Texas Department of Transportation v. Jimmie Lee Lofton ( 2023 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-22-00256-CV
__________________
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant
V.
JIMMIE LEE LOFTON, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 136th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. D-204,737
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, the Texas Department of
Transportation (TxDOT) challenges the denial of its “Motion for Traditional and No
Evidence Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction” in which it
asserted sovereign immunity and requested dismissal of Jimmie Lee Lofton’s
personal injury lawsuit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8).1 In
1We note that Jimmie Lee Lofton’s name is misspelled throughout the clerk’s
record and in the final judgment as Jimmy Lee Lofton.
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two issues, TxDOT contends the trial court erred by denying its Motion for
Traditional and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and To Dismiss for
Want of Jurisdiction because (1) the pothole is not a special defect and there is no
evidence that TxDOT had actual knowledge of the danger of the pothole when the
accident occurred or (2) that the pothole posed an unreasonable risk of harm. TxDOT
argues that without such evidence, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity under
the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”), and the trial court is deprived of subject matter
jurisdiction. As discussed below, we reverse the trial court’s Order and dismiss
Lofton’s suit for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
In his petition, Lofton alleged that on the night of September 24, 2018, Lofton
was riding his motorcycle eastbound in the far right outside lane of Interstate 10 in
Jefferson County when he hit an alleged “special defect” in the roadway, which he
described as “a previously improperly repaired” pothole and crack in the roadway.
As a result of hitting the pothole, he lost control of his motorcycle and suffered
multiple injuries. Lofton claimed that he was an “invitee” on property possessed,
controlled and maintained by TxDOT. Lofton claimed that TxDOT knew or should
have known of the dangerous premises condition, which posed an unreasonable risk
of harm. Asserting causes of action for special defect and in the alternative a claim
for a premises defect, Lofton alleged that he suffered personal injuries caused by a
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condition or use of the property and that TxDOT’s immunity is waived, making it
liable for his injuries and damages.
In its answer, TxDOT raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity.
The case went to trial, but the jurors were unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial
was declared. TxDOT then filed its combined “Motion for Traditional and No
Evidence Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction.” In its
Motion, TxDOT asserted sovereign immunity against suit and liability, and it
requested dismissal of the suit. TxDOT asserted that the condition complained of
was not a special defect. It further argued that no evidence exists to show that
TxDOT had actual knowledge of the condition, as required to find liability for
injuries caused by an ordinary premises defect. TxDOT supported its motion with
trial testimony from several witnesses, including: Tiffany Lofton, Lofton’s wife;
Trooper Kasey Carrier, who investigated the accident; Noel Salac, a TxDOT area
engineer; and Todd Dinger, a TxDOT maintenance supervisor. TxDOT also attached
photographs Tiffany took the day after the accident and photographs Trooper Carrier
took the night of the accident.
In his “Response to Defendant’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence
Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction,” Lofton
asserted that evidence at trial showed the condition of the roadway was a special
defect or, in the alternative, a premise defect, and that fact issues exist on the issue
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of “actual knowledge” of a dangerous condition and whether there was an
“unreasonable risk of harm.” In addition to the trial testimony of the four witnesses,
Lofton’s supporting evidence included a photograph of the pothole taken by Trooper
Carrier, a TxDOT daily activity report for the day after the accident occurred, and
the crash report. The trial court denied TxDOT’s Motion for Traditional and No
Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order in which the trial court
“grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a)(8); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
101.001(3)(A) (defining governmental unit to include the state and all agencies of
the government that constitute the state, including departments). Both a plea to the
jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment are appropriate vehicles to
challenge a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of
subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against the State or certain governmental units
unless the State has consented to suit. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted). The issue in this case is
whether the State waived immunity through the limited waiver provided for in the
TTCA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001–.109.
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Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
reviewed de novo. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. To invoke the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively
demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. “If the evidence
creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot
grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact
finder.” Id. at 227–28. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to
raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, a district court rules on the plea to
the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. at 228. If a party challenges the existence of
jurisdictional facts, we consider the evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the
jurisdictional issue raised. Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
A party who seeks a no-evidence summary judgment contends that there is no
evidence of one or more elements of a claim on which the other party has the burden
of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). If the nonmovant produces more than a
scintilla of evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged
element, summary judgment is improper. See id.; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118
S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). If reasonable, fair-minded people could differ in their
conclusions, there is more than a scintilla of probative evidence. Chapman, 118
S.W.3d at 751 (citation omitted).
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To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the
burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein &
Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who
moves for traditional summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one
essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or establish an affirmative
defense as a matter of law. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508
(Tex. 2010) (citation omitted); Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197
(Tex. 1995). Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable minds could not differ in their
conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). If the
defendant establishes his right to summary judgment as a matter of law, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.
