Ninfa Castaneda and Eloy Castaneda v. Wilma Garza Chapa, Independent of the Estate of Ninfa Rivas McKinzie, and as Trustee of the Samuel Garza Trust ( 2024 )

NUMBER 13-22-00537-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
NINFA CASTANEDA AND
ELOY CASTANEDA, Appellants,
v.
WILMA GARZA CHAPA,
INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF
THE ESTATE OF NINFA RIVAS
MCKINZIE, AND AS TRUSTEE OF
THE SAMUEL GARZA TRUST, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
This case concerns the distribution of a retirement annuity from the Teacher
Retirement System of Texas (TRS) accumulated by Ninfa Rivas McKinzie (the decedent).
Appellants Ninfa and Eloy Castaneda 1 appeal the trial court’s order setting aside
beneficiary designations previously executed by the decedent in favor of Ninfa and Eloy.
By three issues, which have been reorganized, Ninfa and Eloy argue the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to preside over this suit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The decedent passed away on February 2, 2018. She was survived by her five
adult children: Ninfa, Thelma Garza Rodriguez Wallace, Wilma Garza Chapa, Anita
Rowlett, and Samuel Garza. 2
In May 2018, the trial court admitted the decedent’s will into probate. Five months
later, appellee Wilma, as executrix of the decedent’s estate and trustee of the Samuel
Garza Trust, filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a quitclaim deed
executed by the decedent, deeding her home to Thelma in 2013. The petition alleged
claims for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy, and named Thelma, Ninfa, and
Eloy as defendants. 3
Citing the decedent’s lack of capacity, Wilma also sought to set aside TRS
beneficiary designations made in 2015 and 2016, wherein the decedent named Ninfa and
Eloy as joint primary beneficiaries and Thelma as an alternate beneficiary. Prior to these
designations, the decedent had named Samuel as the sole primary beneficiary. 4
1 Eloy is Ninfa’s husband, and Ninfa is the decedent’s daughter.
2 Anita is a court appointed guardian for Samuel, an incapacitated person.
3 Though a named defendant in the underlying suit, Thelma is not a party to this appeal.
4 The appellate record contains “Designation of Beneficiary” forms spanning several decades. The
decedent named Samuel as the primary or alternative beneficiary in all “Designation of Beneficiary” forms
before the 2015 and 2016 designations. In the decedent’s “Application for Service Retirement,”—the form
2
On May 16, 2022, the trial court heard evidence on this case 5 and rendered a
decision, in part, against Ninfa and Eloy. The trial court found Ninfa and Eloy had
breached their fiduciary duty, and the decedent lacked the capacity to execute a
beneficiary designation for TRS benefits in 2015 and 2016. The trial court ordered the
2015 and 2016 beneficiary designations void and ordered Ninfa to hold any monies
received from TRS in a constructive trust 6 for the benefit of Samuel. The trial court
determined Wilma had not established her remaining claims or that the decedent lacked
the capacity to execute the deed in 2013.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDING AND RIPENESS
By their third issue, which we address first, Ninfa and Eloy argue the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction “under judicial doctrines of both ‘standing and ripeness.’”
A. Standard of Review
“While standing focuses on the issue of who may bring an action, ripeness focuses
on when that action may be brought.” Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849,
851 (Tex. 2000). Because standing and ripeness are components of subject matter
jurisdiction, whether a party has standing or whether a claim is ripe are legal questions
preceding her 2015 designation—she selected payment option number one: “a reduced annuity payable
throughout [her] life with the provision that upon [her] death the redirect annuity shall be continued
throughout the life of, and paid to the person designed hereupon as primary beneficiary” and designated
Samuel as the primary beneficiary.
5 The reporter’s record was not included in the appellate record.
6 “A constructive trust is ‘an equitable, court-created remedy designed to prevent unjust
enrichment.’” Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC v. 1776 Energy Partners, LLC, 672 S.W.3d 391, 394–95
n.5 (Tex. 2023) (quoting KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 87 (Tex. 2015)).
3
subject to de novo review. Est. of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2021); Sw. Elec.
Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. 2020). “We review the plaintiff’s pleadings
to determine whether he affirmatively demonstrated the court’s jurisdiction to hear the
cause.” In re Est. of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied)
(cleaned up); see also Glasstex, Inc. v. Arch Aluminum & Glass Co. Inc., No. 13-07-
00483-CV, 2016 WL 747893, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 25, 2016,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
B. Standing Versus Capacity
“Generally, standing involves a threshold determination of whether a plaintiff has
a sufficient ‘justiciable interest’ in the suit’s outcome to be entitled to a judicial
determination.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018). “[A] plaintiff must allege
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to
be redressed by the requested relief.” Tex. Propane Gas Ass’n v. City of Houston, 622
S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (explaining that “[t]he Texas standing requirements
parallel the federal test for Article III standing . . . .”)). Absent standing, a court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over the suit, “and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims thus cannot
be litigated or decided.” In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155; see also Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d
297, 305 (Tex. 2001) (“The standing doctrine identifies those suits appropriate for judicial
resolution.”).
In addition to standing, a plaintiff must have the capacity to pursue a claim. Pike v.
Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 775 (Tex. 2020). For example, “a minor,
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incompetent, or estate may have suffered an injury and thus have a justiciable interest in
the controversy,” but these parties lack the legal capacity to sue. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc.
v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005). In these instances, “the law . . . grants
another party the capacity to sue on their behalf.” Id.; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 351.054(a) (“An executor or administrator . . . may sue to recover property, debts, or
damages.”); see also Est. of Simo, No. 13-16-00211-CV, 2017 WL 4837767, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that an
incapacitated individual was unable to sue in her individual capacity and required suit to
be brought by a representative on her behalf); Cantu v. Medina, No. 13-16-00566-CV,
2017 WL 4296616, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (observing that “[o]nly a duly qualified and appointed representative of an
estate may file suit on the estate’s behalf,” and generally, “heirs to an estate are not
entitled to maintain a suit for the recovery of property belonging to the estate”). Unlike
standing, however, “a challenge to a party’s capacity must be raised by a verified pleading
in the trial court” or such argument will be waived on appeal. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 849.
(first citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(1)–(2); and then Sixth RMA Partners v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d
46, 56 (Tex. 2003)).
Here, Wilma sued Ninfa and Eloy on behalf of the decedent’s estate as executrix
and as trustee of Samuel’s trust seeking to set aside three transactions: (1) a quit-claim
deed in 2013, (2) a TRS beneficiary designation in 2015, and (3) a TRS beneficiary
designation in 2016. As executrix, Wilma sought to void a deed transaction between the
decedent and Thelma, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy by Thelma,
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Ninfa, and Eloy. Pleading similar claims as trustee of Samuel’s trust, Wilma also sought
to void TRS beneficiary designations made in 2015 and 2016, which divested Samuel of
previously designated TRS annuity benefits. Wilma’s pleadings, therefore, identified the
individuals personally aggrieved (the decedent’s estate and Samuel), alleged an injury
(divestment of property and retirement assets) fairly traceable to unlawful conduct (fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy) by defendants (Thelma, Ninfa, and Eloy), and
sought redress (declaratory judgment). Thus, we conclude Wilma has demonstrated
standing. See Tex. Propane Gas Ass’n, 622 S.W.3d at 799; see also City of S. Padre
Island v. Surfvive, No. 13-20-00536-CV, 2022 WL 2069216, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg June 9, 2022), review denied, 678 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. 2023) (mem. op.)
(“To establish standing in Texas, a plaintiff must allege a concrete injury and a real
controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”) (cleaned up)). We
overrule this subissue.
To the extent that Ninfa and Eloy challenge Wilma’s capacity to bring suit as
executrix of the decedent’s estate or trustee of Samuel’s trust, Ninfa and Eloy do not
contend, nor do they direct us to where in the record, they raised a challenge to Wilma’s
capacity via a verified plea. 7 “Requiring a defendant to raise this ‘wrong plaintiff’ problem
7 Appellants’ argument on this issue reads in its entirety as follows:
“Standing”, one prong of [s]ubject-matter jurisdiction, refers to the court’s power to hear a
particular type of suit. Id.; see CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) and [sic]
(“[B]ecause standing is implicit in subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, may be
raised at any time, and may be raised for the first time on appeal[.]”); In re N.L.G., 238
S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (per curiam) (permitting a
challenge to standing on appeal, even though the issue was not raised in the trial court).
