Jason David Sheedy v. Bruce Frederick ( 2023 )

Opinion issued December 7, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00663-CV
———————————
JASON DAVID SHEEDY, Appellant
V.
BRUCE FREDERICK AND CYNTHIA TILLEY, Appellees
On Appeal from the 458th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 20-DCV-277933
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Jason David Sheedy, an inmate in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, appeals from the trial court’s order granting appellees Bruce
Frederick and Cynthia Tilley’s amended motion to dismiss Sheedy’s claims against
them under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.1 In five
issues, Sheedy contends that the trial court erred in (1) failing to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law, (2) dismissing his suit for mandamus relief, (3)
dismissing his common law conversion claim, (4) dismissing his suit under Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14, and (5) construing his conversion
claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). We affirm.
Background
Sheedy is an inmate in the Jester III Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ). Tilley and Frederick were the Warden and Assistant Warden of the
Jester III Unit, respectively, during the relevant time period.
On October 23, 2020, Sheedy sued Frederick and Tilley alleging that they
acquired possession of his personal craft shop property, exercised dominion and
control over his property by closing the Jester III Unit’s craft shop, and refused to
return the property to him. Sheedy amended his petition to assert claims for
conversion and retaliation. In his first amended petition, Sheedy alleged that
appellees wrongfully converted his personal property and retaliated against him for
1
Sheedy sued other unnamed defendants who are not parties to this appeal.
2
availing himself of the grievance process. Sheedy sought actual and exemplary
damages and injunctive relief.2
Frederick moved to dismiss Sheedy’s claims against him under Chapter 14 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code on procedural and substantive grounds.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 14.001–.014 (Inmate Litigation). Tilley and
Frederick later filed an amended motion to dismiss. They argued that Sheedy failed
to comply with Chapter 14’s procedural requirements by (1) filing a false declaration
of inability to pay, (2) omitting relevant actions related to his previous filings from
his affidavit, and (3) failing to properly grieve his claims. They argued that Sheedy’s
claims also failed on substantive grounds because (1) appellees could not provide
the injunctive relief Sheedy sought, (2) Sheedy’s retaliation and conversion claims
had no arguable basis in law, (3) an adequate post-deprivation remedy existed for
his conversion claim, (4) appellees lacked personal involvement regarding his
retaliation claim, and (5) appellees were protected from Sheedy’s suit by sovereign,
official, and qualified immunity.
Sheedy filed a second amended petition changing his claim against appellees
from conversion to theft/appropriation of property. He alleged that (1) his craft shop
2
On June 14, 2021, Sheedy filed a letter with the trial court notifying the court that
he would seek “an issue of mandamus” because the trial court had not taken any
action on his suit to date.
3
property was inventoried in 2016 after the Jester III Unit craft shop closed; (2) Tilley,
as the duty warden, arranged for Sheedy’s craft shop property totaling fourteen
boxes to be picked up in October 2019, but it was never picked up and remained
under appellees’ management and control; (3) in response to Sheedy’s grievance
about his property in 2020, Frederick responded that the craft shop property
belonging to inmates and the TDCJ was being inventoried, and Sheedy’s property
would be returned to him once the inventory was complete; and (4) when Sheedy
went to retrieve his property in October 2020, another corrections officer showed
him only four boxes. As in his first petition, Sheedy alleged that appellees exercised
dominion and control over his personal craft shop property, without permission,
amounting to appropriation/theft for which he sustained injury.
The trial court conducted a hearing on appellees’ amended motion to dismiss.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally announced that it would grant
appellees’ motion to dismiss Sheedy’s claims against them. The trial court issued a
written order granting appellees’ motion and dismissing Sheedy’s claims as
frivolous on September 27, 2023.3
3
Sheedy filed his notice of appeal on October 4, 2022, which was prior to the date
the trial court signed its written order of dismissal. Sheedy’s notice of appeal was
therefore prematurely filed. However, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1(a)
provides that “[i]n a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and
deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting
the appeal.” TEX. R APP. P. 27.1(a). Sheedy’s notice of appeal is therefore deemed
4
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14 applies when, as here, an
inmate files suit in a district court and files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of
inability to pay costs. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.002(a). Under this
chapter, a trial court may dismiss an inmate’s lawsuit for failing to comply with the
chapter’s procedural requirements, and it may also dismiss a lawsuit that is malicious
or frivolous. Id. § 14.003(a); Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
“In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court may
consider whether: (1) the claim’s realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2)
the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact;4 (3) it is clear that the party cannot
prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a
previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative
facts.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.003(b). A claim lacks an arguable basis
in law if the claim is based on a meritless legal theory, or if the inmate failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., No. 01-
to have been filed on September 27, 2023, after the trial court entered its order of
dismissal.
