Katie Rankin v. Erica Hernandez, Chantay Solano, and Delcia Saldana ( 2023 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 17, 2023.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00565-CV
KATIE RANKIN, Appellant
V.
ERICA HERNANDEZ, CHANTAY SOLANO, AND DELCIA SALDANA,
Appellees
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2016-18318
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellees Erica Hernandez, Chantay Solano, and Delcia Saldana (together,
“Appellees”) were traveling together in a car when they were rear-ended by a
vehicle driven by appellant Katie Rankin. Appellees sued Rankin for negligence,
seeking to collect damages for injuries sustained in the accident.
The parties proceeded to a jury trial and the jury returned a verdict assessing
a total of $143,000 in damages for all three Appellees. Rankin appealed and, in a
single issue, asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish a
causal relationship between the accident and Appellees’ claimed injuries and
medical expenses. For the reasons below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2014, Hernandez was driving her Ford Mustang with Saldana
and Solano traveling as passengers. Hernandez was slowing down to come to a
stop at a red light when her car was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Rankin. All
three Appellees visited a chiropractor the day after the car accident, seeking
treatment for neck and back injuries.
Appellees sued Rankin in March 2016 and asserted claims for negligence.
Rankin ultimately accepted fault for the collision but disputed Appellees’ claimed
injuries and damages. The parties proceeded to a jury trial on these issues in
March 2022.
Three questions were submitted to the jury, each inquiring as to the sum of
money that “would fairly and reasonably compensate” each Appellee for her
injuries, “if any, that resulted from the occurrence in question.” The jury returned
the following assessments:
Erica Hernandez
Physical pain sustained in the past: $25,000
Physical pain that, in reasonable probability, $25,000
Hernandez will sustain in the future:
Reasonable medical care expenses incurred in $7,000
the past:
Chantay Solano
Physical pain sustained in the past: $2,000
Physical pain that, in reasonable probability, $15,000
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Solano will sustain in the future:
Reasonable medical care expenses incurred in $2,000
the past:
Delcia Saldana
Physical pain sustained in the past: $25,000
Physical pain that, in reasonable probability, $35,000
Saldana will sustain in the future:
Reasonable medical care expenses incurred in $7,000
the past:
The trial court signed a final judgment on May 3, 2022, awarding Appellees the
damage amounts assessed in the jury’s verdict. Rankin filed a motion for new
trial, asserting the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show that the
accident caused the Appellees’ injuries. The trial court signed an order denying
the new trial motion and Rankin appealed.
ANALYSIS
In a single issue, Rankin argues that Appellees “failed to meet their burden
of proof at trial to establish a causal relation between the accident, [their] claimed
injuries and [their] medical treatment.” This failure, Rankin contends, renders the
evidence legally and factually insufficient to support the judgment. We presume
without deciding that these arguments were properly preserved and analyze their
merits below.
I. Legal and Factual Sufficiency: Standards of Review and Governing
Law
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every
reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 821-22, 827 (Tex. 2005). The evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable
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a reasonable and fair-minded person to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827.
There is “no evidence” or legally insufficient evidence when (1) there is a
complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law
or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;
(3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or
(4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. See id. at
810.
A legal sufficiency challenge asserting that an expert opinion is conclusory
can be raised for the first time on appeal. City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284
S.W.3d 809, 817 (Tex. 2009). An expert opinion is considered conclusory if it is
essentially “a conclusion without any explanation.” See Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v.
FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 399 & n.32 (Tex. 2008).
Accordingly, “if no basis for the opinion is offered, or the basis offered provides
no support, the opinion is merely a conclusory statement and cannot be considered
probative evidence.” City of San Antonio, 284 S.W.3d at 818; see also Burrow v.
Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. 1999) (“it is the basis of the witness’s opinion,
and not the witness’s qualifications or his bare opinions, that can settle an issue as
a matter of law”). But just because an expert’s testimony could have been clearer
does not render it conclusory as a matter of law. Gunn v. McCoy, 489 S.W.3d 75,
85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff’d, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018).
