Benjamin J. Corbin and Cindy Nicole Kroth v. the Commons of Lake Houston Property Owners Association, Inc. ( 2024 )


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  • Affirmed and Opinion filed July 23, 2024.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-23-00668-CV
    BENJAMIN J. CORBIN AND CINDY NICOLE KROTH, Appellants
    V.
    THE COMMONS OF LAKE HOUSTON PROPERTY OWNERS
    ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the 127th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2022-70631
    OPINION
    Does the 2021 enactment of Property Code section 202.023 preclude a
    property owners’ association from enforcing a restrictive covenant which prohibits
    the construction of fencing or other structures in a recreational easement that
    burdens a portion of each lot within the property owners’ association? 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.023
     (“Security Measures”). In a matter of first impression for this
    court, we conclude that although the reservation of the recreational easement
    remains valid, the property owners’ association is prohibited by statute from
    enforcing a restrictive covenant which prevents a property owner from building or
    installing security measures, such as a perimeter fence, in the recreational easement
    at issue.
    The trial court denied the application of appellants Benjamin J. Corbin and
    Cindy Nicole Kroth (the homeowners) for a writ of temporary injunction seeking
    to bar appellee The Commons of Lake Houston Property Owners Association, Inc.
    (the Association) from approving fencing requests that encroach on a recreational
    easement reserved by the Association on each tract of land within the Association.
    In this interlocutory appeal, the homeowners raise two issues arguing the trial court
    erred in (1) denying their application for temporary injunction and (2) interpreting
    and applying Property Code section 202.023. 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.023
    . We
    affirm the trial court’s order.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    The homeowners own real property in Harris County, subject to a mandatory
    property owners’ association known as The Commons of Lake Houston, Inc. 1, 2
    The Association is governed by a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
    Restrictions (the Declaration) that creates and reserves an easement “for any
    purposes of the association including, but not limited to, greenbelt, hiking, biking,
    1
    A property owners’ association is a designated representative of the owners of property
    in a subdivision and may be referred to as a “homeowners association,” “community
    association,” “civic association,” “civic club,” “association,” “committee,” or similar term
    contained in the restrictions. 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 204.004
    (a).
    2
    A property owners’ association “must be nonprofit and may be incorporated as a Texas
    nonprofit corporation.” 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 204.004
    (b). The record reflects that the
    Association is incorporated as Texas nonprofit corporation under the name “The Commons of
    Lake Houston Property Owners Association, Inc.” However, the Declaration refers to the
    Association as “The Commons of Lake Houston, Ltd.” Because it is not challenged or objected
    to by any party, we will consider the Declaration in the record to be an operative document for
    the Association.
    2
    horse trails, Common [Area]s, drainage and service of utilities.” Each lot or tract is
    burdened by this recreational easement on the back 20 feet of the lot. The
    Declaration also contains a provision that prohibits any “structure, planting, or
    other material” from being placed in the recreational easement or interfering with
    “passage along such common or private road Easements or which would interfere
    with maintenance thereof.” The Declaration further provides the Association is
    charged with maintaining the common-area easements including the recreational
    easement.
    Until 2021, the Association prohibited the construction of fencing or other
    improvements within the easement through its restrictive covenants. In 2021, the
    legislature enacted Property Code section 202.023 which states that “a property
    owners’ association may not adopt or enforce a restrictive covenant that prevents a
    property owner from building or installing security measures, including but not
    limited to a security camera, motion detector, or perimeter fence.” 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.023
    (b). After section 202.023 went into effect, the Association began
    approving requests for perimeter fences that encroached on the easement.
    In 2022, the homeowners filed suit against the Association asserting breach
    of contract, breach of the declaration, promissory estoppel, negligence, and aiding
    and abetting. The homeowners also sought temporary and permanent injunctions
    directing the Association to deny all applications that encroach on the easement.
    In 2023, the trial court signed an order denying the homeowners’ application
    for a writ of temporary injunction. The trial court’s order stated:
    Tex. Prop. Code § 202.023, relating to security measures, prevents the
    Defendant from enforcing those provisions of the Amended, Restated
    and Consolidated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and
    Restrictions for The Commons of Lake Houston Sections I, II, III, IV,
    V, VI, VII, VIII, X and XI recorded under Harris County Clerk’s File
    No. Y503501 (“the deed restrictions”) that would prevent the
    3
    installation of perimeter fences within the common area easements,
    and therefore Plaintiffs’ Application for the above-referenced
    injunctive relief should be DENIED.
    The homeowners appeal from this order denying their application for writ of
    temporary injunction.3
    II.     ANALYSIS
    A.     Standing
    Before addressing the merits of the case, we first consider the trial court’s
    jurisdiction, as well as our own. 4 “Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the
    authority of a court to decide a case.” Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
    
    852 S.W.2d 440
    , 443 (Tex. 1993). “Because standing is required for subject-matter
    jurisdiction, it can be—and if in doubt, must be—raised by a court on its own at
    any time.” Finance Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 
    418 S.W.3d 566
    , 580 (Tex.
