Christopher Chad Price v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Opinion filed October 12, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-22-00195-CR
__________
CHRISTOPHER CHAD PRICE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR56842
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Christopher Chad Price, was indicted on four counts for the offense
of aggravated assault against a public servant, a first-degree felony. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2022). The indictment included two
enhancement allegations. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on all four
counts. The jury found the enhancement allegations to be “true” and assessed
Appellant’s punishment for each count at life imprisonment in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See PENAL § 12.42(c)(1)
(West 2019). The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial of
the death of Brittany Teichrobe, the driver of the getaway vehicle from which
Appellant shot at law enforcement officers. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant’s charged offenses arose from a shootout that he initiated with law
enforcement officers while he and Teichrobe were evading from the officers in their
vehicle. The pursuit and shootout ended when Appellant and Teichrobe exited their
vehicle to evade on foot across a field and were both shot by pursuing law
enforcement officers; Teichrobe was killed and Appellant was wounded. Appellant
was apprehended and charged with four counts of aggravated assault against a public
servant.
United States Marshal Jay Easley testified that he was tasked with locating
and arresting two fugitives, Appellant and Teichrobe. Marshal Easley had
information that the vehicle the two fugitives were operating was in the area of
Ponderosa and Willow Drive in Ector County. The two were observed operating a
vehicle that bore a license plate registered to a different vehicle, which Marshal
Easley testified could indicate that the vehicle was stolen or could be an attempt to
conceal the driver’s identity. Law enforcement officers surveilled Appellant and
Teichrobe in a residential area and later at a local gas station but chose not to make
immediate contact with them out of concern for bystanders. When the fugitives left
the gas station in the vehicle—with Teichrobe driving and Appellant in the passenger
seat—a marked DPS patrol unit attempted to conduct a traffic stop but the vehicle
failed to stop and evaded at a high rate of speed toward Midland.
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Lieutenant Kenneth Zane Greenwood of the Texas Department of Public
Safety, who serves as a pilot and tactical flight officer for the agency, was operating
the camera and radio system of a DPS helicopter that day. Video and audio footage
from the helicopter’s camera was admitted and showed the vehicle at the gas station
and then the fugitives evading from the marked DPS unit. During the pursuit, the
helicopter footage shows Appellant leaning out of the passenger window and firing
a weapon at the pursuing officers. The weapon was later identified as a shotgun.
The pursuit continued on Highway 191 into Midland County with the
fugitives’ vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed toward Midland and crossing
multiple lanes of traffic. The driver lost control of the vehicle and it came to rest on
a median between the westbound service road and the access road to the westbound
lane. While their vehicle was still moving, both fugitives exited and ran on foot. As
Appellant exited, he appeared to point something at the pursuing officers. Both
fugitives ran through a fence and into a field where they were shot by law
enforcement officers as they attempted to evade them. Teichrobe was killed and
Appellant was wounded. A shotgun was found beside Appellant where he fell to the
ground after he was shot.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App.
2019)); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This
standard also applies to a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous-
offense evidence. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);
Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). We
will not reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, and there is no abuse of discretion,
unless that decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Ruiz, 631
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S.W.3d at 856 (citing Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
Furthermore, we will not disturb a trial court’s decision, even if its reasoning was
flawed, if it is correct on any theory of law that reasonably finds support in the record
and is applicable to the case. Id. (citing Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016)).
III. Analysis
Appellant contends that the admission of testimony and evidence of the
shooting and death of Teichrobe constituted an abuse of discretion because it was
(1) irrelevant, (2) an inadmissible extraneous offense, and (3) unfairly prejudicial.
We disagree.
For evidence to be relevant under Rule 401 it must make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 401; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387. There must be a
“direct or logical connection” between the evidence and the fact the proponent is
attempting to prove. Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative of guilt as direct evidence. Nisbett v. State,
552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Pieces of evidence that may seem
weak in isolation may become stronger when they are consistent with each other.
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The relevance of
evidence is not always clear cut, and reasonable people may disagree about whether
certain evidence leads to a particular inference. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. If
the relevance of evidence depends on the existence of a fact, then the trial court may
admit the proposed evidence contingent upon the introduction of sufficient evidence
to prove that fact. TEX. R. EVID. 104(b).
