Ex Parte Rickel Tonio Baker , Jr. v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Opinion issued October 17, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-22-00789-CR
NO. 01-22-00790-CR
NO. 01-22-00791-CR
———————————
EX PARTE RICKEL TONIO BAKER, JR.
On Appeal from the 240th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 22-DCR-099972, 20-DCR-092879A, 20-DCR-092879B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury acquitted Appellant Rickel Tonio Baker, Jr. of manslaugher and
criminally negligent homicide arising from a motor vehicle collision in which his
four-year old son J.B. was killed. The State later sought to prosecute Baker for injury
to a child and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on injuries sustained
in the same collision by his eight-year old son T.B. who survived the crash.
Baker filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued
the doctrine of collateral estoppel embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
against double jeopardy barred the State from prosecuting him for injury to a child
and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against T.B. He also argued that
because the State had chosen to proceed to trial on the charges of manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide against J.B. only, the State was estopped or had
waived its right to try him for the other offenses involving T.B. arising from the
same motor vehicle collision. The trial court denied Baker’s pretrial application for
writ of habeas corpus. This appeal ensued.
We affirm.
Background
On August 4, 2020, Carolyn Baker called her father to request help with a flat
tire for her Porsche Cayenne. Appellant Rickel Tonio Baker, Jr., Carolyn’s younger
brother, came to her aid. Baker, his wife, and his two young sons drove in a
Chevrolet Cruze to meet Carolyn. Baker replaced the flat tire with a temporary
“donut” tire and followed Carolyn in her Porsche as she drove to a tire shop via the
Fort Bend County Toll Road. Baker’s wife, Kourtney Hatton, was siting in the front
passenger seat of the Cruze and their sons, four-year-old J.B. and eight-year-old
2
T.B., were sitting in the backseat of the Cruze. J.B. was sitting behind Baker and
T.B. behind Kourtney.
Daniel Hurtado also was traveling on the Fort Bend County Toll Road that
day. He was driving a Chevrolet Silverado flatbed pickup truck with a trailer filled
with heavy equipment when he struck Baker’s Cruze from behind, causing the Cruze
to accelerate rapidly and strike Carolyn’s Porsche. T.B. was seriosuly injured in the
crash and J.B. died of his injuries.
On September 21, 2020, Baker was charged by indictment with manslaughter
against J.B. (trial court cause number 20-DCR-092878) and with aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury against T.B. (trial court cause number 20-DCR-
92879).1 Both charges stem from the injuries the children sustained in the car crash.
On October 11, 2021, Baker was reindicted for manslaughter against J.B. (trial court
cause number 20-DCR-092878A) and aggravated assault causing serious bodily
injury against T.B. (trial court cause number 20-DCR-092879A).2 And on June 27,
2022, Baker was re-indicted for aggravated assault causing bodily injury (trial court
cause number 20-DCR92879B) and indicted for injury to a child with respect to T.B.
(trial court cause number 22-DCR-99972).
1
Neither indictment is included in the clerk’s record filed in this appeal.
2
The original indictment for aggravated assault in 20-DCR-92879-CR was dismissed
on December 11, 2021. Neither the original indictment nor the dismissal is in the
clerk’s record.
3
Baker was tried for the offense of manslaughter against J.B. in trial court cause
number 20-DCR-092878A. The manslaughter indictment alleged that Baker
did then and there recklessly cause the death of … J.B. … by failing to
control speed, following too closely, not using proper emergency
devices, and not properly restraining [J.B.], while driving his motor
vehicle that was occupied by [J.B.] and causing it to collide with
another vehicle.
Manslaughter Trial
A. Pre-Trial Hearing
During a pretrial hearing, the State argued that it had the option of going to
trial on the manslaughter charge against J.B. (20-DCR-092878A), the aggravated
assault charge against T.B. (20-DCR-092879A), or both, and the State had opted to
proceed with the manslaughter charge against J.B. only. The State told the trial
court:
So the manslaughter is the only case, Judge, that we intend to ask the
jury for a verdict on. They’re out of the same transaction, so we'll hear
the same set of facts.
But as far as when we ask them for a—when we give them the charge,
we will only be charging him on the manslaughter.
Baker objected to the “piecemeal” nature of the proceedings and requested
that the manslaughter charge against J.B. (20-DCR-092878A) and the aggravated
assault charge against T.B. (20-DCR-092879A) be consolidated and tried together
because the offenses arose from the same motor vehicle collision. Baker argued:
4
Exact same case. It’s the same crash. Exact same everything. It’s just
two different kids in the backseat of a car. And to split up a criminal
trial, have two different criminal trials for two different kids in the
backseat – it’s going to be the exact same case tried twice. So, for
efficiency for all of us, I think we need to try them both together.
