Steven Williams, as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Courtney Williams v. Anne Tanner ( 2023 )


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  • Affirmed in part; Reversed and Rendered in part; and Opinion Filed
    December 8, 2023
    In the
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-23-00080-CV
    STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
    ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant
    V.
    ANNE TANNER, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Collin County Probate
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-2020
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
    Opinion by Justice Carlyle
    Steven Williams sued Anne Tanner for allegedly breaching a Rule 11
    settlement agreement. After a jury found in his favor, the trial court signed a final
    judgment awarding Williams his damages but granting Tanner’s motion for
    judgment notwithstanding the verdict concerning attorney’s fees. Williams asks us
    to reinstate the jury’s attorney’s fees award. We affirm in part and reverse and render
    in part in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    Williams sued Tanner to enforce a settlement agreement and alleged several
    causes of action, including breach of contract. Counsel represented Williams and
    Tanner appeared pro se. During trial, Williams’s counsel presented evidence
    concerning his attorney’s fees and Tanner neither objected, conducted any cross-
    examination, nor presented any controverting evidence. The proposed jury charge
    focused on Tanner’s alleged breach of contract and contained questions concerning
    Williams’s attorney’s fees; again, Tanner did not object.
    The jury found Tanner committed a material breach of the underlying Rule 11
    settlement agreement and awarded $6,338.39 in damages, $37,811 in attorney’s fees,
    $30,000 in appellate attorney’s fees, and another $45,000 for representation at the
    Supreme Court of Texas through oral argument and the completion of proceedings.
    Tanner then acquired counsel, filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
    verdict, and argued Williams should take nothing based on (1) an ambiguity in the
    Rule 11 agreement, (2) the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because a person
    necessary for the just adjudication of the dispute was not involved, and (3)
    Williams’s failure to segregate his attorney’s fees.
    The trial court granted Tanner’s motion only with respect to Williams’s
    attorney’s fees because the evidence “was insufficient to support a judgment” and
    Williams failed to segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Williams
    timely appealed and, in three issues, argues the trial court erred because (1) Tanner
    waived her objections and Williams sufficiently segregated his fees, (2) some
    –2–
    evidence supports the jury’s fee award, and (3) the trial court granted relief Tanner
    did not request.
    In his first issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s
    motion because Tanner waived her arguments concerning attorney’s fees. The
    record shows Tanner failed to object to Williams’s evidence concerning attorney’s
    fees in a timely manner and failed to object to the jury charge; instead, her first
    complaint about his fees appeared in her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
    verdict. Tanner’s untimely complaint is therefore waived. See Green Int’l, Inc. v.
    Solis, 
    951 S.W.2d 384
    , 389–90 (Tex. 1997); In re A.M.W., 
    313 S.W.3d 887
    , 893
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Ogden v. Ryals, No. 14-10-01052-CV, 
    2012 WL 3016856
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
    notwithstanding the verdict based on a failure to segregate attorney’s fees.
    In his second issue, Williams argues the evidence sufficiently supports the
    jury’s verdict as to fees. Though the segregation complaint is waivable, evidence
    must still sufficiently support the jury’s verdict, and a trial court can properly
    disregard a jury’s answer if it does not. See Green Int’l Inc., 951 S.W.2d at 389–90
    (citing Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 
    876 S.W.2d 154
    , 157 (Tex. 1994)). A
    trial court may disregard a jury finding only if it is unsupported by evidence or if the
    issue is immaterial. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157. Our review of the trial court’s ruling
    employs the well-settled legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard. Del Bosque v.
    –3–
    Barbosa, No. 05-22-00230-CV, 
    2023 WL 1097556
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.
    30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    “Generally, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding and a
    JNOV must be granted when the record demonstrates: (1) the complete absence of
    evidence on a vital fact; (2) a rule of law or evidence precluded according weight to
    the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a
    vital fact amounted to no more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively
    established the opposite of a vital fact.” 
    Id.
     The record lacks evidence conclusively
    establishing that Williams was not entitled to attorney’s fees and neither the trial
    court nor the parties have identified any rule of law or evidence that precluded
    according weight to Williams’s evidence.
    Instead, the record reveals that Williams’s attorney testified as to the specific
    legal services he performed on his client’s behalf, the general reasons he needed to
    perform those services, when he performed those services, the amount of time it took
    him to perform those services, his hourly rates through the years he performed
    relevant services, the reasonableness of the amount of time it took him to complete
    those services, and the reasonableness of his hourly rate as it increased over the
    years. Counsel specifically prefaced each explanation of fees by limiting it to those
    fees caused by Tanner’s breach. The evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s
    verdict. See Kinsel v. Lindsey, 
    526 S.W.3d 411
    , 427 (Tex. 2017); Rohrmoos Venture
    v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 
    578 S.W.3d 469
    , 498 (Tex. 2019). This evidence is
    –4–
    also more than a scintilla concerning vital facts. Del Bosque, 
    2023 WL 1097556
    , at
    *2. As a result, the trial court erred when it granted Tanner’s motion for judgment
    notwithstanding the verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence supporting
    Williams’s attorney’s fees.
    Finally, Tanner attempts to raise cross-points challenging the remaining
    portions of the jury’s verdict but has not filed a notice of appeal. In the absence of a
    notice of appeal, we cannot grant her more favorable relief than the trial court
    granted except for just cause. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); City of Austin v.
    Whittington, 
    384 S.W.3d 766
    , 789 (Tex. 2012); Dean v. Lafeyette Place (Section
    One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 
    999 S.W.2d 814
    , 817–18 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Tanner has not addressed, nor do we find just cause in the
    record to grant greater relief than the trial court granted. Thus, the absence of a notice
    of appeal waives Tanner’s cross-points. See id.; Lubbock Cnty., Texas v. Trammel’s
    Lubbock Bail Bonds, 
    80 S.W.3d 580
    , 584 (Tex. 2002); Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist.
    v. GE Capital Corp., 
    58 S.W.3d 290
    , 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
    Accordingly, without reaching Williams’s third issue, see TEX. R. APP. P.
    47.1, we reverse the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to
    Williams’s attorney’s fees, render judgment including Williams’s attorney’s fees,
    and affirm the remaining portions of the judgment.
    /Cory L. Carlyle/
    CORY L. CARLYLE
    JUSTICE
    230080f.p05
    –5–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS                            On Appeal from the Collin County
    INDEPENDENT                                    Probate, Collin County, Texas
    ADMINISTRATOR OF THE                           Trial Court Cause No. PB1-1601-
    ESTATE OF COURTNEY                             2020.
    WILLIAMS, DECEASED, Appellant                  Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
    Justices Goldstein and Breedlove
    No. 05-23-00080-CV           V.                participating.
    ANNE TANNER, Appellee
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
    court is REVERSED in part and judgment is RENDERED reinstating the jury’s
    award of Williams’s attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment
    is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellant STEVEN WILLIAMS, AS INDEPENDENT
    ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF COURTNEY WILLIAMS,
    DECEASED recover his costs of this appeal from appellee ANNE TANNER.
    Judgment entered this 8th day of December, 2023.
    –6–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-23-00080-CV

Filed Date: 12/8/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2023