Chris Albers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ( 2024 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-23-00230-CV
__________________
CHRIS ALBERS, Appellant
V.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 284th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 20-08-09819-CV
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Chris Albers (“Appellant” or “Albers”) sued Appellee State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Appellee” or “State Farm”) for
declaratory judgment. The parties entered into a settlement agreement just before
trial. In an amended petition, Albers added a claim for breach of the settlement
agreement, and he also filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted
Albers’s summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, but the court did not
1
award Albers attorney’s fees. In this appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court
erred by failing to award him attorney’s fees under section 38.001 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. We affirm as modified.
Background
The underlying lawsuit 1 began in August of 2020, when Albers filed his
Original Petition against State Farm seeking declaratory judgment as to his right to
underinsured motorist benefits under a policy with State Farm. Albers also sought
attorney’s fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act. According to the petition,
Albers was injured when he was struck by Lauren Marshburn, who was insured by
State Farm. Albers settled with Marshburn with State Farm’s consent, but Albers’s
damages exceeded Marshburn’s liability limit. State Farm asserted a general denial
answer and asserted certain affirmative defenses. In his First Amended Petition,
Albers added a bad faith claim against State Farm.
Just before trial, the parties told the trial court that they had reached a
settlement agreement under which State Farm would pay Albers $32,500 in
exchange for a release of all claims. Counsel for the parties told the trial court,
[Counsel for State Farm]: Your Honor, we’re coming now the parties,
State Farm and Mr. Albers, through counsel, announcing that the claims
and causes of action against Mr. Albers asserted in this cause have been
settled. State Farm has agreed to pay and Mr. Albers has agreed to
1
Because this appeal pertains only to the trial court’s failure to award
attorney’s fees, we discuss the details of the underlying lawsuit only as necessary.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
2
accept 32,500 [] in full settlement of its claims against State Farm. The
only condition to the settlement is the parties need to confirm that the
impasse payment previously made has not been cashed.
[Counsel for Albers]: And the plaintiffs agree that that is the settlement
we have reached. We’re good.
Albers filed a Supplemental and Amended Petition alleging that State Farm
failed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement and asserting a breach
of contract claim against State Farm and a claim for attorney’s fees under Chapter
38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
In March of 2023, Albers filed a Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therein, Albers alleged that the parties had reached a settlement agreement in open
court on September 6, 2022, under which Albers would provide a release to State
Farm contingent upon the receipt of a $32,500 payment to Albers from State Farm
and that State Farm did not pay as agreed. Albers stated in the motion that State Farm
had indicated it required confirmation that a previously-issued “impasse” check had
not been cashed. According to Albers’ motion, State Farm had issued the check for
the “impasse payment” of $2,090.92 made payable to “Christopher Albers & David
Kallus Attorney at Law, His Attorney.” However, the check was actually delivered
to State Farm’s original attorneys, Sheehy, Ware, Pappas & Grubbs (“Sheehy
Ware”) and was inadvertently cashed. When the misrouted check was discovered,
Sheehy Ware issued a check from its IOLTA account to Brenton Stanfield, Albers’s
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attorney at the time. Mr. Stanfield held the check, as it was made payable to Albers
and David Kallus.
According to Albers, even after issues related to the issuance of the impasse
payment were resolved, State Farm refused to make the settlement payment to
Albers. Albers alleged the settlement agreement is enforceable under Rule 11, and
“the only [c]ondition placed on this settlement was confirmation that the Impasse
Payment Check had not been cashed by Mr. Albers or his counsel.” Albers also
argued he provided State Farm with a full and final release and indemnity agreement
contingent upon receipt of the $32,500 payment. Albers attached to the motion a
copy of a letter dated October 13, 2022, from Albers’s attorney—Brenton
Stanfield—to counsel for State Farm stating that Albers fully performed his
obligation under the settlement agreement and State Farm failed to comply. The
letter further stated that it constituted presentment of Albers’s claim under Chapter
38. The motion for summary judgment requested damages in the amount of $32,500
and attorney’s fees under Chapter 38.