The State disagreed that the charges should be tried together:
State: It is not the State’s position that we will have two criminal
trials. Our intention is to go forward on the criminal trial on
the manslaughter . . . We’re not asking for a second criminal
trial later.
Baker: Well, so does that mean they’re dismissing the aggravated
assault charges?
State: Not today.
Court: Not at this time.
Baker: So we would –
Court: It can happen in the future, but not today.
The trial court overruled Baker’s objection and trial commenced on the
manslaughter case.
B. Indictment
After the jury was impaneled, the trial court presented the manslaughter
indictment:
In the name and by authority of the State of Texas: The duly organized
Grand Jury of Fort Bend County, Texas, presents in the District Court
of Fort Bend County, Texas, that in Fort Bend County, Texas, Rickel
Tonio Baker, Jr., hereafter styled the defendant, heretofore on or about
August 4, 2020, did then and there, recklessly cause the death of an
individual, namely, J.B., a minor child and hereafter called the
complainant, by failing to control speed, following too closely, not
5
using proper emergency devices or not properly restraining
complainant, while driving his motor vehicle that was occupied by the
complainant and causing it to collide with another motor vehicle.
Baker pleaded not guilty.
C. Opening Statements3
In its opening statement, the State told the jury that the evidence would show
that Baker was driving his Chevrolet Cruze northbound on the Fort Bend County
Toll Road when the Cruze was struck from behind by a truck pulling a trailer loaded
down with heavy equipment. Baker, who had just changed a flat tire on his sister’s
Porsche, was driving behind his sister’s car when the collision occurred. The
prosecutor stated that Baker was driving the Cruze, that his wife Kourtney Hatton
was sitting in the front passenger seat, and that their sons, J.B. and T.B., were sitting
in the backseat. J.B. was sitting behind the driver’s seat and T.B. was sitting behind
the passenger seat. According to the State, the Cruze’s hazard lights were not
flashing and none of the car occupants were wearing a seatbelt or child safety seat.
Because Carolyn’s Porsche was driving on a temporary tire, the Porsche and Baker’s
Cruze were traveling 18 miles per hour on the tollway, which has a posted speed
limit of 65 miles per hour.
3
The excerpts from the record of the manslaughter trial Baker attached to his pretrial
application for writ of habeas corpus do not include a transcript of the voir dire
proceeding.
6
Daniel Hurtado, the driver of a Chevrolet Silverado flatbed pickup truck, was
also traveling northbound on the Fort Bend County Toll Road. When he spotted the
Cruze ahead of him on the right lane of the toll road, Hurtado initially thought the
slow-moving car was stalled. According to the State, the evidence would show that
Hurtado immediately hit his brake and took evasive efforts, but Hurtado was unable
to switch lanes quickly enough to avoid hitting the Cruze. The prosecutor stated:
You’re going to hear evidence from several different witnesses that will
be able to explain to you why no matter who was in that car or what
they were doing in Mr. Hurtado’s truck, that crash occurs. And it occurs
because there was no indication to the driver -- other drivers on the Fort
Bend County Toll Road that [the Cruze] was a hazard.
The State asserted that the jury would hear evidence that J.B. died from the
injuries he sustained in the collision and the State concluded by stating:
So in the end, when you guys are looking at whether or not [Baker] was
reckless and the things that he did that we’ve alleged and talked about
in voir dire, right, not controlling his speed, not using his hazard lights,
not restraining his children, any one of those on their own y’all can
determine is reckless enough.
But at the end of the evidence, you will have heard more than enough
information to be able to determine that Mr. Baker was reckless and
Mr. Baker was the one that caused the death in this case of [J.B.]
In his opening statement, Baker’s counsel asserted:
And so the charge is Mr. Baker caused the crash in those three ways:
Speed, his slower speed; following too closely, no idea what that --
what car that refers to; not using proper emergency devices.
And those are three ways they are charging he caused just the crash.
The crash did cause death. But those are three ways – only concern
7
causing the crash. . . and the fourth thing that they’re saying is Mr.
Baker caused the death of his 4-year-old son [J.B.] by not properly
restraining him. That has nothing do with who or what caused the crash.
That has to do with would a proper restraint have made. . .