In this case the Estate, nor the Trust had any vested or contingent interest in the TRS
An[n]uity. This left her simply as the appointed Executor of a contested will, that was also
6
by verified plea allows the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the problem if possible, such
as through assignment or joinder, and signals whether the parties need to develop and
present evidence on the issue at trial.” Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 779; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 93
(1), (2). A party who does not challenge capacity via a verified pleading in the trial court
waives any right to complain about the matter on appeal. See Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 779;
see also Kessling Servs. v. Manning, No. 13-19-00076-CV, 2020 WL 2213948, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding appellant
failed to preserve the issue for appellate review where appellant failed to challenge a
party’s capacity to bring suit by a verified pleading in the trial court). Accordingly, we
cannot consider Ninfa and Eloy’s challenge to Wilma’s capacity in this appeal. See
Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 849; see also Kessling Servs., 2020 WL 2213948, at *3. We
overrule this subissue.
C. Ripeness
“Under the ripeness doctrine, we consider whether, at the time a lawsuit is filed,
the facts are sufficiently developed so that an injury has occurred or is likely to occur,
rather than being contingent or remote.” Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d
699, 706 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851–52). Contrary to Ninfa and Eloy’s
invocation of the ripeness doctrine, this is not a case where the resolution of the claims
brought against Ninfa and Eloy depended upon contingent or hypothetical facts or upon
events that have not yet occurred. See id.; see also Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs v.
an expressly revoked will, fighting to maintain her position and facing a valid will being filed
for probate under [Texas Estates Code] § 256.102.
7
Tex. Med. Ass’n, 270 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). Wilma’s alleged
injury here, the deprivation of property and assets, by Ninfa and Eloy’s alleged acts of
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy, preceded Wilma’s filing of the lawsuit.
Therefore, Wilma’s claims are ripe. See Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 619 S.W.3d at 706.
We overrule Ninfa and Eloy’s third issue in its entirety.
III. PENDENT OR ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
By what we construe as Ninfa and Eloy’s first issue, Ninfa and Eloy maintain the
trial court erred by invoking its subject matter jurisdiction because “the TRS Annuity
passed outside of ancillary or pendent probate estate proceeding[s].” As previously
established, we review de novo whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction. Est. of
Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 62; Dowell v. Quiroz, 462 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2015, no pet.).
The jurisdiction of all Texas courts “derives from the Texas Constitution and state
statutes.” In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455, 459–60 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding). County courts at law, specifically, “are creatures of statute with varying
jurisdiction individually demarcated by the Legislature.” Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez,
669 S.W.3d 188, 190 (Tex. 2023); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.0003(a). For example,
unlike most Texas statutory county courts at law possessing limited concurrent jurisdiction
with the district court, Nueces County courts at law hold “the jurisdiction provided by the
constitution and by general law for district courts.” 8 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
8 Of the nearly 100 counties with statutory county courts at law, only thirteen counties have
statutory county courts at law with the jurisdiction “provided by the constitution and by general law for district
courts.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 25.0212 (Bowie County), 25.0312 (Calhoun County), 25.0362
8
§ 25.1802(a)(1); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (providing that district courts have jurisdiction
over “all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate,
or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other
court”).
However nuanced a jurisdictional analysis regarding statutory county courts at law
may be, it is further complicated by probate jurisdiction, which “is, to say the least,
somewhat complex.” Palmer v. Coble Wall Tr. Co., 851 S.W.2d 178, 180 n.3 (Tex. 1992).