Albers’s motion requested that the trial court award him reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees of $8,802.50 that he incurred in prosecuting the lawsuit,
and a copy of an “Attorney Fees Statement for Albers v. State Farm” was attached
to the motion. Albers also attached to the motion an Unsworn Declaration of Brenton
M. Stanfield—Albers’s attorney at the time—in which Stanfield states that he had
4
worked 25.15 hours prosecuting the lawsuit on behalf of Albers, at an hourly rate of
$350 an hour and that “Mr. Albers ought to recover the reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs requested herein, in the amount of $8,802.50 pursuant to Texas Civil
Practice[] and Remedies Code § 38.001 and the contract between the parties.”
Stanfield also states that he anticipated that Albers would incur at least $975 in
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees replying to State Farm’s response and $650
if a hearing was required. Stanfield’s declaration also states that he retained the
“Impasse Payment Check” in his files and did not cash the check.
In the response to the motion for summary judgment, State Farm asserted that
although the parties announced a settlement in court on September 6, 2022, the
parties have disagreed about language of the release agreement and the full terms of
the settlement and release “remain undefined and unagreed[.]” State Farm noted in
its response that Albers had signed a release agreement prepared by his own attorney
and that he had not signed a release prepared by State Farm. State Farm did not
challenge the reasonableness or necessity of the amount of the attorney’s fees in its
response to the motion for summary judgment.
Albers filed a reply to State Farm’s response asserting as “indisputable” that
Albers and State Farm entered an enforceable settlement agreement in court and on
the record on September 6, 2022, and that State Farm had not paid Albers $32,500
as agreed.
5
On June 15, 2023, the trial court signed an Order Granting Plaintiff Chris
Albers’s Motion for Summary Judgment on his breach of contract claim, ordering
that Albers recover $32,500 from State Farm along with pre- and post-judgment
interest. The order included the following findings:
The Court Finds that the uncontroverted facts demonstrate the
following:
1. Mr. Albers’s filed suit against State Farm on August 17, 2020,
seeking a declaratory judgment awarding him underinsured motorist
(“UIM”) benefits against his automobile insurer, State Farm.
2. The case was called to trial on September 6, 2022, and Mr. Albers
and State Farm appeared in open court in the 284th Judicial District,
before the Honorable Suzanne Stovall, and announced a settlement of
Mr. Albers’[s] claims against State Farm in this case (Cause No. 20-08-
09819) on the record.
3. State Farm agreed to settle this case by paying to Mr. Albers the sum
of $32,500.00 (“Settlement Payment”) as a full and final settlement of
all claims (“Settlement Agreement”).
4. Mr. Albers has complied with all of his obligations under the
Settlement Agreement.
5. State Farm failed to provide the Settlement Payment as agreed and is
in breach of the Settlement Agreement.
6. Mr. Albers has suffered damages in the amount of $32,500.00 as a
result of State Farm’s breach.
7. On October 13, 2022, Mr. Albers sent a formal demand letter to State
Farm demanding immediate payment of the Settlement Payment and
making formal presentment under Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.
8. However, State Farm has refused and failed to pay the Settlement
Payment.
9. Mr. Albers has incurred $8,802.50 in reasonable and necessary
attorney fees prosecuting his lawsuit to enforce the settlement
agreement and an additional $975.00 in reasonable and necessary
attorney fees replying to State Farm’s response to Mr. Albers[’s]
motion for summary judgment.
6
In the decretal part of the Order the trial court ordered that Albers have summary
judgment against State Farm, recover $32,500 in actual damages, but manually
struck out the paragraph awarding attorney’s fees of $9,777.50.
During the trial, Albers’s initial attorney, David Kallus, filed a petition in
intervention. The essence of his claim is that he was damaged because State Farm
sent the IRS a “false and fraudulent” 1099-Misc. tax form for the misrouted “impasse
payment” check. After the court granted summary judgment for Albers, it denied
summary judgment for Kallus. Albers filed a Motion to Sever, arguing that Kallus’s
claims can be tried in a separate action. The trial court granted Albers’s motion,
severed Kallus’s claims against State Farm into a separate cause number and granted
the severance on August 8, 2023. In the severance order, the trial court incorporated
the Order Granting Albers’s summary judgment and rendered a final judgment
disposing of all claims between Albers and State Farm. Albers timely appealed.
