City of Pharr, Texas v. Heriberto De Leon ( 2023 )

NUMBER 13-23-00033-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CITY OF PHARR, TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
HERIBERTO DE LEON, Appellee.
On appeal from the 93rd District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva
Appellant City of Pharr, Texas (City) appeals the trial court’s denial of its plea to
the jurisdiction as to appellee Heriberto De Leon’s claims of wrongful termination against
it. The City argues that its sovereign immunity was not waived for each of De Leon’s three
grounds for wrongful termination: (1) retaliation under the Texas Whistleblower Act (the
Act), see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(a); (2) discrimination on the basis of disability,
see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051(a); and (3) retaliation for engaging in a protected
activity recognized under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), see id.
§ 21.055. We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.
I. BACKGROUND
A. De Leon’s Claims
De Leon’s live pleading alleges that he was employed by the City for almost twenty
years until he was terminated on or about May 9, 2018. 1 De Leon’s petition alleged that
he was terminated for three unlawful reasons: (1) the City retaliated against him for
making a report to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) regarding a
wastewater spill; (2) the City discriminated against him for his disabilities, namely
hypertension, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder; and (3) the City retaliated
against him for filing a complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) by
denying his appeal regarding termination of his employment. De Leon’s disability
discrimination claim also includes a claim for failure to accommodate.
According to De Leon, during his employment with the City, “a major wastewater
spill occurred at the [City’s] wastewater treatment plant on or about February 11, 2018,
and a sanitary sewer overflow occurred at the [City’s] Lift Station on or about August 2017
(together, the ‘[o]ccurrences’).” Although the City reported the occurrences to the TCEQ,
De Leon believed the reports were insufficient and “informed the [City] of the possible
1 De Leon’s third amended petition was the live pleading at the time the City filed its plea to the
jurisdiction and combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. On December 13,
2022, De Leon filed a fourth amended petition, which was substantially similar to the third amended petition.
After the trial court denied the City’s plea, De Leon filed a fifth amended petition.
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and/or actual misrepresentations in the report to the [TCEQ] so that they could be
corrected.” However, De Leon alleged the City failed to correct its reports, so he notified
the TCEQ of the possible misrepresentations. De Leon states that he was terminated
after he made the reports to the TCEQ.
As to his discrimination claim, De Leon alleged that he “was diagnosed with
hypertension and depressive and anxiety disorders,” necessitating his leave under the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) beginning on or about February 1, 2018. According to
De Leon, bullying and harassing treatment from his supervisor, Jose Villescas, triggered
his depressive and anxiety disorders, as well as hypertension. De Leon was scheduled
to return to work on May 10, 2018, and, in preparation of his return, sent a letter to the
City on May 9, 2018, “requesting accommodations.” However, according to De Leon, the
City denied his accommodations and instead sent him a letter that his employment was
being terminated. De Leon thereafter filed an employment discrimination complaint, which
he alleges serves as the basis for his TCHRA retaliation claim when the City denied his
employment termination appeal on June 12, 2018.
B. The City’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary Judgment
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, or in the alternative, a combined traditional
and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, alleging that it enjoyed immunity from De
Leon’s claims, which had not been waived. The City alleged that De Leon had “not
[pleaded] nor [could he] show jurisdictional facts sufficient to waive the City’s immunity
for either a retaliation or whistleblower claim.” The City attached twenty exhibits to its plea
and combined motion for summary judgment.
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For De Leon’s Whistleblower claim, the City alleged De Leon did not make the
reports to the TCEQ in good faith because he “was not present at the time of the alleged
violations and merely passed on hearsay he heard or reported things that had already
been reported.” The City additionally claimed that De Leon’s communication with TCEQ
was a mere inquiry and could not be classified as a “report.” The City further argued that
De Leon was not able to show that his termination was based on his reports because the
City manager, Juan Guerra, was unaware of the reports and it had a nonretaliatory basis
for his termination.
The City provided a multifaceted basis in which it alleged its immunity had not been
waived for De Leon’s discrimination claim. First, the City alleged that De Leon had not
pleaded a prima facie case because his “alleged disability was exclusively caused by the
relationship with his [d]epartment supervisor Villescas,” which shows “that the ‘disability’
that kept him out of work and needed accommodation, was solely a dislike and inability
to work with his boss.” Further, the City posited that De Leon’s argument and attendant
evidence established that De Leon was not disabled.
The City alternatively alleged that De Leon “ha[d] not and cannot show that he was
otherwise qualified for the job when he was terminated because he could not perform the
essential function of his job with or without ‘accommodations.’” In support of this
argument, the City pointed to a letter from De Leon’s counselor, which, according to the
City, “indicated that it was her professional opinion that [De Leon] could not return to work
until she deemed he was ‘capable of doing so’ without a firm return date.”
