In the Matter of T.H. v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-24-00159-CV
___________________________
IN THE MATTER OF T.H.
On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 323-122960-24
Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
T.H. (Timothy)1 appeals from the juvenile court’s order waiving its jurisdiction
and transferring the case to a criminal district court for him to be tried as an adult for
murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In a single issue, Timothy argues
that the juvenile court abused its discretion by certifying him to stand trial as an adult
because the evidence is legally insufficient to support the transfer order. We will
affirm.
I. Background
In December 2023, Timothy was 16 years old and lived with his cousin D.D.
(Daniel) and Daniel’s girlfriend on Stalcup Road in Fort Worth. Timothy and Daniel
sold and distributed drugs and firearms and had also discussed turning part of the
home into a “grow house” so they could grow their own marijuana to sell and
distribute.
Timothy’s brother B.B. (Brian) was also staying at the home at the time. Brian
helped transport, deliver, and sell drugs. Timothy, Daniel, Brian, and Timothy’s father
T.H. Sr. (Father) worked together in the drug business. Timothy supplied some of
Father’s narcotics—both to sell and for Father’s own use. Father also used Timothy
as a go-between between himself and Daniel.
Throughout this opinion, we use aliases to refer to minors and to Timothy’s
1
parents or other family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(c)(2).
2
On December 22, 2023, Timothy texted Daniel that he had “a play” on an AK-
style pistol. Timothy sent Daniel a photograph of the pistol, and Daniel responded,
“[O]h, that’s nice, are you gonna get it[?]” Timothy replied, “[Y]eah, but I’m not
gonna pay for it.” Daniel then asked, “[A]re you gonna slime[2] him?” Timothy
responded, “[Y]eah,” and explained that the gun’s seller was “green” and “an easy
target.”
Timothy’s easy target was Roy Jackson. Timothy and Jackson knew each other
from school. Communicating electronically, Timothy told Jackson to meet him at the
intersection of Willie Street and Dillard Street in Fort Worth on the evening of
December 27, 2023. Jackson drove there and contacted Timothy to let him know that
he had arrived. Timothy responded that he was at a nearby store, but when Jackson
offered to meet him there, Timothy told him to wait and that he was walking toward
the intersection. Sensing a setup, Jackson left.
The next day, December 28, 2023, Timothy sent Jackson the address and a
photograph of a new meeting spot at 5601 Rickenbacker Place in Fort Worth. On his
way there that afternoon, Jackson picked up his friend Kambron Pryor-Somerville
and Somerville’s girlfriend, Mercedes Gatewood. But when Jackson arrived at
5601 Rickenbacker, he noticed that the surroundings did not look like those in the
photograph Timothy had sent to him. Unnerved, Jackson circled the block. He then
“Slime” means rob.
2
3
contacted Timothy via cellphone; Timothy told Jackson to park behind a box truck
parked on Rickenbacker. Jackson informed Timothy that he was driving a white Kia
and then parked behind the box truck, notified Timothy that he was there, and waited.
A few minutes later, shots were fired at Jackson’s car. As Jackson drove away,
he saw Timothy with an AR-style pistol. Realizing that Somerville had been shot,
Jackson decided to drive to the hospital. He called 911 and reported that his friend
had been shot and that they were on their way to the hospital. Patrol officers located
Jackson’s vehicle and followed it into the hospital’s ambulance bay. Jackson told the
officers that he had gone to meet Timothy and that Timothy had shot at him.
Jackson sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his shoulder, and Gatewood,
who had been sitting in the backseat, had a graze bullet wound on her leg. Somerville,
the front-seat passenger, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the back of his neck.
After Somerville was pronounced dead, Norman Abrams, a homicide detective with
the Fort Worth Police Department, was called to the hospital.
When Detective Abrams arrived at the hospital, he saw that Jackson’s car had
been shot in multiple places and that “[t]here was blood, broken windows, [and]
apparent gunshot impacts on both the glass and the metal frame . . . of the vehicle.”
