Terrance Harris and Deborah Harris v. Rich Willis Construction LLC ( 2024 )

VACATE and DISMISS and Opinion Filed June 4, 2024
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-01039-CV
TERRANCE HARRIS AND DEBORAH HARRIS, Appellants
V.
RICH WILLIS CONSTRUCTION LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-04281-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Appellants Terrance and Deborah Harris1 appeal from a judgment awarding
possession in a forcible-detainer action. The trial court awarded possession of the
property to appellee Rich Willis Construction, LLC (RWCL). In one issue, the
Harrises challenge the jurisdiction of the County Court at Law to hear the case and
contend that title is so intertwined with possession that one may not be resolved
without the other. Because we conclude that title and possession are inextricably
1
Because appellants share a surname, they will collectively be referred to as the Harrises, or, where
relevant, by their first names Terrance or Deborah.
intertwined, we vacate the county court’s judgment and dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
The property in question is a single-family home in Dallas County. The
Harrises have lived at the property for 27 years. The property had belonged to
Deborah’s aunt Clara Watson Gillespie. Prior to the Harrises’ occupancy of the
property, Gillespie made an alleged promise to the Harrises that they could live there
for their entire lives.
The record presents no clear chain of title through deed conveyance. On
October 3, 1989, George Whitaker transferred the subject property via warranty deed
to Gillespie.2 Gillespie later died intestate, and, according to RWCL, title to the
property passed to her son Gregory Watson.3 At some point prior to her passing, the
Harrises assert, Gillespie verbally promised that they could live at the property for
the rest of their lives. Thereafter, the record establishes the subsequent conveyances
as follows:
June 26, 2019: Gregory Watson purported to convey property4 via two
separate Quitclaim Deeds: one from Gregory Watson to Ruth Watson
and the other from Gregory Watson, married and as Independent
2
The deed records show that the transfer was to “Clara Watson.” Deborah testified that Clara Watson
and Clara Watson Gillespie were the same person.
3
The record contains no documented title conveyance from Gillespie to Gregory Watson; however, as
the appeal does not specifically challenge this conveyance, we do not address it.
4
While only one property is at issue in this appeal, the record and evidence before the jury included
multiple properties owned by Gillespie, where family members lived with similar understanding.
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Executor of the Estate of Clara Watson, deceased, hereinafter Grantor
to Grantees Ruth Watson and Ty Simmons Dorsey;
January 11, 2020 via Texas General Warranty Deed Ruth Watson and
Ty Simmons Dorsey convey to Skyfox Realty Group, LLC (Ty Dorsey
CEO);
July 7, 2021 via General Warranty Deed Skyfox Realty Group, LLC,
Ruth Watson Managing Member conveys to Redwood Buyers, LLC
August 5, 2021: Redwood Buyers LLC to Richwills Construction LLC5
via General Warranty Deed.
RWCL as the purported landlord gave the Harrises notice to vacate and initiated an
action for forcible detainer.
A jury trial commenced on September 13, 2022. Immediately before trial, the
Harrises argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, claiming the issue of title was
intertwined with the issue of possession. The trial court stated that because a venire
panel had already been called, in the interest of time, it would move forward with
trial and would determine legal questions as they presented. The trial court
acknowledged that a trespass to quiet title case had been filed in the district court.
At trial, RWCL called two witnesses who testified to chain of title and the use
of a title company. The Harrises called six witnesses, including themselves. All of
the Harrises’ witnesses testified to the promise made by Gillespie to the Harrises.
Two of the witnesses attested that during their time living at the property, the
Harrises made renovations to most of the home.
5
We note without further discussion that there are evident conflicts in the spelling of the RWCL in the
record that may require resolution in the trial court.
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Before closing arguments, RWCL moved for a directed verdict and made a
plea to the jurisdiction on the sole issue of possession. The Harrises responded by
again raising the jurisdictional issue. The Harrises’ argument rested on Watson’s
knowledge of Gillespie’s promise to the Harrises, which the trial court characterized
as a life estate. The Harrises argued that Watson’s conveyance of the property to his
fourth wife was fraudulent. RWCL argued that the Harrises lacked standing to raise
an issue of fraudulent transfer. The trial court ultimately denied the plea to the
jurisdiction and motion for directed verdict, but also rejected the Harrises’
jurisdictional argument, explaining:
For this Court, this is a case of first impression where I have not an
actual challenge of the title by someone who claims superior title, but
rather, that promise to stay, and I don’t know how that is the type of --
of case that the Court -- that the court of appeals have intended to have
the county court at law stay or abate. I don’t know that, just based on
the facts presented, again, the plea to the jurisdiction is one that this
Court would grant. So I think at this point, the court of appeals is in a
better position to answer that question[.]
The jury returned a verdict in favor of RWCL, and the trial court entered
judgment awarding possession of the property to RWCL. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The Harrises’ only issue on appeal is that title is so intertwined with
possession that one may not be resolved without the other. The Harrises argue that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment of possession and was
required instead to abate this lawsuit until a district court could resolve issues of title.