The State objected to these statements as a misstatement of the law and the court
sustained the objection. Baker’s counsel continued,
So the evidence, ladies and gentlemen, will show that this crash was so
big by that truck slamming into the back of that tiny car, that tragically
and unfortunately a restraint was not going to save this child’s life.
....
Now, about a mile and a half after they pass through that toll station the
evidence will show that a company truck towing a trailer weighing
20,065 pounds, seven times as heavy the tiny 3,000-pound Cruz[e],
slams into the back of the Cruz[e]. That’s the crash.
With respect to Hurtado, Baker’s counsel asserted the evidence would show
that Hurtado was “speeding at 73.9 miles an hour moments before the crash,” and
was “fatigued and too tired to be driving because he had just started a night shift job
and he had just worked a 13- or 14-hour night shift, then another 13- or 14-hour
night shift.” Baker asserted that Hurtado “was using his iPhone at the time of the
crash,” and he was distracted by the equipment in the back of his truck and trailer.
According to Baker’s counsel:
And so [Hurtado] was worried that his load was going to fly out. And
he’s admitted—the evidence will show, he’s admitted that he was so
worried about his load flying out, that that was a cause of the crash.
So he will admit on the stand that that was the cause of this crash. His
speeding was a cause of the crash. I don’t know what he’s going to say
8
about the other items, but there’s—evidence on all of this. The evidence
will show Mr. Hurtado was following way too close to traffic in front
of him. You’re going to hear him talk about an SUV that did something
before the crash. I’m going to wait and see what they say about that.
....
None of us are here—none of us are here to say that not having your
child in a proper restraint can ever be allowed. And I’m not sanctioning
that. No one in this courtroom is sanctioning that.
It was a bad decision. It was not a good decision at all. I’ve got three
kids. I got—they used to be in—you know, you’ve got booster seats
and all kinds of car seats. And the child needed to be in such a
restraint— and I’m not trying to tell any of y’all that— I’m not trying
to make excuses. It’s not good. I’m not making any excuses for that.
But here’s what’s important: Causation. Cause means they have to
prove reck—anything they say was reckless caused—the evidence will
show—so they’ve got to show with evidence that if there was a restraint
then their child would have survived.4
With respect to causation, Baker’s counsel also stated that Hurtado’s truck
had struck the Cruze from behind with such force “that the seat the 230-pound
[Baker] was in, broke, slammed back, hit his son [J.B.] from head to his knees.” He
stated, “It is – it’s a terrible thing that happened. It happened because the truck rear-
ended him, seven times the size of it. That’s what the evidence is going to show.”
Baker’s counsel stated that child safety seats which are intended to “prevent
someone from being ejected and thrown out of the vehicle,” could not “protect
4
The State objected to this statement as a misstatement of the law and the court
sustained the objection.
9
everybody in every crash.” He stated, “This case is about the rear-end from the big
truck into the small car [that] caused this terrible crash.”
D. State’s Witnesses
1. Shone Joy
Shone Joy, a deputy with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, was driving north
on the Fort Bend County Toll Road in the left lane when she witnessed the collision
in her peripheral vision. She testified that she saw Hurtado’s truck strike the Cruze
from behind, and then she noticed “a light colored SUV losing control” and crossing
over into the left lane and hitting the concrete barrier. She could not tell if “anybody
was speeding or going too slow or the speed at all.” Deputy Joy pulled her car onto
the shoulder and returned to the scene of the collision where she observed Hatton
sitting on the ground outside the Cruze, cradling a bleeding J.B. in her arms.
According to Deputy Joy, “[e]verybody else was inside the car.” She identified
Baker as the driver of the Cruze.
2. Emily Kennedy
Emily Kennedy, a paramedic with Austin County EMS, responded to the
scene of the crash. When she arrived, T.B. was being treated by a firefighter in the
backseat of the Cruze. According to Kennedy, she did not see any child safety seats
in the Cruze. Kennedy testified that “the safest place for a child is in a [child safety]
10
seat.” She did not express any opinion as to fault or causation regarding the crash,
J.B.’s death, or T.B.’s injuries.
3. Daniel Hurtado
Daniel Hurtado was driving the Chevrolet Silverado flatbed pickup truck with
a trailer on the Fort Bend County Tollway the afternoon of the crash. The trailer
was filled with heavy equipment. Hurtado was traveling northbound on the toll road.
He testified that traffic was light that afternoon and it was moving “pretty fast.”
