In Re Jennifer Aislinn Grant v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Petition for Writ of Mandamus Conditionally Granted and Memorandum
Opinion filed June 11, 2024.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-23-00408-CV
IN RE JENNIFER AISLINN GRANT, Relator
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
245th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2016-22196 & 2016-22196B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 12, 2023, relator Jennifer Aislinn Grant (“relator” or “Jennifer”)
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this Court to
compel the Honorable Angela M. Lancelin, presiding judge of the 245th District
Court of Harris County, to: (1) vacate the March 31, 2023 default temporary
orders in suit to modify parent-children [sic] relationship; (2) strike the
intervention suit filed by real parties in interest seeking to modify the parent-child
relationship; (3) rule on relator’s pending motions; and (4) assess all amicus
attorney’s fees and costs against the real parties in interest. As set forth below, we
conditionally grant mandamus relief.
BACKGROUND
After eleven years of marriage, on March 9, 2018, relator divorced Robert
Steven Sobel (“Sobel” or “father”). The final decree of divorce appointed relator
and father as joint managing conservators with no other parties to those orders that
pertain to the parent-child relationship of relator’s two children–a daughter (“Child
1) and a son (“Child 2”). Father was awarded the exclusive right to designate the
primary residence of the children. Relator was awarded possession and access
pursuant to a modified standard possession order.
On January 5, 2023, father died after several months of a deteriorating
illness. After father’s passing, relator moved into their former marital residence
with the children. On January 11, 2023, after receiving information concerning the
health and safety of her daughter, relator sought to have her daughter admitted to
an in-patient treatment facility. The facility, however, lacked bed availability that
night. Relator contends that due to her concern for the safety of her younger son,
relator allowed father’s law firm’s paralegal, real party in interest Misty Dawn
Runyon (“Misty”), and the paralegal’s husband, real party in interest Kristopher
Damon Runyon (collectively “RPIs”), who are not related to the children, to take
relator’s daughter to their house to await an available bed for admission.
2
January 24, 2023 Petition to Modify Suit Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship
Unbeknownst to relator, approximately three weeks later, on January 24,
2023, RPIs filed a “Petition to Modify Suit Affecting the Parent-Child
Relationship,” seeking custody of relator’s daughter. In the petition, under
“parties,” RPI pleaded as follows:
Intervenors are a husband and wife, the wife having being selected by
the children’s deceased father as an individual to functions [sic] as
guardian over his child of the child the subject of this suit.
Intervenors have standing to intervene in this proceeding as more fully
detailed below
Under “Jurisdiction,” RPIs pleaded that “[t]his Court has acquired and retains
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over this suit and of the child the subject of this
suit as a result of prior proceedings.” Under the heading “Protective Order
Statement,” RPIs pleaded that there was no protective order in effect and that the
“order to be modified is based on an agreement.”1 RPIs asserted that “[t]he
circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order to be
modified have materially and substantially changed since the date of the signing of
the agreement on which the order to be modified is based.” RPIs maintained that
“[t]he conservator who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence
of the child is deceased and the other parent voluntarily relinquished the primary
care and possession of the child to another person . . ..”
In support of their petition, Misty filed an unsworn declaration, wherein she
explained the circumstances on January 11, 2023, when she took possession of
1
RPIs presumably are referencing the final divorce decree between father and relator.
3
relator’s daughter. Additionally, in the unsworn declaration, Misty alleged the
following:
After the divorce Jennifer did not exercise her normal visitation with
the kids. [Child 1] has seen Jennifer maybe once a year in the last 2
years before Robert got hospitalized. When he was hospitalized, I had
to be the one to make sure [Child 1] was okay because she was at his
bedside and didn’t want to have anything to do with Jennifer. CPS
was called by Jennifer and closed the case after they talked to [Child
1] and Robert.
There is a will that was left by Robert stating that I am listed as
second to take care of the children if he passes. I am hoping the court
will take that into consideration.
Misty further alleged that [Child 1] requires daily medicine which Misty alleged
that she is providing and that [Child 1] had head lice which has been taken care of.