Siegler, 899 S.W.2d at 197. We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,
and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the
nonmovant. Id.; see also Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d
211, 215 (Tex. 2003).
ANALYSIS
In two issues, TxDOT argues (1) the pothole is not a special defect and there
is no evidence that TxDOT had actual knowledge of the danger of the pothole when
the accident occurred or (2) that the pothole posed an unreasonable risk of harm.
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TxDOT argues that without such evidence, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity
under the TTCA, and the trial court is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction.
“The State of Texas is protected from suits for damages by sovereign
immunity, unless waived by statute.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d 844,
846 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). “Legislative consent to waive sovereign
immunity by statute must be by ‘clear and unambiguous language,’. . . and suit can
then be brought ‘only in the manner indicated by that consent.’” Id. (quoting Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034; Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692,
694 (Tex. 2003)). “[W]hen construing a statute that purportedly waives sovereign
immunity, we generally resolve ambiguities by retaining immunity.” Wichita Falls
State Hosp., 106 S.W.3d at 697.
The TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity, allowing suits against
governmental units under certain, narrowly defined circumstances. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001). The TTCA provides
that a governmental unit waives governmental immunity from liability for claims
“for personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal
or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to
the claimant according to Texas law.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
101.021(2). The TTCA waives immunity from suit only as expressly provided in the
TTCA. Id. § 101.025(a); Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587. Stated another way, “the extent
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of Section 101.025’s waiver of immunity from suit is determined by the Act’s limits
on liability,” and the TTCA is “a unique statutory scheme in which the two
immunities are co-extensive.”
Premises Defects vs. Special Defects
The TTCA provides for a limited waiver of immunity for two categories of
claims that allege dangerous conditions on real property – premises defects and
special defects. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022. If a claim involves
a premises defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a
private person owes to a licensee on private property. Id. § 101.022(a); see also State
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992).
Likewise, if the claim arises from a premises defect on a “toll highway, road, or
street, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person
owes to a licensee on private property.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
101.022(c). Under a licensee standard, among other elements, a plaintiff must prove
that the governmental unit had actual knowledge of a condition that created an
unreasonable risk of harm and that the licensee did not have actual knowledge of
that same condition. York, 284 S.W.3d at 847; Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237.
If the condition is a special defect, the governmental unit owes the duty that a
private person owes to an invitee. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b);
Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237. Under the invitee standard, a plaintiff need only prove
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that the governmental unit should have known of a condition that created an
unreasonable risk of harm. York, 284 S.W.3d at 847; Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237. To
discharge its duty to keep its premises safe for invitees, the governmental unit must
either adequately warn of the dangerous condition or make the condition reasonably
safe. See TXI Operations, L.P. v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Tex. 2009).
Whether a condition is a premises defect or a special defect is a question of
law that we review de novo. York, 284 S.W.3d at 847 (citation omitted). The Civil
Practice and Remedies Code does not define “special defect,” but gives guidance by
likening special defects to “excavations or obstructions[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 101.022(b); York, 284 S.W.3d at 847. Thus, the question is whether the
condition is of the same kind or class as an excavation or obstruction. Id. (citations
omitted); Denton Cty. v. Beynon, 283 S.W.3d 329, 331 n.11 (Tex. 2009). “A special
defect, then, cannot be a condition that falls outside of this class.” York, 284 S.W.3d
at 847 (citations omitted). In determining whether a particular condition is like an
excavation or obstruction and therefore a special defect, the Texas Supreme Court
has recognized several helpful characteristics, such as: “(1) the size of the condition;
(2) whether the condition unexpectedly and physically impairs an ordinary user’s
ability to travel on the road; (3) whether the condition presents some unusual quality
apart from the ordinary course of events; and (4) whether the condition presents an
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unexpected and unusual danger.” City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 765
(Tex. 2012) (citation omitted).
In City of Denton, the Supreme Court discussed the court of appeals’
reasoning that the sunken area in the roadway was not the same as an ordinary
pothole which would not be a special defect, because the sunken area had been
caused by the City cutting a hole in the street. In other words, the court of appeals
reasoning suggested a pothole by itself might not be a special defect, but the same
pothole would be a special defect if it was caused by the governmental unit’s
ineffective repair. Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 765. The Supreme Court rejected the
reasoning of the court of appeals and stated:
A condition’s quality as a special defect thus bears not so much upon
the government’s role in its creation as it does on the nature of the
condition itself. The circumstances surrounding the governmental
unit’s involvement in the creation of a premises defect may be relevant
to the issue of the government’s knowledge of the defect, but will not
serve to transform an otherwise ordinary premises defect into a special
one.
