Derris Lee Reynolds v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-24-00068-CR
DERRIS LEE REYNOLDS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1793529
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Derris Lee Reynolds appeals1 his convictions for terroristic threat2 and unlawful
restraint.3 Because we find that the evidence (1) establishes his intent to put the victim in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury, (2) shows he unlawfully restrained his victim, and (3) shows he
intended to unlawfully restrain the victim, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.4
I. Trial Evidence
Reynolds was thirty-eight years old when he returned to Arlington to live with his
mother. Several months prior, he had moved to California to live with his father. Due to
Reynolds’s behavior and mental-health problems, “his father just dropped him off at the airport”
in California “and paid for his ticket” back to North Texas, according to Reynolds’s mother, Jill
Reynolds (Jill).5 Jill picked him up from the airport and took him to her apartment in Arlington.
Within two days, Reynolds began exhibiting paranoia and violent behavior.
On August 22, 2023, Jill and Reynolds drove to a UPS store to scan paperwork for
Reynolds’s application for college. On the way, Reynolds accused Jill of not “want[ing] him to
1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We are unaware of
any conflict between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07.
3
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.01(1)(A), 20.02 (Supp.).
4
Reynolds was sentenced to 180-days confinement in the Tarrant County Jail for each offense and was found to have
already served more than 180 days in jail.
5
The family hoped that, while in California, Reynolds could work for his father’s company and receive better
healthcare than what was available in Texas, but that arrangement did not work out. Jill testified that Reynolds’s
“father couldn’t take him anymore, and [Reynolds] wouldn’t go to a mental[-]health facility, so his father sent him
back” to the Dallas Metroplex.
2
go to school” and “trying to take his school money and . . . different conspiracies and paranoia
stuff.” They argued about events in California with his father, and then Reynolds “went ballistic
. . . just a lot of cuss words . . . punching [her] car, hitting the window, the door, his hands
flailing.” Jill stated, “It was just awful.” Reynolds threatened to kill Jill, but from the record, it
is not clear if those threats were made before the errand or during the car ride.
During the car ride, Reynolds began spitting on Jill and exhibited strange, violent
behavior, which she described as “screaming, pounding the car, pounding, moving his feet,
moving his hand, and he hit[] [her] . . . .” She stated, “It wasn’t like a punch.” But she said that
Reynolds made contact with her ear and neck, that it hurt, and that she was scared.
Jill testified that, when they got home from the errand, Reynolds “held [her] hostage” in a
room in the apartment. He screamed at and spat on her and accused her of being a “clone” of his
real mother. Jill “was held hostage” in that room until she finished a task for Reynolds’s school
application. At that point, she told Reynolds, “Let me go.” She testified, “[H]e stood in the door
screaming and his hands are flailing, like he does, telling me all these things.” According to Jill,
Reynolds “finally . . . went to the side,” and she was able to leave the room and then the
apartment. She then called the police, her daughter, and a family friend for help. Those events
led to Reynolds’s arrest and prosecution.6
On appeal, Reynolds claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove (1) his intent to
place Jill in fear of imminent seriously bodily injury, (2) that he unlawfully restrained Jill, and
(3) that he intentionally or knowingly unlawfully restrained Jill.
6
Reynolds was also charged with assault causing bodily injury against a family member. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.01 (Supp.). He was acquitted of that charge.
3
II. Standard of Review
“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)). “Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the
quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J.,
concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while
giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id.(quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of
proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
“In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not
required that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as
4
the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be
established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the
evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Id. at 297–98
(quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d in part by
544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”
Id. at 297 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is
based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
III. Analysis: Terroristic Threat
To prove Reynolds committed a terroristic threat, as alleged in the complaint, the State
had to prove that Reynolds intentionally threatened to murder or commit aggravated assault
(crimes involving violence) against Jill with the intent to place her in fear of imminent7 serious
7
“Imminent means ‘[n]ear at hand; mediate rather than immediate; close rather than touching; impending; on the
point of happening; threatening; menacing; perilous.’” In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899, 904 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2001, pet. denied) (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed.1990)).
5
bodily injury.8 The requisite intent can be inferred from the “acts, words and conduct” of the
accused. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “The accused’s threat
of violence, made with the intent to place the victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, is
what constitutes the offense.” Williams v. State, 194 S.W.3d 568, 574 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2006) (citing Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1982)), aff’d, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “However, the accused’s intent cannot
be determined merely from what the victim thought at the time of the offense. Indeed, for this
offense to be completed it is not necessary that the victim or anyone else was actually placed in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1982).