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or act other than the charged offense is not
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in conformity with his character;
however, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).
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For example, evidence of extraneous offenses that arise from the same transaction
may be admissible to provide appropriate context for the charged offense, or to prove
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, identity, the absence of mistake
or lack of accident. Id.; Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). If a trial court determines that evidence of a defendant’s extraneous acts is
relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b), and a timely, proper objection is made,
the trial court must engage in a Rule 403 analysis to determine whether the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.
See TEX. R. EVID. 403; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 386.
A. Extraneous Offense Admissible as Same-Transaction Contextual Evidence
The State contends that Teichrobe’s death is an extraneous offense committed
by Appellant, rather than simply an evidentiary fact. We agree. “The standard for
[the] admission of extraneous-offense evidence is high: ‘a trial court cannot admit
extraneous-offense evidence unless a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the extraneous offense.’” Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d
749, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Fischer v. State, 268 S.W.3d 552, 558
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
Appellant could have been charged with Teichrobe’s death because his
conduct caused her death in a manner for which he could be held criminally
responsible. See PENAL § 6.04 (West 2021), § 19.02(b)(1) (West 2019); Dowden v.
State, 758 S.W.2d 264, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); see also PENAL § 19.02(b)(3).
Here, when he initiated the shootout with law enforcement, all of which was captured
by the helicopter’s camera, Appellant was aware that his conduct could result in the
death of one or more of those involved—the pursuing law enforcement officers,
himself, or his compatriot Teichrobe. See e.g., Dowden, 758 S.W.2d at 273; Baker v.
State, No. 02-17-00193-CR, 2020 WL 1808292, at *8–10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
April 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Kennedy v. State,
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No. 06-06-00002-CR, 2006 WL 2787477, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 29,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The jury viewed the helicopter’s video footage, which showed law
enforcement’s pursuit and apprehension of Appellant and Teichrobe. The footage
showed both fugitives being shot after they exited their vehicle and as they ran from
law enforcement into the field, as well as the subsequent first aid efforts. Appellant
did not object to the admission of the video on the basis that it showed the events
surrounding the shootings, although he did object to it on other grounds that are not
raised on appeal. In this case, the evidence shows that Teichrobe’s death occurred
as a result of the shootout that Appellant had initiated with law enforcement.
Although evidence of Teichrobe’s death itself may not be relevant to prove
any element of the charged offense, evidence concerning the circumstances of her
death constitutes same-transaction contextual evidence. See Inthalangsy, 634
S.W.3d at 756. This type of evidence is admissible as an exception under
Rule 404(b) because it “illuminate[s] the nature [and context] of the crime alleged.”
Id. (quoting Comacho v. State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); see
also Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (op. on reh’g). The
jury is entitled to know all the facts that are “‘blended or closely interwoven’ with a
continuous criminal episode” so that it may realistically evaluate the evidence.
Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 301
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see also Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). Therefore, the same-transaction evidence must be “necessary to
the jury’s understanding of the offense” such that the charged offense would make
little sense without its admission. Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting
Poindexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
In Inthalangsy, the defendant was charged with capital murder of a man—
Jimmy—committed while in the course of kidnapping the man’s girlfriend—Cassie.
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Id. at 751. The defendant later murdered Cassie. Id. The evidence showed that
Cassie owed a substantial amount of money (derived from illegal drug-trafficking
profits) to the defendant and two other people. Id. at 752. Witnesses observed the
defendant enter a residence where Jimmy and Cassie were staying; a gunshot rang
out, and the defendant and his associate walked out of the residence with Cassie in
between them. Id. She appeared nervous as if she was about to cry. Id. The
defendant and his associates left the scene with Cassie sitting between them in the
back seat of their vehicle. Id. Witnesses entered the house and found Jimmy gasping
for breath and bleeding from a large hole in his face—he died in a hospital shortly
thereafter. Id. Cassie’s body was found with multiple gunshot wounds in a nearby
river. Id. The medical examiner estimated that she died on the same day as Jimmy.