    2013). We review a question of standing de novo. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. City of
    Sunset Valley, 
    146 S.W.3d 637
    , 646 (Tex. 2004).
    The homeowners allege that the Declaration expressly authorized them to
    enforce the restrictive covenant creating an easement:
    Declarant, the Association, or any Owner will have the right to
    enforce, by any proceeding at law or in equity, all restrictions,
    conditions, covenants, and reservations now or hereafter imposed by
    the provisions of this Declaration, Declarant and the Association shall
    have the right to enforce, by proceeding at law or in equity all
    reservations, liens, assessments and charges imposed by the
    Declaration.
    Declaration, art. XI, section 1. The Declaration therefore gives the homeowners the
    3
    “A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . [that] grants or
    refuses a temporary injunction[.]” 
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014
    (4).
    4
    The homeowners’ standing was not challenged in the trial court, nor was it raised the
    parties’ appellate briefs. At this court’s request, the parties did submit briefing on standing.
    4
    legal authority to act. Although the recreational easement is reserved for “any
    purposes of the association,” the homeowners are members of the Association and
    the Declaration specifically provides that all the covenants, conditions, and
    easements created in the Declaration “shall inure to the benefit of each Owner
    thereof.” See 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 204.004
     (membership of association consists
    of owners of property within subdivision subject to property owners’ association);
    Houston Laureate Assocs., Ltd. v. Russell, 
    504 S.W.3d 550
    , 557 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (property owners had standing to enforce
    easement because agreement creating easement specifically conveyed easement for
    benefit of residential property owners and their land). Therefore, we conclude that
    the homeowners have standing to bring the underlying lawsuit and this appeal.
    B.    Temporary injunction
    The trial court’s order states the trial court denied the temporary-injunction
    application because the homeowners had not shown a probable right to the relief
    sought. The trial court analyzed the statute and determined that the relief sought by
    the homeowners was prohibited by law. Therefore, we consider issues one and two
    together because the trial court’s analysis of the statute determined its decision to
    deny the application for temporary injunction.
    1.     Standard of review
    The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
    litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits. Walling v. Metcalfe, 
    863 S.W.2d 56
    , 57 (Tex. 1993). To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must
    plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the
    defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent,
    and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 
    84 S.W.3d 198
    ,
    204 (Tex. 2002). An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately
    5
    compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain
    pecuniary standard. Canteen Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Props., Inc., 
    773 S.W.2d 398
    , 401 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ).
    Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s
    sound discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. We review an order denying a
    temporary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id.
    2.      Easement and restrictive covenant at issue
    The Declaration created both an easement and a restrictive covenant relating
    to fencing on the back of each lot in the property owner’s association.
    “Unlike a possessory interest in land, an easement is a nonpossessory
    interest that authorizes its holder to use the property for only particular purposes.”
    Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 
    90 S.W.3d 697
    , 700 (Tex. 2002) (citing
    Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 1.2(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2000)). An
    easement does not convey title to property. Stephen F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn,
    
    228 S.W.3d 653
    , 658 (Tex. 2007). Here, the Declaration reserved an easement, a
    nonpossessory right to use, for all members of the Association on the back 20 feet
    of each lot for recreational purposes.
    In contrast, a “restrictive covenant” as defined by statute is “any covenant,
    condition, or restriction contained in a dedicatory instrument, whether mandatory,
    prohibitive, permissive, or administrative.” 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.001
    (4).5
    The restrictive covenant in the Declaration preserved access to the recreational
    easement by prohibiting any “structure, planting, or other material” from being
    5
    The Declaration at issue is a dedicatory instrument as defined by statute. See 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.001
     (“‘Dedicatory instrument’ means each document governing the
    establishment, maintenance, or operation of a residential subdivision . . . . The term includes a
    declaration or similar instrument subjecting real property to . . . restrictive covenants, bylaws, or
    similar instruments governing the administration or operation of a property owners’
    association”).
    6
    placed in the recreational easement or interfering with “passage along such
    common or private road Easements or which would interfere with maintenance
    thereof.” 6
    The supreme court has affirmed the legislature’s intent that restrictive
    covenants not proscribed by statute should be “liberally construed to give effect to
    its purpose and intent.” Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches
    Prop. Owners Ass’n, 
    593 S.W.3d 324
    , 339 (Tex. 2020) (quoting 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.003
    (a)). However, the legislature has enacted statutory restrictions or
    limitations on the ability of property owner’s associations to create and enforce
    certain restrictive covenants. See Teal Trading & Dev., 593 S.W.3d at 339; see
    generally 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 201
    .001–216.014. Therefore, we consider now
    whether section 202.023 has proscribed the enforcement of the restrictive covenant
    that prevents the placement of fencing in the recreational easement.
