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In the Interest of I.C. and J.C, Children v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  • Opinion filed May 23, 2024
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    __________
    No. 11-23-00100-CV
    __________
    IN THE INTEREST OF I.C. AND J.C., CHILDREN
    On Appeal from the 446th District Court
    Ector County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. E-20-08-0902-FM
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This is an appeal from an agreed order in a suit affecting the parent-child
    relationship.   The trial court signed the agreed order based upon the parties’
    mediation settlement agreement (MSA). Appellant is the father of the minor
    children, I.C. and J.C. Appellee is the grandmother of the children. Appellant brings
    two issues on appeal. We affirm.
    Background Facts
    On August 25, 2020, Appellee filed the underlying suit affecting the parent-
    child relationship wherein she asserted that the children’s present circumstances
    would significantly impair their physical health or emotional development.
    Appellee and the children’s mother appeared on October 1, 2020 for a hearing on
    temporary orders. On December 11, 2020, the trial court signed temporary orders
    that appointed Appellee and the parents as temporary joint managing conservators
    of the children. The temporary orders also ordered that Appellee would have the
    exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children and to receive child
    support on behalf of the children. The temporary orders further provided that
    Appellant would have not possession or access to the children and that the mother
    would need to begin a therapeutic program with a battered women’s shelter in order
    to have supervised possession and access to the children.
    The parties attended a mediation on November 10, 2021 that resulted in a
    signed MSA that was filed with the trial court on November 12, 2021. At the top of
    the MSA, the following words appeared: “THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT
    SUBJECT TO REVOCATION.” The MSA provided that it resolved all claims
    and controversies between the parties. It also provided that its terms and conditions
    would be incorporated into a final decree, order, or judgment that the parties would
    present to the trial court for entry, and that its terms were “binding, enforceable, and
    irrevocable” in accordance with various laws, including Section 153.0071 of the
    Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.0071 (West Supp. 2023). The
    MSA was signed by each of the parties and their attorneys. The terms of the MSA
    largely mirrored those of the temporary orders—Appellee was granted the exclusive
    right to designate the residence of the children and to receive child support on their
    behalf. The MSA also provided for limited possession and access to the children by
    Appellant and the children’s mother.
    For reasons that are not clear from the appellate record, the trial court did not
    sign an order memorializing the terms of the November 10, 2021 MSA until
    2
    April 11, 2023, when the trial court signed a “Corrected – Agreed Order in Suit
    Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship.” Appellant appeals from this agreed order.
    The agreed order recites that the trial court conducted a hearing with respect to its
    entry on October 24, 2022. The reporter’s record from this hearing reflects the basis
    for Appellant’s appeal from the agreed order: that Appellant did not believe that the
    agreed order should be signed based on events that occurred after the execution of
    the MSA. The trial court advised counsel for Appellant that the order reflecting the
    MSA should be signed first, after which Appellant could file a petition to modify it.
    Analysis
    Appellant presents two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Appellant asserts
    that the trial court erred “in signing an order reflecting an agreement made seventeen
    (17) months prior without further consideration.” Appellant contends that he “raised
    material changes in circumstances” that the trial court should have considered before
    signing the agreed order based upon the MSA. He asserts that the trial court’s failure
    to consider changed circumstances occurring after the mediation interfered with the
    parents’ “fundamental parental rights that are protected by due process,” and is
    inconsistent with the trial court’s “best interest of the child” determination. See FAM.
    § 153.002 (West 2014).
    “If a mediated settlement agreement meets [certain requirements], a party is
    entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement notwithstanding . . .
    another rule of law.” In re Lee, 
    411 S.W.3d 445
    , 447 (Tex. 2013) (quoting FAM.
    § 153.0071(e)). We review a trial court’s decision to render judgment on an MSA
    under Section 153.0071 for an abuse of discretion. See id.; Scruggs v. Linn, 
    443 S.W.3d 373
    , 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (holding that the
    trial court generally does not have discretion to decline to render judgment on or
    deviate from an MSA). If an MSA meets the statutory requirements, a party is
    3
    entitled to judgment on the MSA notwithstanding Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of
    Civil Procedure “or another rule of law.” FAM. § 153.0071(e); Scruggs, 
    443 S.W.3d at 378
    ; see Highsmith v. Highsmith, 
    587 S.W.3d 771
    , 775 (Tex. 2019) (“In other
    words, a statutorily compliant MSA is binding on both the parties and the trial court,
    subject to a few narrow exceptions.”) (citing Section 153.0071(e-1) as an example).