Lastly, the City argued that De Leon “ha[d] not and cannot establish jurisdictional
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facts that he was qualified for the job because his requests for accommodations were
unreasonable and would not have enabled him to perform the essential functions of an
Assistant Director for the Utilities Department.” The City pointed to a letter that De Leon
provided, offering three possible accommodations for him to be able to return to work:
(1) limiting interactions between De Leon and his supervisor to email or other written
forms of communication; (2) assigning De Leon a different supervisor; and (3) providing
De Leon with additional leave for counseling without an expected return date. The City
argued that each of these requests were not reasonable or that they constituted an undue
burden on the City.
The City’s traditional motion for summary judgment incorporated the same
evidence and arguments as its plea to the jurisdiction. The City’s no-evidence plea
challenged various elements of each cause of action. For De Leon’s Whistleblower claim,
the City argued that he “ha[d] no evidence that he made a report to law enforcement
authority in good faith; that the City knew he made reports to law enforcement authority
(here TCEQ) when it terminated him; or that the City terminated him because of his
alleged reports to a law enforcement authority.” For his disability discrimination claim, the
City argued that De Leon
ha[d] no evidence that at the time of his termination he was in fact disabled;
that he was otherwise qualified for his job when his doctor would not permit
him to return to work; that he made or requested any reasonable
accommodations; or that any accommodations would not cause undue
burden and be justified by business necessity.
Lastly, for De Leon’s TCHRA retaliation claim, the City argued that De Leon “ha[d] no
evidence that he took any protected action pursuant to the Retaliation statute prior to his
termination; and has no evidence that his termination was causally related to any alleged
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protected action under the Retaliation statute.”
C. De Leon’s Response
De Leon responded to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary
judgment, including sixteen of his own exhibits.
To support his Whistleblower claim and rebut the City’s argument, De Leon cited
his deposition testimony wherein he testified that he made a report to the TCEQ and met
with the TCEQ and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). According to the
evidence presented by De Leon, he contacted the TCEQ on February 9, February 22,
and April 11, 2018, regarding potential wastewater spill reporting violations by the City.
Thus, De Leon argued that his termination on May 10, 2018, was within ninety days of
his report, which created the presumption of causation. Moreover, De Leon averred that
his belief that the City underreported wastewater spills was based on information he
received from other employees and on his training and experience working with
wastewater spills and TCEQ reporting.
For his disability claim, De Leon relied on evidence including a letter from Thelma
Ramos, a licensed professional counselor, who provided therapy to De Leon for
depression and anxiety disorder. The letter stated that De Leon “continues to struggle
with his diagnosed depression and anxiety disorder,” and it was her “expert opinion that
a return to the condition that caused the initial psychological disorders will retrigger and
would jeopardize his health and over all wellbeing.” Although Ramos recommended that
“De Leon not return to work until [she] deemed [him] capable of doing so,” she requested
that “[i]f his return to work [was] absolutely necessary,” all efforts be made to
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accommodate him. De Leon attached an unsworn declaration, averring that he was
diagnosed with and received treatment for hypertension and “generalized anxiety
disorder” by his physician, Daniel J. Guerra. The declaration stated that the “anxiety
disorder, depression, and hypertension have substantially disrupted [his] sleeping,
thinking[,] and concentrating.”
Finally, for his TCHRA retaliation claim, De Leon reiterated that he appealed his
termination by letter dated May 10, 2018, which the City denied after De Leon reported a
disability discrimination claim to the TWC. De Leon argued that the City’s decision to deny
the appeal “was discriminatory, retaliatory, and punitive.”
D. Trial Court Ruling
The trial court denied the City’s plea and joint motions for summary judgment. This
interlocutory appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(5).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a
cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law; therefore, when the determinative facts are undisputed, we review the trial court’s
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Id.A plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). “When a defendant
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challenges jurisdiction, a court ‘is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may
consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues
raised.’” Id. (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555); see Jones v. Turner, 646
S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that a plea to the jurisdiction may challenge the
pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both). This is true even when the
jurisdictional issue intertwines with the merits of the case. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 550.
A municipality may also challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction on a no-evidence basis. Id.
at 551.
When jurisdictional facts are challenged, our standard of review mirrors that of a
summary judgment. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 805 (Tex.
2018). We must take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor, and disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. at 771; Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 228. If the evidence raises a fact issue regarding jurisdiction, the plea cannot
be granted, and a factfinder must resolve the issue. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. On
the other hand, if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the plea must
be determined as a matter of law. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d
629, 635 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
A no-evidence challenge to jurisdiction applies the same standard as a no-
evidence motion for summary judgment. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 551. Under a no-
evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant may challenge the existence of facts
that would support a waiver of immunity. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)). Once the
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movant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, the nonmovant must produce
enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged element.
Id. at 552. Similar to a traditional motion for summary judgment, evidence is viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 551.
“A genuine issue of material fact exists if more than a scintilla of evidence
establishing the existence of the challenged element is produced.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). The evidence must “rise[] to a level that
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” First
United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017)
(quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).
However, a factfinder may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact from meager
circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more
probable than another. Kingsaire, Inc. v. Melendez, 477 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. 2015)
(quoting Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 70–71 (Tex. 2013)). Furthermore, evidence
does not create a fact issue if it is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise
or suspicion that the fact exists. Parker, 514 S.W.3d at 220.
