Timothy Eugene Tew v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00203-CR
___________________________
TIMOTHY EUGENE TEW, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 485th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1687675
Before Kerr, Birdwell, Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Timothy Eugene Tew agreed to a charge bargain in which he pleaded
guilty to the offense of second-degree assault under Section 22.01(b–3) of the Texas
Penal Code and true to the repeat-offender notice in exchange for the State’s waiving
six other counts. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b–3). The enhancement raised
the punishment range to that of a first-degree felony—imprisonment for life or any
term of years of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years and a fine not to exceed
$10,000. See id. §§ 12.32, 12.42(b). Tew also agreed to have the trial court assess
punishment. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Tew to ten years in prison.
Tew filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court granted him permission to
appeal. See Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that
charge bargains that cap a defendant’s maximum punishment fall within
Rule 25.2(a)(2)’s prohibition); see also Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B) (providing an
exception to the prohibition of appeals following a plea bargain).
Tew’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a
brief in support of that motion. He concludes that, in his professional opinion, the
appeal is frivolous.
Counsel’s motion and brief meet the requirements of Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967), by professionally evaluating the
appellate record and showing why no arguable grounds for relief exist. See Stafford v.
State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Tew filed a pro se
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response to counsel’s Anders brief. The State filed a letter response in which it agreed
with Tew’s counsel that his appeal presented no meritorious grounds to advance.
After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion and brief fulfilling
the Anders requirements, we must independently examine the record for any arguable
ground that may be raised on the appellant’s behalf. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.
Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, Tew’s response, and the appellate
record. We agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit;
we find nothing in the appellate record that arguably might support the appeal. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State,
206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See McCuin v. State, No. 02-
23-00075-CR, 2024 WL 853314, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 29, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: June 13, 2024
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