Leandro Chain Gonzales v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00311-CR
___________________________
LEANDRO CHAIN GONZALES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
Parker County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR23-0225
Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Leandro Chain Gonzales pleaded guilty to felony driving while
intoxicated (DWI) but pleaded “not true” to the indictment’s habitual-offender
enhancement paragraphs alleging that he had three prior felony DWI convictions.
Following a bench trial on punishment, the trial court found two of the habitual-
offender enhancements true and sentenced Gonzales to life in prison. On appeal,
Gonzales argues in a single point that the evidence was legally insufficient to support
the trial court’s finding that the indictment’s first habitual-offender enhancement
paragraph was true.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2022, a driver heading eastbound on I-20 in Parker County called
911 to report a black Honda CRV being driven in an erratic and unsafe manner. A
state trooper responded and pulled over the vehicle. The trooper observed that the
driver—identified as Gonzales—smelled of alcohol and had red, bloodshot eyes;
slurred speech; and a lack of dexterity. After Gonzales failed all three standard field
sobriety tests, the trooper arrested him on suspicion of DWI. Following his arrest,
1
After counsel filed a brief on Gonzales’s behalf, Gonzales filed a pro se letter
raising additional “points.” But because Gonzales is represented by counsel on appeal
and because he is not entitled to hybrid representation, we do not consider his pro se
letter. See Ex parte Bohannan, 350 S.W.3d 116, 116 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 505 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
2
Gonzales consented to a breath test, which revealed his alcohol concentration to be
well above the legal limit for intoxication. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(B).
Gonzales was indicted for felony DWI. See id. §§ 49.04, 49.09(b). To satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements for the charged offense, the State alleged in the indictment
that Gonzales had six prior DWI convictions.2 See id. § 49.09(b). The indictment also
included three habitual-offender enhancement paragraphs alleging that Gonzales had
previously been convicted of felony DWI in March 2018, May 2010, and December
1995, but the State effectively waived the second of these enhancement paragraphs at
trial. 3 See id. § 12.42(d). Gonzales pleaded guilty to the felony DWI offense and “true”
to the jurisdictional enhancement paragraphs, but he pleaded “not true” to the
habitual-offender enhancement paragraphs.
During the bench trial on punishment, the State offered—as Exhibits Five and
Seven—certified judgments to prove the prior felony DWI convictions alleged in the
indictment’s first and third habitual-offender enhancement paragraphs. The State
2
The State waived two of the jurisdictional enhancements before trial.
3
During closing argument, Gonzales’s attorney pointed out that the
indictment’s sixth jurisdictional enhancement and second habitual-offender
enhancement were based on the same conviction and were therefore not both eligible
to be used. Apparently, Gonzales was initially convicted in May 2009 in Dallas County
under Cause No. F-0953705 and placed on probation; then, in May 2010, his
probation was revoked, and he was sent to prison under Cause No. F-0953705-R.
Because Gonzales had already pleaded “true” to the sixth jurisdictional enhancement,
the trial court—at the State’s suggestion—disregarded the second habitual-offender
enhancement.
3
called Beth Turnbow, a retired police officer with expertise in fingerprint
identification, to prove that Gonzales was, in fact, the defendant reflected in the
certified judgments. Turnbow confirmed that the fingerprints on State’s Exhibit Seven
belonged to Gonzales but acknowledged that Exhibit Five contained no fingerprints
for her to analyze. Even though Exhibit Five lacked fingerprints, Turnbow indicated
that Gonzales could still be linked to this prior conviction because the certified
judgment reflected his unique state identification number,4 which also appeared on
other exhibits introduced by the State. 5 Further, the prior convictions recited in the
judicial confession attached to the judgment admitted as Exhibit Five matched two of
the alleged prior convictions in the present case, and Gonzales’s wife testified during
cross-examination that she had been with Gonzales when he had committed the
offense reflected in Exhibit Five. 6
4
As Turnbow explained, when someone is arrested in the State of Texas, the
State generates an identification number that is assigned to that specific person. This
unique state identification number is then associated with the individual’s entire
criminal record. See Johnson v. State, 665 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2023, no pet.).
The certified judgment admitted as State’s Exhibit Six reflected both
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Gonzales’s state identification number (the same number that appeared on Exhibit
Five) and his fingerprints. This same state identification number also appeared on the
offense report in the present case and the presentence investigation (PSI) report, both
of which were admitted into evidence.