Issue and Summary of Arguments on Appeal
In a single issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred and abused its
discretion by failing to award him $9,777.50 in attorney’s fees. Appellant contends
that the evidence established, and the trial court found, that proper presentment was
made, and that the attorney’s fees were incurred and reasonable and necessary.
According to Appellant, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the
fees.
7
Appellee argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
award any attorney’s fees and that there was no finding that the fees were reasonable
and necessary. Appellee argues that “the fees sought relate to an unrelated and
collateral complaint by Intervenor David [] Kallus[.]” Appellee also asks in the
alternative that the court of appeals remand the case to the trial court for further
determination of the amount to be awarded in attorney’s fees.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Helena Chem. Co. v. Cox,
664 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2023); Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 481
(Tex. 2015). In our review we take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant,
indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, and resolving any
doubts in the non-movant’s favor. See Helena Chem. Co., 664 S.W.3d at 73; Valence
Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Ordinarily, findings of
fact and conclusions of law have no place in a summary judgment proceeding
because, for summary judgment to be rendered, there cannot be a genuine issue as
to any material fact, and the legal grounds are limited to those stated in the motion
and response. IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442
(Tex. 1997); Linwood v. NCNB Tex., 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994). “Issues not
expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response
shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
8
Therefore, the non-movant must expressly present in writing any reasons or
arguments why the movant is not entitled to summary judgment. City of Hous. v.
Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).
Whether a party may recover attorney’s fees under a particular statute is a
question of law that we review de novo. See Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Needham, 82
S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002) (“We review legal questions de novo.”); Holland v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (availability of
attorney’s fees under a statute is a question of law). The amount of attorney’s fees
awarded by a trial court is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex. 1998). Section 38.001 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that a person “may” recover reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs on a valid claim based on an oral or written contract. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(b)(8). To recover attorney’s fees under
this provision, a party must prevail on his underlying contract claim, and he must
recover damages or other affirmative relief. See Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C. v.
Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d 816, 824-25
(Tex. 2024) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992); Intercontinental
Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. 2009)); Ventling
v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015).
9
“A settlement agreement is a contract, and its construction is governed by
legal principles applicable to contracts generally.” See Austin Tr. Co. as Tr. of Bob
& Elizabeth Lanier Descendants Trs. for Robert Clayton Lanier, Jr. v. Houren, 664
S.W.3d 35, 42 (Tex. 2023) (citing Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.
1990)). A Rule 11 agreement made in open court and entered of record is enforceable
provided the contract terms that are “material and essential” to the parties’ agreement
are certain. Moore v. Patriot Security Inc., No. 09-16-00182-CV, 2018 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1760, at *15 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 8, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 11; Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex.
2016)). A settlement agreement may still be enforceable even if some of the terms
remain to be negotiated. See id. at *16; see also Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., Inc., 489
S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1972) (“[P]arties may agree upon some of the terms of a
contract, and understand them to be an agreement, and yet leave other portions of an
agreement to be made later.”).
As a general rule, the party seeking to recover attorney’s fees carries the
burden of proof to show its entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 38.001. See
Note Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 476 S.W.3d 463, 483 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2015, no pet.) (citing Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Tr., 296 S.W.3d
545, 547 (Tex. 2009)). Generally, when fee-shifting is authorized by statute or
contract, the party seeking the fee award must prove that the requested attorney’s
10
fees are reasonable and necessary. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare,
LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 484 (Tex. 2019). However, when a claim for attorney’s fees
is based on Chapter 38, it is presumed that the usual and customary attorney’s fees
are reasonable, although that presumption may be rebutted. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 38.003. “[A]n award of attorney’s fees is mandatory when a
statute provides that a party who prevails on its claim or meets other specified
requirements ‘may recover,’ ‘shall be awarded,’ or ‘is entitled to’ fees.” Sealy
Emergency Room, L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d at 825 (citing Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20).
