Yuncai Tang v. American Citigroup Real Estate, Inc. Venetian Property, LLC American Cityhome Group, Inc. Yue Yin And Wei Jia Xu ( 2024 )

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 23, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-23-00195-CV
YUNCAI TANG, Appellant
V.
AMERICAN CITIGROUP REAL ESTATE, INC.; VENETIAN PROPERTY,
LLC; AMERICAN CITYHOME GROUP, INC.; YUE YIN; AND WEI JIA
XU, Appellees
On Appeal from the 11th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2019-16506
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Yuncai Tang appeals from a take-nothing judgment rendered by
the trial court in favor of appellees American Citigroup Real Estate, Inc.; Venetian
Property, LLC; American Cityhome Group, Inc.; Yue Yin; and Wei Jia Xu
(collectively, the Sellers) on Tang’s breach-of-contract and Deceptive Trade
Practices–Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) claims arising out of his purchase of
real estate in Harris County. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 17.41–.63. In a
single issue on appeal, 1 Tang argues the trial court erred by granting the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) with respect to the jury questions
concerning Tang’s DTPA claim against appellees.
Because Tang has not challenged all the grounds on which the trial court
rendered JNOV, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
While living in Shanghai, Tang purchased two residential lots, located in
Harris County, from American Citigroup Real Estate, Inc. The contract contained
the sales price of $237,300 for each lot, which included the real property and a
newly constructed house.
Tang alleges that he entered the contract because the Sellers made
misrepresentations about the properties to him that they knew were untrue and
those representations were made to induce Tang to purchase the properties. Tang
signed the contract in November 2015, along with an addendum reflecting that the
1
Although Tang specifically presents three appellate issues, only one of his issues alleges
any error on the part of the trial court. Further, all three stated issues address aspects of the only
trial-court error raised by Tang—whether the trial court erred by granting judgment not
withstanding the verdict on the DTPA questions:
Issue 1.
Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict regarding the jury’s answers to questions 7, 9, 10, 11
and 12, which support [] Mr. Tang’s Deceptive Trade Practices theory of
recovery.
Issue 2.
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s answers to questions 7,
9, 10, 11 and 12, which support [] Mr. Tang’s Deceptive Trade Practices theory of
recovery.
Issue 3.
Whether Mr. Tang’s grievances against Appellees are cognizable only under
contract law—or also under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
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properties would be ready for delivery in 2016.2 The properties were ultimately not
ready until 2019. Although he paid the 30% down payment for each of the two
properties, Tang never secured financing for the balance of the cost, nor did he
make the final contractual payment. Tang arrived in the United States with his
family and moved into one of the properties, but he was not satisfied with the
quality of the properties, and he did not want to buy the properties. 3
Tang sued the Sellers for breach of contract, violation of the DPTA, and
other causes of action. Because all of Tang’s other causes of action were dismissed
on directed verdict and not pertinent to this appeal, we only discuss Tang’s
breach-of-contract and DTPA claims. The Sellers countersued Tang for breach of
contract.
Tang’s breach-of-contract and DTPA claims were tried to the jury, along
with the Sellers’ breach-of-contract claims against Tang. The jury found there was
no breach of contract by either Tang or the Sellers and awarded no
breach-of-contract damages. However, the jury found that the Sellers had violated
the DTPA and awarded damages.4 The Sellers moved for a JNOV on grounds
including (1) there was no evidence supporting the jury’s finding of damages and
(2) the DTPA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted
2
Tang also signed an addendum which provides that if the Seller cannot deliver the
properties before August 31, 2016, “the company will compensate $700 per month to the
landlord.” If the properties could not be delivered by December 31, 2016, then the contract states
it will be cancelled and the initial payment will be returned with damages. The addendum also
allows the contract to be cancelled automatically if the buyer cannot get financing. Neither Tang
nor the Sellers appear to have enforced contractual provisions until after the properties were
completed.
3
There was also testimony that Tang was evicted by the Sellers after a short stay in the
properties.
4
The jury verdict is not part of the appellate record, although it was requested by Tang.
However, because Tang did not challenge all the grounds on which the trial court rendered
JNOV, a copy of the jury verdict is not necessary to the disposition of this appeal.
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the Sellers’ motion and rendered JNOV on those jury questions that addressed
Tang’s DTPA claim:
The Court, having considered the Motions, the Responses, the Jury’s
verdict, the applicable law including the statute of limitations, the
evidence and testimony introduced at trial, and the arguments of
counsel, finds that the evidence and applicable law does not support
the jury’s findings as to Question Numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13.
The Court further finds that there was insufficient evidence [of]
damages for Question Numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 as well.
The trial court then rendered a final judgment on the remaining questions in the
jury verdict and incorporated the JNOV on the DTPA claims, resulting in a
judgment that Tang take nothing judgment on his claims against the Sellers and
that the Sellers take nothing on their claims against Tang.
II. ANALYSIS
“[U]pon motion and reasonable notice the court may render judgment non
obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and provided
further that the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding
on a question that has no support in the evidence.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. “Judgment
without or against a jury verdict is proper at any course of the proceedings only
when the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide otherwise.” JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018)
(quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005)).
We review a trial court’s grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
under a no-evidence standard, examining whether any evidence supports the jury’s
findings. Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex.
2015); Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990). No
evidence exists when there is:
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(a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only
evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d) the evidence
establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when
the evidence supporting the finding “rises to a level that would enable reasonable
and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted). When determining
whether any evidence supports a judgment, we are “limited to reviewing only the
evidence tending to support the jury’s verdict and must disregard all evidence to
the contrary.” Gharda USA, Inc., 464 S.W.3d at 347 (quoting Mancorp, Inc., 802
S.W.2d at 227).
When a trial court specifies the ground on which it is granting a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, an appellant need only challenge the ground the trial
court relied on. Holman St. Baptist Church v. Jefferson, 317 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Cf. Fort Bend Cnty. Drainage Dist.
v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991) (noting that when party moves for
judgment notwithstanding verdict on multiple grounds and trial court grants
judgment notwithstanding verdict without specifying which ground it found
decisive, appellant has burden of showing that judgment notwithstanding verdict
was not proper on any of asserted grounds). 5
Here, the trial court specified its grounds for granting the JNOV:
The Court . . . finds that the evidence and applicable law does not
5
An appellee may assert on appeal any other grounds that it alleged in its motion for
JNOV, but were not relied upon by the trial court, to attempt to vitiate the jury’s verdict.
Holman, 317 S.W.3d at 547; see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(b); Tex. R. Civ. P. 324(c). Here, the
Sellers do not raise any grounds which were not already included in the trial court’s order.
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support the jury’s findings as to Question Numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
and 13. The Court further finds that there was insufficient evidence
[of] damages for Question Numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 as well.
The trial court further specifically states in its order that it considered “applicable
law including the statute of limitations” before concluding that the “applicable
law” does not support the jury’s findings. Therefore, Tang had the burden to
address all the grounds on which the trial court granted the JNOV.
Tang mentions in his appellate brief that the Sellers sought judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, among other reasons, because Tang filed his DTPA
claim outside the limitations period. The statute of limitations was argued in the
posttrial hearing on the Sellers’ motion for JNOV. However, Tang makes no
argument on appeal to challenge the statute-of-limitation grounds.
Because Tang does not address or argue error with respect to one of the
explicit JNOV grounds and we must affirm a JNOV if it can be sustained on any
ground relied on by the trial court, we overrule Tang’s sole issue on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court as challenged on appeal.
/s/ Charles A. Spain
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan.
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