III. TCHRA CLAIMS
A. Applicable Law
The TCHRA prohibits, among other things, age, disability, and national origin
discrimination and retaliation by employers. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 21.051,
21.055. Section 21.051 of the labor code states:
An employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because
of . . . disability . . . national origin, or age the employer . . . fails or refuses
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to hire an individual, discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other
manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment[.]
Id. § 21.051(1). Section 21.055 provides that an employer commits an unlawful
employment practice if the employer retaliates or discriminates against a person who,
under chapter 21 of the labor code, “(1) opposes a discriminatory practice; (2) makes or
files a charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies, assists, or participates in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Id. § 21.055. An “employer” includes “a
county, municipality, state agency, or state instrumentality, regardless of the number of
individuals employed.” Id. § 21.002(8)(D).
“Governmental units . . . are immune from suit unless the [S]tate consents.” Clark,
544 S.W.3d at 770. “The TCHRA waives immunity from suit only for statutory violations,
which means the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute absent” a
claim for conduct that is recognized under the TCHRA. Id. at 763. If a plaintiff fails to
allege a violation of the TCHRA, then the trial court does not have jurisdiction, and the
claim should be dismissed. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 637.
Because the TCHRA is modeled after federal civil rights law, we may look to
analogous federal precedent for our guidance. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d
46, 59 (Tex. 2021) (citing Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 781); Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alex,
408 S.W.3d 670, 674 n.6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2013, no pet.); see TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001. To establish unlawful discrimination under the TCHRA, a
plaintiff may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 781–
82. A case based on circumstantial evidence is referred to as a “pretext” case. See
Quantum Chem. Co. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). In a
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pretext case, the plaintiff’s goal is to show that the employer’s stated reason for the
adverse action was a pretext for discrimination. Id.“When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to establish a discrimination
claim, we follow the burden-shifting framework the United States Supreme Court
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Tex. Tech Univ.
Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Flores, 612 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2020); Clark, 544 S.W.3d
at 782. Under this framework: (1) the plaintiff must first create a presumption of illegal
discrimination by pleading a prima facie case; (2) the defendant must then rebut that
presumption by producing evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action; and (3) the plaintiff must then overcome the rebuttal evidence by
producing evidence that the defendant’s stated reason is a mere pretext. Flores, 612
S.W.3d at 305; Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 782. If a plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case
against a governmental unit or overcome the rebuttal evidence, then the trial court lacks
jurisdiction and must dismiss the case. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635; Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 225–26.
The requirements to establish a prima facie case of discrimination “vary depending
on the circumstances.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2017).
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, De Leon must show “(1) he
has a ‘disability[’;] (2) he is ‘qualified’ for the job; and (3) he suffered an adverse
employment decision because of his disability.” Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging &
Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
And, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, De Leon must show “(1) [he] engaged
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in an activity protected by the TCHRA, (2) [he] experienced a material adverse
employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
adverse action.” Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 58.
“‘Disability’ means, with respect to an individual, a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits at least one major life activity of that individual, a record of such
an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.002(6). “Major life activity” encompasses a wide number of functions, which includes,
but is not limited to:
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. The term
also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including, but not
limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, and
digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory,
endocrine, and reproductive functions.
Id. § 21.002(11-a).
De Leon can show that he was qualified for his position “in one of two ways: (1) by
proving that he can perform all essential job functions with or without modifications or
accommodations; or (2) by showing that some reasonable accommodation by the
employer would enable him to perform the job.” Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at 437.
“Under a reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he has a
‘disability;’ (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with
‘reasonable accommodations’ he could perform the ‘essential functions’ of his position;
and (4) the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Id. at 439. “Once an
employee makes such a request, however, the employer is obligated by law to engage in
an ‘interactive process’: ‘a meaningful dialogue with the employee to find the best means
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of accommodating that disability.’” E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d
606, 621 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 108 (1st
Cir. 2005)). “When an employer does not engage in a good faith interactive process, that
employer violates the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act]—including when the
employer discharges the employee instead of considering the requested
accommodations.” Id.; see Harmon v. Tex. S. Univ., 672 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (applying Chevron Phillips Chemical to TCHRA
claims).
“An employer . . . commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer
. . . retaliates or discriminates against a person who, under this chapter: (1) opposes a
discriminatory practice; (2) makes or files a charge; (3) files a complaint; or (4) testifies,
assists, or participates in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055. “To establish a violation, the employee must show that: (1) []he
engaged in an activity protected by the TCHRA, (2) an adverse employment action
occurred, and (3) there exists a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015).
B. Analysis
1. Disability Discrimination
The City challenges several components of De Leon’s discrimination claim,
arguing that De Leon: (1) failed to establish a prima facie discrimination claim; (2) did not
have a disability under the TCHRA; (3) was not qualified for his position; (4) did not
request reasonable accommodations; and (5) requested accommodations that would
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impose an undue burden on the City. 2 The City also argues that it had a valid,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating De Leon’s employment. We address each
challenge in turn.
a. Did De Leon plead a prima facie case?
