Joe Luis Becerra v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0280-22
JOE LUIS BECERRA, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
BRAZOS COUNTY
NEWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which
HERVEY, RICHARDSON, WALKER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. YEARY, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion. KEEL, J., filed a dissenting opinion in
which KELLER, P.J., and SLAUGHTER, J., joined.
In this case, the trial court inadvertently allowed an alternate juror
to go back into the jury deliberation room and participate in a vote on
Becerra - 2
the issue of guilt with the jury. This raises several issues. Does this
violate constitutional and statutory provisions setting petit jury
composition in district courts to twelve people? How should courts
analyze the alternate juror’s participation in light of the statutory
provision prohibiting any “person” from being with the jury while it is
deliberating or conversing with the jury about the case on trial? Should
proof of the alternate juror’s presence or participation during
deliberations give rise to a presumption of harm? The court of appeals,
in addressing these issues, ultimately held there was no reversible error.
We hold that there was statutory error and remand the case for the
court of appeals to conduct a statutory harm analysis.
As we will explain in greater detail below, the presence of an
alternate juror during a petit jury’s deliberations does not violate the
constitutional or statutory limits placed upon the size of a jury. At the
time these provisions were enacted, there was no such thing as an
“alternate juror” so the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding
the size of a jury have never included the concept of alternate jurors as
members of the “petit jury.” An alternate juror does not become a
member of the jury until the trial court places the alternate on the jury.
However, the alternate juror’s presence during deliberations in this
case violated the statutory prohibitions against a “person” being with
Becerra - 3
the jury while it is deliberating and conversing with the jury about the
case. To the extent the court of appeals concluded otherwise, it erred.
While we have previously held that such violations can give rise to a
presumption of harm, this presumption is, in practice, indistinguishable
from an ordinary harm analysis. Further, our reference to this
presumption for such violations pre-dated the promulgation of appellate
rules governing review for harm and are ultimately inconsistent with the
purpose of a harm analysis. To the extent that the court of appeals
failed to apply a presumption of harm when conducting its harm
analysis—it did not err.
However, the court of appeals does not appear to have conducted
a harm analysis regarding the alternate’s presence during deliberations
because it concluded that there was no error in allowing the alternate
to be present with the jury during deliberations. And, in conducting a
harm analysis regarding the alternate juror’s participation in jury
deliberations, the court of appeals appears to have conflated the
question of prejudice for purposes of determining admissibility of juror
affidavits with the question of statutory harm. Furthermore, the court
of appeals erroneously failed to consider the entirety of the juror’s
affidavit when it conducted its harm analysis because the court of
appeals erred to conclude that only a portion of the juror’s affidavit
Becerra - 4
concerning the statutory violation was admissible. Consequently, we
will remand the case for the court of appeals to conduct a statutory harm
analysis regarding the statutory violations at issue in this case.
Background
This case arose from an altercation that allegedly resulted in
Appellant shooting and killing a man named Jose Guardado-Rivera in his
home. Although no firearm was ever recovered, there was some
evidence that Appellant asked his girlfriend to bring him a gun prior to
the shooting. Shortly before the shooting, three men were seen walking
into Guardado-Rivera’s home and then a gun shot was heard. Shortly
after the shooting, Appellant was detained while walking away from
Guardado-Rivera’s home. A forensic chemist tested Appellant’s hands
and found they contained gunshot residue.
The State charged Appellant with unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon. 1 Additionally, the indictment alleged that during the
commission of the offense Appellant used or exhibited the firearm as a
deadly weapon by discharging it in the direction of Jose Guardado-
Rivera. 2 Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial
1
Tex. Penal Code § 46.04.
2
Appellant was initially charged in count one of the indictment with the murder and
aggravated assault of Guardado-Rivera but the State proceeded to trial only on the unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon charge in count two.
Becerra - 5
before a jury. A petit jury of twelve was selected and sworn in as well
as one alternate juror.
Following closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate. The
alternate juror retired to the jury room with the regular jury without any
party realizing the issue. Approximately forty-six minutes later, the
State realized there were thirteen people in the jury room and notified
the bailiff. The bailiff notified the trial court, and the court immediately
had the bailiff remove the alternate juror.
The court held a hearing regarding the alternate juror. 3 At the
hearing, the court and parties discussed the implications of this Court’s
holdings in Trinidad v. State. 4 The trial court concluded that Appellant
may have waived any error by failing to object when the alternate
retired to the jury room with the jury. The State requested that the trial
court instruct the jury to disregard anything said by the alternate juror
and to restart deliberations. The parties agreed in substance to the trial
court’s proposed instruction to the jurors, but Appellant requested a
mistrial based on the presence of the juror. Appellant conceded that he
3
A jury note seeking clarification on the deadly weapon special issue was received after the
alternate juror’s removal and was also briefly discussed at this hearing.
4
Trinidad v. State, 312 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding that an alternate
juror’s presence in the jury room and participation in deliberations did not violate
constitutional and statutory requirement that juries be composed of twelve jurors).
Becerra - 6
had no indication of harm at that time and did not seek to question the
alternate or jurors on the matter.
The trial court denied Appellant’s request for a mistrial. The jury
was then given the following instruction:
Members of the jury, jury deliberations began at 9:45 a.m.
At 10:31 a.m., the Court realized that the alternate juror,
[alternate juror], was allowed into the jury room by mistake
and [alternate juror] was at that time asked to separate from
the jury. [Alternate juror] has been placed in a separate
room over here and will continue to serve as the alternate
juror in this case. He simply cannot be present during
deliberations of the 12 jurors. You are to disregard any
participation during your deliberations of the alternate juror,
[alternate juror]. And following an instruction on this extra
note that the Court received, you should simply resume your
deliberations without [alternate juror] being present. 5
The jury resumed deliberations. The jury thereafter returned a verdict
of guilty, and each juror confirmed the verdict when polled individually.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial. Appellant alleged that his
constitutional right to a jury composed of twelve people was violated by
the alternate juror’s participation in deliberations and a preliminary vote
on Appellant’s guilt. Appellant also alleged the juror’s participation
violated Articles 33.01 and 33.011 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant further alleged that the alternate juror’s presence in the jury
5
The trial court also advised the jury that it did not understand the issue raised in the jury’s
note, but the jury was free to clarify in a subsequent note.
Becerra - 7
room and his improper participation in a preliminary vote on Appellant’s
guilt violated Article 36.22, which prohibits non-jurors from talking with
jurors about the case or being with the jury during deliberations.
As to harm, Appellant alleged that based on the alternate juror’s
level of participation the constitutional error was harmful. 6 Regarding
the statutory violations, Appellant acknowledged Rule 44.2 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure 7 would ordinarily govern, but he argued that an
established violation of Article 36.22 shifted the burden to the State to
show lack of harm. In support of his motion for new trial, Appellant
attached an affidavit from one of the regularly seated jurors. In relevant
part, the affidavit stated:
I was a juror in State of Texas v. Joe Becerra . . . During the
jury deliberations in the case, the individual later identified
by the trial judge as the “alternate juror” voted on the verdict
of “guilty” ultimately returned by the jury. The alternate
juror’s presence in the jury room was not discovered until
after the verdict vote was taken on guilt by the jury. After
this vote, there was a question the jury had concerning the
special issue submitted to the jury by the trial judge and
when the bailiff appeared to collect the question, the bailiff
realized the alternate juror was present in the jury room.
Thereafter, alternate juror participated in the deliberation
until the court bailiff came and collected us and brought us
6
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a) (if record reveals constitutional error in a criminal case, judgment
must be reversed unless the error did not contribute to the conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt).
7
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (non-constitutional error that does not affect substantial rights must
be disregarded).
Becerra - 8
into the courtroom. 8 After the alternate juror was excused
the remaining 12 jurors did not revote on the issue of guilt
as the verdict vote taken while the alternate juror was
present in the jury room was unanimous.
The State filed an objection to the admission of the juror’s affidavit
pursuant to Rule 606(b). 9 The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s
motion for new trial. The trial court overruled the State’s objection
concluding the affidavit falls within an exception to the prohibition on
juror testimony concerning whether there was an outside influence upon
any juror. 10 The trial court ultimately denied Appellant’s motion for new
trial concluding that Appellant’s complaints about the alternate juror
were waived and that, even if preserved, any error was harmless.
Direct Appeal and Remand
On appeal, Appellant complained that his constitutional right to a
jury composed of twelve people under Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas
Constitution was violated, Articles 31.011, 33.011, and 36.22 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure were violated, and the trial court erred in
8
The reporter’s record establishes that the alternate juror was removed from the jury room
before the entire jury was brought into the courtroom and given the instruction detailed
above. Further, the State and trial court both stated on the record that the jury note was
received after the alternate juror was removed.