When he passed through a toll station located a mile south of the crash site, Hurtado
was driving in the left lane of the toll road at 67 miles per hour. He moved into the
right lane because he was driving slower than the other vehicles and impeding the
flow of traffic in the left lane. He set the truck’s cruise control at 73 to 74 miles-per-
hour even though he knew the posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour.
Moments before the crash, an SUV driving in front of Hurtado in the right
lane suddenly swerved into the left lane, revealing to Hurtado the Cruze directly in
front of him. Hurtado, who initially thought the slow-moving Cruze was stalled,
braked, disengaging the truck’s cruise control. He quickly realized he did not have
enough time to stop, and he tried to swerve into the left lane to avoid hitting the
Cruze. Hurtado, however, was not able to move into the left lane quickly enough
and his truck struck the Cruze from behind. Hurtado testified he “did not see any
lights” on the rear of the Cruze.
11
After the crash, Hurtado saw Hatton sitting on the ground outside the Cruze
with an injured J.B. in her arms, and T.B. in the back seat of the Cruze on the
passenger side. Baker was sitting in the Cruze’s driver’s seat and there were no child
safety seats in the car.
Hurtado testified that, depending on the speed, he gives himself four seconds
between his truck and the vehicle in front of him. He believed he was traveling at a
safe speed and distance from other vehicles before the crash given that the speed
limit on the road was 65 miles per hour. Hurtado testified that the video from the toll
plaza appeared to show that neither the Cruze nor the Porsche had their hazard lights
flashing. Hurtado testified he felt he had done everything he could to avoid the crash
given the circumstances and it would have been helpful if the Cruze and Porsche had
their hazard lights flashing.
On cross-examination, Baker’s counsel questioned Hurtado extensively about
the cause of the collision. Hurtado testified he would have been able to avoid hitting
the Cruze if the hazard lights on the Cruze had been flashing, if the Cruze were
“traveling at a []faster speed,” and if he had seen the Cruze’s flashing lights “at a
distance.” Hurtado admitted, however, that he was not able to see the Cruze “from
a good distance” because an SUV was traveling in the right lane of the toll road in
front of him before the crash. When asked if the SUV was “a huge part of why this
crash happened,” Hurtado testified there was “an SUV in front of me that did not
12
allow me to see the black [Cruze] in front of me.” When asked if his truck had been
200 feet from the SUV when the SUV swerved to the left lane, Hurtado testified, “I
don’t remember how far it was, but it was a good distance between me and the [SUV
in] front of me.” Hurtado admitted that during his deposition, he testified he believed
the SUV had been 200 feet in front of him.
Hurtado, who did not have a commercial driver’s license, testified he had a
“full load” in the back of his truck and on the trailer. When asked if his truck and
trailer weighed more than 20,000 pounds, Hurtado testified he did not know the
exact weight, but he knew he was driving “a really heavy vehicle” and “heavier
vehicles are harder to stop.” When asked if he would have been able to avoid hitting
the Cruze had he not been pulling such a heavy load, Hurtado testified:
If I didn’t have the amount of weight that I had and the vehicle in front
of me was moving the same speed as I was, I wouldn’t have struck
them.
The fact that they were going a lot slower than I was, and by the time I
seen them, by the time I reacted, I tried pressing my brake, with the
weight that I had.
When later pressed about the impact his truck and the trailer’s weight had on the
collision, Hurtado admitted he “could have stopped the truck if [he] didn’t have such
a heavy load.”
Hurtado testified that he routinely checks his mirrors to make sure his
equipment does not come lose or fly away. When asked if this causes him to take
13
his eyes off the road, Hurtado testified that it does, but only for a “slight moment.”
Hurtado testified that he set his truck’s cruise control at 73–74 miles per hour even
though he knew the posted speed limit on the toll road was 65 miles per hour. He
admitted that if he had been driving “significantly slower” he would have had
“maybe a fraction of a second” more to react once he saw the Cruze in the lane ahead
of him.
Hurtado testified that after the crash, he saw that the driver’s seat in the Cruze
was reclined all the way back and it was touching the back seat. He admitted that
when he spoke to the officers after the crash, he told them it was a “hard hit” and if
a child had been sitting behind the driver’s seat, the child would have been crushed
and probably killed.
Hurtado, who had just started working the night shift, worked a fourteen-hour
shift the night before the crash. Hurtado had slept less than five hours before the
crash, which he admitted was less sleep than he needed to be well rested.