In support of its argument that De Leon failed to allege a prima facie disability
discrimination claim, the City points to De Leon’s pleadings, arguing that De Leon “alleged
[that his] disability was exclusively caused by his relationship with his department
supervisor.” However, we disagree. De Leon’s live pleading alleged that he suffered from
hypertension, depression, and anxiety disorder, which affected his ability to sleep, think,
and concentrate. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6), (11). De Leon also pleaded that
he was qualified for his position and included pertinent facts to support said claim,
including his work history with the City. Finally, De Leon pleaded that he was terminated
from his position as a result of his disability. Accordingly, we conclude that De Leon did
plead a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See Donaldson, 495 S.W.3d at
436 (setting out the requirements for pleading a prima facie case of disability
discrimination). The City does not challenge De Leon’s pleadings for his reasonable
accommodation claim on appeal. See id. at 439. We overrule this subissue.
2 The City also argues that De Leon’s unsworn declaration attached to his response to the City’s
plea to the jurisdiction and joint motions for summary judgment constitute a sham affidavit and should be
disregarded. However, the City failed to obtain a ruling on its sham affidavit claim. Accordingly, that issue
has not been preserved for our review. See Hogan v. J. Higgins Trucking, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“Defects in form of an affidavit must be objected to, and the . . . failure to
obtain a ruling on an objection to a defect in form waives the objection.”); Wolfe v. Devon Energy Prod. Co.,
LP, 382 S.W.3d 434, 452–53 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied) (holding that an objection to an affidavit
as a sham “is [an] objection complaining of a defect in form” that must be preserved for appellate review);
see also Escamilla v. Cadena, No. 13-22-00041-CV, 2023 WL 3015390, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Apr. 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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b. Was De Leon “disabled?”
The City next argues that the evidence shows that De Leon’s “‘disability’ is ‘stress
and anxiety’ that is exclusively caused by the personality of, and his relationship with, his
supervisor,” which “is not a qualifying disability under the ADA or TCHRA.” In support of
its argument, the City relies on Chevron Corporation v. Redmon, which held that under
the TCHRA, a disability “must be one which is generally perceived as severely limiting
him in performing work-related functions.” 745 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1987). However,
Redmon did not review the current definition of “disability,” but instead a prior version of
the TCHRA’s use and definition of “handicap.” See id. (citing Acts of 1983, 68th Leg. 1st
C.S., p. 37, ch. 7, §§ 1.01–10.01, 10.04, 10.05 (repealed 2003) (former Commission on
Human Rights Act)). Thus, Redmon does not stand for the proposition that the City
suggests and is inapplicable to the case at hand. See id. Rather, we look to whether De
Leon had a mental or physical impairment that limited at least one major life activity, had
a record of such impairment, or was regarded as having such an impairment. See TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (defining “disability”); id. § 21.0021(a)(1) (commanding that
“‘disability’ shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals”); id. § 21.105 (“A
provision in this subchapter or Subchapter B referring to discrimination because of
disability or on the basis of disability applies only to discrimination because of or on the
basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability to
reasonably perform a job.”); see also Leatherwood v. Houston Post Co., 59 F.3d 533, 536
(5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he term ‘because of disability’ refers to discrimination because of or
on the basis of a physical or mental condition that does not impair an individual’s ability
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to reasonably perform a job.” (emphasis added)). Here, De Leon presented evidence in
the form of his own testimony and reports from his physician and counselor that he
suffered from hypertension, depression, and anxiety. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.002(6). Moreover, the same evidence demonstrates that De Leon’s conditions effect
his ability to sleep, think, and concentrate. See id. § 21.002(11-a) (defining “major life
activity” to include sleeping, thinking, and concentrating). Thus, we conclude that De Leon
presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he
was disabled. See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 771; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
The City also argues that De Leon’s sole disability was “ONLY his inability to work
directly, face to face, with his boss.” However, that is merely the only way his disability
manifested at work—as noted, a disability need not affect one’s ability to work in order to
be a disability. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6); see also id. § 21.105. In support of
its argument, the City cites to a series of federal cases that hold that an individual’s stress
and anxiety brought on by working with a coworker are not a disability under the ADA or,
by extension, the TCHRA. See Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that plaintiff’s depression caused by working with specific employees “would
merely tend to show that he was unable to perform any job at one specific location, and
is not evidence of [his] general inability to perform a broad class of jobs”); Kurth v.
Gonzales, 472 F. Supp. 2d 874, 880–81 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s evidence
that he could not work with a particular person was “insufficient to raise a genuine issue
of material fact on whether he suffers from an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity of working”); see also Adetimehin v. Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc., No. 4:14-
16
CV-334, 2015 WL 1537280, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2015) (“The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation to the major life activity of
working. . . . Even extreme stress caused by the circumstances of a particular job—while
understandably very disturbing to an employee—is not a qualifying ‘disability’ for the
purposes of the ADA.”); Mason v. Potter, No. CIV.A H-08-3198, 2010 WL 4791497, at *8
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2010) (“The gravamen of [plaintiff’s] complaint is that she was unable
to work under the supervision of one particular supervisor. Such a claim does not
substantially limit a major life activity and, therefore, is not a physical or mental impairment
as defined under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”). However, each of the cases relied
on by the City review only the “major life activity” of working, not of sleeping, thinking, or
concentrating. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6), (11). Accordingly, we find these
cases to be inapposite. We overrule this subissue.
c. Was De Leon qualified?