9
Tex. R. Evid. 606(b) (juror may not testify about jury deliberations unless there was an
improper outside influence on any juror or to rebut a claim that juror was unqualified to
serve).
10
Id.Becerra - 9
failing to grant a mistrial or new trial. The court of appeals concluded
that Appellant’s constitutional and statutory claims were not preserved
because the objection and motion for mistrial were not timely made
when the alternate retired to deliberate with the jury. 11 Appellant
petitioned this Court to review the lower court’s determination that
these claims were defaulted. We granted review and held that because
Appellant objected as soon as he became aware of the error, he had
preserved his constitutional and statutory claims for review. 12 We
reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits
of Appellant’s complaints.
Upon remand, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s request for a mistrial or
motion for new trial. At the time of the request for a mistrial, the court
reasoned there had been no showing that the alternate juror
participated in deliberations or communicated with the regular jurors
about the case. 13 Thus, while Article 36.22 prohibits persons from being
with the jury while it deliberates or conversing with jurors about the
11
Becerra v. State, No. 10-17-00143-CR, 2019 WL 2479957, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco June
12, 2019, pet. granted).
12
Becerra v. State, 620 S.W.3d 745, 748-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
13
Becerra v. State, No. 10-17-00143-CR, 2022 WL 1177391, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco April
20, 2022, pet. granted).
Becerra - 10
case on trial (except in the presence and by permission of the court),
Appellant failed to meet his burden to raise a presumption of harm at
the time of the motion for mistrial. 14
In considering the juror’s affidavit attached to Appellant’s motion
for new trial, the court of appeals held that only a portion of it was
admissible under Rule 606(b). According to the court of appeals, the
portion of the affidavit regarding what transpired after the alternate was
removed from the jury room (e.g., that no revote was taken) was
inadmissible because “it did not involve evidence regarding the outside
influence or its impact on any juror or the deliberations.” 15 The court of
appeals also observed that nothing in the remainder of the affidavit
indicated whether the alternate juror participated in deliberations
beyond voting on guilt or innocence prior to his removal. 16
The court of appeals then held that Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas
Constitution and Article 33.01(a), both of which provide for a jury
composed of twelve persons in district courts, were not violated because
the “ultimate verdict” rendered was voted on by a panel of twelve
14
Id.15
Id. at *4.
16
Id. (“However, there was nothing included [in the affidavit] about whether or not the
alternate juror otherwise participated in deliberations, such as whether the alternate juror
attempted to convince another juror of [Appellant’s] guilt or the effect of some other aspect
of the evidence.”).
Becerra - 11
jurors. 17 In considering Appellant’s claim that Article 36.22 was
violated, the court of appeals found “no authority has established a hard
rule that the presence of the alternate jurors in the jury room during
deliberations is absolutely improper.” 18 Thus, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial. According to the court of appeals, neither the
alternate juror’s presence nor his initial participation in voting was
sufficient to create a reasonable probability that the alternate juror’s
outside influence had a prejudicial effect. 19
Petition for Discretionary Review
Appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, asking this Court
to review the court of appeals’ decision and remand to the trial court for
a new trial or, alternatively, to remand to the court of appeals with
further instruction. We granted review on the following three issues:
1. Art[icle] 36.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides no
person shall be permitted to be with a jury while it is deliberating.
The petit juror affidavit admitted in [Appellant’s] Motion for New
Trial hearing established the alternate juror was present and
participated in deliberations and voted on the verdict. What status,
if any, does Art. 33.011(b) confer on alternative juror service
permitting the presence and/or participation of the alternate
17
Id. at *5 (citing Trinidad, 312 S.W.3d at 28).
18
Id.19
Id.Becerra - 12
during petit jury deliberations and did the alternate’s act in voting
violate Art. 36.22?
2. Rule 606(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence prohibits evidence of
“incidents that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.” The
uncontroverted petit juror affidavit admitted at [Appellant’s]
Motion for New Trial hearing attested the alternate juror voted on
the verdict, and after removal and instruction no further vote was
taken. Is the evidence that no further vote was taken an incident
during deliberations admissible under Rule 606(b) and, if
excludable, must Rule 606(b) yield to the need to prove a violation
of Art. V, Sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution and Art. 33.01 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure?
3. This Court has long held a rebuttable presumption of harm exists
if a facial violation of Art. 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure is shown. The Court of Appeals acknowledged
[Appellant’s] admitted evidence that the alternate juror voted on
the verdict was admissible as outside evidence under Rule
606(b)(2)(A) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Did the failure of that
Court to apply the presumption based on this evidence so far
deviate from accepted law so as to call for the exercise of this
Court’s jurisdiction?
Generally, Appellant maintains that he is entitled to a new trial
because the alternate juror’s participation in deliberations violated
Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution as well as Articles 33.01,
33.011 and 36.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also argues
that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply a presumption of harm
in relation to the alleged violation of Article 36.22. We review a trial
Becerra - 13
court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial and a denial of a motion for new
trial under an abuse of discretion standard. 20
Standard of Review
Under the abuse of discretion standard, we do not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial
court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. 21 A trial judge abuses
his discretion when no reasonable view of the record could support his
ruling. 22 As we have recently reaffirmed, the trial court is the exclusive
judge of the credibility of the evidence presented in connection with a
motion for new trial. 23 Regardless of whether the evidence is
controverted, a trial court’s ruling will only be reversed for an abuse of
discretion, that is, if it is arbitrary or unsupported by any reasonable
view of the evidence. 24
Analysis
20
Burch v. State, 541 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (motion for new trial); Hawkins
v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (motion for mistrial).
21
Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); accord Burch, 541 S.W.3d
at 820 (trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial must be upheld if it is within the zone of
reasonable disagreement).
22
Burch, 541 S.W.3d at 820.
23
Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
24
Id.Becerra - 14
A defendant’s personal right to a jury trial, the composition of a
twelve-person jury, and the prohibition against outsiders interacting
with the jury are three legal concepts that have developed in different
ways in Texas. The right to a jury trial has evolved as a right personal
to the defendant, while the question of how large the jury should be was
originally set by statute. The prohibition against outsiders interacting
with the jury has always been a statutory prohibition, even as the right
to a jury trial developed as a personal constitutional right.
Right to A Jury, a Jury of Twelve, and Jury Secrecy
There is little in the history of the development of the trial by jury
in a criminal case to provide insight into how the jury came to be
generally fixed at twelve jurors. As the United States Supreme Court
has observed:
Some have suggested that the number 12 was fixed upon
simply because that was the number of the presentment jury
from the hundred from which the petit jury developed.
Other, less circular but more fanciful reasons for the number
12 have been given, ‘but they were all brought forward after
the number was fixed,’ and rest on little more than mystical
or superstitious insights into the significance of ’12.’ Lord
Coke’s explanation that the ‘number of twelve is much
respected in holy writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes,
etc.,’ is typical. In short, while sometime in the 14th century
the size of the jury at common law came to be fixed generally
at 12, that particular feature of the jury system appears to
Becerra - 15
have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great
purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place. 25
The Court noted that its earlier decisions had always assumed that a
jury of twelve, what it referred to as an “accidental feature of the jury,”
had been immutably codified into the federal constitution as part of the
right to a jury trial. 26 But according to the Court, “the fact that the jury
at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident,
unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly
without significance ‘except to mystics.’” 27 Even viewing the number
twelve as emanating from the penumbra of a personal right to a jury,
the common-law requirement of twelve jurors was an arbitrary limit with
no intrinsic value. 28
25
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87-90 (1970) (internal citations omitted).
26
Id. at 90. Similarly, Texas has long recognized that a twelve-person jury originated in
common law. See, e.g., Bullard v. State, 38 Tex. 504, 505 (1873); Randel v. State, 219
S.W.2d 689, 692-93 (Tex. Crim. 1949) (“The right to a trial by jury arose in the common law
. . . [i]t has been held in practically all our different state courts that such a trial contemplated
that the jury must be composed of twelve men indifferent between the prisoner and the
sovereign; from the vicinage where the offense was supposed to have been committed; must
be unanimous and uninfluenced by aught save the testimony . . .”).
27
Id. at 102 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
28
Indeed, the Court rejected the suggestion that a twelve-person jury gives either the defense
or the State any particular advantage. As the Court explained, “[i]t might be suggested that
the 12-man jury gives a defendant a greater advantage since he has more ‘chances’ of finding
a juror who will insist on acquittal and thus prevent conviction. But the advantage might just
as easily belong to the State, which also needs only one juror out of twelve insisting on guilt
to prevent acquittal.” Id. at 101. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that a significant
increase in the size of the jury, such as an increase from twelve jurors to one hundred, would
undoubtedly be more advantageous to a defendant, but it clarified that a small difference in
size, such as a decrease from twelve to six jurors, would be unlikely to afford any perceptible
advantage to either side. Id. at 101, n. 47.
