In Re M3P Directional Services, Ltd. v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  • Motion Dismissed; Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and
    Memorandum Opinion filed July 18, 2024.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-23-00676-CV
    IN RE M3P DIRECTIONAL SERVICES, LTD., Relator
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    WRIT OF MANDAMUS
    127th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2023-20799
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On September 14, 2023, relator M3P Directional Services, Ltd. filed a
    petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221;
    see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, M3P asks this Court to compel the
    Honorable Ravi K. Sandill, presiding judge of the 127th District Court of Harris
    County, to vacate the trial court’s August 21, 2023 order denying relator’s motion
    to transfer venue pursuant to Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practices &
    Remedies Code.
    I.      Background
    The underlying case concerns an action for damages arising out of the
    drilling of an oil and gas well in Irion County, Texas. The real party in interest,
    Comstock Energy, LLC, alleges that, in attempting to drill the Well, M3P and
    others’ actions resulted in the failures of three separate wellbores. After such
    failures, Comstock asserts that it “was forced to terminate M3P, Octane, and
    Valence . . . and bring in new companies to plug back and re-drill and complete the
    Well.” Comstock asserts that “[d]ue to Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Comstock
    was unable to timely complete the Well and Comstock was forced to incur more
    than $3.2 Million dollars in damages or expenses over many weeks of failed
    drilling activities together with lost tools and equipment and the plugging and
    abandonment of three wellbores—not including delayed production resulting in
    significant lost profits.”
    M3P filed a motion to transfer venue, requesting that the trial court transfer
    venue from Harris County, Texas to Irion County, Texas pursuant to section
    15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. On August 21, 2023, the trial
    court denied M3P’s motion to transfer venue.            This mandamus proceeding
    followed.
    II.        Standard of Review
    Generally, a venue ruling is not a final judgment ripe for appeal. See Tex.
    Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.064(a); Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(b). However, mandamus
    2
    relief is appropriate to enforce a mandatory venue provision when the trial court
    has denied a motion to transfer venue.        See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
    § 15.0642; In re Lopez, 
    372 S.W.3d 174
    , 176 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (per
    curiam); In re Transcon. Realty Investors, Inc., 
    271 S.W.3d 270
    , 271 (Tex. 2008)
    (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
    In an original proceeding regarding the application of a mandatory venue
    provision, we review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer for an abuse of
    discretion. See In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 
    206 S.W.3d 114
    , 117 (Tex.
    2006) (orig. proceeding); In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 
    988 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tex.
    1998) (orig. proceeding). “[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply
    the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion . . ..” Walker v. Packer, 
    827 S.W.2d 833
    , 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). When a relator seeks to enforce a
    mandatory venue provision, it is not required to prove that it lacks an adequate
    appellate remedy and is only required to show that the trial court clearly abused its
    discretion by failing to transfer the case. See Lopez, 372 S.W.3d at 176–77; In re
    Mo. Pac. R.R., 
    998 S.W.2d 212
    , 215–16 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
    III.   Analysis
    A.    Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
    Certain kinds of suits involving land must be filed in the county where the
    property is located. Specifically, section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and
    Remedies Code provides:
    Actions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real
    property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from
    the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or
    3
    to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which
    all or a part of the property is located.
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.011.
    To show venue is mandatory in a particular county pursuant to section
    15.011, a party must prove two venue facts: (1) the nature of the suit fits within the
    categories listed in section 15.011; and (2) all or part of the property at issue is
    located in the county alleged to have mandatory venue. In re Brooks, No. 14-22-
    00720-CV, 
    2023 WL 139185
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10,
    2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam). The parties do not dispute that
    the property is located in Irion County, but they disagree on whether the first fact
    exists. Thus, the sole issue to be decided in this case is whether the suit falls
    within the parameters of section 15.011.
    To reach this determination, we look at the “essence” of the parties’ dispute,
    rather than how causes of action are described by the parties. See 
    id.
