In the Interest of M.J.M., a Child v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Opinion filed June 13, 2024
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-23-00162-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF M.J.M., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 106th District Court
Dawson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21-05-20774
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) filed suit against Appellant,
J.J.M.G., to establish Appellant’s support obligations for M.J.M. and to recover an
arrearage judgment. Appellant and his trial counsel failed to appear at the final
hearing, and after hearing evidence, the trial court issued a default order in which it
ruled against Appellant and ordered that he pay current and retroactive child
support and current and retroactive medical and dental support. Appellant filed a
timely motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 329b(c).
In two issues, Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred when it denied
his motion for new trial because his motion addressed and satisfied each element of
the Craddock1 test, and (2) the trial court erred when it rendered an arrearage
judgment against him. Our resolution of Appellant’s first issue, to which the OAG
concedes, is dispositive of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
I. Factual Background
Appellant and M.J.M.’s mother were divorced in 2014. The parties final
divorce decree recites that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over M.J.M.;
therefore, no orders regarding conservatorship and support obligations for M.J.M.
were entered.
On May 10, 2021, the OAG filed suit to establish Appellant’s support
obligations for M.J.M.; the OAG also sought a retroactive-support-obligation
finding and an arrearage judgment against Appellant. A final hearing to address the
merits of the OAG’s claims was set for October 12, 2022. Neither Appellant nor his
trial counsel appeared at the final hearing. After hearing evidence, the trial court
found, inter alia, that Appellant was in default, and it signed an order granting the
relief that the OAG requested. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial to set
aside the default order. His motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law
and this appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006) (citing Dir., State Emps.
Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994)); Strackbein v.
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See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
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Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984). In determining whether a trial court abused
its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any
guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide whether the trial court
acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex.
2004).
It is axiomatic that a default judgment should be set aside, and a new trial
granted, if (1) the defendant’s failure to answer was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference but, rather, was due to an accident or mistake; (2) the
defendant sets up a meritorious defense to the plaintiff’s asserted claims; and (3) the
motion is filed at such time that granting a new trial would not result in delay or
otherwise injure the plaintiff. See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. When a defaulting
party who moves for a new trial meets each element of the Craddock test, a trial
court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v.
Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009) (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 873
S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1994)). Further, when as in this case, a trial court grants a
post-answer default judgment due to the movant’s failure to appear for trial or a final
hearing, the same Craddock test applies. See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865(Tex. 1989).
III. Analysis
When the first prong of the Craddock test is established by proof that the
defaulted party was not provided notice of a trial or final hearing setting, it is a
violation of due process if the trial court further requires that the second and third
Craddock prongs be established before it grants a new trial. Mathis v. Lockwood,
166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005); see Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex.
1988) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988)). Thus, because
Appellant claims that he did not receive notice of the October 12, 2022 final hearing
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setting, his satisfaction of the first Craddock prong, without more, would necessarily
require that we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this cause to the trial court
for a new trial. But here, Appellant asserts that he has satisfied each prong of the
Craddock test. Despite this, we need not determine whether due process has been
violated because as Appellant asserts, and the OAG concedes, Appellant has “met
[each of] the required Craddock elements.”
Therefore, we conclude, and the OAG agrees, that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to grant Appellant’s motion for new trial. Accordingly,
we sustain Appellant’s first issue. Because our holding on this issue is dispositive of
this appeal, we need not address Appellant’s second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We reverse the order of the trial court and remand this cause to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
June 13, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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