Moreover, Misty alleged that relator was actively using drugs in excess of those for
which she has a valid prescription and had a “strained, combative relationship with
[Child 1], and “rarely exercised her possession and access of [Child 1] while her
father was alive.” “It’s my understanding that Jennifer exercised possession and
access of [Child 1] a couple of times a year over the last few years.” Misty opined
that it would not be in the best interest of [Child 1] to go back to relator and that
“possession and access and conservatorship rights beyond those provided in the
current order of the court . . . would significantly impair the child’s physical health
or emotional development.2
2
In her unsworn declaration, Misty alleged that relator’s son [Child 2] “stays with his maternal
grandmother a lot and has a great relationship with her.” According to Misty, [Child 1] does not have that
support because she does not get along with her maternal grandmother.”
4
February 1, 2023, Joint and Mutual Restraining Order and Order Setting
Hearing for Temporary Orders
On February 1, 2023, the trial court signed a “Joint and Mutual Restraining
Order and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Orders.” The order provides that
“[t]he Court examined the pleadings of [RPIs] and finds that [RPIs] is [sic] entitled
a joint and mutual temporary restraining order.” Relator’s daughter, [Child 1], was
to be taken into the possession of RPIs. Relator was “excluded from possession of
or access to [her daughter] beyond her periods of possession already granted by the
Court.” Additionally, relator was restrained from admitting her daughter, [Child
1], into an in-patient treatment facility. The trial court set a hearing for March 7,
2023.
On or about February 5, 2023, relator was seriously injured as a passenger
while riding on an ATV with her son. Relator was placed into a medically induced
coma.3 According to relator, while she was in the hospital, relator’s mother and
stepfather allowed relator’s son, [Child 2], to go to the RPIs’ house to be with his
older sister, [Child 1].
February 10, 2023 First Amended Petition to Modify Suit Affecting the Parent-
Children Relationship
On February 10, 2023, RPIs filed a “First Amended Petition to Modify Suit
Affecting the Parent-Children Relationship,” seeking as to both children an
appointment as non-parent sole managing conservators and alternatively,
appointment as non-parent joint managing conservators having the exclusive right
to designate the primary residence of relator’s children, and for orders allowing the
3
It is not clear from the mandamus record when she was released from the hospital.
5
RPIs to have possession of and access to relator’s children. In their amended
petition, RPIs pleaded that they were “selected by the children’s deceased father as
an individual to functions [sic] as guardian over his children of the children of this
suit.” RPIs alleged that they “have standing to intervene in this proceeding as
more fully detailed below.” RPIs pleaded the same statement under “jurisdiction,”
i.e., that the trial court retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this suit and
the children based on prior proceedings. The amended petition further alleged
under the heading “circumstances of modification” that relator “voluntarily
relinquished the primary care and possession of the children to another
person . . ..” RPI pleaded that it is in the best of the children to appoint RPIs joint
managing conservators of the children with the right to designate the children’s
primary residence. RPIs claimed that “appointment of a parents [sic] as joint
managing conservators would not be in the best interest of the children because the
appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional
development.”
Additionally, in support of the first amended petition, Misty filed “an
amended unsworn declaration in support of extraordinary relief and temporary
emergency jurisdiction.” In the amended unsworn declaration, the same facts were
alleged as to relator’s daughter, [Child 1]. With respect to relator’s son, [Child 2]
Misty alleged that relator was taken “off the ventilator as of February 7, 2023, but
remains in ICU under sedation to continue her recovery from the accident. I am
asking for [Child 2] to be place [sic] in my husband and I’s possession until she is
able to take care of him.” Misty declared that he had been with her since the
6
accident happened and did not want to go to his maternal grandmother’s home.
Misty opined that it was in [Child 2's] best interest for the children to stay together.
February 14, 2023, First Amended and Mutual Temporary Restraining Order
and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Orders
On February 14, 2023, the trial court signed a “First Amended and Mutual
Temporary Restraining Order and Order Setting Hearing for Temporary Orders.”