Id. “The class of special defects contemplated by the statute is narrow.” The Univ.
of Tex. at Austin v. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Tex. 2010). “It does not include
common potholes or similar depressions in the roadway.” Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 766;
Hindman v. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 906 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1995, writ denied) (observing that special defects do not include “every
pothole or bump encountered on a public highway in Texas capable of upsetting a
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cyclist”). “Rough, uneven asphalt and even potholes are not unexpected and should
be within the realm of objective expectations of the ordinary user.” Tex. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Pierce, No. 12-19-00260-CV, 2020 WL 500779, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Jan. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116. Typically,
such irregularities will not present an unusual danger to the traveler. Paper, 376
S.W.3d at 766.
Having reviewed all the trial testimony, photographs, and other exhibits, we
agree with TxDOT that the subject pothole was at most an ordinary premises defect
and not a special defect. The photos of the pothole depict an area of asphalt with an
uneven, rough, irregular surface in two areas. The photographs show that the
complained-of condition is at the edge of the outside lane, close to the shoulder of
the road but still within the lane of travel. The width of the lane of travel is
approximately twelve feet wide.
Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper Kasey Carrier investigated the
accident and took two photographs of the location of Lofton’s accident. Trooper
Carrier testified that Lofton was traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 in the outside
lane of travel. He did not take any measurements that night of the size or depth of
the pothole. As usual, he notified dispatch to contact TxDOT concerning the damage
to the roadway. Trooper Carrier testified he determined the specific pothole in
question by looking for scrapings from the motorcycle on the ground. Prior to
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Lofton’s accident, Trooper Carrier had been to this area many times for accidents,
flat tires or “motorist assists,” and he notified communications about problems in
the area on multiple occasions. Carrier stated in his opinion that the “amount of risk
that this pothole poses to a motorcycle is unreasonable, unacceptable.” And he
testified that “there are a lot of potholes out there over time [and] that [he had]
notified communication to let TxDOT know.” However, he admitted that he had
never notified TxDOT about the specific pothole involved in Lofton’s accident
before Lofton’s accident occurred.
Tiffany Lofton, Lofton’s wife, testified that she took photographs of the
potholes the day after the accident. Tiffany explained she knew she photographed
the correct pothole because Trooper Carrier told her where it was located. She did
not measure the pothole but explained it was “about two of my – both my hands put
together.” Regarding depth, Tiffany testified her whole index finger could fit in the
pothole. While on the witness stand, Tiffany measured her hands and index finger,
which measured six inches in width and three and a half inches in depth. Since
Trooper Carrier did not measure the pothole in question, Tiffany’s testimony is the
only evidence concerning the pothole’s size.
The existence of a special defect is a question of law, which we review de
novo. City of Dall. v. Reed, 258 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Tex. 2008). As explained by the
Supreme Court, we traditionally distinguish special defects by some unusual quality
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outside the ordinary course of events. Id. Here, the evidence shows the pothole
measured approximately six inches in width and three and a half inches in depth.
Ordinary drivers in the normal course of driving roadways should expect that normal
wear and tear may cause depressions and potholes like the pothole the evidence
describes in relation to its size and depth, and we cannot say this pothole was of an
“unusual quality outside the ordinary course of events” such as would cause it to be
included within the same kind or class of excavations or obstructions that qualify as
special defects. Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b). This
pothole does not fit within the same class of hazard of an excavation or obstruction
as referenced in the TTCA. Compare Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 765–66 (holding sunken
area on the street that was two inches to a few inches more at its deepest point and
located in the center of one lane of traffic was not a special defect), and Reed, 258
S.W.3d at 622 (holding that a two-to three-inch difference in elevation between
traffic lanes was not a special defect), and City of El Paso v. Bernal, 986 S.W.2d
610, 611 (Tex. 1999) (holding that a worn or depressed area of a sidewalk
approximately three feet by six feet in size with a depth of three inches was not a
special defect), with Cty. of Harris v. Eaton, 573 S.W.2d 177, 178–79 (Tex. 1978)
(oval-shaped hole six to ten inches deep, and four to nine feet wide, extending across
ninety percent of roadway is a special defect), and City of Weston v. Gaudette, 287
S.W.3d 832, 838–39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (pothole ten feet in diameter
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and five to six inches deep, extending the width of one traffic lane is a special defect),
and Morse v. State, 905 S.W.2d 470, 475–76 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, writ
denied) (ten to twelve inch drop off on shoulder of road is a special defect), and State
v. Nichols, 609 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(caved-in portion of highway three to five feet wide and three to four feet deep,
extending across entire highway is a special defect). Since the pothole was not a
special defect, section 101.022(b) of the TTCA does not apply and TxDOT did not
owe a heightened duty as would apply to an invitee. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 101.022(b); Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 117.