    3.      The statute
    Property Code section 202.023 states that “a property owners’ association
    may not adopt or enforce a restrictive covenant that prevents a property owner
    from building or installing security measures, including but not limited to a
    security camera, motion detector, or perimeter fence.” 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.023
    (b).7 The statute does not prohibit a property owners’ association from
    regulating the type of fencing that a property owner may install. Tex. Prop. Code
    6
    While the reservation of the easement itself is not affected by section 202.023, access to
    the easement, through enforcement of the restrictive covenant that restricts the use of all lots
    within the Association, may be affected.
    7
    Although it does not bear on our statutory construction analysis, we note that section
    202.023 was enacted to address reports that some property owners’ associations were preventing
    homeowners from installing security measures such as fences, motion detectors, and security
    cameras. See Senate Comm. on Bus. & Industry, Bill Analysis, Tex. C.S.H.B. 3571, 87th Leg.,
    R.S. (2021). The bill analysis states that the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that
    homeowners can adequately protect their homes. 
    Id.
    7
    Ann. § 202.023(c).
    Construction of statutory language is a question of law we review using the
    de novo standard. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 
    282 S.W.3d 433
    , 437
    (Tex. 2009). When construing a statute, the court’s primary objective is to give
    effect to legislative intent. Colorado Cnty. v. Staff, 
    510 S.W.3d 435
    , 444 (Tex.
    2017). “The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent
    unless a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads
    to absurd or nonsensical results.” Molinet v. Kimbrell, 
    356 S.W.3d 407
    , 411 (Tex.
    2011). When interpreting the legislature’s words, however, we must never “rewrite
    the statute under the guise of interpreting it,” and it is not appropriate to rely on
    documents beyond the statutory text for assistance in determining legislative intent
    unless the statutory text is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
    See In re Ford Motor Co., 
    442 S.W.3d 265
    , 284 (Tex. 2014); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
    Ruttiger, 
    381 S.W.3d 430
    , 452 (Tex. 2012).
    4.     Application to the facts
    The homeowners argue that enforcement of the reserved recreational
    easement and section 202.023 are compatible. They assert that the Association can
    enforce the easement in such a manner that perimeter fences are approved only if
    they do not encroach on the recreational easement. In opposition, the Association
    argues the plain language of the statute prohibits the association from denying or
    limiting the ability of property owners to install perimeter fencing.
    The question raised by the arguments of the parties is how the term
    “perimeter fence” applies. The statute does not contain a definition for the term
    “perimeter fence” or “perimeter.” Therefore, we look to the ordinary or common
    meaning. See Code Construction Act, Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.011 (words and
    phrases construed according to common usage). “Perimeter” as applicable here is
    8
    defined as “(1) the boundary of a closed-plane figure; (2) a line or strip bounding
    or protecting an area; and (3) outer limits.” Perimeter, Merriam-Webster.com,
    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/perimeter (last visited July 18,
    2024). Therefore, the common usage of the term “perimeter fence” describes a
    fence around the boundary or outer limits of a property. This statutory construction
    analysis supports the arguments made by the Association.
    Other provisions in Property Code chapter 202 support this interpretation. In
    section 202.012, the legislature prohibits a property owners’ association from
    restricting the display of certain flags; however, the statute specifically provides
    that a “reasonable dedicatory instrument provision” may be enforced to comply
    with “applicable zoning ordinances, easements, and setbacks of record[.]” 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.012
    . Although a property owners’ association may not
    prohibit the display of certain religious items, the legislature made an exception for
    the enforcement of restrictive covenants if the display of a religious item would
    violate any easement. 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 202.018
    . Similarly, the statutes
    addressing enforcement of restrictive covenants on swimming pools, stand-by
    generators, and solar devices contain significantly more exceptions and discussion
    of when and how property owners’ associations may enforce restrictive covenants
    with respect to those items. See 
    Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 202.007
    , .010, .019, .022.
    In summary, the language of section 202.023 reflects a clear and unambiguous
    intent to prohibit property owners’ associations from restricting the ability of
    homeowners to fence the perimeter of their property. 8
    Because we agree with the trial court that the homeowners did not establish
    a probable right to the relief sought given the application of section 202.023, we
    8
    To the extent that the real argument raised by the homeowners is that the language of
    section 202.023 as enacted is too broad, that is an argument to make to the legislature, not the
    courts.
    9
    conclude the trial court did not err in denying the homeowner’s application for a
    writ of temporary injunction.
    We overrule issues one and two.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s order denying the homeowners’ application for a
    writ of temporary injunction as challenged on appeal.
    /s/    Charles A. Spain
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Wise, Bourliot, and Spain.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-23-00668-CV

Filed Date: 7/23/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/29/2024