The hearing was set for March 7, 2023. According to relator, these documents
were filed without relator’s knowledge or consent.
On or about February 12, 2023, the children’s maternal grandparents called
RPIs to discuss the return of their grandson, [Child 2].4 Misty allegedly told
grandparents that their grandson “asked if he could stay [with RPIs] until his mom
is better and I told him yes. And that’s what’s gonna happen. Okay? Technically,
I have a shit ton of rights. I am in the will to step into Sobel’s place for the
children. So technically I can.”
The mandamus records contains two affidavits of service declaring that
relator was served on February 28, 2023 with the first amended petition to modify
suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the temporary restraining order, the first
amended joint and mutual temporary restraining orders and order setting hearing
for temporary orders, and exhibits.5 On March 1, 2023, relator sent RPIs’ attorney
4
The mandamus record contains a transcript of an alleged “nonstenographic digital recording or
a telephone conversation” between grandparents and RPIs on February 12, 2023.
5
On July 30, 2023, the process server filed a “Declaration Regarding a Typographical Error in
Affidavit of Service,” asserting that she received the referenced documents on February 26, not February
2 as set forth in her affidavit of service.
7
an email asserting that the process server failed to serve her with several
documents and relator requested a copy of every pleading filed to date.
March 7, 2023 Hearing
On March 7, 2023, the trial court held a “prove up default hearing.” RPIs
appeared in person at the hearing. Relator was not present at the hearing. The trial
court accepted into evidence two affidavits of service and made the following
findings in the record.
THE COURT: Okay. So the Court is going to find that the affidavits
of service indicate that Jennifer Grant was served with the First
Amended Petition to Modify the Suit affecting the Parent-Child
relationship on Tuesday, February 28th, 2023, and also served with
TRO along with the request for joint mutual restraining orders and an
order setting hearing for today's date. She was also served with that on
February 28, 2023. The Court is going to accept these exhibits and
move forward by default.
Misty testified at the hearing.
Q. And what is your relationship, generally, with the children in this
case, [Child 1] and [Child 2]
A. Family friend.
Q. Okay. Have you – prior to the present, have you previously cared
for the children?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And approximately when was that?
A. From 2014 until 2021.
Q. Okay. And how did you care for the children in that time period?
8
A. I was an employee of the children’s father, who is current – who is
deceased. I took care of the kids, took them to school, did basic stuff
after the divorce case was done between the two parties.
Q. And are you currently in possession of the children?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. When did you – what circumstances led to you taking
possession of Child 1.
A. Her mother tried to commit her to a mental hospital . . . on January
11th. I met them over there at 5:00 o’clock when I got off of work,
and they couldn’t find a bed for her, and so they released her into
Jennifer’s custody, which is Mom, and they told us that if Jennifer
was going to let [Child 1] go with us, that we had to do the exchange
in the parking lot. So we did. I left with [Child 1] on that night, and
she’s been with me ever since.
Q. An under what circumstances did you come into possession of
[Child 2]
A. [Child 2] and Jennifer were on four-wheelers and got into a four-
wheeler accident. Neither one were wearing helmets. [Child 2] was
driving, and he hit a log and Jennifer flew up and face-planted a tree
and she ended up in ICU.
The trial court also admitted three exhibits into evidence, including: photographs
of father’s home; two affidavits of service; and father’s last will and testament
dated August 29, 2019.6 RPIs requested sole managing conservatorship of
6
Father’s will contained a “guardian nomination” that provided as follows:
I nominate my sister, Randee Sobel, to be the guardian of the person and estate of each
minor child or mine.
If at any time during the minority of any child of mine, my first nominee guardian is for
any reason unable or unwilling to serve or to continue to serve as guardian of the person
and estate of each minor child, I nominate my friend, Misty Runyon, to be the guardian
of the person and estate of each minor child of mine.
9
relator’s children or, in the alternative, to be designated as joint managing
conservators with the right to designate the primary residence.