The City next argues that De Leon was not qualified for his position “because he
could not perform the essential functions of his job with or without ‘accommodations.’”
The City’s sole basis for this argument relies on the letter from De Leon’s counselor,
wherein she opined “that a return to the condition that caused the initial psychological
disorders will retrigger and would jeopardize his health and over all wellbeing,” and she
recommended that De Leon not return to work until she deemed him capable of doing so.
However, this ignores the remaining portion of Ramos’s letter: “If [De Leon’s] return to
work is absolutely necessary, please make all necessary efforts to accommodate [him]
so as to not worsen his current conditions.” Moreover, De Leon sent a letter that same
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day asking for accommodations to “avoid further aggravation of [his] symptoms and help
[him] continue performing [his] job duties without any issues.” Construing this evidence in
a light most favorable to De Leon, we conclude that this creates a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether De Leon was qualified for his position and able to return to
work. See Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 771; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Donaldson, 495
S.W.3d at 437. We overrule this subissue.
d. Did De Leon request reasonable accommodations?
Next, the City argues that De Leon did not and could not establish jurisdictional
facts “that he was qualified for the job[ ]as his requests for accommodations were entirely
unreasonable and would not have enabled him to perform the essential functions of” his
job. This argument overlaps with the City’s argument that he was not qualified for his
position as well as its arguments that his requested accommodations would have placed
an undue burden on the City. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.128(a), (b) (creating an
affirmative defense to a reasonable accommodation claim if the requested
accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
the respondent”).
De Leon’s May 9, 2018 letter suggested three possible accommodations: (1) that
all communications between he and his supervisor be limited to email or other written
correspondence; (2) that De Leon be appointed a different supervisor or otherwise report
to another person; or (3) De Leon be permitted to take additional sick leave to continue
counseling and treatment. 3 The City argues and presented evidence that De Leon’s
3 De Leon’s letter suggested that he had unused sick leave available to him, which the City does
18
requests were unreasonable because his position necessarily required that he be able to
communicate with his supervisor orally during emergencies and that no other person
could supervise De Leon because he was second-in-command while his supervisor was
first. Moreover, the City argued that to the extent De Leon’s request required the City to
terminate his supervisor and hire a new one, it was unreasonable. 4
The City relies on Gonzalez v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which held that the
plaintiff’s request for accommodation—to be moved to a parttime position where no such
position existed—was unreasonable as a matter of law, meaning that the employer “had
no duty to engage in the interactive process.” No. 5:15-CV-986-RCL, 2018 WL 4699274,
at *14 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018). In Gonzalez, the court noted that an employer’s
“‘dereliction cannot be said to have led to a failure to reasonably accommodate’ an
employee where ‘there is no evidence that a reasonable accommodation was feasible.’”
Id. (quoting Silva v. City of Hidalgo, 575 Fed. Appx. 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2014)). In affirming
Gonzalez, the Fifth Circuit noted that the employer did engage in the interactive process,
but concluded that “[n]o accommodations could ameliorate [Gonzalez’s] cognitive
disabilities, and his proposal to redress his physical disabilities was not a reasonable
accommodation, but the creation of a new position altogether.” Gonzalez v. United Parcel
Serv., 777 Fed. Appx. 735, 739 (5th Cir. 2019).
not dispute.
4 De Leon’s response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and attendant unsworn declaration
suggested additional possible accommodations: (1) De Leon be permitted to take short work breaks when
his anxiety and hypertension increase; (2) De Leon be excused from work for counseling sessions; (3) the
City “counsel [De Leon’s] supervisor to not bully or harass”; and (4) De Leon be permitted to employ
relaxation techniques at work.
19
We find Gonzalez and Silva distinguishable. In both cases, the plaintiff-employees
were unable to return to their positions at all. In Gonzalez, Gonzalez was unable to work
more than four hours at a time even with additional accommodations, prompting his
request for a new, parttime position to be created. Id. at 738. However, as a matter of law,
that is not a reasonable accommodation. See id. (citing Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487
F.3d 309, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that an
available position exists that he was qualified for and could, with reasonable
accommodations, perform.”)); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th
Cir. 1997) (“For the accommodation of a reassignment to be reasonable, it is clear that a
position must first exist and be vacant. Under the ADA, an employer is not required to
give what it does not have.”)). In Silva, the employee was entirely unable to return to work
at all, even after exhausting FMLA leave, and requested additional unpaid leave for up to
three months, or in the alternative, “to be placed on light duty or desk duty,” which did not
exist. Silva, 575 Fed. Appx. at 423 (“Silva could not (or simply did not) provide an estimate
of when she could resume her former job duties except to say that it would be longer than
one month in the most optimistic scenario.”); see Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc.,
87 F.3d 755, 760 (5th Cir.1996) (“Reasonable accommodation does not require an
employer to wait indefinitely for the employee’s medical conditions to be corrected.”