When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the
entire record, considering all the evidence both in favor of and contrary to the
challenged finding. Vast Constr., LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 709,
723 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). When a party attacks the
factual sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to a finding on which the party did
not have the burden of proof, we may set aside the finding only if it is so contrary
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to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.
Bennett v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 489 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We consider all the evidence, but will not
reverse the judgment unless the evidence supporting the challenged finding is so
weak as to render the finding clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. 4922 Holdings,
LLC v. Rivera, 625 S.W.3d 316, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet.
denied). The amount of evidence necessary to affirm is far less than the amount
necessary to reverse a judgment. GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Pascouet,
61 S.W.3d 599, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a
duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. W.
Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). Establishing causation in a
personal injury case requires a plaintiff to “prove that the conduct of the defendant
caused an event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable
injuries.” JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, 466 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. 2015). Thus,
“when an accident victim seeks to recover medical expenses, she must show both
‘what all the conditions were’ that generated the expenses and ‘that all the
conditions were caused by the accident.’” Id. (quoting Guevara v. Ferrer, 247
S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. 2007)).
Expert testimony generally is necessary to establish causation of medical
conditions that are “outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors.”
Guevara, 247 S.W.3d at 665; see also, e.g., Jefferson v. Parra, 651 S.W.3d 643,
650-51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). To constitute evidence of
causation, a medical expert’s opinion must rest in reasonable medical probability.
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995). Whether
expert testimony on causation rests on a reasonable medical probability must be
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determined by the substance and context of the testimony rather than semantics or
use of a particular term or phrase. Smith v. Landry’s Crab Shack, Inc., 183 S.W.3d
512, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
However, a plaintiff “is not required to establish causation in terms of
medical certainty nor is he . . . required to exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis.” Bradley v. Rogers, 879 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, writ denied). On that note, “a medical causation expert need not
disprove or discredit every possible cause other than the one espoused by himself.”
Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2010) (internal quotation
omitted). Only if the evidence presents other plausible causes of the claimed
injuries or conditions must the plaintiff offer evidence excluding those causes with
reasonable certainty. JLG Trucking, LLC, 466 S.W.3d at 162.
II. Relevant Evidence
A. Appellees’ Evidence
Appellee Erica Hernandez
Testifying at trial, Hernandez said she was 29 years old at the time of the car
accident. Hernandez said the accident occurred at approximately 7:00 p.m. on
March 23, 2014. Later that night, Hernandez recalled she “started to feel pain
[that] kept worsening, getting worse throughout the night.” Hernandez said she
sought medical treatment the day after the vehicle accident and went to Dr.
Zicterman, a chiropractor.
Hernandez testified that she received treatment from Dr. Zicterman,
including heating pads, electric shock treatments, and various physical exercises
and adjustments. Hernandez also recalled getting an MRI on her neck and lower
back. Post-treatment, Hernandez said she expects that her pain will “sometimes
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fluctuate from maybe no pain or sometimes a little bit of pain and sometimes can
feel a little worse.”
Hernandez said she did not have any neck or back pain before the 2014 car
accident. Describing her current situation, Hernandez said her pain can be
aggravated by sitting for extended periods of time. Hernandez also said the pain
prevents her from riding bikes or playing soccer.
The jury also heard testimony from Naomi Vela, one of Hernandez’s friends.
Describing Hernandez’s condition after the car accident, Vela said Hernandez
complained of back and neck pain that affected her ability to walk up stairs and sit
for long periods of time. Vela testified that Hernandez is not “as active as she
normally was” and no longer played soccer despite previously being an “avid
player.” Vela said Hernandez never complained about back or neck pain before
the accident.
Dr. Zicterman testified about the treatment he provided Hernandez after the
accident. Beginning with his medical background, Dr. Zicterman said he
graduated from the Texas Chiropractic College in 1998 and has been practicing as
a chiropractor since his graduation. Dr. Zicterman said he previously had treated
patients after “a motor vehicle collision where they were struck from behind.”
Describing the types of complaints these patients typically presented with, Dr.
Zicterman said it is “more of a back and low back injury, just because of the
mechanism of the injury from behind.”