    In Lee, the Texas Supreme Court determined that, based upon the language of
    Section 153.0071, the trial court is prohibited from denying a motion to enter
    judgment on a properly executed MSA “based on a broad best interest inquiry.” 411
    S.W. 3d at 457–58. In this regard, the court noted that Section 153.0071 omits the
    broad best interest inquiry set out in Section 153.002. 
    Id.
     at 454–55. Thus,
    Section 153.0071(e-1) sets out the only means by which an MSA that meets the
    requirements of Section 153.0071(d) may be rejected by the trial court. See 
    id.
    Under Section 153.0071(e-1), an MSA may only be rejected in instances of family
    violence that impaired a party’s ability to make decisions or the MSA would permit
    a child to either reside with or have unsupervised contact by a registered sex offender
    and the agreement is not in the child’s best interest. FAM. 153.0071(e-1); see Lee,
    411 S.W.3d at 452.
    The court held in Lee that a broad best interest inquiry under Section 152.002
    is foreclosed by its omission from Section 153.0071. See Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 457–
    58. Accordingly, because the exceptions in subsection (e-1) do not apply in this case
    and the statute and Lee preclude a broad best interest inquiry, Appellant’s assertion
    that the trial court should have conducted a best interest inquiry is without merit.
    See id. We further note that Section 153.0071 does not contain a provision that
    permits the trial court to reject an MSA based upon changed circumstances occurring
    after the mediation, or the fundamental nature of parental rights. Accordingly, the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s attempt to prevent the
    4
    entry of an order that set out the terms of the parties’ MSA. We overrule Appellant’s
    first issue. 1
    Appellant asserts in his second issue that the trial court erred in vacating an
    order it signed on February 21, 2023. In support of his contention, Appellant asserts:
    “[t]he Trial Court did err in vacating the order on February 21, 2023 because [there
    was] no evidence to rebut [the] fit parent presumption.” This is the only argument
    offered by Appellant with respect to the February 21 order.
    We note at the outset that, at the top of the February 21 order, the following
    words in bold, red type appear: “Order/Judgment Vacated/Set Aside by subsequent
    Order on 04/11/2023.” In this regard, the trial court signed an “Order on Granting
    Emergency Motion to Modify, Correct, or Reform Judgment & Vacating Order” on
    April 11, 2023 that provides:
    IT IS ORDERED that the order signed by the Court in this cause
    number on FEBRUARY 21, 2023 is VACATED and shall have no
    further effect.
    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are enjoined from
    attempting to present the order VACATED in the preceding paragraph
    as a valid order related to any child the subject of this suit.
    The February 21, 2023 order recites that it was the product of a hearing that
    occurred on August 1, 2022. However, we do not have a reporter’s record from a
    hearing that occurred on this date. The February 21 order also recites that it was
    based on a petition to modify. However, no corresponding petition to modify filed
    by Appellant was included in the clerk’s record. The February 21 order removed
    Appellee as the party with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of
    1
    We additionally note that Appellant did not make an offer of proof describing the evidence that he
    would have sought to introduce to the trial court about changed circumstances occurring after the mediation.
    In the absence of an offer of proof, we are hard pressed to declare an abuse of discretion by the part of the
    trial court for complying with the requirements of Section 153.0071.
    5
    the children, replacing her with the parents. It also removed the parents’ obligation
    to pay child support.
    One week after the February 21 order was signed, Appellee filed an
    “Emergency Motion to Modify, Correct, or Reform Judgment” with respect to the
    February 21 order. Appellee asserted that it was error for the trial court to sign the
    February 21 order because it did not comply with the MSA.
    Appellant has not cited any legal authority for why the trial court erred in
    vacating the February 21 order. As we previously noted, there is no corresponding
    petition to modify filed by Appellant in the clerk’s record to support the entry of the
    February 21 order. Further, it directly contravenes the terms of the parties’ MSA.
    For the reasons set out in our discussion of Appellant’s first issue, it was error for
    the trial court to sign an order that differed from the terms of the parties’ MSA.
    Accordingly, the trial court did not err by vacating the February 21 order. We
    overrule Appellant’s second issue.
    This Court’s Ruling
    We affirm the order of the trial court.
    JOHN M. BAILEY
    CHIEF JUSTICE
    May 23, 2024
    Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
    Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-23-00100-CV

Filed Date: 5/23/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2024