In Re the Sydow Firm, PLLC and Michael D. Sydow v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  • Opinion issued May 9, 2024
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-23-00694-CV
    ———————————
    IN RE THE SYDOW FIRM, PLLC AND MICHAEL D. SYDOW, Relators
    Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Relators, The Sydow Firm, PLLC and Michael D. Sydow (collectively,
    “Sydow”), filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s
    August 9, 2023 order denying their “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,”
    and the trial court’s October 17, 2023 order on the motion to compel filed by real
    party in interest, Series 2 – Virage Master LP (“Virage”). Sydow requested that this
    Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to (1) “vacate the written
    [o]rder denying the Motion to Dismiss [for Lack of Jurisdiction],” and (2) “vacate
    its discovery rulings made from the bench,” which were memorialized in the trial
    court’s October 17, 2023 order.
    On October 26, 2023, Sydow filed an “Emergency Motion for Temporary
    Relief to Stay Trial Court’s Oct[ober] 17[, 2023] Order Compelling Production.”
    The Court granted the motion, in part, on October 31, 2023, staying enforcement of
    the October 17, 2023 order compelling production “only as to [Sydow’s] obligation
    to serve supplemental written responses and/or produce all responsive,
    non-privileged documents to Request for Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15, and
    Interrogatory No. 4.”
    This Court requested a response to Sydow’s petition for writ of mandamus.
    Virage filed a response to the mandamus petition, and Sydow filed a reply in support
    of his mandamus petition.
    We lift the stay imposed by our October 31, 2023 order and deny Sydow’s
    petition for writ of mandamus in part, and conditionally grant Sydow’s petition for
    writ of mandamus in part.1
    1
    The underlying case is Series 2 – Virage Master LP v. The Sydow Firm, PLLC and
    Michael D. Sydow, Cause No. 2023-03316, in the 113th District Court of Harris
    County, Texas, the Honorable Rabeea Sultan Collier presiding.
    2
    Background
    This original proceeding arises from a suit filed by Virage against Sydow. In
    its lawsuit, Virage brought claims for a declaratory judgment and breach of contract.
    Virage is a commercial lender which provides loans to law firms and lawyers
    to assist in financing litigation against well-funded parties. Virage and Sydow
    disagree about whether a formal contractual relationship existed between them,
    under which Virage would provide funding assistance to Sydow for certain
    contingency fee cases.
    In the mandamus petition, Sydow asserted that in October 2014, Sydow
    “engaged . . . with a broker to possibly get nonrecourse funding for two . . . cases.”
    Sydow was then “directed to an electronic platform for attorneys called LitCap.”
    After entering information regarding the cases, Sydow was “matched . . . with
    Virage as a funder willing to review the two . . . cases.”
    According to Virage, after negotiating the terms of an agreement, the parties
    entered into a commercial lending agreement under which Virage would provide
    litigation loans to Sydow, referred to as the “LitCap Business Expense Note Number
    711” (the “Note”). Virage stated that the Note was electronically executed by Virage
    and Sydow on November 20, 2014 via the LitCap electronic platform. However,
    Sydow asserted that, despite being “informed that the [N]ote was available for
    3
    review on the LitCap platform,” Sydow was not able to “review it or otherwise sign
    onto the LitCap platform.”
    Despite this assertion, the mandamus record included a copy of the Note
    which was electronically executed by both Virage and Sydow. However, Sydow
    asserted that he “did not approve by any interaction with the LitCap platform . . . his
    or his firm’s consent or approval of an electronic signature to any note.”
    Accordingly, Sydow “denied signing any note or guaranty, electronically or
    otherwise.”
    The terms of the Note provided that Virage would lend Sydow $2,060,000 for
    litigation funding in exchange for, among other things, a security interest in the
    recovery on litigation matters specifically identified in the Note. The Note also
    provided that Sydow was required to provide a quarterly status report to Virage for
    each litigation matter identified in the Note, describing “the current status of each
    Litigation Matter, the minimum amount in controversy in respect therefore, the
    anticipated date of any Recovery Event,” and “any change in the status of any
    Litigation Matter” since the previous quarterly status report.
    Notably, despite the assertions that he “did not approve . . . an electronic
    signature to any note,” Sydow’s mandamus petition does not dispute that Virage
    performed its obligations under the Note, specifically, by loaning $2,060,000 to
    Sydow. According to its suit, Virage “performed its obligations under the Note” by
    4
    “advancing $2,060,000” to Sydow. However, Virage asserted that Sydow “ha[d]
    only repaid $22,425 to Virage.” In its suit, Virage alleged that Sydow breached and
    defaulted on the Note by failing to make the required payments from recoveries in
    the litigation matters that were collateral for the Note and he failed to provide the
    required quarterly status reports.