Detective Abrams interviewed Gatewood and Jackson. Both recounted to Detective
Abrams what had happened, and Jackson identified Timothy as the shooter. Detective
Abrams later searched the backyard at 5601 Rickenbacker and found nineteen
5.56 mm shell casings with unusual markings.
4
During his investigation, Detective Abrams obtained information from
Jackson’s cellphone and from Gatewood that corroborated Jackson’s timeline.
Detective Abrams went to the location of Timothy and Jackson’s first planned
meeting—Willie and Dillard Streets—and determined that the location was better
suited to a robbery than a sale because it was poorly lit and some of the surrounding
lots were heavily treed, which provided places to hide. Detective Abrams also
determined that Jackson had asked to meet at a public place on December 28, 2023.
Timothy had originally agreed but then changed the meeting location to
5601 Rickenbacker.
Timothy’s cellphone records showed that his phone was within a 600-yard
radius of the area at the time of the shooting. Using Timothy’s cellphone number,
Detective Abrams was able to tie Timothy’s various social-media, Google, Gmail, and
iCloud accounts together. A search of these accounts revealed photographs of an
AR15-style pistol and photographs of Timothy with the weapon, which he had
advertised for sale. There were also photographs of Timothy with a 7.62-style pistol.
The day after the shooting, Timothy disabled the “find my iPhone feature” on
his cellphone. On December 31, 2023, Timothy sent a text to someone saying, “Stop
textin[g].” The other party responded, “?,” and Timothy replied, “Jus[t] stop; New
# Later.” In text exchanges with his girlfriend on December 31, 2023, and January 1,
5
2024, Timothy told her “don’t b saying ts[3] to errbody,” and “I should get a new
# tmr.” Later on January 1, 2024, Timothy’s cellphone number was terminated. And
on January 13, 2024, Timothy changed his Instagram handle from “murdahman6” to
“mtvshow23.” Jackson reported to Detective Abrams that after the shootings, he had
been contacted from accounts bearing those handles with “threatening messages and
emojis [directed] to him and his family.”
A search of Timothy’s accounts also revealed that in the days immediately
following the shooting, Timothy had searched the Internet for “shootings in fort
worth,” “December 28 shootings,” “used iphones for sale,” and “iphones for sale.”
By January 16, 2024, Timothy had secured a new iPhone. The following day, he
searched the Internet for information about Somerville and about how to recover
Instagram, Apple, and Google accounts.
Detective Abrams’s investigation soon led him to the Stalcup home, which was
within walking distance of the shooting scene. Detective Abrams searched the home
pursuant to a search warrant and found narcotics, cocaine, Promethazine, and a bag
of green-tip, 5.56 mm rounds of ammunition. 4 The bottom stamps of those
ammunition rounds matched those found at the shooting scene.
3
According to Detective Abrams “ts” meant “that shit.”
4
Detective Abrams described green-tip ammunition as follows: “Green[-]tip
ammo . . . [is] a full metal jacketed round with a solid core. The green tips were used
to annotate their use for increase[d] penetration, not necessarily armor piercing, but
increase[d] penetration into body armor and into certain metals as opposed to the
6
At some point, Daniel was arrested and jailed, and Daniel’s girlfriend and
Timothy continued to sell and distribute drugs from the Stalcup home. Timothy also
continued attempting to purchase weapons and narcotics even after he knew that a
warrant had been issued for his arrest for murder and aggravated assault. He also
bragged to his girlfriend that he was going to beat the charges.
Timothy was arrested, and the State filed a petition requesting his discretionary
transfer from juvenile court to criminal district court. The State initially alleged that
probable cause existed to show that Timothy had committed two counts of murder,
three counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and one count of deadly
conduct. The State amended its petition to allege one count of murder (Paragraph
One) and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Paragraphs Two
and Three).
On April 10, 2024, the juvenile court held the transfer hearing.5 Detective
Abrams testified regarding his investigation, the results of which we set out above.