March 7, 2023 “Bandaid Visitation Order”
The trial court signed a “Bandaid Visitation Order,” granting temporary
custody of the two children to RPIs and giving relator “possession and access of
the children as mutually agreed or in the absence of mutual agreement though the
Harris County Domestic Relations Office.” The trial court also entered an Order
for Mediation by the Domestic Relations Office on March 7, 2023.
More than a week later, relator received by mail to her home the Bandaid
Visitation Order together with a document entitled, “Notice of Attorney Michael
Krocker’s [opposing counsel] Email Address” and “Order for Mediation by the
Domestic Relations Office.” Additionally, relator received a notice of submission
for entry of temporary orders for March 31, 2023.
March 31, 2023 Default Temporary Orders in Suit to Modify Parent-Child
Relationship
On March 31, 2023, the trial court signed “Default Temporary Orders in Suit
to Modify Parent-Children [sic] Relationship.” Under the heading of
“Jurisdiction” the trial court found the following:
The Court, after examining the record, and hearing the evidence and
argument of counsel, finds that all necessary prerequisites of the law
have been legally satisfied and that this Court has jurisdiction of this
case and of all the parties.
This Default Order appointed RPIs Temporary Sole Managing Conservators and
relator Temporary Possessory Conservator of the children. RPIs approved and
consented to this Order as to both form and substance.
10
On April 7, 2023, relator claims that she received a postcard from the office
of the Harris County District Clerk advising her that an order granting temporary
injunction was signed on March 31, 2023. 7 Thereafter, relator filed a plethora of
motions and documents seeking a dismissal of RPIs’ suit. On April 11, 2023,
relator filed a special appearance, plea to the jurisdiction, request to decline
jurisdiction, original answer with affirmative defenses, request for referral for
prosecution for perjurious acts, and motion for sanctions for frivolous filing.
Relator included an affidavit in support and numerous exhibits. Relator
affirmatively pleaded that the RPIs “wholly lacked standing to even bring their suit
to modify, let alone obtain a temporary order affecting [relator’s] parental rights.”
Relator also filed an emergency motion for dissolution of the default temporary
orders, arguing among other points, that RPIs lacked the statutorily required
standing and that relator had not voluntarily relinquished primary care and
possession of her children to RPIs. Relator attached to her emergency motion an
affidavit in support and numerous exhibits. On April 30, 2023, relator filed an
emergency motion to disqualify opposing counsel and his law firm. Moreover, on
May 4, 2023, relator filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to Return
Children and Request for Writ of Attachment.”
May 12, 2023 Hearing
On May 12, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on relator’s motion to
dissolve the temporary restraining order. Relator’s counsel conceded that relator
was served with a temporary restraining order and with the notice of hearing but
7
According to relator, it was not until April 21, 2023, that opposing counsel provided the default
temporary orders to relator.
11
not the motion itself. Additionally, relator’s counsel argued that relator is the sole
surviving parent of the children and RPIs have no standing. She further
maintained that the TRO should be dissolved because it was not in the best interest
of the children, claiming that the older child had missed cumulative over 102 days
of school since September 2022. The trial court interjected that it had not been 102
days since RPIs got the TRO. Relator’s counsel replied “No, I know but they’ve
had the children before then, Your Honor.” In response, the trial court stated, “No,
I don’t know that but that’s not – if they did, then they’ve had – they would have
sufficient standing but thank you for clarifying that for me.” Thereafter, RPIs’
counsel asserted that there was not a motion to serve on relator; rather, there was a
first amended petition and a first amended temporary restraining order. RPIs’
counsel stated that the process server was present at the hearing and prepared to
testify to verify service on relator. RPIs’ counsel further opined that “I believe the
Court found that the – Runyons have standing and the Court granted the temporary
order in this case.”
THE COURT: . . . the Court is going to find that as to improper
service, that is not the appropriate means to challenge service. If you,
in fact, believe that service was defective, dissolving – the answer to
that is not to dissolve the TRO.
Based on your testimony, Counsel, and with regard to the
children were there prior for more than – or have been with them prior
to the filing of this and for quite some time based on the testimony I
previously heard, I would stand firm on the fact that I found that they
had – they have proper standing to come in and file this – action.