    On May 22, 2023, Sydow filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.”
    In the motion to dismiss, Sydow argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
    the case because Virage “lacked standing to sue” as it “could not prove [that] it was
    a ‘holder’ in due course” of the Note.
    Separately, on March 30, 2023, Virage served written discovery on Sydow,
    including requests for production and interrogatories. After Sydow served his
    responses and objections, which Virage deemed deficient, Virage filed a motion to
    compel in the trial court on June 30, 2023. In its motion to compel, Virage requested
    that the trial court overrule certain objections offered by Sydow. Specifically,
    Virage challenged Sydow’s objections to the requests for documents and
    information covering three categories: (1) communications between Sydow and a
    receiver in a turnover proceeding pending in a different trial court, (2) documents
    and information concerning the collateral cases identified in the Note, and (3)
    financial information and records of Sydow purportedly “related” to Sydow’s
    recovery of fees and expenses “that are owed to Virage under the Note.”
    5
    On August 8, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Sydow’s motion to
    dismiss and Virage’s motion to compel. During the hearing, the trial court orally
    stated on the record that it was sustaining Sydow’s objections to Virage’s request to
    produce tax records, but that it was overruling all other objections asserted by Sydow
    which were challenged by Virage. On August 9, 2023, the trial court entered an
    order denying Sydow’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On October 17,
    2023, the trial court entered an order memorializing its rulings from the August 8,
    2023 hearing on Virage’s motion to compel.
    Sydow, in his reply in support of the mandamus petition, complained that “the
    trial court overruled [his] objections to four key discovery requests involving [his]
    and [his] Firm’s confidential and sensitive financial information.” Sydow further
    asserted that the “four discovery requests are vastly overbroad and, if Sydow and
    [his] Firm must respond to them, [it] will subject Sydow and [his] Firm to irreparable
    harm.”
    Specifically, Sydow complained about the trial court’s order granting
    Virage’s motion to compel, overruling his objections to Request for Production Nos.
    12, 14, and 15, and Interrogatory No. 4. Those requests, and Sydow’s response,
    were as follows:
    Request for Production No. 12: All financial records, including
    balance sheets, statements of cash flow, profit and loss statements, and
    bank statements of The Sydow Firm and any related entity from
    November 2014 to present.
    6
    Response: Defendant, The Sydow Firm, PLLC objects to this request
    as it is overbroad and unduly burdensome and invades the right to
    privacy. [Sydow] further objects that such discovery is outside the
    scope of permissible discovery under the Texas Rules of Civil
    Procedure and is not the type of discovery permitted by the rules of
    discovery. Furthermore, Defendant, The Sydow Firm, PLLC is not a
    proper party to this suit having been formed on May 28, 2019.
    Request for Production No. 14: All bank statements for all accounts
    owned or accessible by The Sydow Firm, and any related entity,
    including operating accounts and IOLTA accounts, from November
    2014 to present.
    Response: To the extent this would disclose attorney-client privilege,
    [Sydow] assert[s] that privilege. Defendant, The Sydow Firm, PLLC
    objects to this request as it is overbroad and unduly burdensome and
    invades the right to privacy. [Sydow] further objects that such
    discovery is outside the scope of permissible discovery under the Texas
    Rules of Civil Procedure and is not the type of discovery permitted by
    the rules of discovery. Furthermore, Defendant, The Sydow Firm,
    PLLC is not a proper party to this suit having been formed on May 28,
    2019.
    Request for Production No. 15: All bank statements for all accounts
    owned or accessible by Sydow, including personal or business
    accounts, from November 2014 to present.
    Response: Defendant, Sydow objects to this request as it is overbroad
    and unduly burdensome and invades the right to privacy. [Sydow]
    further objects that such discovery is outside the scope of permissible
    discovery under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and is not the type
    of discovery permitted by the rules of discovery.
    Interrogatory No. 4: Identify all bank accounts, including by account
    number, that are referenced in Requests for Production Nos. 12, 13, and
    14.
    Response: [Sydow] objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it
    is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence that
    would be admissible at time of trial. [Sydow] further object[s] on the
    ground of [his] right to privacy as recognized by Texas law.