“All probate proceedings must be filed and heard in a court exercising original probate
jurisdiction.” TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001. In counties, such as Nueces County, where
there exists no statutory probate court, the county court at law possesses original probate
jurisdiction. Id. § 32.002(b). A plaintiff’s claims must fall within the scope of a “probate
proceeding” to invoke the original probate jurisdiction of a county court at law. Id. § 31.001
(defining the scope of “probate proceeding”); see also Est. of Puckett, No. 02-18-00349-
CV, 2019 WL 3492396, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 1, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Probate proceedings can include “an application, petition, motion or action
regarding . . . an estate administration” and “any other matter related to the settlement,
partition, or distribution of an estate.” TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 31.001(4), (6). The estates
code further affords a statutory probate court and statutory county court at law exercising
its probate jurisdiction with the ability to “exercise its pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over
nonprobate matters when there is a close relationship between the probate and
(Cass County), 25.0732 (El Paso County), 25.0862 (Galveston County), 25.0942 (Gregg County), 25.1142
(Hopkins County), 25.1312 (Kaufman County), 25.1802 (Nueces County), 25.1862 (Parker County),
25.2012 (Rockwall County), 25.2142 (Smith County), 25.2392 (Waller County).
9
nonprobate claims and doing so will aid in the efficient administration of the estate.” In re
Est. of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d at 389; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001(b); see also
Mortensen v. Villegas, 630 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.).
It is undisputed that this cause was filed in Nueces County Court at Law No. 2, a
statutory county court at law, which possesses original probate jurisdiction. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1802. Further, neither party appears to dispute that Wilma’s
pleading concerning the 2013 deeded transaction constituted an appropriate probate
claim or that a probate proceeding was otherwise pending in probate court. See In re Est.
of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d at 389; see also Est. of Puckett, 2019 WL 3492396, at *3 (“By
alleging in the pending probate proceeding that the general warranty deed was void
based on [the decedent’s] lack-of-capacity and undue-influence arguments, [the plaintiff]
was bringing a claim arising from the estate administration that directly related to the
settlement, partition, and distribution of [the decedent’s] estate.”). At issue then is whether
trial court has jurisdiction to hear Wilma’s TRS annuity claims concerning a nonprobate
asset. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001(b); In re Est. of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d at 389.
Ninfa and Eloy argue that the TRS annuity claims do not exist in close relationship to
Wilma’s probate claim, and therefore, the county court at law was without jurisdiction. We
disagree that, for purposes of the county court at law’s subject matter jurisdiction, there
must exist a nexus between Wilma’s probate and nonprobate claim.
Absent an express constitutional or statutory grant, a court lacks jurisdiction to
decide any case. In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d at 459–60. Here, the county
court at law unequivocally possessed jurisdiction to hear both probate and nonprobate
10
matters. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1802; TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.002(b). While
the estates code affords limited-in-jurisdiction statutory probate courts and statutory
county courts at law additional jurisdiction over “pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as
necessary to promote judicial efficiency and economy,” see TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 32.001(b), such provision neither limits nor substantively expands the county court at
law’s jurisdiction here—which already possessed jurisdiction to hear both probate and
nonprobate matters independent from the estates code. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 25.1802; see also Lee v. Lee, 528 S.W.3d 201, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, pet. denied) (“Our review of the legislative framework for a statutory probate court’s
jurisdiction shows that the court’s trust jurisdiction is independent of its probate
jurisdiction.”); In re Est. of Ikenaga, No. 04-15-00005-CV, 2016 WL 928781, at *2 n.1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 24, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting appellant’s claim
that because a matter involved nonprobate property, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
make orders in relation to nonprobate property because “statutory probate courts have
jurisdiction not only over probate proceedings, but also ‘pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
as necessary to promote judicial efficiency and economy,’ and concurrent jurisdiction with
the district court in various other actions”).