12
After sorting though additional matters in the case, 8 the trial court suggested
the following:
THE COURT: Okay. So my question, although it may sound odd, it
would appear to me that the appropriate thing with regard to what is
before me in all of these writings is that perhaps you all should –
someone, not you, but file a motion to modify temporary orders so
you can get back in here. I can’t really – there’s nothing before the
Court that gives me the authority on the basis of any of the pleadings
filed to undo, set aside, dissolve or do anything with that temporary
order.
The trial court contended that “if that was the complaint, then the Court can’t move
forward unless there’s a different request made.” Based on the filings and the
multitude of documents, the trial court advised the parties that she believed that
appointing an ad litem for the children was going to be appropriate.
May 12, 2023 Joint and Mutual Temporary Injunctions
On May 12, 2023, the trial court entered “Joint and Mutual Temporary
Injunctions” that enjoined certain behavior of the respective parties. The attorneys
on behalf of both sides, agreed to the order as to form only.
After the hearing, relator filed several additional motions, including a
“Verified Emergency Briefed Motion to Find Prima Facie [RPIs’] Failure to Serve
8
It appears that relator filed numerous motions, including but not limited to: a special
appearance, pleas to the jurisdiction, request to decline jurisdiction, answer with affirmative defenses,
request for referral for prosecution for perjurious acts, and a motion for sanctions. RPIs filed a motion to
strike pleading due to the multitude of evidentiary facts contained in the documents. RPIs requested that
relator be ordered to replead her emergency motion to dissolve temporary orders, brief in support, and
motion for sanctions. Relator also filed a countermotion to strike. During the May 12, 2023 hearing,
relator’s counsel agreed to replead everything.
13
[relator] with Process and Emergency Motion to Declare Void: Default Temporary
Orders in Suit to Modify Parent-Children Relationship (Entered March 31, 2023).”
This petition for writ of mandamus followed. 9 Subsequently, relator filed
amended petitions, with relator’s third amended petition for writ of mandamus
identifying fifteen issues. After receiving several extensions, RPIs filed a response
and a second amended response to relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Thereafter, relator filed a reply in support of her petition and an eighth amended
appendix.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To obtain mandamus relief, a relator generally must show both that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion, and that the relator has no adequate remedy by
appeal. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding). Trial
courts have no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the
facts. In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 875–76 (Tex. 2021) (orig.
proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (failure by
the trial court to apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion). Where
the relator challenges the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enter a
temporary order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, a remedy by
appeal is inadequate. See Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. 1991); see
also In re Ostrofsky, 112 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
orig. proceeding) (temporary orders are interlocutory with no statutory appeal).
9
In her 8th amended appendix to her petition for writ of mandamus, relator has included
numerous pleadings filed in the underlying court after filing her petition for writ of mandamus.
14
Therefore, temporary orders are subject to mandamus review. Dancy v. Daggett,
815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
ANALYSIS
A. STANDING
Standing is an issue that focuses on whether a party who has filed an action
is a proper party to raise the legal issue presented for adjudication. Tex. Ass’n of
Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993); see also Waco
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000). Standing is an
implicit component of subject matter jurisdiction and is essential to a court’s power
to decide a case. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443; see also M.D.
Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). Because the requirement is
a component of subject matter jurisdiction, standing to file suit is not conferred or
obtained by waiver, and can be challenged at any time. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852
S.W.2d at 443-445.
Whether a party has standing to maintain a suit is a question of law, which
we review de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d
637, 646 (Tex. 2004). The pleader must allege facts that, taken as true,
affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. See Tex. Ass’n
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Besides the pleadings, we may also consider relevant
evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.
See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555.
15
B. REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST FAILED TO PROVE STANDING
In her petition, relator asserts, among other issues, that RPIs lacked standing
to file an original suit requesting appointment as a sole managing conservators.
Thus, relator argues that the trial court’s default temporary orders signed March
31, 2023, are void and should be vacated.
