and authorities challenging each ground.” Rollins v. Denton Cnty., No. 02-14-
    00312-CV, 
    2015 WL 7817357
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3, 2015, no pet.)
    (mem. op.) (emphasis added).
    Green failed to adequately brief this issue for our review. See Craaybeek, 
    2021 WL 1803652
    , at *5.
    Regardless, Green misplaces the burden of proof, see Alvarez, 861 S.W.2d at 888,
    and the record reflects that he did not plead his defendant-identification defense or
    7
    raise it in his summary-judgment response. Thus, Green waived the issue. See Brownlee,
    665 S.W.2d at 112; Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.
    The State, nonetheless, contends that certain deemed admissions establish that
    the criminal defendant called was the same person who signed the bond. The State
    offered summary-judgment evidence of requests for admissions that it had propounded
    on Green. The requests included admissions that Green signed the bond for the
    criminal defendant and that the criminal defendant’s name was called outside the
    courtroom for the hearing at issue. The State also offered a records custodian’s affidavit
    to prove up the requests and confirm that the State’s case file contained no record that
    Green had responded to the State’s discovery requests. The State’s discovery requests
    were attached to and referenced in the affidavit.
    Green objected that the affidavit did not “include the documents it [was]
    attempting to authenticate,” but he did not identify which documents were missing. He
    makes the same argument on appeal. The record, however, does not reflect that Green
    obtained a ruling on his objection. Generally, if a party does not obtain a written ruling
    on an objection to summary-judgment evidence, the objection is not preserved. Seim v.
    Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 
    551 S.W.3d 161
    , 164–65 (Tex. 2018); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Thus,
    Green failed to preserve this error for appeal.
    In its summary-judgment motion, the State contended that the requests were
    deemed admitted because Green failed to respond. The record reflects that Green
    offered no evidence or argument to refute the State’s contention. Indeed, he did not
    8
    address the State’s requests for admission at all. Nor does he on appeal. Thus, as we
    did in our previous opinion, we will consider the admissions deemed because Green
    failed to preserve a complaint about them for appeal. See Green, 
    2021 WL 5747148
    , at
    *2 n.3 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)). We further note that the bond, hearing notice,
    call certification, and judgment nisi reflected in the State’s evidence name the same
    criminal defendant and have the same case number. Thus, not only did Green waive
    the defendant-identification issue, but the State’s evidence and the deemed admissions
    prove that the criminal defendant called was the same person who signed the bond. We
    overrule Green’s third issue.
    Conclusion
    Having overruled Green’s remaining issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    Bonnie Sudderth
    Chief Justice
    Delivered: August 31, 2023
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-21-00013-CV

Filed Date: 8/31/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/4/2023