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In Texas, the personal right to a jury trial was first recognized in
the Texas constitution even as the size of the jury was left to statute.
Starting in 1836, Texas has included a personal right to a jury trial in
every version of its constitution. 29 However, the rule that a felony jury
consist of twelve jurors started as a statutory requirement. 30 As a
constitutional requirement, the remedy for situations in which a trial
court impaneled a jury outside composition requirements was for
reviewing courts to render the entire proceedings void, a practice
consistent with the view that such violations deprive the jury of the
authority to act. 31 The prohibition against being with the jury or
29
Repub. Tex. Const. of 1836, Declaration of Rights 6, 9, reprinted in 1 H.P.N. Gammel, The
Laws of Texas 1822-1897, at 1083 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898); Tex. Const. of 1845,
art. I, §§ 8, 12; Tex. Const. of 1861, art. I, §§ 8, 12; Tex. Const. of 1866, art. I, §§ 8, 12;
Tex. Const. of 1869, art. I, §§ 8, 12; but see Peak v. Swindle, 4 S.W. 478, 479-80 (Tex.
1887) (discussing the inquiry into the ratification of the Constitution of 1869); Tex. Const. of
1876, art. 1, §10. A criminal defendant also has a personal right to a jury trial under the
federal constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30
See Act approved August 26, 1856, 6th Leg., reprinted in 2 H.P.N. Gammell, The Laws of
Texas 1822-1897 (Austin, Gammell Book Co. 1898) (originally codified in Article 539 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure); see also Walker v. State, 42 Tex. 360, 374 (Tex. 1874) (“The
law of the State, as contained in the code, is as plain as it can be written in separating the
duties of the judge and of the jury, and in defining exactly the respective duties of each in a
criminal trial, all in harmony with and to carry out that provision of our Constitution which
declares ‘the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The only mode of trial upon issues of
fact in the District Court is by a jury of twelve men, unless in cases specially excepted.’”)
31
See, e.g., Ogle v. State, 63 S.W. 1009, 1010 (Tex. Crim. App. 1901) (interpreting Article
V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution to hold that an indictment returned by a grand jury
composed of thirteen people was void so that a subsequent prosecution under a valid
indictment did not result in a double jeopardy violation).
Becerra - 17
conversing with it about the case has always arisen from statutory
provisions starting with the first Code of Criminal Procedure in Texas. 32
To be sure, all these different provisions developed alongside and
informed each other. But that history does not imbue the formal
requirement of twelve jurors in felony cases with any talismanic
significance. If there were any such significance, there would not have
been any need for a statutory provision setting the jury composition at
twelve because the requirement would have already been regarded as
a necessary part of the personal right to a jury trial. 33
Alternate Jurors Are Not Part of the Composition of the Jury
Considering the text and history of the relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions as well as the common-law and statutory origins of
the twelve-person jury, Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution and
Article 33.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure address exactly what
they appear to address—the size of the jury. Article V, sec. 13 of the
Texas Constitution refers to the composition of the jury and uses the
32
See Act approved August 26, 1856, 6th Leg., reprinted in 2 H.P.N. Gammell, The Laws of
Texas 1822-1897 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (codified in Article 607 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure: “The Sheriff shall take care that no person converses with a juryman
after he has been impaneled to try a criminal action, except in the presence and by permission
of the Court.”)
33
Appellant did not argue at trial and does not argue on appeal that the alternate juror’s
participation in jury deliberations violated his right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment
of the federal Constitution or Article I, §. 10 of the Texas Constitution.
Becerra - 18
word “composed” which refers to the formation of the jury. 34 Article
33.01 is specifically titled “Jury Size.” 35 These provisions do not contain
references to “alternate jurors,” nor do they contain terms that suggest
that an alternate juror becomes a member of the jury if he or she
participates in a jury’s “ultimate verdict.” A jury is necessarily composed
before it retires to deliberate.
Moreover, these constitutional provisions were enacted prior to the
statutory provisions authorizing a trial court’s selection and use of
alternate jurors. In light of the plain text and the historical context of
these provisions, an alternate juror’s participation in jury deliberations
does not convert a twelve-person jury into a thirteen-person jury in
violation of Article V, sec. 13 or Article 33.01. Participation in
deliberations by an alternate juror establishes an outside influence on
the jury not a change in the composition of the jury.
The Texas Constitution currently provides in relevant part:
Grand and petit juries in the District Courts shall be
composed of twelve persons, except that petit juries in a
criminal case below the grade of felony shall be composed of
six persons; but nine members of a grand jury shall be a
quorum to transact business and present bills. In trials of
civil cases in the District Courts, nine members of the jury,
34
Tex. Const. art. V, Sec. 13. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1095 (11th Ed.
2020) (defining compose as “to form by putting together”); Webster's II New College
Dictionary 230 (1999) (defining compose at "to create by putting together").
35
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.01(a).
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concurring, may render a verdict, but when the verdict shall
be rendered by less than the whole number, it shall be signed
by every member of the jury concurring in it. When, pending
the trial of any case, one or more jurors not exceeding three,
may die, or be disabled from sitting, the remainder of the
jury shall have the power to render the verdict; provided,
that the Legislature may change or modify the rule
authorizing less than the whole number of the jury to render
a verdict. 36
This provision was ratified in the Texas Constitution of 1876, which
remains in force today. 37 It refers only to the jury and its composition
without reference to the defendant. It was amended in 2001 to make
the text gender neutral, 38 and again in 2003 to provide that petit juries
in criminal cases below the grade of felony be composed of six persons
rather than nine. 39 None of these amendments alter the meaning of
“petit juries” contained in the text of the Texas Constitution.
Article 33.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure codifies this
constitutional requirement as follows:
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b), in the district
court, the jury shall consist of twelve qualified jurors. In the
county court and inferior courts, the jury shall consist of six
qualified jurors.
36
Tex. Const. art. V, Sec. 13.
37
Tex. Const. art. V, § 13 interp. Commentary (West 2007) (noting prior to ratification, if a
juror was to die or become ill during trial, or for any other reason was unable to serve, it
necessitated a retrial and the ratification sought to prevent the delay and additional cost of a
retrial by allowing a trial to continue without the incapacitated juror).
38
Tex. Const. art. V, Sec. 13 (amended 2001).
39
Tex. Const. art. V, Sec. 13 (amended 2003).
Becerra - 20
(b) In a trial involving a misdemeanor offense, a district
court jury shall consist of six qualified jurors. 40
This provision was originally enacted in 1965 and contained no reference
to the number of jurors required for a misdemeanor trial in district
court. 41 Article 33.01 was amended in 2003 to address those situations
by adding subsection (b). 42 As with Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas
Constitution, the amendment to the statute does not alter the meaning
of the word “jury” as originally drafted.
Both Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution and Article 33.01
of the Code of Criminal Procedure pre-date the enactment of Article
33.011 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the statutory provision that
creates “alternate jurors.” First enacted in 1983, the text of the
alternate juror statute makes clear that an alternate juror exists “in
addition” to the “regular jury.” 43 Though this statute, entitled “Alternate
Jurors,” does refer to alternate jurors as “jurors,” the context of the
statute makes clear that the jurors are not considered part of the
40
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.01(a).
41
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., ch. 722 § 1 (1966), amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 466, § 1
(eff. Jan 1, 2004).
42
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 466, § 1 (2004).
43
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(a); Acts 1983, 68th Leg., ch. 775, § 2 (1983), amended
by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 846, § 1 (eff. Sept. 1, 2007).
Becerra - 21
“regular jury.” 44 The statute clarifies that they sit “in addition” to the
regular jury and the statute specifically clarifies that they are “alternate
jurors.” 45 An alternate juror is not a member of the regular jury until a
trial court makes the determination that a sitting juror is disabled or
disqualified and the trial court then replaces a sitting juror who becomes
unable to perform his or her duties with an alternate juror. 46 Article
33.011 provides in relevant part:
(a) In district courts, the judge may direct that not more
than four jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and
impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. In county courts, the
judge may direct that not more than two jurors in addition to
the regular jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate
jurors.