Jill testified that, while driving in the car, she was frightened by Reynolds’s behavior,
which included spitting and cursing at her, “pounding the car,” and hitting her around her ear and
neck. Jill also explained that, either on the drive or before, Reynolds had threatened to murder
her. She told the jury that she was frightened by Reynolds’s behavior in the car and that he hurt
her when he struck her. Jill testified that Reynolds had been exhibiting very bizarre and paranoid
8
The information alleged that Reynolds:
DID INTENTIONALLY THREATEN TO COMMIT MURDER OR AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING VIOLENCE, AGAINST ANY PERSON OR
PROPERTY, WITH INTENT TO PLACE JILL REYNOLDS, A MEMBER OF THE
DEFENDANT’S FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD, IN FEAR OF IMMINENT SERIOUS BODY
INJURY.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2), (c)(1). The date of the offense and venue are not challenged. These
allegations track the statutory elements of terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2), (c)(1). Such
an offense is a class A misdemeanor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(c)(1).
6
behavior all day and that such behavior was why Reynolds’s father had sent him back to live
with Jill.
Reynolds argues that the evidence was insufficient to show he intended to place Jill “in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2). Reynolds
concedes in his brief that it is “reasonable to infer[, from the testimony,] that he was angry.”
Even so, Reynolds argues that the evidence shows he was having a mental-health crisis9 and that
the evidence is insufficient to prove that he “spoke with a ‘conscious objective or desire’ to place
[Jill] in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a).
We disagree with Reynolds’s assessment of the evidence. He told Jill he would kill her,
and he called her a derogatory term, which Jill said was out of the ordinary for him. While he
was making the threatening statements to Jill, Reynolds was spitting at her and “pounding the
car,” and he struck her at least once.10 Reynolds had been exhibiting bizarre behavior all day.
Jill testified that, the morning of the offenses, Reynolds was “stomping on people he s[aw],
building barricades, anything, pillows, so that you [could not] see anything out of - - so nobody
[could] see in from the window, grabbing a knife or whatever, having it by the barricades.”11
9
To the extent Reynolds argues that his mental-health issues negated his intent, there is nothing in the record to show
how his symptoms “affected [his] ability to perceive that” he was placing her in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury or, as discussed below, confining Jill or substantially interfering with her liberty. Woods v. State, 306 S.W.3d
905, 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.03(a), 20.01.
Jill described that part of the car ride as “very frightening, very disgusting, and very horrible for [her] own child to
10
be saying things about” her.
11
Reynolds exhibited such behavior at his father’s home, where he also “started accusing his family there that there
was a big sex ring, prostitution going on in his father’s home,” and Reynolds believed that “his father was molesting
his brother, that there was rape” of “his sisters,” and that “there was a whorehouse.”
7
Even after police arrived and arrested Reynolds, Jill was afraid “he’d get out and come back and
kill” her.
In Williams, the appellant threatened an assistant principal at the school attended by
Williams’s child. Williams, 194 S.W.3d at 572. The assistant principal was “shocked” and
“immediately feared for her safety” when Williams “invited [her] to . . . a beat down in the
parking lot.” Id. The assistant principal stated that she thought Williams “might ‘come across
the table or come around and try to strike [her].’” Id. That was sufficient to show Williams’s
intent to imminently cause the witness serious bodily injury. Id.Jill’s testimony is helpful in determining Reynolds’s intent. From her descriptions of his
conduct, it is reasonable to infer that Reynolds meant to threaten her and make her believe he
would imminently cause her serious bodily injury. “One’s acts are generally reliable
circumstantial evidence of one’s intent.” Rogers v. State, 687 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982,
no pet.)).12 As a result, we find that a rational jury could reasonably infer that Reynolds intended
for Jill to fear that he meant to imminently cause her serious bodily injury.
For these reasons, we overrule Reynolds’s first point of error.
12
See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 380–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). There, the State presented substantial
evidence of Mays’s “mental impairment at the time of” the murders. Id. at 380. And while the “mental-illness
evidence explained [Mays’s] actions and demonstrated his motive for killing the deputies—paranoia, suspicion, and
distrust of the officers”—such evidence “did not rebut the culpable mental state of ‘intentional or knowing’ conduct
or raise any legal justification or exoneration for the murders.” Id. at 380–81.
