Jordan Luis Garcia v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-23-00326-CR
JORDAN LUIS GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 52nd District Court
Coryell County, Texas
Trial Court No. 20-26165
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jordan Luis Garcia appeals his two convictions for indecency with a child. In a
single issue, he contends the trial court gave an improper instruction to the jury. We
affirm.
Background
Garcia was indicted for engaging in sexual contact with his daughter, referred to
as O.C., who was under age seventeen at the time, by causing her to touch his genitals
and by touching her genitals. The jury heard O.C.'s testimony, who was seventeen at the
time of the trial, as well as the testimony of the outcry witness, O.C.'s mother, two social
workers, a children's advocacy center forensic interviewer, and the pediatric nurse
practitioner who performed a sexual assault exam on O.C. After hearing the testimony,
the jury found Garcia guilty on both counts and assessed punishment at fifteen years of
incarceration for each count and a $10,000 fine for each count. The trial court rendered
judgment on each jury verdict and ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
Jury Charge
In his sole issue, Garcia asserts the trial court erred in including an instruction in
the jury charge regarding offenses other than the offenses alleged against him. He opines
that this instruction allowed the jury to find he had the propensity to commit the charged
acts and that he "acted in conformity with his criminal nature." He further contends the
instruction caused egregious harm.
The following instruction is at the heart of Garcia's complaint:
You are instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case
regarding the Defendant having committed offenses, if any, other than the
offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot
consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed such other
offenses, if any were committed, and even then you may only consider the
same for its bearing on relevant matters, including the character of the
Defendant, acts performed in conformity with the character of the
Defendant, the state of mind of the Defendant and the alleged victim O.C.,
a pseudonym, and the previous and subsequent relationship between the
Defendant and the alleged victim, O.C., a pseudonym, if any, in connection
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with the offenses, if any, alleged against him in the indictment in this case
and for no other purpose.
Standard and Applicable Law
We review charge error by determining first whether error exists, then evaluating
the harm caused by any error. Arteaga v. State, 521 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
If there is no error, our analysis ends. See Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012).
Because an accused must be tried only for the offense for which he is charged and
may not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal generally, extraneous offense
evidence is usually not admissible "to prove a person's character in order to show that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." TEX. R. EVID.
404(b)(1); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). However, in
prosecutions for sexual offenses against children under the age of seventeen, Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 permits the admission of evidence concerning
extraneous offenses committed by the defendant against the child. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.37. The unique nature of sexual assault crimes justifies admitting
extraneous offense evidence. See Jenkins v. State, 993 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1999, pet. ref'd).
Article 38.37, section 1(b) provides:
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Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against the child
who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted for its bearing on
relevant matters including:
(1) the state of mind of the defendant and the child; and
(2) the previous and subsequent relationship between the defendant and
the child.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 1(b).
Section 2(b) provides that:
Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and subject
to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has committed a separate offense
described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted in the trial of an
alleged offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the
evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant
and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.
Id. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Subsections 1(b) and 2(b) apply to specified offenses, including
indecency with a child. See id. art. 38.37, §§ 1(a)(1)(A), 2(a)(1)(C).
Discussion
Embedded in Garcia's complaint that the trial court gave an erroneous charge
instruction is the contention that his due process rights were violated. Specifically, he
asserts the trial court did not conduct a statutorily required hearing to determine if the
evidence would support a finding that he committed any separate offenses. See id. art.
38.37, § 2(a). Garcia waived this complaint due to his failure to raise it in the trial court.
See Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d 95, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref'd).
Regarding Garcia's argument that the charge erroneously allowed the jury to
consider extraneous offenses, we turn to the applicable statute. The charge tracks the
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language of article 38.37. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b). Following
the law as it is set out by the Texas legislature will not be deemed error on the part of a
trial judge. Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally,
Garcia did not request any limiting instructions on evidence he deemed extraneous
offense evidence. Therefore, the evidence was admitted for all purposes. See Hammock v.
State, 46 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We hold that the trial court did not err
by instructing the jury that it could consider evidence of extraneous offenses or acts for
character-conformity purposes. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b);
Martinez, 924 S.W.2d at 699.
Furthermore, the charge also instructed the jury that it could consider extraneous
offenses for their bearing on relevant matters including the state of mind of the defendant
and the victim and the relationship between them. Therefore, the jury could have
properly considered the evidence that Garcia committed other offenses for the reasons
articulated in article 38.37, section 1(b) instead of for purposes of character conformity
addressed in section 2(b). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 1(b); Campbell v.
State, No. 02-15-00018-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12592, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Dec. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We overrule Garcia's
sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgments on each count for indecency with a child.
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STEVE SMITH
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed July 25, 2024
Do not publish
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