4
If no fact hearing is held, we are limited to reviewing whether the claim had an
arguable basis in law. Camacho v. Rosales, 511 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2014, no pet.).
5
17-00565-CV, 2018 WL 5289140, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25,
2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court may rely on Chapter 14, specifically section
14.003(b)(1), to dismiss an inmate’s claim if the petition alleges facts showing that
sovereign immunity would, in all likelihood, bar the inmate’s claim. Lopez v. Serna,
414 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citing TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.003). A dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if the trial
court has determined an inmate’s claim has no arguable basis in law. Hosea v.
Alamanza, 659 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (citing
Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.
denied)).
In conducting our review, we take as true the allegations in the inmate’s
petition and review the types of relief and causes of action set out therein to
determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would
authorize relief. See Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266; Harrison v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.,
Inst. Div., 164 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no
pet.). We ordinarily review a trial court’s decision to dismiss a claim on the grounds
of frivolousness for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.–
Inst. Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
But when dismissal is based on there being no arguable basis in law for the asserted
claim, we review that determination de novo. Harrell v. Brinson, No. 01-18-00031-
6
CV, 2019 WL 1284926, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2019, pet.
denied) (mem. op.); Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266. When a trial court dismisses an
inmate’s claims without specifying on which ground its judgment rests, we may
affirm under any applicable legal theory. Harrell, 2019 WL 1284926, at *2;
Camacho v. Rosales, 511 S.W.3d 82, 85–86 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
Discussion
Sheedy raises five issues on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred in
(1) failing or refusing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) dismissing
his suit for mandamus relief, (3) dismissing his common law conversion claim, (4)
dismissing his claims under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14,
and (5) construing his conversion claim as a claim under the TTCA.
A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, Sheedy contends that, upon his
request, the trial court was required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
He argues that the trial court erred by failing or refusing to file findings and
conclusions.
7
Rule 296 provides that in any non-jury case tried in a district or county court,
a party may request that the trial court issue written findings of fact and conclusions
of law provided that the request is filed within twenty days after the judgment is
signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. Rule 297 provides that the court must issue its
findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days after a timely request is
filed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 297.
However, the trial court has no duty to file findings of fact or conclusions of
law where there has been no trial or evidentiary hearing. Skinner v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Just. Corr. Inst. Div., No. 12-12-00091-CV, 2013 WL 543452, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Feb. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Addicks v. Quarterman, No. 12-09-
00098-CV, 2011 WL 597148, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Kaminetzky v. Park Nat’l Bank of Hous., No. 01-03-01079-CV, 2005 WL
267665, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 3, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Where no trial has occurred, the trial court is under no duty to file findings of fact
and conclusions of law”); Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.). This rule has been applied to indigent pro se
inmate suits under Chapter 14. See Skinner, 2013 WL 543452, at *3; Addicks, 2011
WL 597148, at *4; Teague v. Livingston, No. 01-10-00075-CV, 2010 WL 4056853,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(recognizing “there is no ‘duty on [a] trial court to file findings of fact or conclusions
8
of law where there has been no trial.’”). Here, the trial court dismissed Sheedy’s suit
without a trial and without holding an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the court was
not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Teague, 2010 WL
4056853, at *2. The trial court did not err in denying Sheedy’s request for findings
of fact and conclusions of law. We overrule Sheedy’s first issue.
B. Dismissal of Mandamus Petition
In his second issue, Sheedy contends that the trial court erred in dismissing
his suit for mandamus relief.
At the conclusion of the hearing on appellees’ amended motion to dismiss, the
trial court stated, “I’m going to grant the State’s motion here, and this thing is going
to have to be refiled as some sort of mandamus.” Earlier in the hearing, the trial court
stated:
Well, I’m going to grant the defendant’s motion because it appears to
me if there is a claim, it’s got to be—you’re going to have to mandamus
the warden to make a decision first, and then appeal that through the
grievance process.
....
I mean, what you’re describing here is clear a mandamus proceeding
where you’re going to have to refile this thing and get the warden to
actually make a decision so you can then appeal.
Sheedy argues that “the trial court was never confronted with a mandamus
request, nor did appellees argue for mandamus relief. . . . Instead, it appears the trial
court declined to exercise a power of discretion vested to it by law when the
9
circumstances required that the power to be exercised, that is, ruling on the elements
of appellant’s case.” Although not entirely clear, we understand Sheedy to complain
that the trial court granted appellees’ motion and dismissed his claims only because
the court concluded that a mandamus proceeding was the proper vehicle, and that it
did not dismiss his claims on a proper basis, i.e., because it found that he had failed
to comply with Chapter 14’s requirements or that his lawsuit was malicious or
frivolous.
