Erick Garcia v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00097-CR
___________________________
ERICK GARCIA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 5
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. F21-1866-16
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Erick Garcia appeals his sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for
his fifth driving-while-intoxicated offense (DWI). In a single issue, Garcia asserts that
the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to confinement as opposed to
probation in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 1.02(1)(B). We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Garcia was charged with felony DWI following a May 2020 incident. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2). Although Garcia’s offense was a third-
degree felony, the indictment contained an enhancement paragraph that increased the
punishment range to that of a second-degree felony. See id. §§ 12.42(a); 49.09(b)(2).
Garcia pleaded guilty to the alleged offense and true to the enhancement paragraph.
Garcia also waived his right to a jury trial regarding sentencing and elected to have the
trial court decide his punishment.
At the punishment hearing, the State called two on-scene police officers as
witnesses. Officer Jeffrey McAdams testified that Garcia had been found with his car
in a ditch. According to Officer McAdams, Garcia had been unconscious behind the
wheel of the vehicle when he arrived on the scene, reeked of alcohol, had slurred
speech, was unable to perform multiple standardized field sobriety tests, was unable to
stay awake during the entirety of the investigation, and was one of the most
intoxicated people that he had ever investigated for DWI. Officer Ryan Karnes
testified that his observations of Garcia matched Officer McAdams’s.
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The State also introduced a number of exhibits into evidence. One of these
exhibits was a lab report showing that Garcia had a blood–alcohol concentration level
of 0.376 at the time that he was tested, which was several hours after he drove into
the ditch. In addition, the State offered a number of exhibits detailing Garcia’s prior
criminal history, which included four prior DWI convictions.
After the State rested, Garcia called his ex-girlfriend, his ex-wife, and his
counselor as witnesses. Garcia’s ex-girlfriend and ex-wife both praised his current
sobriety but also acknowledged his long-term issues with alcohol abuse and the fact
that he had continued to drink after his May 2020 DWI arrest despite having been
ordered not to consume alcohol upon his release from jail. The counselor testified
that Garcia was a good candidate for community supervision, posed little risk to
reoffend, and would benefit from the DWI Court program.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Garcia to seven years
in prison. Garcia objected to the sentence as being contradictory to the Texas Penal
Code’s rehabilitative goals. See id. § 1.02(1)(B). The trial court overruled Garcia’s
objection, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Garcia contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to consider the Texas Penal Code’s rehabilitative objectives when sentencing him. See
id. Garcia’s argument lacks merit.
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We review a trial court’s punishment decision for an abuse of discretion.
Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The general rule is that a
trial court does not abuse its discretion if the sentence is within the statutory
punishment range. Id. Indeed, a trial court has “essentially ‘unfettered’” discretion to
impose any sentence within the prescribed statutory range, Ex parte Chavez, 213
S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892,
895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)), and any sentence within the statutory limits is virtually
“unassailable” on appeal provided that it is based upon the sentencer’s informed
normative judgment. Id. at 324.
The range of punishment for a second-degree felony1 is imprisonment for any
term of not more than twenty years or less than two years in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33(a). Thus, Garcia’s seven-year
sentence is well within the applicable statutory range. See id.Garcia argues that because he presented evidence showing that he had a
genuine desire for change and sobriety, posed little risk to reoffend, and would benefit
greatly from a rehabilitative program and because the State presented no evidence
showing that Garcia was a danger to public safety or that sentencing him to prison
would deter him or others from committing additional crimes, the trial court abused
1
As noted above, Garcia pleaded true to the indictment’s enhancement
paragraph. Thus, even though his DWI offense was a third-degree felony, the
applicable punishment range was that for a second-degree felony. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.42(a), 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2).
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its discretion by sentencing him to confinement as opposed to probation. But as the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized, a trial court’s decision regarding
what sentence to impose is a “normative process, not intrinsically factbound.”
Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323. Even assuming that specific evidence were
needed to support the imposed sentence, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion. The State presented evidence showing that Garcia has been
convicted of five DWIs, two of which he committed while on probation for previous
DWI offenses. Given the egregious nature of Garcia’s DWI offense—which
involved driving his car into a ditch while having a blood–alcohol level of over four
times the legal limit, see Tex. Penal Code Ann. 49.01(1)(B), (2)(B)—and his history of
recidivism, we cannot say that his sentence violates the Texas Penal Code’s objectives
to ensure public safety by deterring and preventing the reoccurrence of criminal
behavior. See id. § 1.02(1)(A), (C); Marquez-Ortiz v. State, No. 11-21-00196-CR, 2023
WL 3513188, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
Moreover, as Garcia’s counselor acknowledged, Garcia will have access to
continued treatment after he serves his prison sentence. Thus, by sentencing Garcia
to incarceration, the trial court did not necessarily deny him the opportunity for
rehabilitation. See Marquez-Ortiz, 2023 WL 3513188, at *3.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Garcia’s sentence falls
within the prescribed statutory range and does not violate the Texas Penal Code’s
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objectives. See Tex. Penal Code § 1.02(1). Accordingly, we overrule Garcia’s sole
issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Garcia’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: December 7, 2023
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