Dr. Zicterman said he examined Hernandez on March 24, 2014, the day after
the car accident. According to Dr. Zicterman, he performed an orthopedic exam,
muscle-strength testing, and range-of-motion testing on Hernandez, who was
complaining of cervical and lumbar pain. Dr. Zicterman said he diagnosed
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Hernandez with “cervicalgia[1], cervical sprain/strain, [and] low back pain as well
as [a] lumbar sprain/strain.”
Dr. Zicterman said Hernandez’s course of treatment included “passive
modalities” like electric stimulation treatments and heat packs, “active
rehabilitation” to strengthen the muscles, and “manual therapy” including
stretching and deep tissue work.
Despite this treatment, Dr. Zicterman testified that Hernandez still had
“residual complaints.” Dr. Zicterman said Hernandez was referred for an MRI, a
medical procedure he described as “reasonable and necessary” because Hernandez
“was still having the complaints of the neck and back even after all this time of
doing the therapies.” Dr. Zicterman said the MRI showed that Hernandez had
three disc herniations2 in her neck.
To sum up Dr. Zicterman’s testimony with respect to Hernandez, Appellees’
counsel asked Dr. Zicterman if he “ha[d] an opinion based on reasonable medical
probability about whether the — the car collision . . . caused or contributed to the
condition you diagnosed in Ms. Hernandez?” Dr. Zicterman responded “[y]es”
and explained that “it’s the mechanism of the injury, to me, that caused the neck
injury and the low back injury.”
Dr. Zicterman’s medical records for Hernandez also were admitted into
evidence. In relevant part, these records show as follows:
• Hernandez visited Dr. Zicterman on March 24, 2014, the day after the
car accident. In his “Initial Evaluation” notes, Dr. Zicterman stated:
“The patient was involved in a motor vehicle accident as the driver;
was struck by another vehicle. Patient complains of low back and
1
Later on in his testimony, Dr. Zicterman described “cervicalgia” as “pain in the neck.”
2
According to Dr. Zicterman, a “herniation is when the disc is protruded or inflamed [or]
irritated,” which “can cause irritation to the spinal cord.”
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cervical pain which radiates into the lower and upper extremities.”
Dr. Zicterman diagnosed Hernandez with the following conditions:
(1) cervicalgia; (2) cervical sprain/strain; (3) lumbago; (4) lumbar
sprain/strain; and (5) muscle spasms. The bill for this visit shows a
charge for $435.
• Hernandez visited Dr. Zicterman 14 times between March 26 and
June 4, 2014. Visit notes for each of Hernandez’s 14 visits list (1) the
areas of complaint; (2) the pain level; (3) the objectives for that day’s
treatment; and (4) the treatment administered. The bills for these
visits totaled $2,090.
• Hernandez received an MRI on May 7, 2014. The bill for the MRI
shows a charge for $4,112.
Dr. Zicterman testified that the services he provided Hernandez were “necessary
for the proper treatment of the conditions” he diagnosed. Dr. Zicterman agreed
that it also was necessary for Hernandez to undergo an MRI.
Appellee Delcia Saldana
Saldana was 37 years old at the time of the vehicle accident. According to
Saldana, shortly after the accident she felt pain in her neck, back, and left shoulder.
Saldana said she sought medical care the day after the accident and visited Dr.
Zicterman. Saldana said Dr. Zicterman used hot and cold therapy and electric
stimulation before referring her to have an MRI.
Saldana said she did not have any neck, back, or shoulder pain prior to the
2014 accident. Post-treatment, Saldana said certain activities can aggravate her
pain including “lifting heavy things,” “moving furniture,” and “sleeping on [her]
side.” Saldana also said she no longer goes to the gym because it causes her “a
pretty fair amount of pain.”
According to Dr. Zicterman’s testimony, Saldana presented the day after the
accident complaining of neck, lower back, and shoulder pain. After examining
Saldana, Dr. Zicterman diagnosed her with “cervicalgia, cervical sprain/strain,
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lumbar sprain/strain, and lumbago to the back, as well as pain to the left shoulder.”
