Kathy C. Harris v. Larry E. Covey D/B/A American Pride Roofing ( 2023 )


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  • DENIED and Opinion Filed December 12, 2023
    S  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-23-01231-CV
    KATHY C. HARRIS, Appellant
    V.
    LARRY E. COVEY D/B/A AMERICAN PRIDE ROOFING, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-03352-B
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
    Opinion by Justice Goldstein
    Kathy C. Harris has filed a pro se petition for permission to appeal the trial
    court’s order denying her motion for partial summary judgment. In that order, the
    trial court denied Harris’s motion, but did not grant her permission to appeal, did not
    identify the controlling issue of law as to which there is a substantial ground for
    disagreement and did not state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the
    outcome of the litigation. Because the complained-of order does not satisfy the
    requirements of section 51.014(d), we deny the petition for permissive appeal.
    Applicable Law
    Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory
    orders for which appeal is authorized by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Guzman, 
    390 S.W.3d 593
    , 596
    (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). Under certain circumstances, a trial court may allow
    an appeal from an order that is otherwise not appealable. See Sabre Travel Int’l, Ltd. v.
    Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 
    567 S.W.3d 725
    , 730 (Tex. 2019). When the trial court permits
    an appeal from an interlocutory order, the party seeking to appeal must file a petition in
    the court of appeals seeking permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a). We
    strictly construe such requests because statutes allowing for interlocutory appeals are an
    exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. See Gulf Coast
    Asphalt Co. v. Lloyd, 
    457 S.W.3d 539
    , 545 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no
    pet.); Rogers v. Orr, 
    408 S.W.3d 640
    , 642 (Tex. App—Fort Worth 2013, pet. denied).
    Section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits an
    interlocutory appeal of an otherwise unappealable order, if several predicates are met.
    See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d). To qualify, the trial court must first
    certify the order is immediately appealable, and expressly identify a controlling question
    of law on which there is substantial ground for disagreement. Id.; see also TEX. R. CIV.
    P. 168 (requirement that trial court’s order identifies a “controlling question of law on
    which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion[.]”). The trial court’s order
    must also explain why an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate
    resolution of the case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d); Hebert v. JJT Constr.
    –2–
    
    438 S.W.3d 139
    , 142 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist. 2014, no pet.). Finally, this Court
    must then agree to hear the appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(f).
    Discussion
    To satisfy the requirements of rule 51.014(d), the trial court’s order must
    expressly grant permission to appeal, identify the controlling question of law as to which
    there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and state why an immediate
    appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Tex. R. Civ. P.
    168; Hebert v. JJT Constr. 
    438 S.W.3d 139
    , 142 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist. 2014,
    no pet.). Harris has not alleged the trial court granted permission to appeal and she has
    not provided a signed order granting permission. Larry Covey, appellee, filed a response
    asserting the trial court has not granted permission and requesting this Court to dismiss
    the petition.
    Because Harris has not established she is entitled to an immediate appeal of the
    trial court’s order pursuant to section 51.014(d) of the civil practices and remedies code,
    we deny her petition for permissive appeal. See Hebert, 
    438 S.W.3d at 142
    . Having
    done so, we deny appellee’s request to dismiss the petition as moot.
    /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
    BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
    JUSTICE
    231231F.P05
    –3–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    KATHY C. HARRIS, Appellant                    On Appeal from the County Court at
    Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
    No. 05-23-01231-CV           V.               Trial Court Cause No. CC-22-03352-
    B.
    LARRY E. COVEY D/B/A                          Opinion delivered by Justice
    AMERICAN PRIDE ROOFING,                       Goldstein. Justices Molberg and
    Appellee                                      Pedersen, III participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we deny appellant’s
    petition for permissive appeal.
    Judgment entered December 12, 2023
    –4–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-23-01231-CV

Filed Date: 12/12/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2023