Generally, when a statute requires the trial court to award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party, “the trial court has no discretion to deny attorney’s fees when
presented with evidence of the same.” Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 154 (citing Bocquet,
972 S.W.2d at 20). Because this case was decided on summary judgment, Albers
was entitled to his attorney’s fees only if his summary judgment evidence
conclusively established the amount of the fees. See McMahan v. Izen, No. 01-20-
00233-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7339, at **29-30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Sept. 2, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Cossio v. Delgado, No. 01-17-
00704-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4828, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June
28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
When a movant includes a request for attorney’s fees in his summary
judgment motion, an attached affidavit or unsworn declaration made in compliance
11
with applicable law is testimony that may be considered proof of the attorney’s fees
incurred. J.R. Richard Enters. v. Niz, No. 01-20-00124-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS
9993, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing Petrello v. Prucka, 415 S.W.3d 420, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013, no pet.)); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 132.001(a). Even if
the testimony comes from an interested witness, the movant establishes the amount
of attorney’s fees as a matter of law when the testimony is clear, direct, positive, not
contradicted by any other witness or attendant circumstances, and could have been
easily controverted by the non-movant. See Smith, 296 S.W.3d at 547 (citing
Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990)). To
create a fact issue, the non-movant must file a counter-affidavit contesting the
reasonableness of the movant’s attorney’s fee claim. Petrello, 415 S.W.3d at 431
(citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001(b)). Unless a controverting
affidavit is filed, an affidavit (or in this case a compliant unsworn declaration) as to
the amount of attorney’s fees is presumed reasonable. Hunsucker v. Fustok, 238
S.W.3d 421, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001(b). A trial court abuses its discretion in denying
attorney’s fees when the movant files an affidavit for fees and the non-movant does
not create a fact issue as to the attorney’s fees. See Hunsucker, 238 S.W.3d at 432
(citing Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882).
12
In reviewing the sufficiency of the attorney-fee evidence in this case, the
lodestar analysis applies. See Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 497-98. The starting
point for calculating an award of attorney’s fees is “determining the reasonable hours
worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,” and the party seeking recovery of
attorney’s fees bears the burden of providing sufficient evidence on both counts. Id.
at 498; El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012) (stating that first
step of lodestar analysis involves determining reasonable hours spent by counsel and
reasonable hourly rate, then multiplying number of hours by rate to get base lodestar
and that second step of analysis involves adjusting base amount up or down “if
relevant factors indicate an adjustment is necessary to reach a reasonable fee in the
case[]”). “This base lodestar figure should approximate the reasonable value of legal
services provided in prosecuting or defending the prevailing party’s claim through
the litigation process.” Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 498. “[T]here is a
presumption that the base lodestar calculation, when supported by sufficient
evidence, reflects the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that can be shifted to
the non-prevailing party.” Id. at 499.
“Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular
services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the
services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the
services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such
13
services.” Id. at 502. Obtaining such evidence requires “itemizing specific tasks[]”
and “the time required for those tasks[.]” Id. at 495 (quoting City of Laredo v.
Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)). In addition, a claimant
seeking recovery of attorney’s fees bears the burden to plead and prove presentment.
Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. 1983) (op. on reh’g).
Analysis
Albers prevailed on his motion for summary judgment against State Farm,
thus satisfying the requirement that he prevail on his underlying contract claim to
recover attorney’s fees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001(b)(8); Sealy
Emergency Room, L.L.C., 685 S.W.3d at 824-25. Therefore, if the record includes
sufficient evidence of presentment and of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees,
“the trial court has no discretion to deny attorney’s fees when presented with
evidence of the same.” Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 154. A movant is entitled to his
attorney’s fees if his summary judgment evidence conclusively established the
amount of his fees. See McMahan, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7339, at **29-30.
In his declaration, Stanfield (Albers’s attorney) stated that he is licensed to
practice law in Texas, that he had practiced civil litigation in Montgomery and Harris
Counties since 2006, and that he had the experience, training, and specialized
knowledge necessary to establish and provide expert testimony regarding reasonable
and necessary attorney fees in cases like this one. Stanfield stated that attached to
14
his declaration was a record of the time he spent on this case and attorney fee records.