(cleaned up)). Although De Leon did ask for additional leave, he also requested specific
accommodations to enable him to return to his position at the end of the leave, making
this case distinguishable.
We find the language in Dillard v. City of Austin, Texas to be persuasive. See 837
20
F.3d 557, 562–63 (5th Cir. 2016). In Dillard, the Fifth Circuit held that “the interactive
process is a two-way street; it requires that employer and employee work together, in
good faith, to ascertain a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 563. “This should be an
ongoing, reciprocal process, not one that ends with ‘the first attempt at accommodation,’
but one that ‘continues when the employee asks for a different accommodation or where
the employer is aware that the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation
is needed.’” Id. at 562 (quoting Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1138
(9th Cir. 2001)). However, no reciprocal process happened here: the City ended the
process at the first attempt at accommodation without engaging in the process at all. See
id. If we were to accept the City’s position, an employee would be required to provide a
reasonable accommodation on their first request with no responsibility on the employer
to engage in a dialogue. Such a requirement would completely eliminate the efficacy of
the interactive process, rendering it meaningless. Thus, although De Leon’s first request
may have placed an undue burden on the City, by failing to engage in the process at all,
it cannot rely on the defense of undue burden. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.128(c)
(requiring an employer demonstrate “good faith efforts . . . to identify and make a
reasonable workplace accommodation that would provide the individual with an equally
effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the
business”); Chevron Phillips Chem., 570 F.3d at 621. We overrule this subissue.
e. Did the City have nondiscriminatory reasons for termination?
Finally, the City argues it had a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating De Leon:
he was unable to return to work. However, this is the same argument the City relies on
21
for its claim that De Leon was not qualified for his position. Having already resolved that
claim by noting that De Leon requested accommodations to allow him to return to work,
we overrule this subissue.
f. Conclusion
Having considered and overruled each of the City’s subissues as it relates to De
Leon’s disability discrimination claim, we overrule the City’s first issue.
2. Retaliation
The City also challenges the trial court’s ruling denying its plea to the jurisdiction
and combined traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment on De Leon’s
TCHRA retaliation claim. Specifically, the City argues that De Leon’s pleaded claim
relates solely to its decision to deny his appeal to his termination, which does not
constitute a material adverse employment action that would support a retaliation claim.
See Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Esparza, 510 S.W.3d 147, 160 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016,
no pet.) (“Denial of a post-termination internal grievance proceeding does not constitute
an ‘adverse employment action’ unless the post-termination conduct has some tangible
adverse effect on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s current or prospective
employment.” (citing Cantu v. Hidalgo County, 398 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2012, pet. denied)). De Leon responds by arguing that the City’s position
relies on “a superseded pleading” because he has since amended his petition. Thus, De
Leon claims for the first time on appeal that the protected act was requesting
accommodations and that the adverse employment action was his termination.
However, even accepting De Leon’s position that we should consider his since-
22
amended pleadings, they do not include such a claim. De Leon’s third amended petition
and response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction cited his report of discrimination to the
TWC after his termination and the City’s denial of his appeal to his termination as the
basis of his discrimination claim. So, too, does his fifth amended petition. As it relates to
his TCHRA retaliation claim, De Leon’s fifth amended petition states:
[De Leon] brings claims for disability discrimination, failure-to-
accommodate, harassment based upon disability, retaliation for engaging
in a protected activity (refusal to rehire or reinstate) and all statutory
damages allowed by law.
....
[De Leon] was retaliated against by [the City] after filing his June 4,
2018, [c]harge of [d]iscrimination, and suffered an adverse employment
decision, termination of employment in May 201, and denial of his appeal
on June 12, 2018 (refusal to rehire or reinstate).
....
[De Leon] appealed his termination of employment by May 10, 2018,
letter. On or about June 4, 2018, [De Leon] filed his [c]harge of
[d]iscrimination with TWC[], alleging disability discrimination. On or about
June 12, 2018, [the City] was provided with a copy of the [c]harge and an
invitation to participate in mediation. On that same day of receipt of the
[c]harge, [the City] denied the appeal. Such conduct in denying the appeal
(refusing to rehire or reinstate) was discriminatory, retaliatory, and punitive.
De Leon’s fifth amended petition does not mention that his TCHRA retaliation claim rests
on his requests for accommodations and the City’s subsequent decision to terminate him.
Accordingly, we address the City’s argument that his pleaded claim does not support a
waiver of immunity.
The City does not contend that De Leon’s report of disability discrimination was
not a protected activity, see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.055; rather, the City only argues
that the complained-of adverse action did not have a tangible adverse effect such as to
23
constitute a material adverse employment action. We agree. In Cantu, we considered
whether Hidalgo County’s decision to terminate Cantu’s post-termination appeal after his
complaint of discrimination constituted an adverse employment action under the TCHRA.