Id.
The defendant sought to exclude any reference to Cassie’s death. Id. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that evidence of Cassie’s death was relevant and
admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence because her death provided
necessary context of the defendant’s continuing course of conduct that included
capital murder. See id. at 757 (“One cannot tell the story of Cassie’s kidnapping
without revealing the end of the story. [Jurors] would naturally wonder what
happened to Cassie after she left [the residence] and why she did not testify about
what happened to her on [the day she was kidnapped”].).
The same logic applies here. As we have said, the jury viewed the sequence
of events as recorded by the DPS helicopter’s camera, which showed the pursuit and
apprehension of Appellant and Teichrobe. The video footage showed both fugitives
being shot as they ran from law enforcement in the field, as well as first aid efforts
that were made thereafter. As in Inthalangsy, the jury here would naturally wonder
about Teichrobe’s involvement and fate, and her death illuminated the full nature of
Appellant’s crime—his act of shooting at the pursuing law enforcement officers,
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which he had initiated, and which led to both fugitives’ apprehension and ultimately
to Teichrobe’s death. See id. This evidence was indivisible from the ongoing
encounter between Appellant and law enforcement, including the conduct that
constitutes the basis for his charged offenses. Therefore, this evidence was
admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence.
B. Unfairly Prejudicial
Appellant made numerous objections under Rule 403 regarding the content
of the helicopter video footage of law enforcement’s pursuit of Appellant and
Teichrobe. On appeal, Appellant globally complains about the admission of this
evidence—both the video footage and witness testimony that described the events
depicted in the video footage—and he raises arguments concerning Teichrobe’s
death.
Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption
that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Walter v. State, 581
S.W.3d 957, 978 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Hayes v. State, 85
S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it
has the undue tendency to suggest an improper basis for reaching a decision.
Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Render v. State, 347
S.W.3d 905, 921 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. ref’d).
When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court must balance: (1) the
inherent probative force of the proffered evidence along with (2) the proponent’s
need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision
on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury
from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by
a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and
(6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate
amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Garcia v. State, 630
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S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) (citing Gigliobiano v. State,
210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In overruling a Rule 403
objection, the trial court is assumed to have applied a Rule 403 analysis and
determined that the evidence was admissible, even if the analysis is not performed
on the record. See Roe v. State, 660 S.W.3d 775, 784 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023,
pet. ref’d); Greene v. State, 287 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet.
ref’d).
Teichrobe’s death was mentioned periodically during the guilt/innocence
phase of trial. During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor stated: “And
because of these events, there was a tragedy. Brittany Teichrobe is no longer here.
Her life was lost because of these events.” Next, Texas Ranger Stephen Gray stated
that he observed the spot where “Brittany Teichrobe was shot and ended up
sustaining fatal wounds.” Finally, the State mentioned in its closing argument that:
“[B]ecause of all of those actions, Brittany [Teichrobe] is no longer here.” Although
Appellant urges that Teichrobe’s death was highly emphasized by the State and that
the references to her death improperly transformed the trial into a “mini-trial” against
Appellant for causing her death, the State briefly and sparingly referred to
Teichrobe’s death only within the context of the cases’ core issue—the pursuit,
shootout, and apprehension of Appellant. As discussed, the evidence that showed
Teichrobe’s involvement (and her fate) was indivisible from the evidence that
showed Appellant’s ongoing criminal conduct.
The trial court’s decision to admit this evidence was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. The evidence was highly probative and the State’s need
for the evidence was great—the entire encounter between law enforcement and
Appellant occurred within the context of Appellant’s and Teichrobe’s flight, on foot
and through a high-speed chase in a vehicle, which included the shootout and both
fugitives’ eventual apprehension after they were shot by law enforcement. The State
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did not over-emphasize the circumstances of Teichrobe’s death to the jury, and the
few references to her death were not likely to be given undue weight by the jury, or
to confuse or distract the jury from the issues that were central to Appellant’s
charged offenses.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
evidence concerning the occurrence and the circumstances of Teichrobe’s death.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
October 12, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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