Gonzales’s wife testified that she had been with Gonzales in 2018 when he
6
committed a DWI in Dallas County. Her testimony did not reference a cause number
or an exact conviction date, but a review of Gonzales’s criminal history admitted as
4
At the punishment hearing’s conclusion, the trial court found the indictment’s
first and third habitual-offender enhancement paragraphs to be true and sentenced
Gonzales to life in prison. Gonzales filed a timely motion for new trial, which was
overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single point, Gonzales contends that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support the trial court’s finding that the indictment’s first habitual-offender
enhancement paragraph was true. 7 We disagree.
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists and that the
defendant is linked to that conviction, but no specific document or mode of proof is
required to prove these two elements. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. Crim.
part of the PSI report shows that she could have been referencing only the prior
felony DWI conviction reflected on Exhibit Five.
7
Although Gonzales characterizes his sole point as a legal-sufficiency challenge,
he appears to argue that because the evidence was insufficient to link State’s Exhibit
Five to him, this exhibit was irrelevant, and the trial court therefore abused its
discretion by admitting it. See Perez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). But because Gonzales did not object when the State
offered Exhibit Five during trial, he has failed to preserve any complaint regarding its
admission. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d
687, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In any event, because—as shown below—the
evidence was sufficient to link State’s Exhibit Five to Gonzales, his relevance
complaint is meritless. See Perez, 21 S.W.3d at 630 (concluding that the trial court had
not erred by admitting copies of appellant’s prior criminal record because the State
proved the documents’ relevance by offering evidence linking them to the appellant).
5
App. 2016) (quoting Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
One example of acceptable evidence is “documentary proof which contains sufficient
information to establish that a prior conviction exists and the defendant’s identity as
the person convicted.” Id. There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that
the fact of a prior conviction must be proven with any document, much less any
specific document. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. “Regardless of the type of evidentiary
puzzle pieces the State offers to establish the existence of a prior conviction and its
link to a specific defendant, the trier of fact determines if these pieces fit together
sufficiently to complete the puzzle.” Id. at 923.
Although a certified judgment, on its own, is insufficient to prove both
required elements, Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919, we and many of our sister courts have
held that the appearance of a defendant’s name and unique Texas identification
number on a certified judgment can sufficiently link a defendant to a prior conviction,
see Johnson v. State, No. 02-17-00382-CR, 2019 WL 4309171, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 12, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also
Westbrook v. State, No. 10-18-00367-CR, 2021 WL 2252818, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco
May 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Gonzales v. State,
No. 05-19-00719-CR, 2020 WL 1672554, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 6, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Barnes v. State, 585 S.W.3d 643,
650 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019), rev’d on other grounds, No. PD-1072-19,
2021 WL 476483 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 10, 2021) (not designated for publication); cf.
6
Johnson, 665 S.W.3d at 907 (holding “that orders and judgments of convictions
containing a Texas state identification number, coupled with testimony that the
number is ‘unique’ to a defendant’s criminal record, provides [a] sufficient basis for
the fact finder to link the defendant to prior convictions for purposes of proving a
defendant’s criminal history under [Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 37.07,
§ 3(a)(1)”).
We apply the Jackson standard to determine whether the State offered sufficient
proof of a prior conviction. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2789 (1979); cf. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[T]he
Jackson . . . legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should
apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Under this familiar standard, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
Gonzales asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that the indictment’s first habitual-offender enhancement paragraph
was true because State’s Exhibit Five contained neither his fingerprints nor his
photograph and because no one with personal knowledge testified to confirm that
Gonzales was the defendant reflected in the certified judgment. But as noted above,
7
no specific mode of proof is required to prove a prior conviction. Henry, 509 S.W.3d
at 918. The certified judgment admitted as State’s Exhibit Five reflected both
Gonzales’s name and his unique state identification number. Although this
information, standing alone, sufficed to link Gonzales to the prior conviction, see
Johnson, 2019 WL 4309171, at *10; see also Westbrook, 2021 WL 2252818, at *4; Gonzales,
2020 WL 1672554, at *3; Barnes, 585 S.W.3d at 650, the record contains additional
evidence to support the trial court’s finding. As previously noted, the prior
convictions recited in the judicial confession attached to the judgment admitted as
Exhibit Five matched two of the alleged prior convictions in the present case, and
Gonzales’s wife acknowledged that she was aware of Gonzales’s 2018 DWI
conviction—the one alleged in the indictment’s first habitual-offender enhancement
paragraph.
Because a rational factfinder, having considered the evidence outlined above,
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzales had been convicted of the
prior offense alleged in the indictment’s first habitual-offender enhancement
paragraph, we overrule Gonzales’s sole point. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Gonzales’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: July 25, 2024
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