Keanetta Brown, a court-intake officer with the Tarrant County Juvenile Probation
Department who was assigned to Timothy, and her supervisor, David Ansley, also
testified.
non-green tip.” Rap lyrics recovered from Timothy’s iCloud account—the admission
of which Timothy does not challenge—referenced using green-tip ammunition.
5
By this time, Timothy was 17 years old.
7
Brown testified that Timothy—who had been detained in the Tarrant County
Juvenile Detention Center since the case’s inception—admitted to her that he had
used THC daily. He also tested positive for the substance when he was first detained.
Brown further testified that while detained, Timothy had been involved in two
physical altercations, one involving a staff member when Timothy was attacked by a
fellow detainee and another involving that detainee. But Timothy had also displayed
good behavior while detained.
Although Timothy did not have a juvenile record, the resource staffing
committee had recommended that Timothy be committed to the Texas Juvenile
Justice Department (TJJD). According to Brown, the juvenile-justice system’s goal is
rehabilitation, and it was her opinion that if Timothy were found delinquent, it was in
his best interest to be rehabilitated. Ansley testified about the resources available at
TJJD to rehabilitate Timothy.
Brown further opined that Timothy appeared to be a “typical teenager,” neither
mature nor immature for his age. He also seemed to be relying on his parents’ advice
in making legal decisions in the case.
At the hearing’s conclusion, the juvenile court stated that it was waiving
jurisdiction and was referring the “matter to an adult felony district court for further
prosecution.” The juvenile court then signed an order waiving its jurisdiction and
transferring the case to the appropriate criminal court for Timothy to be tried as an
adult. In its order, the juvenile court found that Timothy was then 17 years old, that
8
he was at least 14 years old and less than 17 years old “at the time the [charged]
act[s] . . . are alleged to have occurred,” and that “no adjudication hearing ha[d] been
conducted concerning said offenses.” The juvenile court made the following
additional findings:
The Court finds the offense alleged in Paragraph One of the Petition
Requesting [t]he Juvenile Court to Consider Discretionary Transfer to
Criminal Court (Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction) on file in this
cause is a first[-]degree felony offense under the penal laws of the State
of Texas if committed by an adult. The Court finds the offense[s] alleged
in Paragraphs Two and Three of the Petition Requesting [t]he Juvenile
Court to Consider Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court (Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction) on file in this cause are second[-]degree
felony offenses under the penal laws of the State of Texas if committed
by an adult. The Court further finds that the offenses are against the
person of another.
The Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that the
Respondent committed the offenses alleged in Paragraph[s] One, Two,
and Three of the Petition Requesting [t]he Juvenile Court to Consider
Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court (Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction) on file in this cause number.
The Court finds that the Respondent is of sufficient
sophistication and maturity to be tried as an adult.
The Court finds that this Court should waive its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transfer this Cause to an appropriate District Court
(with criminal jurisdiction) or Criminal District Court of Tarrant County,
Texas.
The Court, after considering all the testimony, social evaluation,
full investigation of the Respondent, his circumstances, and the
circumstances of the alleged offenses, and other admitted records and
reports finds that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to retain
jurisdiction.
9
The Court finds that because of the seriousness of the offenses
alleged and the background of the Respondent, the welfare of the
community requires criminal proceedings.
In making the above determinations, the Court has considered,
among other matters:
(1) whether the alleged offenses are against person or property,
with the greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses
against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by use or
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court.
Timothy timely filed a notice of appeal. In a single issue, he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the required statutory factors underpinning the
juvenile court’s finding “that because of the seriousness of the offenses alleged and
the background of the Respondent, the welfare of the community requires criminal
proceedings.”