(b) Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called
shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury renders a
verdict on the guilt or innocence of the defendant and, if
applicable, the amount of punishment, become or are found
to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties or are
found by the court on agreement of the parties to have good
cause for not performing their duties. Alternate jurors shall
be drawn and selected in the same manner, shall have the
same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination
and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the
same functions, powers, facilities, security, and privileges as
regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a
regular juror shall be discharged after the jury has rendered
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Tex. Code Crim Proc. arts. 33.011(b), 36.29; Scales v. State, 380 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (“The trial court has discretion to determine whether a juror has become
disabled and to seat an alternate juror.”).
Becerra - 22
a verdict on the guilt or innocence of the defendant and, if
applicable, the amount of punishment. 47
Prior to 2007, this statutory provision required alternate jurors to be
discharged after the jury retired to consider its verdict. 48 The statute
was amended in 2007 to require the discharge of alternate jurors after
the jury had rendered a verdict on guilt and, if applicable, the amount
of punishment. 49 This case presents an unintended consequence of that
amendment.
Looking at the text of the constitutional and statutory provisions,
an “alternate juror” does not alter the composition of the petit jury even
if the alternate erroneously participates in jury deliberations. 50 The
Texas Constitution limits the size of the petit jury to twelve people and
provides that a jury of less than twelve may render a verdict if one or
more (but no more than three) jurors are unable to carry out a juror’s
duty. That’s it. Statutes allowing a juror to be replaced by an alternate
juror were enacted later, but the statutory provision authorizing the use
of alternate jurors still does not transform an alternate juror into a
47
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011.
48
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011 (1983), amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 846, § 1
(eff. Sept. 1, 2007).
49
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 846, § 1 (2007).; see also House Comm. on Crim. Jurisprudence,
Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1086, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
50
Trinidad, 312 S.W.3d at 28.
Becerra - 23
member of the regular jury. It is only when the alternate juror replaces
a member of the jury that the alternate juror can be said to be a member
of the regular jury. The only way a district court runs afoul of the
constitutional and statutory provisions setting the number of jurors is to
impanel a jury of greater or fewer than twelve jurors in a felony case.
That the district judge chooses to qualify alternate jurors does not alter
the composition of the regular jury.
We have previously stated that the presence of an alternate juror
in the jury room during deliberations, even when the alternate juror
participates in those deliberations, does not violate the constitutional
and statutory twelve-person jury requirement as long as only the twelve
members of the petit jury voted on the ultimate verdict received. 51 In
Trinidad v. State, we considered two consolidated cases in which trial
courts allowed an alternate juror to be present for, and to participate in,
jury deliberations. 52 In each case, the trial court knowingly retired the
jury, including the alternate, to begin deliberations, instructing the jury
51
Id.52
Id. at 24.
Becerra - 24
that the alternate juror would be a part of their deliberations but would
not vote on the verdict unless a regular juror became disabled. 53
In Trinidad, we held no constitutional violation occurred under
these circumstances because the alternate jurors were not allowed to
vote on the “ultimate verdict” even though the alternate jurors were
allowed to participate in jury deliberations. 54 We did not explain what
constitutes the “ultimate verdict” as it was not necessary to the
disposition of the case. 55 We supported this language by citing to cases
involving juries that had been impaneled with less than twelve jurors. 56
Appellant now relies upon this aspect of Trinidad to argue that, although
twelve jurors “were in the box” when the verdict was received, the
alternate juror in this case participated in the only vote that apparently
occurred in this case. Appellant essentially argues that there is a
53
Id. at 24-25 (in both cases, the trial court, in instructing the jury, referenced the 2007
amendment to Article 33.011, which provided that alternate jurors shall not be discharged
until after the verdict is received).
54
Id. at 28.
55
Id. (“As long as only the twelve regular jurors voted on the verdicts that the appellants
received, it cannot be said that they were judged by a jury of more than the constitutionally
requisite number.”).
56
Id.; see, e.g., Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding a
defendant, who agreed to proceed on a jury of eleven, can waive his constitutional right to a
jury of twelve); Roberts v. State, 957 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (remanding for
reconsideration in light of Hatch where court of appeals held that requirement of jury
composed of twelve members could not be waived); Harrell v. State, 980 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998) (requirement of jury composed of twelve members can be, and was,
expressly waived).
Becerra - 25
constitutional violation in this case because the alternate juror
participated in a vote regarding Appellant’s guilt during jury
deliberations and that vote became the jury’s “ultimate verdict.”
But Appellant’s focus on our reference in Trinidad to the jury’s
“ultimate verdict” is a distraction from the actual holding of that case.
As we noted in Trinidad, the error in allowing alternates to be present
with the regular jurors during their deliberations “is more usefully
conceived of as an error in allowing an outside influence to be brought
to bear on the appellants’ constitutionally composed twelve-member
juries.” 57 We went on to agree with the court of appeals that such error,
if any, “would be controlled by Article 36.22, which is the statute that
expressly prohibits any outside ‘person’ from being ‘with a jury while it
is deliberating.’” 58 Yet, Appellant’s arguments and proof mistakenly
focus on whether the alternate participated in the “ultimate verdict.”
The relevant issue, however, was whether that alternate juror’s
participation in the jury’s deliberations was an outside influence on the
jury. The only time an alternate juror can be said to participate in the
57
Id. at 28.
58
Id.
Becerra - 26
“ultimate verdict” is as an actual member of the jury, not as an
alternate.
In Trinidad, the alternate jurors’ participation in jury deliberations
did not result in a constitutional or statutory violation of the requirement
that a petit jury be composed of twelve people. 59 That is because the
alternate juror was never a member of the petit jury. Nothing in the
text of Article V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution or Article 33.01
mentions participation in the petit jury’s “ultimate verdict” or suggests
that an alternate juror becomes a member of that jury when he or she
participates in the “ultimate verdict.” Suggesting that an alternate juror
becomes a member of the petit jury through participation and
deliberation is akin to saying that this Court consists of more than nine
judges because staff attorneys assist in drafting opinions. 60
As far as the text of the Texas Constitution and Code of Criminal
Procedure are concerned, an alternate juror’s participation in a jury’s
preliminary vote during deliberations has nothing to do with whether the
trial court composed a petit jury of twelve people. Our suggestion in
59
Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993) (presence of alternates in
jury deliberations, with instructions not to participate, did not affect substantial rights of
defendants).
60
See, e.g., Tex. Const. Art. 5 §4(a) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall consist of eight
Judges and one Presiding Judge.”)
Becerra - 27
Trinidad that there might be a constitutional or statutory violation of the
twelve-person jury requirement if an alternate juror participates in the
jury’s “ultimate verdict” was unsupported dicta. It was unnecessary to
our disposition of the case, and we now expressly disavow it.
Given this understanding of the relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions, we hold that the trial court did not violate Article
V, sec. 13 of the Texas Constitution because the trial court
unquestionably composed the petit jury of twelve people. Likewise, we
hold that Article 33.01(a), which codifies Article V, sec. 13’s requirement
for a jury of twelve persons, was not violated. And finally, we hold that
there was no violation of Article 33.011 as there does not appear to be
any dispute that the selection of the alternate juror was made in
accordance with Article 33.011.
In this case, the trial court impaneled a jury of twelve people
consistent with the constitutional and statutory requirement that petit
juries be composed of twelve people. The trial court exercised its
discretion to qualify an alternate juror consistent with Article 33.011(b).
Each of these provisions appears to have been properly applied
according to their terms. We agree with the court of appeals that no
constitutional or statutory violation of the twelve-person jury
requirement occurred.
Becerra - 28
Article 36.22 and Outside Influence
Our holding that the alternate juror’s participation in deliberations
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation should not be taken
as a suggestion that the alternate juror’s presence with the jury during
deliberations and participation in those deliberations was permissible.
It was not. It violated Article 36.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 36.22 provides that:
No person shall be permitted to be with a jury while it is
deliberating. No person shall be permitted to converse with
a juror about the case on trial except in the presence and by
the permission of the court. 61
Article 36.22 has two prohibitions, the first disallows any person from
being with a jury while it is deliberating and the second prohibits any
person from conversing with a juror about the case on trial except in
the presence and by permission of the court. 62 Both parts of the statute
were violated in this case.
In Trinidad, we left open the question of whether alternate jurors
constituted an outside person for purposes of Article 36.22’s first
prohibition provision. 63 We noted that, as amended, Article 33.011
61
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.22.
62
Id.
63
Trinidad, 312 S.W.3d at 28 n. 24 (concluding that the defendant forfeited the 36.22
statutory claim).