Stanfield attached an “Attorney Fees Statement for Albers v. State Farm.” The
statement contains the date, a description of work performed, time worked, the
hourly rate, and a total amount billed for dates ranging from October 13, 2022
through March 3, 2023. In his declaration, Stanfield represented that he performed
the work itemized on the statement. This generally corresponds to the requirements
outlined in Rohrmoos Venture. See 578 S.W.3d at 502. In addition, the record
includes a letter dated October 13, 2022, from Albers’s attorney to State Farm
stating, in relevant part, “[t]his correspondence constitutes presentment of [Albers’s]
claim pursuant to Chapter 38.” See Ellis, 656 S.W.2d at 905.
As we explained earlier, under section 38.003 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, it is presumed that the usual and customary attorney’s fees are
reasonable, although that presumption may be rebutted. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 38.003. State Farm did not offer any evidence to rebut Albers
representation that the fees listed in the “Attorney Fees Statement for Albers v. State
Farm” were usual and customary. In its response to the motion for summary
judgment, State Farm did not challenge the amount of the attorney’s fees or make
any argument that the fees did not relate to Albers’s claim. Therefore, the
presumption in sections 18.001 and 38.003 applied. See id. §§ 18.001, 38.003.
15
Although Appellee State Farm suggests on appeal that some of the work
represented on the Attorney Fees Statement relates to “an unrelated and collateral
complaint by Intervenor” David Kallus, we find this argument is not supported by
the record. First, State Farm failed to make this argument in the trial court in its
response to the motion for summary judgment. See Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589
S.W.2d at 677-78. Second, there is no indication in the record that Mr. Stanfield
represented David Kallus either as attorney for Kallus on Kallus’s Petition in
Intervention or in Kallus’s separately filed Motion for Summary Judgment. Each of
those documents reflect that Kallus represented himself in the Intervention and on
Kallus’s motion. Third, we note that although the billing statement attached by
Stanfield to the motion for summary judgment references a 1099-MISC, the record
shows that State Farm also mistakenly sent Albers a 1099-MISC, and Stanfield made
a demand on State Farm to retract the 1099-MISC that was sent to Albers. Therefore,
we find State Farm’s argument unavailing.
State Farm failed to raise a material fact issue in the trial court as to the
reasonableness or necessity of the fees set forth in Stanfield’s declaration, and it
failed to file an affidavit or declaration controverting Stanfield’s declaration. See
J.R. Richard Enters., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9993, at *11 (citing Petrello, 415
S.W.3d at 431). The amount Albers requested for attorney’s fees was clear, direct,
16
positive, and could have been readily controverted if the amount was not reasonable.
See Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882.
We conclude from the record before us that Albers prevailed on his breach of
contract claim against State Farm, there was uncontroverted evidence of presentment
of the claim under Chapter 38, State Farm did not challenge the amount,
reasonableness, or necessity of the fees presented, and the trial court erred in denying
a recovery of attorney’s fees. See Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 154. Using the lodestar
method, Stanfield’s unchallenged declaration and itemized billing record
conclusively established his attorney’s fees for prosecuting this suit in the trial court.
See McMahan, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7339, at *33; J.R. Richard Enters., 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 9993, at *11. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding no attorney’s fees in the face of uncontroverted evidence of the fees
incurred. See McMahan, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7339, at *33; J.R. Richard Enters.,
2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 9993, at *11; Hunsucker, 238 S.W.3d at 432 (holding trial
court abused its discretion in awarding no attorney’s fees where uncontroverted
affidavit established reasonableness of fees). Therefore, we sustain Albers’s sole
issue, and we modify the trial court’s judgment in accordance with the uncontested
17
evidence to add $9,777.50 for attorney’s fees. 2 See J.R. Richard Enters., 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 9993, at *11.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on December 20, 2023
Opinion Delivered July 18, 2024
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
2
The Stanfield declaration stated that $8,802.50 had been incurred at the time
he filed his motion for summary judgment, and another $975 would be incurred to
reply to a response by State Farm, for a total of $9,777.50.
18