Dr. Zicterman testified that Saldana underwent a course of treatment similar to
Hernandez’s, which included passive modalities, active rehabilitation, and manual
therapy.
According to Dr. Zicterman, Saldana also was referred for an MRI. Dr.
Zicterman said the MRI showed that Saldana had two disc herniations in her neck,
three disc herniations in her lower back, and “a small amount of physiological fluid
within the glenohumeral joint” of her left shoulder. Dr. Zicterman opined that
these injuries were “due to the mechanism of injury from the motor vehicle
accident.”
Dr. Zicterman’s medical records for Saldana also were admitted into
evidence. In relevant part, these records show as follows:
• Saldana visited Dr. Zicterman on March 24, 2014, the day after the
car accident. In his “Initial Evaluation” notes, Dr. Zicterman stated:
“The patient was involved in a motor vehicle accident as the front seat
passenger; was struck by another vehicle. Patient complains of low
back and cervical pain which radiates into the lower and upper
extremities and left shoulder pain.” Dr. Zicterman diagnosed Saldana
with the following conditions: (1) cervicalgia; (2) cervical
sprain/strain; (3) lumbago; (4) lumbar sprain/strain; (5) injury to the
left shoulder; and (6) muscle spasms. The bill for this visit shows a
charge for $435.
• Saldana visited Dr. Zicterman 15 times between March 26 and June 4,
2014. Visit notes for each of Saldana’s 15 visits list (1) the areas of
complaint; (2) the pain level; (3) the objectives for that day’s
treatment; and (4) the treatment administered. The bills for these
visits totaled $2,250.
• Saldana received an MRI on May 7, 2014. The bill for the MRI
shows a charge for $4,162.
Dr. Zicterman testified that the services he provided Saldana were “necessary for
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the proper treatment of the conditions” he diagnosed. Dr. Zicterman agreed that it
also was necessary for Saldana to undergo an MRI.
Appellee Chantay Solano
Solano is Saldana’s daughter and, at the time of the accident, she was 17
years old. According to Saldana, Solano was unable to testify at trial because she
had “a rash over her entire body.” Saldana said that, after the accident, Solano is
“always complaining [about] a lot of pain in her neck.” Saldana said Solano did
not complain about neck pain prior to the accident.
According to Dr. Zicterman, Solano also presented to him the day after the
accident complaining of neck and lower back pain. Dr. Zicterman performed the
same tests he did on Hernandez and Saldana and diagnosed Solano with
cervicalgia and lumbar pain. Dr. Zicterman opined that, “based on reasonable
medical probability,” Solano’s injuries were caused by “the mechanism of injury in
the car accident.”
Dr. Zicterman said he also referred Solano for an MRI. According to Dr.
Zicterman, the MRI showed that Solano had one disc herniation in her neck and
one disc herniation in her lower back. Dr. Zicterman said the MRI also showed
that Solano “had a reversal of the lordotic curve of the neck which is compatible
with muscle spasm.”
Dr. Zicterman’s medical records for Solano also were admitted into
evidence. In relevant part, these records show as follows:
• Solano visited Dr. Zicterman on March 24, 2014, the day after the car
accident. In his “Initial Evaluation” notes, Dr. Zicterman stated:
“The patient was involved in a motor vehicle accident as the rear seat
passenger; was struck by another vehicle. Patient complains of low
back and cervical pain.” Dr. Zicterman diagnosed Solano with the
following conditions: (1) cervicalgia; (2) lumbago; (3) lumbar
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sprain/strain; and (4) muscle spasms. The bill for this visit shows a
charge for $435.
• Solano visited Dr. Zicterman eight times between March 26 and April
11, 2014. Visit notes for each of Solano’s eight visits list (1) the areas
of complaint; (2) the pain level; (3) the objectives for that day’s
treatment; and (4) the treatment administered. The bills for these
visits totaled $1,450.
• Solano received an MRI on May 7, 2014. The bill for the MRI shows
a charge for $5,250.
Dr. Zicterman testified that the services he provided Solano were “necessary for
the proper treatment of the conditions” he diagnosed. Dr. Zicterman agreed that it
also was necessary for Solano to undergo an MRI.