Actual knowledge
We next consider whether Lofton established a claim waived by the TTCA
for a premises defect. To establish waiver of immunity for a premises defect claim,
Lofton must establish, among other elements, that TxDOT “actually knew of a
‘dangerous condition at the time of the accident.’” Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 117
(quoting City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 413–14 (Tex. 2008)). Lofton
asserts that TxDOT had actual knowledge of the condition because TxDOT was
aware that this stretch of road was marred by potholes, TxDOT employees regularly
inspected this area and were notified by the Texas Department of Public Safety
(“DPS”) of potholes in this area, and this location was repaired several times before
the accident. Lofton also points to Noel Salac’s testimony that he was notified about
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Lofton’s accident around the time it occurred and that he believed TxDOT was aware
of the accident.
Noel Salac, a TxDOT assistant area engineer in the Beaumont District at the
time of Lofton’s accident, testified that two main roles of TxDOT are new
construction and maintenance. Salac testified that since this area was past the new
construction phase, repairs to this section of the road would be handled by the
TXDOT Beaumont maintenance division. When shown the photographs of the area
in question, Salac admitted that this area of the roadway had been repaired numerous
times. When questioned about whether it would take more than two weeks for the
pothole in question to develop, Salac testified that it could develop overnight or even
in a few minutes. Salac explained this could occur from water infiltration in the road
and expansion from sunlight that could cause a repaired pothole to pop loose. He
also testified that a pothole could be repaired and look fine but heavy truck traffic
could make the asphalt patch pop loose. Based upon mathematical calculations,
Salac testified that on a given day, 12,500 vehicles could have used the lane where
Lofton’s accident occurred, meaning 125,000 vehicles could have used the lane
during any given ten-day period.
Todd Dinger, a TxDOT maintenance section supervisor at the time of
Lofton’s accident who has since retired from TxDOT, testified that he was head of
maintenance in Jefferson County in 2018 and was responsible for Interstate10. He
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stated that 50,000 – 80,000 vehicles drive on Interstate10 in Jefferson County on a
daily basis. Since it was so heavily travelled, Interstate10 would be visually
inspected probably twice a week. Dinger testified that 20–30% of maintenance
involves potholes. He discussed TxDOT’s “Daily Activity Report” that identified
who, what, when and where a maintenance crew went out and how much “cold mix”
was used to repair a given number of potholes. Dinger explained that he had seen
pothole repairs last two to five years, but he had seen other repairs last only a month
or two before requiring further repair. After a repair, someone would drive by and
inspect the repair work within two to three days, unless an issue was reported.
However, Dinger testified that repairs sometimes fall apart very quickly due to the
large volume of 18-wheeler traffic. Based upon the September 21, 2018 Daily
Activity Report, TXDOT was last in the area performing repairs on I10 around
where Lofton’s accident occurred three days before Lofton hit the pothole on
September 24, 2018.
We conclude that Lofton’s evidence does not establish that TxDOT had actual
knowledge of the pothole in question when the accident occurred. See York, 284
S.W.3d at 847; Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237. It is not sufficient for TxDOT to merely
know of the possibility that a dangerous condition could develop over time. See
Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 117 (quoting Stewart, 249 S.W.3d at 414–15). “‘Awareness
of a potential problem is not actual knowledge of an existing danger.’” Paper, 376
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S.W.3d at 767 (quoting Reyes v. City of Laredo, 335 S.W.3d 605, 608 (Tex. 2010)).
At most, TxDOT arguably knew that the area of the roadway might need to be
repaired again, and that it was possible other potholes could develop, but this does
not establish actual knowledge of the pothole in question. Even if TXDOT had just
previously made a repair to the same pothole, which is unclear on this record, the
mere possibility that the pothole might redevelop does not show TXDOT possessed
actual knowledge of an existing danger. Id. In other words, to prove the actual
knowledge element of his premises defect claim, Lofton had to prove that at the time
of his accident, TxDOT knew about the dangerous premises condition. See id. Since
Lofton failed to establish that TxDOT had actual knowledge the pothole existed and
posed an unreasonable danger when the accident occurred, Lofton failed to meet his
burden to establish that TxDOT’s immunity from suit on the premises defect claim
had been waived by the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 101.022(a); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228, 232. Having failed to establish a
valid waiver, the trial court lacked the authority to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over Lofton’s suit. Id. We sustain TxDOT’s first issue. It is not necessary
to address TxDOT’s second issue, in which it contends there is no waiver of
immunity because the condition did not pose an unreasonable risk of harm. See Tex.
R. App. P. 47.1.
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CONCLUSION
We conclude that TxDOT established as a matter of law that there has been
no waiver of sovereign immunity under the TTCA and that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court erred in denying TxDOT’s Motion for
Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of
Jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying TxDOT’s
Motion for Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for
Want of Jurisdiction, we grant TxDOT’s Motion for Traditional and No Evidence
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, and we render
judgment dismissing Lofton’s claims against TxDOT with prejudice.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
W. SCOTT GOLEMON
Chief Justice
Submitted on June 30, 2023
Opinion Delivered October 19, 2023
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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