Assuming arguendo that the Nueces County Court at Law No. 2’s jurisdiction was
predicated on the existence of an “ancillary or pendent” matter, Ninfa and Eloy’s argument
would still fail. Although the TRS annuity is a nonprobate asset, the TRS annuity claims
concern the same individual defendants (Ninfa, Eloy, and Thelma), same causes of action
(fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy), and same underlying facts evidencing
11
the decedent’s lack of capacity9 as Wilma’s probate claim. See In re Est. of Hallmark,
629 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) (“Typically, probate courts
exercise ancillary or pendent jurisdiction when a close relationship exists between the
non-probate claims and the claims against the estate.”). In other words, Wilma’s TRS
annuity claims possess a sufficiently “close relationship” to Wilma’s probate claim so as
to warrant the trial court’s exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction as necessary to promote
judicial efficiency and economy. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001; see, e.g., Narvaez
v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d 49, 58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (concluding probate
court had jurisdiction to preside over a “legal malpractice claim . . . interwoven with and
related to Ninfa and Eloy’s breach of fiduciary duties, barratry, and declaratory judgment
causes of action”); Dailey v. McAfee, No. 01-18-01060-CV, 2020 WL 4758429, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding probate court
was not prohibited from exercising its pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in declaratory
judgment action filed to construe a divorce decree and related settlement agreement).
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (APA) AND TRS
By what we construe as Ninfa and Eloy’s second issue, Ninfa and Eloy argue the
trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction because (1) in contravention to
§ 2001.038 of the Texas Government Code, Wilma failed to exhaust the remedies
available, “file suit in the proper forum,” join TRS as a party to this suit, and “petition TRS
9 The record contains the decedent’s medical records between 2013 and 2016, which included
notes from 2014 regarding the decedent’s gradual “memory impairment” that has “been occurring in a
persistent pattern for years,” and a practitioner’s “Statement of Medical Need,” indicating the decedent was
suffering from cognitive, hearing, and vision impairment and required “lifetime” home care services in 2016.
12
for relief”; and (2) Texas Government Code § 824.1012(a-1) prohibits the trial court’s
adjudication of this suit. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 824.1012(a-1), 2001.038.
A. Standard of Review
The issues here necessitate the interpretation of several provisions, which we
review de novo. In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 596 (Tex. 2023). “We interpret statutes by
looking to their plain language and construing the text in light of the statute as a whole.”
City of Austin v. Quinlan, 669 S.W.3d 813, 821 (Tex. 2023). “We need not and should not
seek the answer from any source other than the statute’s plain language.” Rodriguez v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Indiana, 684 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2024). “[W]hen a statute’s words
are unambiguous and yield but one interpretation, the judge’s inquiry is at an end.” Id.(cleaned up).
B. APA § 2001.038
Ninfa and Eloy assert that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
Wilma ignored a list of suit requirements outlined in § 2001.038 of the Texas Government
Code. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.038.
Entitled “Declaratory Judgment,” § 2001.038 of the government code sets forth
administrative procedures and requires that APA suits be brought in Travis County and
the state agency implicated be made a party to the action. The statute is included in
applicable part below:
(a) The validity or applicability of a rule, including an emergency rule
adopted under [§] 2001.034, may be determined in an action for
declaratory judgment if it is alleged that the rule or its threatened
application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or
impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.
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(b) The action may be brought only in a Travis County district court.
(c) The state agency must be made a party to the action.
(d) A court may render a declaratory judgment without regard to whether
the plaintiff requested the state agency to rule on the validity or
applicability of the rule in question.
Id. § 2001.038 (a)–(d) (emphasis added). The APA defines a “rule” as “a state agency
statement of general applicability that: (i) implements, interprets, or prescribes law or
policy; or (ii) describes the procedure or practice requirements of a state agency.” Id.
§ 2001.003(6).
By its plain language, § 2001.038 provides the legal avenue, i.e., declaratory
judgment, for a party to challenge the validity or applicability of an agency’s rule. See Tex.
Tel. Ass’n v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 653 S.W.3d 227, 264 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022,
no pet.); see, e.g., Muth v. Voe, No. 03-22-00420-CV, 2024 WL 1340855, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Austin Mar. 29, 2024, no pet. h.) (challenging the validity of a new rule announced
by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services and seeking declaratory
judgment under § 2001.038); SaveRGV v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, No. 13-22-00358-CV,
2024 WL 385656, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 1, 2024, no pet. h.)
(challenging the validity of Texas Natural Resources Code § 61.132 and seeking
declaratory judgment under § 2001.038). Significantly, Ninfa and Eloy do not specify any
rule being challenged here, and Ninfa and Eloy’s entire argument on this issue reads as
follows:
In this case, TRS recognized [a]ppellants as the legal beneficiaries of the
TRS Annuity. [Wilma] was required to bring this action by way of the
administrative procedures and rules issued by the TRS. Once they were
14
exhausted, the proper forum to file a claim would be in the Travis County
District Court. [TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN.] § 2001.038.