B. Rankin’s Evidence
The jury also heard testimony from Dr. McKechnie, a chiropractor. Dr.
McKechnie reviewed the Appellees’ medical records in preparation for his
testimony. However, Dr. McKechnie did not meet or provide any treatment to the
Appellees.
When asked if Appellees “were injured as a result of the March 23, 2014
collision,” Dr. McKechnie responded: “It’s hard to say. [Dr. Zicterman’s] records
were very strange and peculiar, to say the least.” Elaborating on this point, Dr.
McKechnie testified:
I’ve never seen three individuals present to the chiropractor and have
exactly the same exam findings to the degree. I’ve never seen three
patients with the same reflex findings or straight leg raise findings or
exactly the same orthopedic findings. In my — my practice, that is —
that borderlines on the clinically impossible.
* * *
The diagnoses, with the exception of [Saldana’s] shoulder pain, are
essentially identical. The exam findings are identical. And a 17-year-
old, 29-year-old, a 37-year-old in different vehicle positions, different
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seat belt configurations all presenting with exactly the same exam
findings, that’s incredible.
Discussing Hernandez’s MRI findings, Dr. McKechnie noted that there were three
disc herniations identified on her back. According to Dr. McKechnie, this “[c]an
be” a “meaningless finding.” With respect to Solano’s MRI findings, Dr.
McKechnie testified that the notes identified a “1 millimeter broad-based
herniation.” Dr. McKechnie described this herniation as “nothing.” For the
herniations noted in Saldana’s MRI findings, Dr. McKechnie said they “are normal
age-related degenerative changes” that are “not traumatic.” Dr. McKechnie opined
that it was not necessary for the Appellees to undergo MRIs.
III. Application
On appeal, Rankin asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the award of damages because there was no evidence the accident caused
Appellees’ injuries and resulting medical expenses. Rankin contends that Dr.
Zicterman’s testimony cannot support the causation finding because it is
conclusory.
As the above evidentiary summaries show, Dr. Zicterman provided similar
testimony for all three Appellees regarding his medical conclusions and treatment.
With respect to causation, Dr. Zicterman opined that Appellees’ injuries were
caused by “the mechanism of injury” from the motor vehicle accident.
But the sufficiency of Dr. Zicterman’s opinions is not examined in isolation;
rather, we consider them in conjunction with the record as a whole to determine
whether they are impermissibly conclusory. See Gunn, 489 S.W.3d at 85-86(“When evaluating whether an expert’s testimony is speculative or conclusory, or
whether an expert’s opinion contains fatal analytical gaps, we look to the entire
record, not just to the expert’s statements in isolation.”). Here, considered with all
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the evidence presented at trial, Dr. Zicterman’s opinions on causation are not
conclusory.
Dr. Zicterman discussed his initial meeting with each Appellee the day after
the car accident, the examinations that were performed, and his diagnoses for each.
Dr. Zicterman described each Appellee’s course of treatment, which included
passive modalities, active rehabilitation, and manual therapy. Dr. Zicterman
testified that he also reviewed the Appellees’ MRIs and discussed the specific
injuries shown in each. These medical visits and the treatments that were provided
to each Appellee also were substantiated by the medical records admitted into
evidence. This evidence of Dr. Zicterman’s medical visits with Appellees, the tests
and treatments that were performed on each, and Dr. Zicterman’s reviews of those
tests provide a factual basis sufficient to support Dr. Zicterman’s opinion that the
Appellees’ injuries were caused by the motor vehicle accident with Rankin. See,
e.g., Port of Houston Auth. v. Morales, No. 14-21-00052-CV, 2022 WL 4103184,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (an
expert’s medical opinion was not conclusory because, “before opining that the
gantry accident caused Morales’s injuries, [the expert] performed an extensive
clinical examination of Morales” and “reviewed Morales’s MRIs”); Hospadales v.
McCoy, 513 S.W.3d 724, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (Dr.