    7
    In its October 17, 2023 order, the trial court ordered Sydow to “serve
    supplemental written responses and produce all responsive non-privileged
    documents” to Request for Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15, and to “serve
    supplemental written responses” to Interrogatory No. 4 “within 14 days of the entry”
    of the trial court’s order. Sydow’s mandamus petition challenging the trial court’s
    August 9, 2023 order denying his motion to dismiss and the trial court’s discovery
    rulings followed.
    This Court requested a response to Sydow’s mandamus petition. Virage filed
    a response to the mandamus petition. Sydow then filed a reply in support of his
    request for mandamus relief.
    Standard of Review
    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is only available in limited
    circumstances. See Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 839–40 (Tex. 1992).
    Specifically, mandamus relief is only available where a relator establishes two
    requirements.   First, relator must establish that the trial court has abused its
    discretion. See 
    id.
     Second, a relator must establish that it has no adequate remedy
    by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    148 S.W.3d 124
    , 135–36 (Tex. 2004).
    Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
    In his first issue, Sydow argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction” because Virage lacks
    8
    standing. Thus, Sydow’s mandamus petition requested that this Court “issue a Writ
    of Mandamus to [the trial court] directing it to vacate the denial of the Plea to the
    Jurisdiction.”
    While Sydow’s motion filed in the trial court was titled a “Motion to Dismiss
    for Lack of Jurisdiction,” as Sydow correctly noted in his mandamus petition, “[a]
    motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a plea to the
    jurisdiction.” See Wheeler v. Law Office of Frank Powell, No. 01-22-00479-CV,
    
    2023 WL 5535670
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2023, no pet.)
    (mem. op.).
    We conclude that Sydow has failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus
    relief from the trial court’s August 9, 2023 order denying his motion to dismiss for
    lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we deny Sydow’s petition for writ of mandamus
    to the extent that it requests that we direct the trial court to vacate its August 9, 2023
    order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).
    Discovery Rulings
    In his second issue, Sydow argued that the trial court abused its discretion in
    overruling his discovery objections because the discovery requests go beyond the
    scope of permissible discovery for breach of contract and are invasive. Specifically,
    in his reply in support of his mandamus petition, Sydow complained that “the trial
    court overruled [his] objections to four key discovery requests involving Sydow’s
    9
    and [his] Firm’s confidential and sensitive financial information.” Sydow further
    asserted that the “four discovery requests [were] vastly overbroad and, if Sydow and
    [his] Firm must respond to them, [the discovery requests] will subject Sydow and
    [his] Firm to irreparable harm.”
    “Generally, the scope of discovery is within the trial court’s discretion.” In
    re CSX Corp., 
    124 S.W.3d 149
    , 152 (Tex. 2003). However, where a trial court
    “compels overly broad discovery well outside the bounds of proper discovery,” the
    trial court commits “an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper
    remedy.” See In re Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., 
    210 S.W.3d 598
    , 600 (Tex. 2006).
    The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure define the general scope of discovery as
    any unprivileged information that is relevant to the subject of the action, even if it
    would be inadmissible at trial, so long as the information is “reasonably calculated
    to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).
    However, the rules do not permit a party to use discovery as a “fishing
    expedition . . . simply to explore.” See Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 
    909 S.W.2d 491
    , 492 (Tex. 1995); see also In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152–53; In
    re Am. Optical, 
    988 S.W.2d 711
    , 713 (Tex. 1998). Accordingly, while the scope of
    discovery is broad, discovery requests must be “reasonably tailored” to include only
    relevant matters. See In re Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d at 713.
    10
    In his mandamus petition, Sydow challenged the trial court’s order overruling
    his objections, and compelling Sydow to respond and produce documents, in
    response to Request for Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15, and Interrogatory No. 4.:
    Request for Production No. 12: All financial records, including
    balance sheets, statements of cash flow, profit and loss statements, and
    bank statements of The Sydow Firm and any related entity from
    November 2014 to present.
    Request for Production No. 14: All bank statements for all accounts
    owned or accessible by The Sydow Firm, and any related entity,
    including operating accounts and IOLTA accounts, from November
    2014 to present.
    Request for Production No. 15: All bank statements for all accounts
    owned or accessible by Sydow, including personal or business
    accounts, from November 2014 to present.
    Interrogatory No. 4: Identify all bank accounts, including by account
    number, that are referenced in Requests for Production Nos. 12, 13, and
    14.