Becerra - 29
“does not indicate whether the alternate juror should be allowed to be
present for, and to participate in, the jury’s deliberations, or instead,
whether he should be sequestered from the regular jury during its
deliberations until such time as the alternate’s services might be
required.” 64 To date, the question of whether an alternate juror’s
presence violates the first provision of Article 36.22 has not been
definitively answered. 65 As we noted above, nothing in the statutory
provision governing the use of alternate jurors transforms an alternate
juror into a member of the regular jury prior to an alternate juror’s
replacement of a regular juror. Only then does an alternate juror
become a member of the regular jury. If we were to regard alternate
jurors as members of the regular jury, then statutory provisions that
govern how an alternate juror “replaces” a disabled juror would be
rendered meaningless. 66
64
Id. at 24; see also Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *5 (declining to find the trial court abused
its discretion absent an explicit rule that an alternate juror’s presence in the jury room is
“absolutely improper”).
65
But see Laws v. State, 640 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“A claim that the
presence of an alternate juror while the jury deliberates violates Article 36.22 is not the same
sort of claim as an allegation of juror misconduct during deliberations.”); Becerra, 2022 WL
1177391, at *2 (noting the Court in Trinidad declined to determine whether the presence of
an alternate juror during deliberations violated Article 36.22).
66
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(b) (“Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called
shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury renders a verdict on the guilt or innocence
of the defendant and, if applicable, the amount of punishment, become or are found to be
unable or disqualified to perform their duties. . .”)(emphasis added); see also Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 36.29(b) (“If alternate jurors have been selected in a capital case . . . and a juror
Becerra - 30
Notably, at the time Article 36.22 was enacted in 1965, there was
no statutory provision allowing for the selection and use of alternate
jurors. In its original form, Article 36.22’s use of the terms “jury” and
“juror” necessarily contemplated the regular jury and regular jurors, not
alternates. 67 When the statute used the word “jury” it was referring to
the regular jury of twelve people. When the statute used the word
“juror” it was referring to a member of the regular jury. The statute’s
use of the word “juror” could not have been a reference to an alternate
juror because the statute allowing for the use of alternate jurors did not
exist. Even after Article 33.011 was enacted in 1983, this understanding
of the terms held true because alternate jurors were specifically
discharged before deliberations. It was only after the amendment to
33.011 in 2007 that the danger of an alternate juror deliberating with
dies or becomes disabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to
the jury, the alternate whose named was called first . . . shall replace the dead or disabled
juror”); Tex. Gov’t Code § 62.020(d) (“In the order in which they are called, alternate jurors
shall replace jurors . . .”); Mahaffey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
(“In interpreting statutes, we presume that the Legislature intended for the entire statutory
scheme to be effective.”); Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“we
read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and
usage”). Therefore, we must read the statute to give effect to the word “replace” in context
of the entire statutory scheme. See New Oxford Dictionary (3rd Ed. 2010) (defining "remove"
as "eliminate or get rid of" and defining "replace" as "fill the role of (someone or something)
with a substitute").
67
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011 (1983), amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 846, § 1
(eff. Sept. 1, 2007).
Becerra - 31
the regular jury arose. 68 Even then, the statute’s silence regarding what
trial courts should to do with alternate jurors while the jury is
deliberating does not suggest that the amendments to article 33.011
altered the meaning of the statutory terms, “jury” or “juror.” 69 More
importantly, Article 33.011 and its subsequent amendment do not
include an exception to Article 36.22’s prohibition on persons being with
a jury while it is deliberating to allow alternate jurors to participate in
those deliberations. We now hold that the presence of an alternate juror
with the jury while it is deliberating violates the first provision of Article
36.22.
Turning to Article 36.22’s second prohibition provision, we have
recognized that “[t]he primary goal of Article 36.22 is to insulate jurors
from outside influence.” 70 Outside influence cases under Article 36.22
68
Id.
69
See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948) (statute susceptible of either of two
opposed interpretations must be read in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates
the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen); see also State v. Brent, 634 S.W.3d 911,
913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“Prolonged inaction by the Legislature in the face of a judicial
interpretation of a statute implies approval of that interpretation. Its re-enactment of a law
without change in its verbiage is regarded as a legislative adoption of prior judicial
interpretations of said law. We generally give little weight to later legislative enactments when
interpreting a prior law.”) (internal quotations removed).
70
Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Chambliss v. State, 647
S.W.2d 257, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (considering the second provision and concluding
Article 36.22’s “main purpose is to prevent an outsider from saying anything that might
influence a juror”) (emphasis in the original)).
Becerra - 32
often involve jurors discussing the case with unauthorized people
outside of the jury room. 71 Having concluded that an alternate juror is
an outside person for purposes of Article 36.22, we have little trouble
concluding that the participation of the alternate juror in this case,
including casting a vote during the initial deliberations, constituted an
impermissible conversation with the jurors about the case on trial, which
did not occur in the presence of the court.
This is not to suggest that outside individuals are free to speak
with alternate jurors about the case on trial or that a trial court cannot
prohibit communications with alternate jurors about the case on trial.
Under the statute, alternate jurors are qualified just as regular jurors
are. 72 So, as with regular jurors, a citizen may be unable to serve as
an alternate juror if he or she has outside knowledge of the case that
might give rise to a valid challenge for cause. 73 Additionally, the
71
See Chambliss, 647 S.W.2d at 263-66 (considering a juror’s conversation with one of the
victim’s sisters during break in the trial but finding no error where the record did not show
the conversation concerned the case on trial); Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885 (juror’s telephone
conversation with an unknown person regarding the case on trial, which was overheard by
defense counsel and occurred in the presence of another juror likely violated Article 36.22’s
prohibition on conversing with a juror).
72
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 33.011(b) (“Alternate jurors shall be drawn and selected in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination
and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers,
facilities, security, and privileges as regular jurors.”).
73
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.16 (“A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular
juror, alleging some fact which renders the juror incapable or unfit to serve on the jury.”).
Becerra - 33
statutory prohibition against conversing with a juror still applies in a
situation in which someone converses with an alternate juror who later
replaces a member of the jury. In that situation, the juror still had a
conversation about the case on trial without the trial court’s permission
and outside the court’s presence even though the conversation took
place when the juror was simply an alternate juror. And nothing in this
opinion should be construed to prevent a trial court from holding a
person in contempt for violating an order not to speak with jurors or
alternates about the case on trial. 74
We have recognized that a violation of Article 36.22’s prohibition
on conversing with a juror about the case on trial, once proven by the
defendant, raises a rebuttable presumption of injury that may warrant
a mistrial. 75 Appellant asks us to consider the propriety of the court of
appeals’ failure to apply that presumption. Having determined that both
74
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 36.23 (“Any juror or other person violating the preceding Article
shall be punished for contempt of court by confinement in jail not to exceed three days or by
fine not the exceed one hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”); Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 21.002.
75
Chambliss, 647 S.W.2d at 265-66 (“Although it is ‘generally presumed that a defendant is
injured whenever an empaneled juror converses with an unauthorized person about the case,’
the defendant has the burden ‘to establish that if a conversation did occur . . . the discussion
involved matters concerning the specific case at trial.’”) (emphasis in the original); Ocon, 284
S.W.3d at 885 (reporting violating conversation raised rebuttable presumption of injury);
Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Once proven, a violation of
Article 36.22 triggers a rebuttal presumption of injury to the accused, and a mistrial may be
warranted.”).
Becerra - 34
provisions of Article 36.22 were violated, we turn now to the issue of
the rebuttable presumption of harm.
Rebuttable Presumption of Harm
The court of appeals concluded that any violation of Article 36.22
was harmless because the alternate juror’s presence and participation
in initial voting with the jury was not sufficient to create a “reasonable
probability that the alternate’s outside influence had a prejudicial effect
on the ‘hypothetical average juror.’” 76 Appellant alleges in his third
issue that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply a rebuttable
presumption of harm as a result of the Article 36.22 violation. The State
argues that if a rebuttable presumption of harm was triggered by an
Article 36.22 violation, the record establishes that the presumption is
rebutted and the error was harmless.
Ultimately, we disagree that the court of appeals was required to
couch its analysis in terms of a rebuttable presumption of harm. To the
extent that the rebuttable presumption of harm for a violation of Article
36.22 has ever been applied in practice, this case provides a good
example of why it is misleading to cast the harm analysis for violations
of Article 36.22 in terms of a rebuttable presumption of harm. In 1919,
76
Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *5.
Becerra - 35
this Court first recognized this presumption of harm in Mauney v. State
stating:
We think the rule in cases of a violation of the provisions of
article 748 [which “forbid any one from being with the jury
while they are deliberating on a case and from
communicating with a juror after he has been impaneled,
except in the presence and by permission of the court”]
ought to be that injury in such a case is presumed unless the
contrary is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court,
the trial court primarily, and ultimately this court. Any
presumption can be overcome by evidence, and in such case
of presumptive injury the burden ought to be on the state to
satisfy the court that no injury has resulted from such
violation of the statute. 77
The Court in Mauney appears to have been concerned with assuring a
fair trial, avoiding the appearance of impropriety by strict observance of
the rule, and authorizing a juror to remain on a case even when the
juror may fail to accurately recall improper conversations with a non-
juror “by virtue of a convenient memory.” 78 These are all significant
concerns, to be sure. But our reference in Mauney to a rebuttable
presumption was otherwise unsupported.
