Tristan Keir Edwards v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed May 21, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-22-00699-CR
TRISTAN KEIR EDWARDS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 239th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 85794-CR
CONCURRING OPINION
I disagree with the majority opinion because the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted Exhibit 63, the crime-scene photograph appellant
challenges in his last issue. Although the error would not result in a reversal of the
judgment, the prejudicial nature of the photograph far outweighed its probative value
and admission of the photograph was unnecessary, as it was cumulative of other
evidence.
Additionally, although not required to do so by statute, the trial court did not
conduct a timely competency hearing.
Exhibit 63
In reviewing whether the crime-scene photograph was properly admitted, we
determine whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Tex. R. Evid. 403. The term “unfair prejudice” is the “tendency to
suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
This determination requires a balancing test of the following factors: (1) the
probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some
irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; and (4)
the proponent’s need for the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389–
90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Here, the admitted crime-scene photograph was particularly disturbing,
gruesome, and revolting, and it undoubtedly spurred a strong emotional response
from the jurors. As noted by the majority, the photograph depicts the three-week old
infant laying on the kitchen floor, with brain matter on the floor next to the infant’s
body. Exhibit 63 was not necessary, as the majority asserts, to “assist the jury in
understanding the medical examiner and crime scene investigator’s testimony.” The
photograph was not material evidence necessary for the State to prove its case
because the photograph was duplicative of other evidence in the case—the testimony
of the medical examiner, the investigating officers, and the witnesses, who all gave
a detailed synopsis of the nature of the injuries to the infant; the photographs
admitted as Exhibits 2-6, which explicitly show the injuries to the infant; and the
indictment read to the jury, which detailed the injuries to the infant, alleging
appellant had murdered his own child by slamming the infant to the ground, against
hard surfaces, and by stomping on him.
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The trial court admitted body cam video of the scene the officers encountered
and crime-scene photographs that depicted the complainant laying on the floor with
injuries similar to those in Exhibit 63. The medical examiner testified in detail about
the injuries depicted in the photographs:
[State]: Going down to the Evidence of Injury, the
first thing that you note is the blunt head
trauma. Can you describe to the jury how --
what you saw in this injury?
[Dr. Erin Barnhart 1]: Yes. So, in this case there was a deformity of
the skull meaning that the head was very
obviously misshapen. There were some
abrasions on the forehead area. There was a
large laceration that extended from the right
ear to the back of the head and the scalp was
undermined in that location meaning
basically that the scalp had been separated
from the skull. The calvarium is the scalp cap
or the top of the head, the round portion. That
portion of the skull was in pieces. And then
the base of the skull which is where the brain
sits -- it would be essentially above your face
here -- was also fragmented or in pieces as
well. A portion of the brain had come out of
the skull. Because the skull was in pieces and
because of the large scalp laceration, the
cranial cavity was essentially open. Part of
the brain was recovered at the scene and was
given to us by law enforcement. So that came
separate from the body. And the right globe
or right eye because of the fragmentation of
the base of the skull had actually been
displaced backwards into the cranial cavity.
However, because evidence of appellant’s guilt is overwhelming, this error is
harmless and must be disregarded. See Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 818 (Tex.
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Dr. Barnhart is the chief medical examiner for Galveston County.
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Crim. App. 2011) (observing that the erroneous admission of evidence is reviewed
for harm under the standard for non-constitutional error); see, e.g., Nguyen v. State,
No. 14-23-00126-CR, __ S.W.3d __, __, 2024 WL 629109, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 15, 2024, no pet. h.) (concluding that error in admission
of evidence was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence in support of
the verdict). For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the judgment, but disagree
with the analysis and conclusion in regard to Exhibit 63.
The trial court refused to conduct a timely informal competency hearing
As the majority opinion recites, on the fourth day of trial testimony, counsel
for appellant filed a motion for a court ordered independent examination by a
forensic psychiatrist after a meeting between appellant and the defense’s expert
psychiatric witness, who opined that appellant was incompetent to continue with
trial. Defense counsel requested an immediate examination, which the trial court
denied.
When raised after trial on the merits begins, Article 46B.005(d) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure allows the trial court to determine the issue of competency at
any time before sentence is pronounced, and, as here, to consider the defendant’s
mental state after the return of a verdict, unless the verdict is not guilty.
Because important constitutional rights are at issue, including the right to a
fair trial, see U.S. Const. Amends. VI, XIV; Tex. Const. Art. 1, § 10, the trial court
should have considered appellant’s competency when requested by the defense. See
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384–86 (1966). The issue of competency is crucial
to the appellant’s ability to consult with his counsel at trial. See Turner v. State, 570
S.W.3d 250, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The failure to do so calls into question the
verdict, as the person charged may have lost the important right and opportunity to
provide information to his counsel, suggest effective cross-examination, and
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participate fully in his defense. See Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 689–91 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). Because the trial court has the discretion, by statute, to determine
competency at any time before sentence is pronounced, the reviewing court is
precluded from considering the trial court’s decision as “arbitrary or unreasonable.”
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(d); Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919,
924 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). While I acknowledge that the
trial court performed its duty as required under the relevant statute, I nevertheless
believe that this is a violation of a criminal defendant’s Due Process rights, as it
prevents the defendant from assisting in his defense by avoiding a determination of
competency until after a trial has been concluded and guilt has been determined. The
Texas Legislature should review and amend art. 46B.005(d) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to remedy the violation of Due Process rights permitted by this provision.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment, but disagree with the analysis and
conclusion in regard to whether the trial court erred in the admission of Exhibit 63,
and despite article 46B.005, disagree with the timing of the competency hearing. I
nevertheless agree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be
affirmed.
/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant. (Zimmerer, J., majority).
Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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