8
IV. Analysis: Unlawful Restraint
A. Jill Was Restrained
Reynolds argues there was no evidence that he “physically place[d] or h[e]ld [Jill] in one
place, nor did he substantially restrict her movement.” Nothing in Section 20.02 requires the use
or exhibition of physical acts. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.02. “‘Restrain’ means to restrict
a person’s movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with [her] liberty, by
moving [her] from one place to another or by confining [her].” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 20.01(1). The statute imposes no minimal requirement or time limitation for restraint. Walton
v. State, 641 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tex App.—Fort Worth 2022, pet. ref’d) (citing Rogers, 687
S.W.2d at 342).
“Confinement is not defined by the Penal Code. We therefore use its common meaning
when reviewing the evidence.” Robinson v. State, 568 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2019, no pet.) (citing Holmes v. State, 873 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994,
no pet.). “To confine means ‘to shut up, imprison, immure, put or keep in detention, to relegate
to certain limits.’” Id. (quoting Holmes, 873 S.W.2d at 126).
In Robinson, the victim stayed in Robinson’s “apartment for two days and nights, and
chose not to leave on multiple occasions.” Id. at 722. However, when the victim tried to leave
to feed her cat, Robinson “hid her cell phone,” “‘grabbed’ her by the hair and ‘dragged’ her back
to the bedroom,” id. at 720, refused her entreaties to be released, undressed her, tied her hands
and feet, then sexually assaulted her. Id. at 721. The fact that she had previously been in the
apartment willingly did not negate the ultimate unlawful restraint. Id. at 724; see also Reyes v.
9
State, 491 S.W.3d 36, 45–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (acknowledging
that “the fact that a victim initially accompanies her assailants voluntarily does not preclude” a
finding the defendant kidnapped the victim).13
Here, Jill testified that, when they got home from the errand, she was held “hostage” in a
room in the apartment. Reynolds told her that he was going to kill her. Jill also testified that she
was held hostage in that room until she finished a task for Reynolds. She “had to sit there and do
what he said[,] and he wouldn’t let [her] out.” Reynolds screamed and spat at her and told her
she “was against him and . . . wasn’t his real mother” but rather a “clone.” Jill continued:
He was saying that the ops - - that I was an opt (phonetic), meaning opposition, I
believe, saying that he would kill me, that he would murder me, that I was a B, all
kinds of horrible things to his mother, and wouldn’t let me out until - - I was held
hostage until I finished that school thing. And then I said, “Let me go.” And he
stood in the door screaming and his hands are flailing, like he does, telling me all
these things. And then, finally, he went to the side and that’s when I went out and
then I got out the door.
All of that, in the context of Reynolds’s behavior throughout the day, supports a rational
inference by the jury that Reynolds confined Jill such that he substantially interfered with her
liberty and did so without her consent. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.01, 20.02. As a result,
we overrule Reynolds’s second point of error.
13
In Jenkins v. State, 248 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d), the defendant “forced
himself into” the victim’s apartment and refused to leave when asked. Id. at 295. That proved restraint. Id. In
Walton, the defendant refused to allow the victim to leave his truck and, under the influence of cocaine, drove
dangerously and erratically at high speed, “swerving in and out of traffic,” eventually running “a red light and
hit[ting] a parked car.” Walton, 641 S.W.3d at 865. That behavior was sufficient to prove unlawful restraint. Id. at
870; see also Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (appellant was convicted of capital murder
by killing the victim in the course of kidnapping her). In Brimage, the victim’s restraint “began when [Brimage]
dragged [her] down the hall of his home; it ended only with her death.” Id. at 476; see Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d
929, 931–32 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (The defendant gave two hitchhikers a ride, and before letting
them out, forced them to engage in sexual behavior with each other and then him. He did not release them, and they
eventually escaped in his car while Phillips bought cigarettes.).
10
B. Unlawful Restraint: Intent
In his third point of error, Reynolds argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he
had the requisite intent (intentionally or knowingly) to commit unlawful restraint. He points to
the evidence of his paranoia and mental-health problems and, again, concedes that the record
shows he was “angry and wanted [Jill] to submit a document online” for his school application.
We refer to the above discussion about inference of intent from acts, words, and conduct of the
accused.
After the threatening behavior in the car, when Reynolds and Jill returned home,
Reynolds made Jill stay in a room until she completed a task for him on her computer. He
continued to scream at and spit on her, he accused her of not being his mother but some kind of
opposition agent or clone, and he again threatened to kill her. The jury could infer, from
Reynolds’s words, acts, and conduct, that he intended to restrain Jill, without her consent, by
confining her to a room, and that he did so by force, intimidation, or deception. The evidence is
sufficient to prove that Reynolds had the requisite intent to commit unlawful restraint. As a
result, we overrule Reynolds’s third point of error.
11
V. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: August 13, 2024
Date Decided: September 24, 2024
Do Not Publish
12