Arnulfo Estrada v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Indenture Trustee, Successor in Interest to Wachovia Bank, National Association, as Indenture Trustee for Bayview Financial Revolving Asset Trust 2005-E ( 2023 )

Opinion filed December 14, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-22-00240-CV
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ARNULFO ESTRADA, Appellant
V.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS INDENTURE
TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO WACHOVIA BANK,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS INDENTURE TRUSTEE FOR
BAYVIEW FINANCIAL REVOLVING ASSET TRUST 2005-E,
Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CCL-22838
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a forcible detainer action initiated by Appellee, U.S. Bank National
Association, in which it sought possession of the subject property. The justice court
awarded possession of the property to U.S. Bank and, in the de novo trial on appeal
from the justice court’s decision, the county court at law also awarded possession
to U.S Bank. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (West 2023); TEX. R.
CIV. P. 510.9, 510.10(c).
Here, acting pro se, Appellant, Arnulfo Estrada, presents two issues on appeal:
the trial court erred when it granted possession of the property to U.S. Bank because
(1) U.S. Bank failed to provide notice of default and notice of sale to the borrower,
and (2) the “underlying issue (wrongful foreclosure) was wrought with issues,” such
as a defect in the foreclosure sale proceeding, a pending modification review, and
U.S. Bank’s alleged failure to provide notice of sale. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Estrada executed a note to purchase the subject property with the original
lender in 2007 and, on the same date, executed a deed of trust that contained a power
of sale provision. The terms of the deed of trust also provided that, if the property
is sold under the deed of trust, (1) the grantor (identified as Estrada) “shall
immediately surrender possession to the purchaser” and (2) failure to do so would
render the grantor (Estrada) a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser, subject to an
action for forcible detainer.
U.S. Bank purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale in 2022. U.S.
Bank thereafter immediately sought possession of the property and sent a notice of
eviction to Estrada, who refused to vacate the premises or surrender possession to
U.S. Bank. Estrada filed an action for wrongful foreclosure in district court, which
is still pending. U.S. Bank initiated the underlying forcible detainer action which is
the basis of this appeal. See PROP. § 24.007.
The justice court awarded possession of the property to U.S. Bank, and
Estrada appealed the decision to the county court at law. The county court at law
set the matter for a hearing but, pursuant to Estrada’s requests, twice continued the
setting. When the hearing did proceed, Estrada asserted that he was not prepared to
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address the forcible detainer action because he had filed suit in district court for the
wrongful foreclosure of the property, and that suit was still pending. The county
court at law refused to continue or stay the hearing and noted that the hearing had
been continued twice at Estrada’s request and that Estrada had not mentioned his
pending wrongful foreclosure suit in his previous motions for continuance.
At the hearing, the county court at law admitted U.S. Bank’s proffered
affidavit of business records, the attachments to which included U.S. Bank’s notice
to vacate that was sent to the address of the subject property, where Estrada lives, as
well as an affidavit of the posting and filing of the notice of sale of the subject
property. Estrada testified that the subject property had been sold, although he
contended that the sale was improper because he had initiated an application for loan
modification. He also testified that he had filed suit in district court for wrongful
foreclosure and that the forcible detainer action should be stayed until the wrongful
foreclosure action was disposed of. At the conclusion of the hearing, the county
court at law denied Estrada’s oral request for a stay and ruled that U.S. Bank had a
superior, immediate right to the possession of the subject property.
II. Analysis
“A forcible-detainer action determines which party has the superior right to
immediate possession of real property.” Tellez v. Rodriguez, 612 S.W.3d 707, 709
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d
705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)). Forcible detainer actions are intended
to be a summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy to resolve the question of
entitlement to the immediate possession of the property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of
City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). The only issue litigated in a
forcible detainer action is the superior right to actual and immediate possession of
the property; title to the property is not litigated. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e) (“The
court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title. Counterclaims . . .
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are not permitted in eviction cases. A claim that is not asserted because of this rule
can be brought in a separate suit in a court of proper jurisdiction.”); Tellez, 612
S.W.3d at 709.
The mere existence of a title dispute does not necessarily deprive the justice
court or county court at law of jurisdiction over the action to determine possession
of the property. Id. (citing Gardocki v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 14-12-00921-
CV, 2013 WL 6568765, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2013, no
pet.) (mem. op.)). Instead, the title dispute must be “so integrally linked to the issue
of possession that possession may not be determined without first determining title.”
Id. at 709–10 (quoting Falcon v. Ensignia, 976 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi—Edinburg 1998, no pet.)). “If the right to immediate possession can
be adjudicated on a basis other than title, then the justice court (and on appeal, the
county court) retains jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action.” Id. at 710.
A tenant at sufferance commits a forcible detainer when he refuses to
surrender possession of real property on written demand by the person who is
entitled to possession of that property. PROP. § 24.002(a)(2). A plaintiff in a forcible
detainer suit can establish the superior right to immediate possession of property by
establishing that a foreclosure occurred pursuant to a deed of trust that created a
tenancy at sufferance after the foreclosure. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710 (citing
Scott v. Hewitt, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1936)); Onyedebelu v. Wilmington Sav.
Fund Soc’y, FSB as Tr. of Residential Credit Opportunities Tr. V-C, No. 02-20-
00239-CV, 2021 WL 4319705, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 23, 2021, pet.
denied) (mem. op.). It is not necessary for the trial court to determine whether the
foreclosure was valid before awarding possession to the plaintiff. See Elwell v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 267 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2008).
To establish a forcible detainer, U.S. Bank was required to prove that: (1) it
owned the property, (2) Estrada became a tenant at sufferance when U.S. Bank
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purchased the property under the deed of trust, (3) U.S. Bank gave proper notice to
Estrada to vacate the property, and (4) Estrada refused to do so. Id. at 568–69;
Onyedebelu, 2021 WL 439705, at *3.
Importantly, we note that Estrada’s issues on appeal relate to title to the
property, rather than to which party holds the superior right to immediate
possession.1 In cases in which the validity of a deed of trust is challenged, as in this
case, the legislature contemplated that concurrent actions could exist in the district
and justice courts to resolve issues of title and immediate possession, respectively.
Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710–11. Here, the foreclosure pursuant to the deed of trust
established a landlord and tenant-at-sufferance relationship between U.S. Bank and
Estrada; this relationship provides an independent basis on which the county court
at law could determine the issue of immediate possession without resolving the issue
of title to the property. Id. at 712. Therefore, in this case, the parties’ dispute as to
title is not “so integrally linked to the issue of possession that possession may not be
determined without first determining title.” Tellez, 612 S.W.3d at 709–10 (holding
that such circumstances must exist for a parallel title dispute to deprive the justice
or county court of jurisdiction); Gardocki, 2013 WL 6568765, at *3 (quoting Falcon,
976 S.W.2d at 338).
Based on these facts and the issues that Estrada has presented on appeal, we
conclude that the issue of title to the subject property is not so integrally linked to
the issue of immediate possession such that possession may not be determined
without first determining title; therefore, Estrada’s issues present nothing for our
review. Accordingly, we overrule Estrada’s issues on appeal.
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Estrada has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment,
that is, the sufficiency of the evidence as to whether U.S. Bank has established the elements of forcible
detainer. Nor has Estrada challenged the justice or county court at law’s subject matter jurisdiction. See
Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708.
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III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
December 14, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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