In a later case, we noted the presumption “is rebuttable; and on
motion for new trial, if the State negates this presumption by showing
77
Mauney v. State, 210 S.W. 959, 963 (Tex. Crim. 1919) (concluding that the presumption
of injury was overcome “by the evidence showing what the conversations were, and that no
fact bearing on the case was discussed between the juror and his wife”).
78
Id. at 962-63.
Becerra - 36
that either the case was not discussed or that nothing prejudicial to the
accused was said, then the verdict should be upheld.” 79 In this way, the
presumption of harm appears to only apply to a violation of Article
36.22’s prohibition on conversing with a juror about the case on trial
and not to an unauthorized person simply being present with the jury. 80
More importantly, the ultimate question in considering whether the
presumption has been rebutted appears to boil down to whether the
statutory violation had an injurious effect on the jury. In practice, our
reference to a presumption of harm appears no different than a mere
recognition that error occurred, and the rebuttable nature of the
presumption describes the necessity of conducting a harm analysis
regarding that error.
Given the circumstances in which we have held that the
presumption has been rebutted, casting a harm analysis in terms of a
rebuttable presumption of harm is unnecessary. That is because the
inquiry ultimately focuses on whether the alternate juror’s intrusion into
79
Williams v. State, 463 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
80
See, e.g., Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885 (reporting the conversation with a juror, which took
place in violation of Article 36.22’s second provision, raised a rebuttable presumption); Laws
v. State, No. 06-19-00221-CR, 2022 WL 2811958, at *5-6 (Tex. App. —Texarkana July 19,
2022) (not designated for publication) (citing Ocon and Hughes to conclude that the
presumption applies only to the second provision of Article 36.22).
Becerra - 37
jury deliberations affected those deliberations and thereby the verdict. 81
For example, in Quinn v. State, a juror had a phone conversation with
a co-worker mid-trial, that was recorded, in which he discussed the case
on trial. 82 The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was
ultimately denied after a hearing. 83 We noted that “[w]hen a juror
converses with an unauthorized person about the case, ‘injury to the
accused is presumed’ and a new trial may be warranted. However, the
State may rebut this presumption of harm.” 84 Ultimately, we affirmed
the denial of the motion for new trial because the evidence established
that the juror did not relay the conversation with his co-worker to any
other members of the jury, and that the conversation did not otherwise
impact the juror’s deliberations. 85 Put in terms of a traditional harm
analysis, we appear to have recognized in Quinn that error occurred in
the form of a conversation between a juror and an unauthorized person,
81
The United States Supreme Court made essentially the same observation in United States
v. Olano, when it rejected the contention that there should be a presumption of prejudice
arising from an alternate juror’s presence during jury deliberations. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
As the Court noted, “[A] presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not
change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its
verdict?” Id.82
Quinn v. State, 958 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
83
Id. at 399.
84
Id. at 401.
85
Id. at 402.
Becerra - 38
but we effectively held that the error was harmless because we had fair
assurance from the record that the conversation did not affect the jury’s
verdict. 86
In the context of a motion for mistrial, we have held that the State
rebutted the presumption of harm by submitting that the account of the
improper conversation could not be verified and that the jury had been
instructed not to talk about the case. 87 In that case, defense counsel
overheard one side of a juror’s telephone conversation while defense
counsel was in the restroom with another juror; defense counsel
reported the conversation, in which the juror spoke negatively about the
trial, to the judge and requested a mistrial. 88 Although we found that
reporting the conversation to the judge raised a rebuttable presumption
of harm, we also noted that the defense had not presented evidence
that either juror received any new or outside information as a result of
the phone conversation. 89 We concluded that “the paramount issue is
86
Id.; Stredic v. State, 663 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“Because the error at
issue is solely a statutory violation, the Rule 44.2(b) standard of harm for nonconstitutional
errors governs the analysis. Under that standard, an error that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded . . . an error does not affect substantial rights if an appellate court
has fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.”).
87
Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 885.
88
Id. at 882.
89
Id. at 887.
Becerra - 39
whether Appellant received a fair and impartial trial, and therefore the
analysis must focus on whether the juror was biased as a result of the
improper conversation.” 90 We held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial even though the State never
presented any evidence to rebut the presumption of harm from the
unauthorized communication with the juror. 91
Further, the rebuttable presumption’s placement of “burdens”
upon the parties appears at odds with our later promulgation and
application of Rule 44.2(b). Rule 44.2 separates, for purposes of a harm
analysis, the standard for constitutional and non-constitutional errors. 92
We have held that “it is the responsibility of the appellate court to assess
harm after reviewing the record and that the burden to demonstrate
whether the appellant was harmed by a trial court error does not rest
on the appellant or the State.” 93 In assessing harm, there is no burden
90
Id.91
Id. at 885-88 (concluding the presumption of harm was rebutted by the fact that the jurors
had been instructed not to discuss the case, the conversation could not be verified, and noting
questioning of the jurors should have been at the defense’s behest).
92
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.
93
Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (adopting the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995) (“it is still the responsibility of the
… court, once it concludes there was error, to determine whether the error affected the
judgment. It must do so without benefit of such aids as presumptions or allocated burdens or
proof that expedite fact-finding at the trial”) and noting Rule 44.2(b) is based on Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 52(a)).
Becerra - 40
on either party to prove harm or harmlessness resulting from the
error. 94
That neither party bears a burden in assessing harm is particularly
appropriate here given that neither party bears responsibility for the
error of allowing the alternate juror to participate in part of the jury
deliberations. Rather, an established violation of Article 36.22 should
be reviewed for harm by the appellate court based upon a review of the
record to determine whether the error had a substantial and injurious
effect in determining the jury’s verdict. 95 Neither party bears a burden
because it is the duty of the courts to determine whether the record as
a whole shows the outcome of the proceeding was influenced by the
error. 96 Given that a harm analysis is more of a systemic requirement
that ensures the reliability of the verdict based upon a review of the
entire record, burdens of persuasion are not appropriate. 97
94
VanNortick v. State, 227 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
95
Maciel v. State, 631 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (Newell, J., concurring) (“the
Court should recognize that an evaluation for harm flowing from error is as much as systemic
requirement as determining whether that error has been preserved”).
96
Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Neither the appellant nor
the State have any formal burden to show harm or harmlessness under Rule 44.2(b).”).
97
We note that harm analysis on direct review differs in this respect from the burden to
establish prejudice upon collateral review in a writ of habeas corpus. See Ovalle v. State, 13
S.W.3d 774, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 534 n. 6 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013); Cf. Maciel, 631 S.W.3d at 726 (Newell, J., concurring) (noting, on direct
appeal, the reviewing court makes its own assessment of harm independently of the
arguments of the parties).
Becerra - 41
Discontinuing reference to a rebuttable presumption is also
consistent with the harm analysis applicable to other species of outside
influence claims. We have recognized, for example, that an outside
influence is problematic only if it has the effect of improperly affecting
a jury’s verdict in a particular manner for or against a particular party. 98
And we have held that courts conduct an objective analysis to determine
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the outside influence had
a prejudicial effect on the hypothetical average juror in order to
determine whether a juror affidavit regarding the outside influence is
admissible under Rule 606(b). 99 Notably, we have not couched our
harm analysis in these types of outside influence cases in terms of the
creation and rebuttal of a presumption of harm.
Likewise, in considering a statutory violation of the right to have a
verdict returned by a jury of twelve, we have analyzed the question of
harm without resort to a rebuttable presumption. 100 In Chavez v. State,
98
Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 129 (outside pressures on jury were neutral when “they were not
intended to persuade a juror to decide this case in any particular manner even if they might
have influenced the jury to reach a verdict more quickly”).
99
McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We note that it is
pursuant to this standard that the court of appeals concluded that a violation of Article 36.22,
if any, was harmless. Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *5. It appears the court of appeals
conflated the standard for admissibility under Rule 606(b) with the harm analysis for a
violation of Article 36.22.