In their second amended response to the petition for writ of mandamus, RPIs
assert that relator has not requested a ruling (either by hearing or submission) to
issues raised by relator in her petition, including issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, and 16. RPIs further maintain that “[t]he trial court considered sufficient
evidence to satisfy the requirements of Texas Family Code Sections 156.002(b),
102.003(a)(9), and 102.003(b).” RPIs claim that Misty “has been involved in the
children’s lives for at least 7 years.” RPIs further argue that:
Relator did not appear at the hearing and therefore did not make
objections or present testimony in support of her case. That would
have been the opportunity to properly do so. Real Parties in Interest
had actual and personal knowledge of the issues with the children
subject of this suit as one child had already been in their possession
since January 11, 2023 and the second child in their possession since
February 5, 2023.
As a threshold matter, the interest of parents in the “care, custody, and
control” of their children is a fundamental liberty interest of constitutional
dimensions. See In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009,
orig. proceeding) (citations omitted). Section 102.003(a)(9) of the Family Code,
the provision RPIs rely upon, provides that “a person, other than a foster parent,
who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months
ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition” may
16
file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 102.003(a)(9). This section requires that the RPIs have “actual care, control, and
possession of the child[ren].” See id. “Control” has been interpreted as referring
to the power or authority to guide and manage and includes the authority to make
decisions of legal significance for the children. See In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788,
793 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding) (citing cases).
Here, RPIs pleadings do not demonstrate RPIs’ standing to intervene and
modify the suit affecting the parent-child relationship as they did not allege the
statutory requirements of “care, custody, and control.” It is undisputed that RPIs
did not have possession of the daughter and son until January 11 and February 5,
2023, respectively. Misty’s original and amended unsworn declarations make no
reference to possession of the children until after father died. Nevertheless, on the
face of their pleadings, the trial court considered RPIs petitions and signed
temporary restraining orders on February 1 and 10, 2023, before relator was served
with select pleadings on February 28, 2023.
Additionally, neither the testimony nor exhibits admitted into evidence at the
hearing on March 7, 2023, supported RPIs standing. Misty testified that her
relationship to the children was as a “family friend,” and that Misty had previously
“cared” for the children from 2014 to 2021. During that time-period, while an
employee of father, Misty testified that she “took care of the kids, took them to
school, did basic stuff after the divorce.” There was no testimony that she ever had
possession or control of the children prior to January 11 and February 5, 2023, or
even “cared” for the children in any context after 2021. Similarly, the exhibits
admitted into evidence on March 7, 2023, do not provide RPIs standing. Pictures
17
of father’s house in disarray, 10 two return of service affidavits of select documents
on relator, and father’s 2019 11 will are insufficient to establish RPIs standing. The
fact that relator did not appear at the hearing and make objections to RPIs evidence
and testimony does not relieve RPIs of their burden to establish standing. See
generally Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
In sum, RPIs did not plead or prove standing under section 102.003(9) to file
the underlying action. See Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(9); In re M.J.G., 248
S.W.3d 753, 757-58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). By incorrectly
applying the law on standing, the trial court abused its discretion.
Further, relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Haz Mat
Special Servs., No. 14-23-00320-CV, 2023 WL 7401412, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 9, 2023, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting
mandamus relief when party asserting claim was determined to lack standing).
CONCLUSION
Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion and relator does
not have an adequate remedy by appeal, we conditionally grant relator’s petition
for writ of mandamus, as explained above, and direct the trial court to vacate the
March 31, 2023 default temporary orders. We are confident the trial court will act
10
Misty testified that the house smelled of cat urine, that cat feces were in [Child 1’s] room, and
that everything was pulled out of cabinets and all over the floor. There is no testimony as to whether the
house had been maintained prior to father’s death and there is no testimony as to whether living
conditions in the house deteriorated with father’s health.
11
Although Misty “hoped” the trial court would take into consideration father’s will, RPIs
provide no authority for the proposition that father’s will provides standing to RPIs in the underlying suit.
18
in accordance with this opinion and a writ will issue only if the trial court fails to
do so.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Hassan, and Wilson.
19