     (citing In re
    Signorelli Co., Inc., 
    446 S.W.3d 470
    , 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,
    orig. proceeding) (citations omitted)). The essence of the lawsuit “depends on the
    facts alleged in the petition, the rights asserted, and the relief sought.” 
    Id.
     (citing
    In re Hardwick, 
    426 S.W.3d 151
    , 162 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig.
    proceeding)); see also Airvantage, L.L.C. v. TBAN Properties #1, L.T.D., 
    269 S.W.3d 254
    , 258 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“Whether the recovery is
    called conversion, breach of contract, or other non-real property types of recovery,
    the true nature of the lawsuit depends on the facts alleged in the petition, the rights
    asserted, and the relief sought.”). “Thus, once it is demonstrated that the court's
    judgment would have some effect on an interest in real property, the venue of the
    4
    suit is properly fixed under section 15.011.”                   Hardwick, 
    426 S.W.3d at 161
    (citations omitted). If section 15.011 applies to one of the claims or causes of
    action, then all claims and causes of action arising from the same transaction must
    be brought in the county of mandatory venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
    § 15.004; Hardwick, 
    426 S.W.3d at 161
    ; Airvantage, 
    269 S.W.3d at 259
    .
    B.      Mandatory Venue in Irion County
    Here, M3P asserts that section 15.011 applies to the underlying case because
    Comstock alleges it is entitled to “damages to real property” arising from “the
    failure to properly drill and complete a horizontal oil and gas well located in Irion
    County.” Comstock alleges that M3P damaged three wellbores and that Comstock
    is entitled to recover from M3P damages proximately caused by its actions—
    including expenses Comstock allegedly incurred to plug the three allegedly failed
    wellbores.
    Comstrock argues that the mandatory venue provision of section 15.011(5)
    is not applicable because the dominant nature of this lawsuit does not involve
    damages to real property. Comstock maintains that permissive venue lies properly
    in Harris County.1 Although Comstock argues that its action does not seek to
    recover “damages to real property,” the facts alleged in support of its claims
    establish otherwise. See In re Custom Home Builders of Cent. Tex., Inc., 647
    1
    Even if Comstock is correct that one or more defendants maintained a principal office in Harris
    County and that section 15.002(a)(3) would generally permit venue in Harris County, the mandatory
    venue requirements of Section 15.011 trump the permissive venue rules set forth under Section 15.002.
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002; Wichita Cnty., Tex. v. Hart, 
    917 S.W.2d 779
    , 781 (Tex. 1996) (“If
    the plaintiff's chosen venue rests on a permissive venue statute and the defendant files a meritorious
    motion to transfer based on a mandatory venue provision, the trial court must grant the motion.”).
    
    5 S.W.3d 419
    , 422–28 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, orig. proceeding); Bayer
    Crop Science, L.P. v. Timmons, No. 09-22-00204-CV, 
    2022 WL 16993420
    , at *7
    (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 17, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Comstock
    seeks to recover damages for alleged damage to the allegedly failed wellbores,
    including expenses allegedly incurred to “plug” the wellbores; thus, the underlying
    action is one for recovery of “damages to real property,” triggering the mandatory
    venue statute and requiring transfer of the underlying matter to Irion County,
    Texas. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.011. The trial court abused its discretion
    by denying relator’s motion to transfer venue to Irion County, Texas.
    IV.    Conclusion
    We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying M3P’s motion
    to transfer venue and failing to transfer the case to Irion County. We conditionally
    grant the petition and direct the trial court to sign an order (1) vacating its August
    21, 2023 order denying M3P’s motion to transfer venue and (2) granting the
    motion to transfer venue and transferring the lawsuit to Irion County. We are
    confident the trial court will act in accordance with this memorandum opinion and
    the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply.
    Additionally, we dismiss as moot all pending motions.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Poissant.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-23-00676-CV

Filed Date: 7/18/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/29/2024