Sheedy’s argument is unavailing. That the trial court suggested a mandamus
action as an avenue Sheedy might pursue does not mean that it did not dismiss his
claims after it concluded that he had failed to comply with Chapter 14’s procedural
requirements or that his suit was frivolous. Appellees argued both grounds for
dismissal in their motion and at the hearing. In its September 27, 2023 order, the trial
court stated that “after considering the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it
ordered Sheedy’s claims DISMISSED WITH PREJDUICE AS FRIVOLOUS for
failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”
Because the trial court dismissed Sheedy’s claims as provided by Chapter 14, we
overrule his second issue. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.003.
C. Dismissal of Sheedy’s Claim
In his third through fifth issues, Sheedy contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing his common law conversion claim, dismissing his claims under Texas
10
Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 14, and construing his conversion claim
as a claim under the TTCA. We address these related issues together.5
We initially note that although Sheedy’s first amended petition asserted a
conversion claim against appellees, Sheedy filed a second amended petition—the
live pleading—changing his claim to one for appropriation/theft of property against
appellees.6 At the hearing on appellees’ amended motion to dismiss, Sheedy argued
that appellees were liable for their incompetence in allowing plaintiff’s craft shop
property to be stolen or appropriated. We note that the same allegations underlie
both claims—appellees wrongfully exercised dominion and control over his
personal property resulting in injury to him—and Sheedy frames his issue on appeal
as a challenge to the trial court’s dismissal of his conversion claim. Nonetheless, we
analyze Sheedy’s claim as pleaded, i.e., one for theft/appropriation of property.
5
Sheedy does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing his retaliation
claim against appellees and has therefore waived any error as to that issue. See
Hagberg v. City of Pasadena, 224 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, no pet.) (stating failure to raise issue on appeal waives error on issue) (citing
Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 2001)); see also San Jacinto
River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209–10 (Tex. 1990) (noting “well-established
rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of
appeals are waived”).
6
The record reflects, and appellees acknowledge in their brief, that the trial court
considered Sheedy’s second amended petition at the hearing on appellees’ amended
motion to dismiss.
11
A plaintiff may sue a government employee in his or her individual capacity,
official capacity, or both. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 n.7 (Tex.
2009). A suit against a government employee in his individual capacity seeks to
impose personal liability on the individual. Aguilar v. Frias, 366 S.W.3d 271, 273
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied); City of San Angelo Fire Dep’t v. Hudson,
179 S.W.3d 695, 703 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). Conversely, an official
capacity suit is essentially a suit against the governmental agency for which the
person works rather than a suit against the individual. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v.
Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 844 (Tex. 2007). If an employee is sued in his official
capacity, that employee may raise any defense that would be available to his
employer, including the defense of sovereign immunity. See id. at 843; Newman v.
Bryan, No. 06-13-00063-CV, 2013 WL 5576369, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct.
9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
1. Individual Capacity
Sheedy asserted a claim for theft/appropriation of property against appellees
in their individual capacities, seeking to hold them personally liable for the loss of
his property. Appellees argue, as they did in their motion to dismiss, that Sheedy’s
claim against them in their individual capacities is foreclosed by Section 101.106 of
the TTCA.
12
Section 101.106(f) of the TTCA provides that when a suit is filed against a
governmental employee that is based upon conduct within the general scope of the
employee’s employment and the same suit could have been brought against the
governmental unit, the suit is held to be against the employee in his official capacity
only. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(f). In other words, a suit is
completely foreclosed against a government employee when sued in his individual
capacity if he is acting within the scope of his employment. See Franka v. Velasquez,
332 S.W.3d 367, 381 (Tex. 2011). In Franka, the Texas Supreme Court held that a
case is considered against an employee within his official capacity if: (1) the
defendant was an employee of a governmental unit; (2) the defendant was acting
within the general scope of his employment; and (3) the suit could have been brought
under the Tort Claims Act against the agency. See id. at 370.