As relevant here, TRS benefits are regulated by Chapter 824 of the Texas
Government Code, which allows a retiree to elect an annuity that provides reduced
payments to the retiree during their life and, at death, continued payments to and
throughout the life of a designated beneficiary. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 824.101; see
also Holmes v. Kent, 221 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tex. 2007); Elsik v. Elsik, No. 04-10-00705-
CV, 2011 WL 2473088, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22, 2011, no pet.) (mem.
op.). However, as noted supra, Ninfa and Eloy’s argument contains no challenge to the
validity or applicability of any rule, pursuant to Chapter 824 or otherwise. Therefore, we
decline to impose § 2001.038 requirements regarding forum, available remedies, and
joinder where there exists no argument or evidence of a challenge to the validity or
applicability of an agency’s rule as required by the plain language of § 2001.038. We
overrule Ninfa and Eloy’s second issue in part.
C. TRS § 824.1012(a-1)
Next, Ninfa and Eloy assert that § 824.1012(a-1) prohibits the trial court’s authority.
Because we do not read statutes in isolation, for purposes of our analysis, we include
§ 824.1012(a) as well as § 824.1012(a-1) below:
(a) As an exception to [§] 824.101(c) [(Designation of Beneficiary)], a retiree
who selected an optional service retirement annuity under [§] 824.204(c)(1),
(c)(2), or (c)(5) or an optional disability retirement annuity under
[§] 824.308(c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(5) and who has received at least one
payment under the plan selected may change the optional annuity selection
made by the retiree to a standard service or disability retirement annuity as
provided for in this section. If the beneficiary of the optional annuity was the
spouse of the retiree when the retiree designated the spouse as beneficiary
15
of the optional annuity, to change from the optional annuity to a standard
retirement annuity under this subsection, the spouse or former spouse, as
applicable, who was designated the beneficiary of the optional annuity must
sign a notarized consent to the change or a court with jurisdiction over the
marriage of the retiree and beneficiary must approve or order the change.
The change in plan selection takes effect when the retirement system
receives the request to change the plan, provided the signed consent form
or court order, as applicable, is subsequently received by the retirement
system.
(a-1) The executive director or the executive director’s designee has
exclusive authority to determine whether the language in a court order
described by Subsection (a) is sufficient to indicate that the court has
approved or ordered the change in plan selection. A determination by the
executive director or the executive director’s designee under this subsection
may be appealed only to the board of trustees, except that the board by rule
may waive the requirement that an appeal be to the board. An appeal to the
board is a contested case under Chapter 2001. The standard of review of
an appeal brought under this subsection is by substantial evidence.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 824.1012 (emphasis added).
This provision exists inapposite to Ninfa and Eloy’s argument that the trial court is
prohibited from adjudicating the suit. Entitled “Post-Retirement Change in Retirement
Payment Plan for Certain Retirement Benefit Options,” this statute recognizes and
permits a court-ordered post-retirement change to TRS accounts by retirees. See id.
Perhaps more significantly, however, this statute contemplates a situation not before us—
wherein a retiree seeks to make changes to their designation of beneficiary during their
lifetime. See id. This provision does not expressly prohibit the trial court’s adjudication of
this suit because it does not account for litigation or events following a retiree’s death.
The provision is thus, inapplicable.
16
We overrule Ninfa and Eloy’s second issue. 10
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
16th day of May 2024.
10 Embedded within this subissue, Ninfa and Eloy argue the trial court’s creation of the constructive
trust was preempted by § 821.103 and § 821.005. No analysis or citations to case law or the record
accompanies this argument; thus, the subissue is waived for inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)
(“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations
to authorities and to the record.”); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85
(Tex. 1994) (holding appellate courts have discretion to deem points of error waived due to inadequate
briefing); Gomez v. Esquivel, No. 13-19-00037-CV, 2020 WL 1303233, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Mar. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
17