Rodriguez’s causation opinion was not conclusory because it “was based on [the
plaintiff’s] description of the accident, his physical examination of [the plaintiff],
and the MRI of [the plaintiff’s] knee.”); City of Laredo v. Limon, No. 04-12-
00616-CV, 2013 WL 5948129, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 2013, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (the expert’s opinion was not conclusory because the expert
“provided a factual basis to support his opinion based on his examination of [the
plaintiff] and his review of [the plaintiff’s] medical records”).
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Moreover, Dr. Zicterman’s opinions on causation received additional factual
substantiation from other witnesses’ testimony. Hernandez testified that she felt
pain shortly after the car accident that worsened throughout the night. Hernandez
also said she did not have any back or neck pain prior to the accident and, even
with the chiropractic treatment she received, she has not been able to resume her
pre-accident level of activity. Similarly, Vela testified that Hernandez is not “as
active as she normally was.”
Saldana testified that she too felt pain in her neck, back, and shoulder shortly
after the accident. Saldana said she did not have neck, back, or shoulder pain prior
to the accident. Saldana said her post-accident activities have been limited due to
the pain resulting from the accident. Saldana said her daughter, Solano, also has
complained about neck and back pain after the accident — complaints she did not
have before the accident. Together with Dr. Zicterman’s testimony, this evidence
is legally sufficient to show that Rankin’s conduct caused an event and that the
event caused the Appellees to suffer compensable injuries. See JLG Trucking,
LLC, 466 S.W.3d at 162.
Dr. Zicterman also testified as to the treatments provided to each Appellee
based on their diagnoses. Notes for these visits were admitted into evidence; the
summary for each visit lists (1) the areas of complaint; (2) the pain level; (3) the
objectives for that day’s treatment; and (4) the treatments administered. Medical
records for each Appellee’s MRI were admitted into evidence and Dr. Zicterman
summarized their findings and their relevance with respect to Appellees’
complained-of injuries. The billing records for these treatments and MRIs were
admitted into evidence; Dr. Zicterman testified that the treatments he provided and
the subsequent MRIs were “reasonable” and “necessary” for Appellees’ treatment.
Considered with the record in its entirety, this evidence is legally sufficient to
15
establish Appellees’ past medical care expenses. See Gunn, 489 S.W.3d at 101(“A claim for past medical expenses must be supported by evidence that such
expenses were reasonable and necessary.”).
Turning to our factual sufficiency analysis, we also conclude that the
challenged finding is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Bennett, 489 S.W.3d at 66. As summarized
above, Dr. McKechnie was the only witness who offered evidence contrary to the
challenged finding. Dr. McKechnie opined as to the weaknesses in the Appellees’
medical records and testified that their MRI findings did not exhibit significant
injuries.
But it was within the jury’s province to resolve these conflicts in the
evidence. See In re Wyatt Field Serv. Co., 454 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“When presented
with conflicting testimony, the fact finder may believe one witness and disbelieve
others[.]”). Considered in light of the record as a whole, the jury’s resolution of
this conflict in favor of finding Rankin liable is not clearly wrong or manifestly
unjust. 4922 Holdings, LLC, 625 S.W.3d at 324.
On appeal, Rankin asserts that Appellees never ruled out “other causes” of
their injuries. However, as we stated above, it is necessary to rebut other plausible
causes of the claimed injuries only if there is evidence of those causes. See JLG
Trucking, LLC, 466 S.W.3d at 162. Here, there was no evidence that Appellees’
injuries were attributable to any other causes. Hernandez testified that she did not
have any neck or back pain prior to the car accident with Rankin. Similarly,
Saldana testified that neither she nor Solano had any back or neck pain prior to the
incident. Therefore, it was not necessary for Appellees to rebut other potential
causes of their claimed injuries. See id.
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After applying the applicable standards of review, we conclude that the jury
reasonably could have found that the car accident caused the Appellees’ injuries
and their subsequent treatment. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 821-22, 827.
Therefore, legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that
the accident caused Appellees’ injuries. We overrule Rankin’s sufficiency
challenge.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s May 3, 2022 final judgment.
/s/ Meagan Hassan
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Hassan.
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