Demetrius Dewayne Thompson v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 7, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00879-CR
DEMETRIUS DEWAYNE THOMPSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F19-75626
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
Appellant Demetrius Dewayne Thompson was convicted of capital murder
after a bench trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appeals,
complaining that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
I. BACKGROUND
On Saturday, May 27, 2018, Dominique Torres-Williams was sitting in a car
on her street when she heard glass shatter and saw flames shooting out of the duplex
located at 4934 Berridge Lane. The fire department was called at 12:08 a.m. on
Sunday, May 28, 2018, and Torres-Williams called 911 at 12:12 a.m. At trial she
testified that she did not know the owner of the house and did not see anyone exiting
the house. Dallas Fire and Rescue was dispatched to the house and discovered the
body of the resident, Eric Moore, inside. Moore’s neighbor, Jose Nava, testified that
he lived in the same duplex building as Moore sharing an interior wall, and that on
the night of Moore’s death, he heard a “loud commotion” from Moore’s house at
approximately 11:00 p.m.
Although the body was badly burned, the medical examiner, Dr. Stephen
Lenfest, determined that the cause of death was homicide after finding two gunshot
wounds which traveled through Moore’s neck and into his spinal cord. Lenfest also
noted that because no soot was found in Moore’s airway, Moore could not have been
breathing at the time the house caught fire. Arson investigators located a shell casing
in the room where Moore’s body was found as well as an additional shell casing
approximately 15 to 20 feet away. Investigators could not determine the cause of
the fire, but they could not rule out the possibility of arson. Investigators determined
that the room the body was found in was the fire’s point of origin.
Moore’s neighbor, Kitzia Garza, had a camera mounted on her front door
which faced the alleyway behind the houses; surveillance footage from the camera
provided investigators with key information regarding Moore’s movement prior to
the fire. Jeffrey Loeb, a Dallas Police Department homicide detective, found that
the surveillance footage showed that Moore’s vehicle, a silver Chevy Impala,
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traveled northbound on Berridge Lane towards his home at 8:28 p.m., and that the
door to Moore’s home was unlocked at 8:33 p.m. Video also showed Moore’s car
traveling along Berridge Lane at 10:05 p.m., 11:53 p.m., 12:01 a.m., 12:03 a.m., and
finally at 12:07 a.m. Moore’s vehicle disappeared after the fire started and was never
recovered, and the theft of Moore’s car turned the murder investigation into a capital
murder investigation.
Moore’s phone records showed that on the night he died, his last call was
made at 11:12 p.m. to a number belonging to appellant. Appellant’s phone pinged
a tower near Moore’s home around 11:13 p.m. that night. Appellant’s cell records
also showed that just hours after Moore’s death, appellant had traveled from
Arlington to Dallas, then arrived in Louisiana at 4:33 a.m. on May 28, 2018.
Appellant did not own a car at that time.
Approximately a year after Moore’s death, police located appellant in
Louisiana, and he voluntarily agreed to an interview. At that time, appellant stated
that he barely knew Moore and had sold him marijuana on occasion. He told police
Moore was a gay man who had made sexual advances which appellant had rebuffed
and that Moore had a jealous boyfriend. Loeb learned during the course of his
investigation that Moore was attracted to straight men and would attempt to get them
to engage in homosexual activity with him. Appellant met with Moore on May 27,
2018 at a McDonald’s to sell him marijuana but was unable to tell police which
McDonald’s location. He told police that Moore had dropped him back off at
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McDonald’s and that he had called a ride, but appellant’s phone records did not
reflect such a call was ever made. Appellant then told police he used Moore’s phone,
but that phone also did not have record of any such call.
When asked where he was living at the time of the murder, appellant stated
that he “can’t really remember,” but that he was staying in Arlington with his
girlfriend, Keisha. When asked, appellant could not give police Keisha’s last name
or any details regarding her appearance, which left Loeb with the impression that
appellant was withholding information. Appellant initially told police he had never
been to Moore’s home but later told police that he had “been near it,” and then
eventually he admitted that he had been inside Moore’s home once, on the day of
the murder. He told police that he had seen Moore’s boyfriend come down the stairs
that night while he was at Moore’s house. Appellant also told police that he arrived
in Louisiana in June of 2018 but could not provide police with any details about how
he arrived there. Appellant had lived in Dallas for nine years before the night of the
murder.
Appellant also told police that he had never driven Moore’s vehicle but later
in the same interview told police that he could not be sure but that he would not be
shocked if another person had seen him driving the vehicle. Once appellant was
arrested, police conducted a second interview with him. Appellant told police at that
time that a girl gave him a ride from Dallas to Louisiana, but he could not remember
her name. According to appellant, he and Moore drank and smoked marijuana the
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night of the murder, but the toxicology report showed no alcohol or drugs in Moore’s
system. Loeb testified that appellant “went back and forth a few times” with his
version of events.