II. Applicable Law and Standards of Review
Under the Texas Family Code, a juvenile court may waive its exclusive original
jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile to a criminal district court for criminal proceedings
if
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
(2) the child was:
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(A) 14 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have
committed the offense, if the offense is a capital felony, an
aggravated controlled substance felony, or a felony of the first degree,
and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that
offense; or
(B) 15 years of age or older at the time the child is alleged to have
committed the offense, if the offense is a felony of the second or
third degree or a state jail felony, and no adjudication hearing has
been conducted concerning that offense; and
(3) after a full investigation and a hearing, the juvenile court determines
that there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court
committed the offense alleged and that because of the seriousness of the
offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the
community requires criminal proceedings.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a); see id. § 51.02(2)(A) (defining “child” as “a person
who is . . . ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age”).
The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court by a preponderance of
the evidence that the community’s welfare requires the transfer, either because of the
seriousness of the offense or the child’s background, or both.6 In re A.K., No. 02-20-
00410-CV, 2021 WL 1803774, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). In making this
determination, the juvenile court must “consider, among other matters,” the following
four factors: (1) whether the alleged offense was against a person or property, with
greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) the child’s
6
Timothy does not challenge the juvenile court’s determination that there is
probable cause to believe that he “committed the offense[s] alleged.” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 54.02(a)(3).
11
sophistication and maturity; (3) the child’s record and previous history; and (4) the
prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the child’s
rehabilitation through procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the
juvenile court. 7 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f). Any combination of these factors
may suffice to support a waiver of jurisdiction; not every factor needs to weigh in
favor of transfer. See In re Z.M., No. 02-21-00213-CV, 2021 WL 4898851, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing A.K., 2021 WL 1803774,
at *19). The juvenile court need not consider any other factors, nor does it need to
find that the evidence establishes each factor. Id. (citing A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at
*19).
When reviewing a juvenile court’s waiver-and-transfer order, we first review the
court’s specific fact-findings regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under a traditional
evidentiary-sufficiency review.8 E.g., A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *18 (citing In re
Although Timothy states throughout his brief that there are “six enumerated
7
factors” in Section 54.02(f), there are only four factors. See id. § 54.02(f). Timothy
appears to be relying on a pre-1995 version of the statute. See Act of May 27, 1995,
74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, § 34, sec. 54.02, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2517, 2533 (current
version at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)) (amending Section 54.02(f) to delete two
of the former six factors).
8
We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence
challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of
law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn
v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). When reviewing an assertion that the
evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding, we set aside the finding only if,
12
C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)).
We then review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision for an abuse of
discretion:
That is, in deciding whether the juvenile court erred to conclude that the
seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the juvenile or
both called for criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community,
we simply ask, in light of our own analysis of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the Section 54.02(f) factors and any other relevant
evidence, whether the juvenile court acted without reference to guiding
rules or principles.
Id. (citing C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701). A juvenile court abuses its discretion when its
transfer decision is essentially arbitrary, given the evidence upon which it was based.
Id. (citing C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701). In contrast, “a waiver decision representing ‘a
reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria’ generally will pass muster
under this standard of review.” Id. (quoting C.M.M., 503 S.W.3d at 701).
III. Analysis
Timothy makes two arguments in his sufficiency challenge. First, he complains
that the juvenile court’s order lacks case-specific fact-findings and asks us to review
“the method of analysis and review of orders transferring jurisdiction in . . . juvenile
case[s]” and to determine whether a “juvenile court must ‘show its work’” by
after considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that
the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a
new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on
reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821,
823 (Tex. 1965).
13
including case-specific fact-findings that had been required by Moon v. State,
451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Second, he argues that considering the
statutory factors set out in Section 54.02(f), the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the juvenile court’s finding that the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the
background of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3), (f). We address each
of these arguments in turn.