100
See Chavez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Becerra - 42
a juror became disabled from service after the jury reached a verdict
but before it was announced in court. 101 Over the defendant’s objection,
the trial court received the verdict from the eleven remaining jurors in
violation of Article 36.29’s requirement that, after the jury charge is
read to the jury, if a juror becomes disabled the jury must be discharged
except by agreement of the parties to have the remaining eleven
members render a verdict. 102 Concluding that the decision to proceed
with the trial over the defendant’s objection did not implicate the
constitutional right to a jury of twelve, we held that a pure statutory
violation of Article 36.29 was subject to harm analysis under Rule
44.2(b). 103
We now conclude the same harm standard applies to a violation of
Article 36.22 and referring to that analysis in terms of a rebuttable
presumption of harm is inappropriate. Our description of this
presumption was unnecessary and unsupported at the time and pre-
dates our promulgation of rules regarding harmless error. Further, it
has led to inconsistent application across related types of error. In
101
Id. at 798.
102
Id. at 800; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.29(c).
103
Id. at 801; Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (“[a]ny other error, defect, irregularity, or variance
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded”).
Becerra - 43
short, the justification for this language was poorly reasoned and has
proven unworkable. 104 To the extent it is necessary, we expressly
disavow the language in Mauney and its progeny purporting to apply a
rebuttable presumption of harm to violations of Article 36.22.
Rule 44.2(b)
We also disagree that we should adopt a categorical approach to
the assessment of harm rather than a specific inquiry into whether the
record reveals harm. We disagree that an alternate juror’s participation
in jury deliberations results in structural error depending on the degree
of the alternate juror’s participation. 105 We also disagree with the
suggestion that an alternate juror’s participation in jury deliberations
always inures to the benefit of the defense. Instead, we hold that the
appropriate standard for evaluating harm when an alternate juror
participates in jury deliberations in violation of Article 36.22 is the
standard for non-constitutional error found in Rule 44.2(b).
We held in Cain v. State that no error, whether it relates to
jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory
104
See Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Proctor v.
State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“when governing decisions of this Court
are unworkable or badly reasoned, we are not constrained to follow precedent”).
105
See Lake v. State, 532 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (recognizing that only
federal constitutional errors labeled structural from the United States Supreme Court are
immune to a harmless error analysis); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
Becerra - 44
requirement, is categorically immune from a harm analysis unless it
amounts to federal constitutional error that has been labeled as
structural by the United States Supreme Court. 106 The United States
Supreme Court has affirmatively rejected the argument that a violation
of a rule prohibiting an alternate juror from being with the jury during
jury deliberations is structural error. We reach the same conclusion.
In United States v. Olano, the Court considered a case in which
two alternate jurors had retired to deliberate with the jury though they
did not participate in jury deliberations. 107 In deciding that an
evaluation for harm was appropriate, the Court noted that cases in
which significant intrusions upon the jury’s deliberative process were
evaluated for the prejudicial effect of those intrusions. 108 Given that
precedent, the Court reasoned that an evaluation for harm was
appropriate for an alternate juror’s presence during jury
106
Cain v. State, 947, S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
107
Olano, 507 U.S. at 727-30.
108
Id. at 739. As the Supreme Court observed, “[w]e cannot imagine why egregious
comments by a bailiff to a juror (Parker) or an apparent bribe followed by an official
investigation (Remmer) should be evaluated in terms of “prejudice,” while the mere presence
of alternate jurors during jury deliberations should not.” Id.; see also Parker v. Gladden, 385
U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (holding that bailiff’s comments to a juror that the defendant was a
“wicked fellow” who was “guilty” materially affected the rights of the defendant because the
comments were overheard by at least one juror or an alternate); Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954) (holding that defendant was entitled to hearing to determine
effect of F.B.I. investigation in to allegation that someone had attempted to bribe a juror in a
criminal case).
Becerra - 45
deliberations. 109 Moreover, the Court rejected the suggestion that
prejudice should be presumed, noting that “a presumption of prejudice
as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry:
Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its
verdict?” 110
Notably, Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion to argue
that the error should be treated as affecting the system as a whole based
in part upon his view that it was difficult to measure the effect of the
error on jury deliberations. 111 According to Justice Stevens, allowing
alternate jurors into the jury room violated the cardinal principle that
the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret in every
case. 112 Further, he argued that this type of error affected the structural
integrity of the criminal tribunal itself. 113 But the Court rejected these
arguments, quoting Smith v. Phillips to explain the Court’s “intrusion”
jurisprudence:
“[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror
has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.
Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally
109
Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
110
Id.111
Id. at 743-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112
Id.113
Id.Becerra - 46
acceptable . . . [I]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from
every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their
vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge
ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to
determine the effect of such occurrences when they
happen.” 114
Ultimately, in Olano, the Supreme Court did not treat the presence of
an alternate, or even the specter of some chilling conduct by the
alternate juror’s presence, as “structural error” that defies a harm
analysis. 115 Instead, the Court determined that the error was the type
of error that is susceptible to a harm analysis that can be undertaken to
determine the effect of the error upon the jury’s verdict. We agree.
That some errors may involve a greater intrusion upon the jury’s
deliberative process only suggests the error may be harmful, not that
the error is categorically immune from a harm analysis.
Conversely, we also disagree that allowing an alternate juror to
participate in jury deliberations would always inure to the benefit of the
defense. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Olano noted when analyzing
harm that the alternate jurors in that case were essentially
indistinguishable from the regular jurors. 116 The Court also noted that
114
Id. at 738 (majority opinion) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).
115
Id. at 740.
116
Id.
Becerra - 47
the alternates received the same initial admonishments not to consider
the case on evidence outside the record. 117 The Court relied upon these
facts among others when making its determination in Olano that the
alternate’s presence during jury deliberations was harmless. 118
However, the Court also noted that the alternate jurors had been
instructed not to participate in jury deliberations. 119 And the Court held
that the court of appeals erred to speculate that the alternate jurors
contravened that instruction. 120 In so holding, the Court implies that a
greater degree of involvement by the alternate jurors in the jury’s
deliberative process might not be so easily dismissed as harmless
error. 121
While we have not considered a violation of Article 36.22 with a
comparable degree of involvement by an alternate juror, we have
117
Id.
118
Id. at 741.
119
Id. at 740.
120
Id.
121
In Olano, the Court noted that theoretically an alternate juror’s presence during jury
deliberations might prejudice a defendant in two different ways, namely participating in
deliberations verbally or through body language or by exerting a “chilling” effect on regular
jurors by virtue of the alternate juror’s presence. Id. at 739. The Court cited to two federal
cases as support for this conclusion, both of which observed that an alternate’s participation
in jury deliberations could be deemed prejudicial to a defendant under a harm analysis for
non-constitutional error. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir.
1982) and United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973)).
Becerra - 48
considered a case which at least illustrates how a single person in the
jury room can impact jury deliberations to the detriment of the defense.
In Scales v. State, we considered a case in which the trial court removed
a member of the regular jury as disabled because that juror refused to
deliberate with the rest of the jury because she believed the State had
not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 122 We held that
removing that juror and replacing her with an alternate juror was a
statutory error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. 123 We
specifically noted that as soon as the judge erroneously replaced the
hold-out-juror, the jury returned a guilty verdict, clearly demonstrating
that the erroneous removal had a substantial and injurious influence in
determining the jury’s verdict. 124 Indeed, in that situation a single
alternate juror’s participation resulted in harm to the defendant because
the removal of a member of the regular jury who was not disabled
affected the defendant’s substantial rights. 125
122
Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 781-82.
123
Id. at 786-87.
124
Id.
125
Id.; see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 (“It might be suggested that the 12-man jury gives
a defendant a greater advantage since he has more ‘chances’ of finding a juror who will insist
on acquittal and thus prevent conviction. But the advantage might just as easily belong to
the State, which also needs only one juror out of twelve insisting on guilt to prevent
acquittal.”).
Becerra - 49
Ultimately, harm in a case in which an alternate juror participates
in jury deliberations with a lawfully composed jury of twelve depends
upon what the record reveals about the alternate juror’s involvement in
jury deliberations. 126 There is no question that the trial court impaneled
a “legal jury” of twelve jurors. 127 Rather, the question is how the
alternate juror’s participation in deliberations with that lawfully
composed jury affected the proceedings. If an examination of the entire
record reveals that the alternate juror’s participation in jury
deliberations had a substantial or injurious effect in determining the
jury’s verdict, then it can be said that the error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights and cannot be disregarded. But the Court cannot
recast the error at issue to require the application of a particular harm
standard (or the abandonment of a harm analysis altogether) to reach
a desired outcome.