As to the first Franka prong, Sheedy alleged in his pleadings that Tilley was
Warden and Frederick was Assistant Warden at the Jester III Unit. It is also clear
from the record that both appellees were employees of a governmental unit. See
Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 894; Anderson v. Bessman, 365 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
As to the second Franka prong, the TTCA defines scope of employment as
“the performance for a governmental unit of the duties of an employee’s office or
employment and includes being in or about the performance of a task lawfully
13
assigned to an employee by a competent authority.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.001(5). Scope of employment “extends to job duties to which the official has
been assigned, even if the official errs in completing the task.” Lopez, 414 S.W.3d
at 894. “The Restatement (Third) of Agency provides additional clarity by defining
the term negatively: ‘[a]n employee’s act is not within the scope of employment
when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the
employee to serve any purpose of the employer.’” Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d
789, 792 (Tex. 2014) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (2006)).
In his petition, Sheedy alleged that appellees were the only personnel
authorized to approve a person to pick up Sheedy’s craft shop property, and that
Tilley, as duty warden, approved pick-up of Sheedy’s property. He further alleged
that appellees informed him the craft shop property belonging to inmates and the
TDCJ was being inventoried following closure of the craft shop, and that his
property would be returned to him once the inventory was complete. Authorizing
the pick-up of an inmate’s property and taking inventory of property in the prison’s
custody to determine ownership of the property do not describe acts within an
independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose
of the employer. See Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 894 (concluding record showed
corrections officers were acting within scope of their employment where inmate
admitted officer oversaw offender property confiscation and officer left form with
14
appellant citing reasons for confiscating his property). Thus, Sheedy’s suit is based
on conduct that is within the scope of appellees’ employment.
The third Franka prong is also satisfied because a suit against a state employee
that alleges wrongful conduct in the scope of employment could have been brought
against the state agency. See Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 895. Because Sheedy’s theft
claim is based on actions taken by appellees in the scope of their employment, it
could have been brought against the TDCJ. See Demar v. Garcia, No. 13-19-00182-
CV, 2020 WL 3396602, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 18, 2020,
no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, Section 101.106(f) applies, and Sheedy’s theft claim
against appellees is in their official, not individual, capacities. Id.
2. Official Capacity
Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, protect the
State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages.
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). The
State of Texas, its agencies, and officers are immune from suit unless the State,
through its legislature, consents to being sued. Texas Nat’l Res. Conservation
Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853–54 (Tex. 2002); Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ.,
951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). Because a suit against government employees in
their official capacities is, in all respects, a suit against the governmental entity,
employees sued in their official capacities are shielded by sovereign immunity or
15
governmental immunity. See Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 382–83 (“[A]n employee sued
in his official capacity has the same governmental immunity, derivatively, as his
government employer.”).
All common law torts, including intentional torts, that are asserted against a
governmental unit are assumed to be under the TTCA. See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at
658–59. While the TTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain tort claims brought
against governmental units, this limited waiver of immunity does not apply to
intentional torts. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, 101.057; City of
Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2014); see also Lopez, 414 S.W.3d
at 895 (noting sovereign immunity bars intentional tort suits against state employees
while acting in their official capacities). Sheedy sued appellees for the intentional
tort of theft. See Gonzalez v. Myles, No. 01-20-00664-CV, 2022 WL 2163023, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 16, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting inmate’s
theft and conversion claims against prison officials, if brought against TDCJ, would
be barred by sovereign immunity because TTCA does not waive immunity for
intentional torts); Minix v. Charlton, No. 13-17-00082-CV, 2018 WL 1027755, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(noting TTCA does not waive governmental immunity for intentional torts such as
theft). Because the TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional torts, Sheedy’s
pleadings do not demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim against
16
appellees in their official capacities.7 See Zambrano v. Malone, No. 13-17-00022-
CV, 2018 WL 549198, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 25, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding TTCA’s limited waiver of immunity did not apply
to inmate’s intentional tort claims of theft and conversion brought against
corrections officer in her official capacity); see also Hosea v. Dominguez, 668
S.W.3d 704, 709–10 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied) (“Sovereign immunity,
however, bars intentional tort suits against state employees while acting in their
official capacities.”).
In summary, appellees were acting within the scope of their employment,
meaning that any suit against them in their individual capacities is barred. See
Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381. Under section 101.106(f), because the appellees were
sued in their official capacities, the proper defendant for the case is TDCJ, but
Sheedy’s theft claim against TDCJ would be barred by sovereign immunity. See
Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 896. Thus, Sheedy’s claim against appellees lacks an arguable
basis in law and the trial court did not err in dismissing his claim with prejudice. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.003(b). We overrule Sheedy’s third through fifth
issues.
7
We note that the same analysis we apply to Sheedy’s theft claim would apply
equally to his previous conversion claim. See Agnew v. Gonzales, No. 11-19-00249-
CV, 2021 WL 3414549, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 5, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (noting that same analysis court applied to conversion claim would apply
to theft claim).
17
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order.
Amparo Monique Guerra
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.
18