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A. Standard of Review
The existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we
review de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004).
We review a trial court’s denial of a plea in abatement for abuse of discretion.
Lagow v. Hamon, 384 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or
without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. at 415.
B. Analysis
A justice court in the precinct where the real property is located has
jurisdiction of forcible-detainer suits. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(2); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). A forcible-detainer action determines which party
has a superior right to immediate possession. See Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705,
709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). The only issue heard in an action of forcible
detainer is the right to actual possession; the merits of title shall not be adjudicated.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 746; see Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709.
To obtain possession, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but must show
sufficient evidence of ownership to establish superior right to immediate possession.
Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. The mere existence of a title dispute does not deprive a
justice court of subject matter jurisdiction. Bruce v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 352
S.W.3d 891, 893 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). A title dispute divests a
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lower court’s jurisdiction only if the issue of title and possession are so intertwined
that resolution of title is required to determine right of possession. Id. To defeat the
court’s jurisdiction, the defendant must provide “specific evidence” of a genuine title
dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession. Gutierrez v.
Gonzalez, No. 05-16-00631-CV, 2017 WL 2729901 at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June
26, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Yarto v. Gilliland, 287 S.W.3d 83, 93
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.)). Specific evidence exists if a party
asserts a basis for title ownership that is not patently ineffective under the law. Id.The Harrises make two claims to establish a genuine title issue. First, they
claim to have a life estate through a promise made by Gillespie. Second, they claim
there was a fraudulent transfer from Watson to his wife. RWCL responds to the first
point by arguing that the statute of frauds requires the transfer to be in writing and
the evidence conclusively establishes that it was not. RWCL responds to the second
point by arguing that the Harrises lacked standing to challenge Watson’s transfer to
his wife as fraudulent. Because we agree with the Harrises that there was sufficient
evidence of a life estate to create a genuine title issue, we need not address their
second argument.
A life estate grants an interest to an individual for the duration of their life.
Knopf v. Gray, 545 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2018). It is created when language in a
deed or will “manifests an intention on the part of the grantor to pass to a grantee a
right to possess, use, or enjoy property during the period of the grantee’s life. Id.–6–
“The life tenant owns the estate only for life, which is a lesser estate than the fee or
inheritance which belongs to the remaindermen.” Tellez v. Rodriguez, 612 S.W.3d
707, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (quoting Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 235 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1950), rev’d on other
grounds, 151 Tex. 1, 244 S.W.2d 803 (1951)). A life tenant and remainderman each
hold the same land under separate titles. Id. However, “[a] life tenant is entitled to
exclusive possession and control of the property comprising the life estate and the
remaindermen are not entitled to possession thereof until the life estate terminates.”
Id. (quoting Enserch Expl., Inc. v. Wimmer, 718 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
Although the statute of frauds ordinarily requires the grant of a life estate to
be in writing, a parol gift of a life estate may be established if the donee proves: (1) a
present gift by the donor; (2) possession under the gift, taken and held by the donee
with the consent of the donor; and (3) permanent and valuable improvements made
by the donee upon the property in reliance upon the gift with knowledge and consent
of the donor. Soltner v. Flores, 335 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1960, no
writ).
Six witnesses testified to Gillespie’s oral promise to the Harrises. The basis
of the promise is that they could live in the home for their entire lives. The Harrises
lived there for thirty-five years and they paid taxes. The Harrises also put on
evidence that they lived in the home during Gillespie’s life and made substantial
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permanent improvements to the property (kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom) while
they lived there. Accordingly, the Harrises presented sufficient evidence of a life
estate for the trial court to conclude that there were genuine issues of title intertwined
with the issue of possession. See Tellez, 612 S.W.3d at 710 (evidence sufficient to
show that residents were granted a life estate created genuine issues of title
intertwined with possession in forcible detainer action).
Because the Harrises proffered sufficient evidence of a parol gift of a life
estate to create a genuine title issue, the resolution of title is required to determine
the right of possession. See id. Therefore, we sustain the Harrises’ sole issue on
appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the county court at law was divested of jurisdiction to hear
this matter due to the inextricably intertwined issue of title and possession. We
therefore vacate the judgment of possession and dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(e).6
/Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
221039F.P05
6
RWCL raises an objection to documents filed with the Harrises’ brief, as well as two paragraphs of
the statement of facts in that brief, as they are not part of the record. Documents attached to a brief but not
part of the record may not be considered by the appellate court. In Interest of S.H., No. 05-17-00336-CV,
2018 WL 3751297 at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 8, 2018, no pet.). Because these documents, with the
exception of deed number 2019000181485, were not part of the record, we cannot and did not consider
them.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
TERRANCE HARRIS AND On Appeal from the County Court at
DEBORAH HARRIS, Appellants Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-04281-
No. 05-22-01039-CV V. D.
Opinion delivered by Justice
RICH WILLIS CONSTRUCTION Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and
LLC, Appellee Breedlove participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s
judgment is VACATED.
The case is DISMISSED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered June 4, 2024
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