126
Other jurisdictions have analyzed an alternate juror’s participation in jury deliberations for
harm further suggesting that such an analysis is appropriate in these circumstances. See,
e.g., James v. People, 426 P.3d 336, 341 (Colo. 2018) (“Like all errors in the trial process
that do not amount to structural error, whether an intrusion or outside influence on jury
deliberations should be disregarded as harmless must depend upon an evaluation of the
likelihood that the outcome of the proceedings in question was adversely affected by the
error.”); McAdams v. State, 75 P.3d 665, 668 (Wyo. 2003) (“We evaluate whether the
alternate juror's presence in the jury room during the jury's deliberations prejudiced the
defendant, and also whether the court acted or utilized sufficient procedural safeguards to
‘obviate the danger of prejudice to the defendant.’”) (quoting Alcalde v. State, 74 P.3d 1253,
1258 (Wyo. 2003)); Sanchez v. State, 794 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (mistrial
may be warranted based on alternate deliberating with the jury if the conduct was “both error
and had a probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision”).
127
Stell, 14 Tex. App. 59, 60 (1883).
Becerra - 50
Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure sets out the
proper standard for analyzing whether non-constitutional error resulted
in harm. 128 Under this standard, any non-constitutional error that does
not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. 129 An error affects
substantial rights only if it has a substantial or injurious effect in
determining the jury’s verdict. 130 If, on the other hand, after an
examination of the record as a whole we have a fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect, a reviewing
court should not overturn the conviction. 131 To the extent that Appellant
argues that a reviewing court should consider whether the alternate
juror improperly participated in the jury’s ultimate verdict, that is a
factor that should be considered when evaluating whether the violation
of Article 36.22 affected Appellant’s substantial rights. 132
128
Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).
129
Id.; accord Gray v. State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“In summary, when
only a statutory violation is claimed, the error must be treated as non-constitutional for the
purpose of conducting a harm analysis . . .”).
130
Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Taylor v. State,
268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
131
Id.132
Trinidad, 312 S.W.3d at 28 (noting that an alternate juror’s participation in jury
deliberations is more usefully considered as a claim that the alternate juror brought an outside
influence to bear on the jury).
Becerra - 51
In this case, the court of appeals does not appear to have done a
complete harm analysis having concluded that the alternate’s presence
during jury deliberations was not error. 133 It also did not have the
benefit of our discussion regarding the applicable harm standard.
Moreover, it appears to have addressed the issue of harm in the context
of the alternate juror’s prejudicial effect on a “hypothetical average
juror.” 134 In doing so, it seems to have conflated the inquiry into
whether there was an outside influence, for purposes of determining
admissibility of juror affidavits regarding an outside influence, with the
inquiry into whether there was harm from the violation of Article
36.22. 135 Instead, the court of appeals should have examined the
record as a whole to determine whether the error affected Appellant’s
substantial rights. Because it did not, we will remand the case for the
court of appeals to conduct a harm analysis pursuant to Rule 44.2(b).
As this standard requires examination of the record as a whole, we must
address Appellant’s claim regarding the admissibility of the juror
133
Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *5 (“As to the other alleged statutory violations, primarily
article 36.22 regarding the presence of outsiders with the jury during deliberations, we have
found no authority that has established a hard rule that the presence of the alternate jurors
in the jury room during deliberations is absolutely improper.”).
134
Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *5.
135
Id.Becerra - 52
affidavit under Rule 606(b) of the Rules of Evidence to determine if the
entire affidavit can be considered by the court of appeals.
Rule 606(b)
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the near-
universal and firmly established common-law rule in the United States
flatly prohibits the admission of juror testimony to impeach a jury
verdict. 136 However, Rule 606(b) of the Rules of Evidence permits juror
testimony relating to improper outside influence. Rule 606(b) states:
(b) During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or
Indictment.
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence.
During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement
made or incident that occurred during the jury's
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror's or
another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes
concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may
not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's
statement on these matters.
(2) Exceptions. A juror may testify:
(A) about whether an outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any juror; or
(B) to rebut a claim that the juror was not
qualified to serve. 137
136
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987) (holding that an evidentiary hearing in
which jurors would testify on juror alcohol and drug use during trial was barred by rule of
evidence prohibiting juror impeachment of jury verdict).
137
Tex. R. Evid. 606(b).
Becerra - 53
The court of appeals upheld the admissibility of the portion of the
affidavit indicating that the alternate juror voted during deliberations
but was removed from the jury room before the ultimate verdict. 138
However, it held that the portion of the juror's affidavit indicating that a
subsequent vote was not taken once the court removed the alternate
juror was not admissible pursuant to Rule 606(b). 139 The court of
appeals reasoned that this portion did not involve evidence regarding
the outside influence or its impact on any juror or the deliberations. 140
Whether an affidavit is admissible pursuant to Rule 606(b), is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard like other evidentiary rulings. 141
We do not agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that only a
part of the affidavit is admissible because the admissibility of the entire
affidavit falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. In McQuarrie
v. State, we considered what constituted an “outside influence” for
purposes of admissibility under Rule 606(b). 142 McQuarrie was a sexual
138
Becerra, 2022 WL 1177391, at *4.
139
Id.140
Id.McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 155; Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App.
141
2000) (“An appellate court reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
must utilize an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.”).
142
McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 150-55.
Becerra - 54
assault case in which a trial court relied upon Rule 606(b) to exclude
juror affidavits regarding internet research that a juror shared with the
rest of the jury. 143 Specifically, two jurors submitted affidavits that a
third juror had conducted internet research into the effects of a date
rape drug and shared it with other jurors the next morning. 144 We held
that the juror affidavits were admissible because the content included
an inquiry into how the internet research affected the jury’s verdict
without delving into its deliberations. 145 In reaching our conclusion, we
explained that the 606(b) inquiry is limited to that which occurs outside
the jury room and outside of the juror’s personal knowledge and
experience. 146
In this case, the second part of the affidavit seems to have dealt
with jury deliberations. The affidavit avers that the jury did not take a
subsequent internal vote after the alternate juror was removed from the
143
Id. at 148.
144
Id.145
Id. at 154 (“[A] trial court should be able to inquire as to whether jurors received such
outside information and the impact it had on their verdict without delving into their actual
deliberations. This can be done by making an objective determination as to whether the
outside influence likely resulted in injury to the complaining party—that is, by limiting the
questions asked of the jurors to the nature of the unauthorized information or communication
and then conducting an objective analysis to determine whether there is a reasonable
possibility that it had a prejudicial effect on the ‘hypothetical average juror.’”).
146
Id. (“[T]he plain language of Rule 606(b) indicates that an outside influence is something
outside of both the jury room and the juror.”) (citing White v. State, 225 S.W.3d 571, 574
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
Becerra - 55
jury room and the trial court had instructed the jury to disregard the
alternate juror’s participation. 147 However, the fact that no subsequent
vote was taken after the alternate juror was removed from the jury
room could have some bearing on whether the alternate juror’s
erroneous participation in jury deliberations had some effect on the
jurors. Like the affidavits at issue in McQuarrie, the affidavit in this case
could have provided a small nudge to show that either the jury was
affected by the alternate juror’s previous participation or that the jurors
followed the trial court’s instructions to disregard the alternate juror’s
participation. 148 Consequently, the court of appeals erred because the
trial court’s ruling admitting the entirety of the affidavit was not outside
of the zone of reasonable disagreement. 149 On remand, the court of
appeals should consider the entire affidavit when evaluating whether
the alternate juror’s presence and participation during deliberations
affected Appellant’s substantial rights.
Conclusion
147
There is no indication in the affidavit, for example, that the alternate juror actively swayed
the other jurors to a particular conclusion like Henry Fonda in the movie 12 Angry Men or was
largely ignored as a distraction like actor James Marsden in the recent Amazon Freevee series
Jury Duty. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957); Jury Duty: Deliberations (Amazon
Studios April 21, 2023).
148
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (evidence need not by
itself prove or disprove a particular fact to be relevant; it need only provide a small nudge).
149
McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 155.
Becerra - 56
The inadvertent presence and participation of the alternate juror
in the jury’s initial deliberations did not implicate Appellant’s
constitutional right to a jury of twelve people, or the statutory
codification of that right in Article 33.01. Likewise, the alternate juror’s
presence and participation in a portion of jury deliberations did not run
afoul of Article 33.011 because the alternate juror was properly
discharged after the jury rendered its verdict.
However, the alternate juror’s participation and presence during a
portion of jury deliberations did violate Article 36.22’s prohibition on
unauthorized persons being present with the jury while the jury is
deliberating, as well as Article 36.22’s prohibition against conversing
with the jury about the case. We remand this case for the court of
appeals to analyze whether this non-constitutional error affected
Appellant’s substantial rights. On remand, the court of appeals should
consider the entirety of the juror affidavit regarding the jury
deliberations after the alternate juror had been excluded from the jury
room to determine whether Appellant was harmed by the statutory
violation.
Delivered: February 7, 2024
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