In Moon, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a juvenile court must
“show its work” in an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction under Section 54.02 by
including case-specific fact-findings supporting the court’s decision to waive its
jurisdiction. 451 S.W.3d at 49 (stating that “Section 54.02(h) obviously contemplates
that both the juvenile court’s reasons for waiving its jurisdiction and the findings of
fact that undergird those reasons should appear in the transfer order”); see also Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(h) (“If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state
specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the
written order and findings of the court, and shall transfer the person to the
appropriate court for criminal proceedings . . . .”). The court of criminal appeals
further held that when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction, an “appellate court must limit its
sufficiency review to the facts that the juvenile court expressly relied upon, as required
14
to be explicitly set out in the juvenile transfer order under Section 54.02(h).” Moon,
451 S.W.3d at 50.
But the court of criminal appeals has overruled Moon. In Ex parte Thomas, the
court held that no statutory provision “require[s] the juvenile court to recite the
underlying facts upon which its reason for transfer is based.” 623 S.W.3d 370,
379 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The court explained that contrary to Moon’s reasoning,
“the statutory scheme merely directs the juvenile court to state the reasons for the
waiver set out in the statute.” Id. While acknowledging that Section 54.02(h) states
that the juvenile court “shall state specifically in the order its reasons for
waiver . . . including the written order and findings of the court,” id. at 378 (quoting
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(h)), the court concluded that the “including the written
order and findings of the court” additional language in Section 54.02(h) “allows for
‘findings,’ but it does not require case-specific fact-finding beyond a statement of the
reasons for transfer, id. at 379. And although an order waiving a juvenile court’s
jurisdiction must state the court’s reasons for doing so, a juvenile court is not required
to include in the order detailed, case-specific findings supporting its decision. See id. at
381–83.
In short, the court of criminal appeals’ holding was clear: “A juvenile transfer
order entered after the required transfer hearing and complying with the statutory
requirements constitutes a valid waiver of jurisdiction even if the transfer order does
not contain factually-supported, case-specific findings.” Id. at 383. In reaching its
15
holding, the court rhetorically asked, “So What is Left of Moon?” and answered,
“Nothing.” Id. at 381. The court also noted the legislature’s response to Moon:
What the Legislature did do, in response to our decision in Moon, was
repeal Article 44.47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and add Section
56.01(c)(1)(A) to the Family Code. That took review of these claims
away from this Court and created a vehicle for immediate, interlocutory
appeal to the courts of appeals and then to the Texas Supreme Court.
This provides more immediate safeguards for juveniles being transferred
to district court for trial as an adult than the fact-specific finding
requirement set out in Moon. The Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the method of analysis and review of orders transferring
jurisdiction in juvenile cases, but it is not bound by Moon. And decades of
case law preceding Moon from this Court and our sister court alike
remain as guidance for the appellate courts.
Id. at 382–83 (footnotes omitted). Although the “Texas Supreme Court has not
addressed the method of analysis and review of orders transferring jurisdiction in
juvenile cases,” id. at 383, we—as an intermediate appellate court—are bound by the
court of criminal appeals’ interpretation of Section 54.02. See Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d
173, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); see also Swilley v. McCain,
374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (“After a principle, rule or proposition of law has
been squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having
jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by
the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in
a subsequent suit between different parties.”). And we have recognized Thomas’s
holding in at least one of our prior opinions: “A juvenile transfer order entered after
the required transfer hearing and complying with the statutory requirements
16
constitutes a valid waiver of jurisdiction even if the transfer order does not contain
factually-supported, case-specific findings.” A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *19 (quoting
Thomas, 623 S.W.3d at 383). We thus conclude that the juvenile court was not required
to include case-specific findings in its transfer order and now turn to Timothy’s
sufficiency challenge.
We have recognized that “[t]he nature and seriousness of the specific alleged
offense, alone, may justify the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction ‘notwithstanding
other section 54.02(f) factors, so long as the offense: (1) is substantiated by evidence
at the transfer hearing, and (2) is of sufficiently egregious character.’” Z.M.,
2021 WL 4898851, at *5 (quoting In re M.A.T., No. 13-18-00295-CV,
2018 WL 5289550, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 25, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op.)). Here, the alleged offenses—murder and aggravated assault—were
each against a person, which weighs more greatly in favor of transfer than if the
offense were against property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(1). And these
offenses were serious: the shooting was premeditated and resulted in Somerville’s
death and injuries to Jackson and Gatewood; the shooting was in furtherance of
Timothy’s obtaining a weapon from Jackson that Timothy wanted as part of his
firearm-selling business; and at least 19 rounds were fired during the shooting.