    Sydow asserted that “[b]y seeking all financial records, without limitation,
    Virage’s discovery requests d[id] not comply with the requirement that they be
    reasonably tailored to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Further, Sydow
    argued that the discovery requests were overbroad because they seek financial
    records and information “irrespective of any connection to [Virage’s] suit to recover
    on its promissory note,” and Virage “d[id] not explain . . . how all of [Sydow’s]
    financial records, bank statements and bank accounts ha[d] any relevance at all to”
    its claims.
    11
    In arguing that the requested documents were discoverable, Virage stated that
    the “requests were crafted to capture evidence that, as Virage ha[d] alleged, Sydow
    ha[d] obtained recoveries on various cases identified in the Note but failed to either
    report those recoveries or make payments from them to Virage as required under the
    Note.” Virage further attacked Sydow’s objection that these requests invaded a
    “right to privacy,” asserting that there was “no constitutional privacy right in
    personal financial records.” According to Virage, the records related to the financial
    condition of Sydow are relevant to assist it in “investigat[ing] the full extent of
    [Sydow’s] breaches of contract,” and to “show the extent of the alleged breach which
    includes a failure to pay and a failure to report” earnings from the litigation matters
    for which Virage provided a loan to Sydow.
    While certain records relating to Sydow’s financial condition may be relevant,
    “discovery may not be used as a fishing expedition.” See In re Am. Optical, 988
    S.W.3d at 713. In the challenged discovery, Virage requested “[a]ll financial
    records . . . of The Sydow Firm and any related entity from November 2014 to
    present,” “[a]ll bank statements for all accounts owned or accessible by The Sydow
    Firm . . . from November 2014 to present,” “[a]ll bank statements for all accounts
    owned or accessible by Sydow, including personal or business accounts, from
    November 2014 to present,” and that Sydow “[i]dentify all bank accounts, including
    12
    by account number, that are referenced” in response to the requests for production.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Sydow objected to Virage’s requests for “all” documents and records as
    overly broad. We note that a “central consideration in determining overbreadth is
    whether the request could have been more narrowly tailored to avoid including
    tenuous information and still obtain the necessary, pertinent information.” See In re
    CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153. Virage asserted that the requested records were
    necessary in investigating the full extent of Sydow’s breaches of contract,
    specifically, the failure to pay and report earnings from the litigation matters
    identified in the Note. However, Virage failed to articulate why production of “[a]ll
    financial records . . . of The Sydow Firm and any related entity from November 2014
    to present,” “[a]ll bank statements for all accounts owned or accessible by The
    Sydow Firm . . . from November 2014 to present,” and “[a]ll bank statements for all
    accounts owned or accessible by Sydow, including personal or business accounts,
    from November 2014 to present,” was necessary to obtain that information.
    (Emphasis added.) Or, more directly, Virage failed to articulate why a more
    narrowly tailored request for records would be insufficient.
    We conclude that Virage’s challenged requests which seek “all” documents
    and records are an impermissible fishing expedition and are not sufficiently
    13
    “narrowly tailored to avoid including tenuous information,” but still “obtain the
    necessary, pertinent information.” Id.
    Because we conclude that the trial court’s October 17, 2023 discovery order
    is overbroad, the trial court has abused its discretion and the order must be vacated
    if there is no adequate remedy on appeal. See In re Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d at 713.
    We further conclude that no adequate appellate remedy exists, because where a
    discovery order compels production of irrelevant or duplicative documents, there is
    no adequate appellate remedy. See In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 153.
    Conclusion
    We conclude that, as written, Request for Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15 and
    Interrogatory No. 4 are overbroad and not “narrowly tailored” to seek only relevant
    information. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    277 S.W.3d 667
    , 669 (Tex. 2007)
    (concluding trial court abused its discretion by compelling production to overbroad
    requests that “could easily have been more narrowly tailored to the dispute at hand”).
    We therefore lift the stay imposed by our October 31, 2023 order and conditionally
    grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its October 17, 2023 order
    to the extent that it overrules Sydow’s objections to the overbreadth of Request for
    Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15 and Interrogatory No. 4 and to the extent that it orders
    Sydow to serve supplement written responses and/or produce documents in response
    to Request for Production Nos. 12, 14, and 15 and Interrogatory No. 4.
    14
    However, we deny Sydow’s petition for writ of mandamus to the extent that
    Sydow requests this Court to direct the trial court to vacate its August 9, 2023 order
    denying Sydow’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    We are confident that the trial court will comply with this Court’s ruling, and
    the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within thirty days of the date
    of this opinion. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
    Amparo Monique Guerra
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-23-00694-CV

Filed Date: 5/9/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/13/2024