Appellant was tried before the court on August 30, 2022. The charge of
capital murder was presented to the court. The court found appellant guilty of capital
murder as charged in the indictment. Appellant moved for a new trial on September
2, 2022, which was denied by operation of law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
45.038(b). This appeal followed. In one issue, appellant complains that the evidence
was legally insufficient to support the verdict.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a criminal
conviction, we apply well-established standards. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 316 (1979). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and determine whether a rational factfinder could have found all the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313; Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In a bench trial, the trial judge, as the fact
finder, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony. Joseph v. State, 897 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When
there is conflicting evidence, we presume the fact-finder resolved those conflicts in
favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution so long as it is supported by the
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evidence. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
We also defer to the trier of fact’s determinations of witness credibility and
the weight to be given their testimony. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks, 323
S.W.3d at 899. Our role as an intermediate appellate court is restricted to guarding
against the “rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.” Isassi v.
State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Laster v. State, 275
S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
III. DISCUSSION
A person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of an individual and he commits the murder in the course
of committing or attempting to commit a robbery or arson. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2). A person commits theft “if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” Id. § 31.03(a).
A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and with the intent
to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Id. § 29.02(a). The phrase “in the course
of committing” has the same meaning under both the robbery and capital murder
statutes: conduct occurring in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in
immediate flight after the attempt or commission of, the underlying offense. Id.
§ 29.01(1); Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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A person commits arson if “he starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire
continues after ignition, or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage any
building or habitation, while “knowing that it is within the limits of an incorporated
city or town,” or “knowing that it is located on property belonging to another,” or
“when the person is reckless about whether the burning or explosion will endanger
the life of some individual or the safety of the property of another.” Id.§ 28.02(a)(2)(A), (D)-(F).
“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). “A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. at § 6.03(b). “A person acts recklessly,
or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Id. at
§ 6.03(c).
In his brief, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the verdict because, in summation, there was no direct evidence of appellant’s guilt.
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However, circumstantial evidence alone can support a judgment, so long as the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
The evidence shows that appellant was with Moore shortly before Moore’s
death, that appellant was near Moore’s duplex around 11:00 p.m., the time when
Moore’s neighbor heard a loud disturbance and shortly before Moore’s death, and
that appellant left the Dallas area, where he had been living for nine years, shortly
after Moore died and went to Louisiana, where he remained until his arrest. The
evidence also showed that Moore’s car disappeared at approximately the same time
appellant left for Louisiana, appellant did not own a car, and he could not provide
details on how he traveled to Louisiana. Unexplained flight from a crime scene has
long been deemed indicative of consciousness of guilt. Santos v. State, 961 S.W.2d
304, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (citing Cawley v. State,
310 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957)). The trial court could have rationally
concluded that appellant fled Dallas because he murdered Moore and was conscious
of his guilt of murder, arson, and robbery. See id.Loeb also testified to the multiple inconsistencies and gaps in appellant’s story
during his two police interviews. The finder of fact may infer the requisite intent
from a defendant’s motive, his attempts to conceal evidence, his implausible
explanations to the police, and the extent of the victim’s injuries. Nisbett v. State,
552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). This remains true even when the
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element of appropriation takes place after the murder. Russo v. State, 228 S.W.3d
779, 793 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Zimmerman v. State, 860
S.W.2d 89, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)) (holding that the State presented sufficient
evidence that the murder occurred in the course of committing robbery because the
evidence showed that money and jewelry were taken from the victim’s home
immediately after the victim was attacked). The judge, rather than appellant, is the
determiner of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony, and the court was
entitled to believe the testimony of Detective Loeb over the conflicting and
contradictory testimony of appellant. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Based on the evidence in the record, any rational trier of
fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018). We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
IV. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
The State argues in its sole cross-point that the judgment should be modified
to reflect that the trial court sentenced appellant to life without parole.
Appellate courts may modify a trial court's judgment and affirm it as modified.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993). This Court “has the power to correct and reform the judgment of the court
below to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and
information to do so.” Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas
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1991, writ ref’d). Appellate courts may reform trial court judgments where “the
evidence necessary to correct the judgment appears in the record.” Id. Here, the
judgment reflects the trial court sentenced appellant only to life in prison. In a capital
murder where the State does not seek the death penalty, the only two punishments
possible are life or life without parole; life is required when the defendant was
younger than eighteen years of age when he committed the offense, and life without
parole is required when the defendant was eighteen years of age or older when he
committed the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(1)-(2). The record
reflects appellant was thirty-four years of age at the time he committed the offense.
Therefore, the judgment should be modified to reflect appellant’s sentence as life
without parole.
V. CONCLUSION
We modify the judgment to reflect that appellant was sentenced to life without
parole and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
/Maricela Breedlove/
220879f.u05 MARICELA BREEDLOVE
Do Not Publish JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
DEMETRIUS DEWAYNE On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
THOMPSON, Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F19-75626.
No. 05-22-00879-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Breedlove. Justices Carlyle and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Goldstein participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
Remove "Life" and insert "Life without Parole"
As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 7th day of December, 2023.
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