Turning to the evidence regarding Timothy’s sophistication and maturity, see id.§ 54.02(f)(2), the juvenile court expressly found that Timothy was of “sufficient
sophistication and maturity to be tried as an adult.” At the time of the shooting,
17
Timothy was four months shy of his seventeenth birthday. The fact that the shooting
was premeditated rather than impulsive showed Timothy’s sophistication and
maturity, as did his planning the meetings with Jackson in locations conducive to
committing a robbery. So did Timothy’s working with Daniel, Brian, and Father in the
drug business; Timothy and Daniel’s drugs and weapons business; and Timothy’s
maintaining that business after Daniel was arrested. Timothy further demonstrated his
sophistication and maturity by taking steps to evade culpability after the shooting by
changing his cellphone number, getting a new cellphone, changing his Instagram
handle, and using Instagram to track down and threaten Jackson.
Despite this evidence, Timothy points to Brown’s testimony that he appeared
to be a “typical teenager,” was neither mature nor immature for his age, and seemed
to be relying on his parents’ advice in making decisions in the case as evidence of his
lack of sophistication and maturity. But according to the psychological evaluation
conducted as part of the diagnostic study, social evaluation, and investigation ordered
and considered by the juvenile court, Timothy’s “level of maturity [was] uneven,
ranging from meeting to exceeding that of same-aged peers,” 9 and his “level of
sophistication appear[ed] to slightly exceed that of same-aged peers.” The
psychological evaluation also revealed that Timothy did not have an intellectual
disability or significant mental illness and that he appeared “capable of understanding
9
The psychologist observed that Timothy “came across as if he may not [have]
appreciate[d] the gravity of his legal circumstances.”
18
the legal implications surrounding a discretionary transfer motion and of assisting his
attorney in his defense.” We thus conclude (1) the juvenile court could have
reasonably determined that Timothy could appreciate the nature and effect of his
actions, that he understood right from wrong, and that the evidence of Timothy’s
level of sophistication and maturity weighed in favor of his being tried as an adult and
(2) that these reasonable determinations sufficed to support the juvenile court’s
sophistication-and-maturity finding. See id.
Although Timothy had no prior juvenile history and there was testimony
regarding the procedures, services, and facilities available in the juvenile system,
Brown testified that the resource staff committee had determined that aside from
confinement in TJJD, none of those resources would meet Timothy’s needs. Both
Brown and Ansley testified that if Timothy were adjudicated as a juvenile, they would
recommend commitment to TJJD, but neither testified whether Timothy should be
tried as an adult. From this testimony, the juvenile court could have reasonably
concluded that given Timothy’s involvement in the drugs-and-weapons business, the
level of callousness and calculation Timothy displayed in planning and executing the
crime, and the sophistication he showed in attempting to evade responsibility for it,
the services available to Timothy through the juvenile-justice system would not have
adequately protected the public and were unlikely to rehabilitate him. See id.
§ 54.02(f)(3) (“the record and previous history of the child”), (4) (“the prospects of
19
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child
by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court”).
The Section 54.02(f) factors “serve to facilitate the juvenile court’s balancing of
‘the potential danger to the public’ posed by the juvenile offender with his
‘amenability to treatment.’” A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *19 (quoting In re J.R., No. 05-
20-00920-CV, 2021 WL 777090, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 1, 2021, pet. denied)
(mem. op.)). Here, the evidence regarding those factors sufficed to support the
juvenile court’s findings that because of the seriousness of the offenses and because
of Timothy’s background, the community’s welfare required Timothy’s transfer to
criminal court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). We thus conclude that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying Timothy to stand trial as an
adult. We overrule Timothy’s sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Timothy’s single issue, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
waiving its jurisdiction and transferring the case to criminal district court.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: July 18, 2024
20