See Cantu, 398 S.W.3d at 829. There, we held that “to constitute an ‘adverse employment
action,’ post-termination conduct must have a ‘tangible adverse effect’ on the terms and
conditions of the plaintiff’s current or prospective employment.” Id. (quoting Waters v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 159 Fed. Appx. 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2005)). We conclude that
the City’s denial of De Leon’s appeal did not have a tangible adverse effect on the terms
and conditions of his employment because the denial did not alter his employment status
at all. See Esparza, 510 S.W.3d at 160; Cantu, 398 S.W.3d at 829. Accordingly, we
sustain the City’s second issue.
Having sustained the City’s issue, we must next consider whether we must render
a judgment dismissing the claim or remand the matter and allow De Leon an opportunity
to replead his claim. See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. 2022)
(“[S]o long as petitioners’ pleading does not affirmatively demonstrate the absence of
jurisdiction, they should be given an opportunity to amend.”). However, where a party’s
pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, the appropriate remedy is to render a judgment
dismissing the claim. See State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 885–56 (Tex. 2009).
“Generally, remand is a mechanism for parties, over whose claims the trial court may
have jurisdiction, to plead facts tending to establish that jurisdiction, not for parties, over
whose claims the trial court does not have jurisdiction, to plead new claims over which
the trial court does have jurisdiction.” Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538,
24
559 (Tex. 2016). “Once the defendant’s jurisdictional plea gives notice of the jurisdictional
defect, however, and the plaintiff responds with an amended pleading that ‘still does not
allege facts that would constitute a waiver of immunity,’ then the trial court should order
the case dismissed with prejudice.” Fraley v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 664 S.W.3d 91, 101
(Tex. 2023) (quoting Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. 2004)).
Here, the City’s plea to the jurisdiction alerted De Leon to the jurisdictional defects
in his pleadings. Although De Leon did not initially accept the opportunity to replead, he
did so after the trial court denied the plea the jurisdiction. See Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 101.
However, De Leon’s amended pleading relies on the same claim that the City challenged,
which affirmatively negates jurisdiction. See Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 397; Esparza, 510
S.W.3d at 160. Instead, for the first time on appeal, De Leon urges an entirely new theory
of liability to support his TCHRA retaliation claim. Thus, permitting him to amend would
allow him to plead a new claim over which the trial court has jurisdiction. See Marquez,
487 S.W.3d at 559. Accordingly, we must render an order dismissing De Leon’s TCHRA
retaliation claim with prejudice as his pleadings affirmatively negated the trial court’s
jurisdiction. See Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 101; Dohlen, 643 S.W.3d at 397; Marquez, 487
S.W.3d at 559.
IV. WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIM
A. Applicable Law
The Act provides that a governmental entity may not take adverse personnel action
against “a public employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the employing
governmental entity or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement
25
authority.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(a). A public employee who alleges a violation
of the Act “may sue the employing state or local governmental entity” as “[s]overeign
immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief” allowed under the
Act. Id. § 554.0035.
To establish a claim under the Act, an employee must show that he (1) reported
(2) a violation of law by the employer or another employee (3) to an appropriate law
enforcement authority, (4) that the report was made in good faith, and (5) that the adverse
action would not have occurred if the employee had not reported the illegal conduct. City
of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176, 182 (Tex. 2022). The Act waives immunity only
for viable claims. See id. Thus “the elements of [a claim under the Act] can be considered
as jurisdictional facts, when it is necessary to resolve whether a plaintiff has alleged a
violation under the Act.” Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 881.
“[T]o properly ‘report’ under the Act, a public employee must convey information
that exposes or corroborates a violation of law or otherwise provide relevant, additional
information that will help identify or investigate illegal conduct”; “[c]ommunicating
unsupported opinions or legal conclusions is insufficient.” Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 184.
“[T]he ‘good faith’ limitation modifies all the Act’s components, including the report
requirement.” Id. at 184 n.5 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.002(a)). The good faith
requirement has both “subjective and objective components.” Id. (citing Wichita County
v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996)). To properly report a “violation of law,” an
employee must personally believe the conduct reported was a violation of law, and the
employee’s belief must have been reasonable in light of his training and experience. Hart,
26
917 S.W.2d at 784. “[A]n employee ‘reports’ ‘in good faith’ when (1) the employee believes
the reported information will facilitate identifying or investigating a violation of law by the
employing governmental entity or another public employee, and (2) the employee’s belief
is reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at
184 n.5 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. 2002)).
To show that the reporting party was terminated because of his report, they must
“demonstrate that the person who took the adverse employment action—the decision-
maker—knew of her report of illegal conduct.” Whitney v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 545
S.W.3d 150, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (first citing Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Perry, 440 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); and
then citing Harris County. v. Vernagallo, 181 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)). However, if a reporting party was terminated or suspended from
employment “not later than the 90th day after the date on which the employee reports a
violation of law, the suspension, termination, or adverse personnel action is presumed,
subject to rebuttal, to be because the employee made the report.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 554.004(a). “Once sufficient evidence is produced to support a finding of the non-
existence of the causal connection between the termination or suspension and the
reported violation of law, the case proceeds as if no presumption had ever existed.”
Whitney, 545 S.W.3d at 159–60; City of Houston v. Levingston, 221 S.W.3d 204, 226
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v.
McDill, 914 S.W.2d 718, 723 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ).
27
B. Analysis
The City challenges De Leon’s Whistleblower claim on three bases: (1) De Leon
did not make a report in good faith; (2) De Leon “cannot provide evidence creating
jurisdictional facts showing that the City had any knowledge of his alleged report and took
action against him based on them”; and (3) the City had a nonretaliatory reason for
terminating De Leon.
As part of its argument that De Leon did not make a report in good faith, the City
argues that De Leon simply made an inquiry, not a report, and that it was not done in
good faith because it was based on hearsay obtained while he was on leave. De Leon, in
response, argues that the evidence shows he did make a report, not merely an inquiry,
but that an inquiry could constitute a report. Moreover, De Leon argues that a report may
be based on hearsay evidence and the violation of law does not need to be personally
observed to be in good faith. We agree with De Leon.
In his deposition, which was produced in response to the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction, De Leon testified that he met with TCEQ officials “[t]o report the illegal
activities that [were] going on,” specifically, a wastewater spill that was either
underreported or not reported at all. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 319.302(b) (2023) (Tex.
Comm’n on Env’t Quality, Notification Requirements) (requiring wastewater facilities to
disclose certain wastewater spills). The City focuses its arguments on emails that De
Leon sent to TCEQ without mention of De Leon’s deposition testimony. Regardless, we
disagree that the emails constitute mere inquiries. On February 22, 2018, De Leon sent
an email to a TCEQ employee that stated, “This email is to inform you that a major
28
wastewater spill[] happened at Pharr Wastewater Plant on February 11th, at 2:20 p.m[.]
and operations is worried that it might not have been properly or not reported to your
office.” On April 11, 2018, De Leon sent a follow-up email, inquiring into the status of his
report, to which the TCEQ employee responded, notifying De Leon that “[t]he region is
conducting an investigation into [his] complaint.” We conclude De Leon’s emails were
sufficient to constitute a report under the Act. See Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d at 184; Tex. Dep’t
of Assistive & Rehab. Servs. v. Howard, 182 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005,
pet. denied) (“[T]he Act only requires a disclosure of information by a public employee
tending to directly or circumstantially show a violation by a public employer.”).
As to the “good faith” component of De Leon’s report, the City argues without
support that De Leon’s report could not have been in good faith because he was on leave
under the FMLA at the time of the reports and “all the evidence submitted to TCEQ were
documents and photos taken by other City employees.” However, a report may be made
in good faith, even if it is based on hearsay. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. McElyea, 239
S.W.3d 842, 853 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (“While a report may not be based
on rumor and innuendo, it is permissible for a whistleblower’s knowledge about violations
of law to be based on hearsay.”); see also Gray v. City of Galveston, No. 14-12-00183-
CV, 2013 WL 2247386, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 21, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (same). Accordingly, we reject the City’s argument that De Leon did not make
a good faith report.
The City also argues that De Leon “has not and cannot provide evidence creating
jurisdictional facts showing that the City had any knowledge of his alleged reports and
29
took action against him based on them. [De Leon] simply relies on the timing of his
termination and the timing of his alleged reports months earlier.” The termination in this
place occurred within ninety days of De Leon’s report, which supports the statutory
presumption that the termination was because De Leon made the report. TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 554.004(a). Thus, the City was required to produce sufficient evidence to rebut
the causal connection between the report and termination but failed to do so. See
Whitney, 545 S.W.3d at 159–60. Rather, the City only argues that De Leon did not
produce evidence that the person who made the decision to terminate De Leon was
aware that he made a report. But because De Leon was entitled to the presumption of
causation, the City’s argument is unavailing. 5 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.004(a);
Whitney, 545 S.W.3d at 159–60. Accordingly, we conclude that the presumption was
sufficient for De Leon’s Whistleblower claim to survive the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Lastly, the City argues that it had a nonretaliatory reason to terminate De Leon,
which is an affirmative defense. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.004(b). Specifically, the
City argues that it terminated De Leon “because he was unable to return to work after
exhaustion of his medical leave.” However, we rejected the same argument for the City’s
challenge to De Leon’s discrimination claim. We similarly reject it here.
5 In a single sentence with no supporting citations, the City also argues that De Leon “specifically
plead[ed] he was terminated in relation to his issues with Villescas and the associated ‘stress’ from this,
which necessarily affirmatively negates the ‘but for’ requirement of a whistleblower claim.” Because the City
offers no supporting analysis for this argument, we conclude the argument is waived as insufficiently
briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”). Moreover, such a conclusion
would prohibit a plaintiff from pleading alternative theories of recovery. See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft
Network, L.L.C., 213 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (“A party may plead alternative
theories of recovery, present the facts as it understands them to be, and recover under any one of their
theories.”).
30
Having considered and rejected each of the City’s subissues, we overrule it’s third
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as it relates to De Leon’s disability
discrimination and Whistleblower claim and reverse and render an order dismissing De
Leon’s TCHRA retaliation claim with prejudice.
CLARISSA SILVA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
14th day of December, 2023.
31