Nevertheless, Hurtado believed he had gotten adequate sleep the night before and he
never thought he was “not safe to drive.” Although he denied being on his cell phone
when the crash occurred, Hurtado admitted he uses Apple maps on his phone, and
he had the application open around the time of the collision. Baker’s counsel also
questioned Hurtado about the light-colored SUV Hurtado claimed was driving in
14
front of him on the tollway obscuring his view of the Cruze attempting to cast doubt
as to the existence of the SUV.
Hurtado testified that he “didn’t see any drugs or alcohol in the [Cruze] when
[he] peeped in,” but he could smell something that “could be tobacco or marijuana.”
Hurtado also admitted, however, that during his deposition, he only stated he was
“able to smell a heavy odor of cigarettes.”
4. Carolyn Baker
Carolyn Baker is Baker’s older sister. Carolyn testified she was driving her
Porsche SUV down Highway 6 when she got a flat tire, and she waited in the parking
lot of a fast-food restaurant for Baker or her father to arrive to help her change the
tire. Baker arrived and replaced the flat tire with a “donut” or “dummy” tire. Baker,
who was driving the Cruze, then followed behind Carolyn’s Porsche as she drove to
a tire shop. Carolyn testified there was no tire shop at the nearby gas station, so she
decided to drive to the tire shop she normally used. She chose to drive there via the
Fort Bend County Toll Road rather than Highway 6 because she thought it would be
faster. Carolyn testified that she could not drive faster than 20 miles per hour because
she was driving on a donut. The posted speed limit on the tollway is 65 miles per
hour.
Carolyn testified that a photograph taken by the toll plaza reflected she was
driving 18 miles per hour when she drove by the toll plaza, and she could not tell
15
from the photo whether the hazard lights of her Porsche were flashing. According
to Carolyn, she drove in the right lane when she entered the tollway because traffic
is generally faster in the left lane, and she did not drive on the shoulder because she
“didn’t believe that would be safe.”
Carolyn testified she did not remember much about the crash, but she
remembered she was wearing her seatbelt and using the hazard lights of her Porsche.
According to Carolyn, she and Baker “had [their] hazard lights on the entire time.”
Carolyn’s Porsche was rear-ended by Baker’s Cruze after Hurtado’s truck rear-
ended the Cruze.
5. Martin Garret
Lieutenant Martin Garret with Fort Bend County Constable Precinct 3 was the
primary deputy who investigated the crash.5 On direct examination, Lieutenant
Garret testified about the location of the Porsche and the Cruze at the scene, the
vehicles’ conditions, and the marks on the roadway. He testified the Cruze had
“substantial damage to the rear and it look[ed] like [it was] a little bit more towards
the right of center.” According to Lieutenant Garret, the Cruze was “struck with
such force [from behind] that the door frame on the back left started to collapse
downward.” He testified that the damage to the rear of the Cruze indicated that
5
When the accident occurred, Martin Garret was a sergeant with Fort Bend County
Constable Precinct 4.
16
Hurtado had swerved to the left prior to impact. With respect to the interior of the
Cruze, Lieutenant Garret testified that “the driver’s seat [was] leaned back all the
way,” there were “no car seats, no booster seats in this vehicle,” and “none of the
seat belts in this vehicle [had been] used.”
As part of his investigation, Lieutenant Garret took measurements and
prepared a diagram of the crash site. He also inspected the Cruze after it was towed
to the wrecker yard. Lieutenant Garret removed a light bulb from the Cruze’s left-
rear light housing, and he determined from the bulb’s filaments that the bulb was off
when the crash occurred. Lieutenant Garret also obtained Baker’s and Hurtado’s
phone records and data from the Cruze’s and the truck’s airbag modules, which are
also referred to as black boxes. According to Lieutenant Garret, the Cruze’s airbag
module indicated that neither Baker nor Hatton were wearing their seat belts, which
was consistent with his observations. The data also reflected that the Cruze was
traveling 18-19 miles per hour at the time of the collision, which Lieutenant Garret
considered to be “a very unsafe speed” and “equally dangerous” as driving 105 miles
per hour. The truck’s airbag module indicated Hurtado was wearing his seatbelt and
the truck was traveling 74 miles per hour 5 seconds before the crash and 70 miles
per hour half a second before impact. Lieutenant Garret did not consider 70–74
miles per hour to be unsafe speeds to travel on the tollway and he noted that “people
drive faster.”
17
On cross-examination, Lieutenant Garret testified that hazard lights are
intended to draw attention to a car, and drivers in emergency situations should use
their hazard lights because they will “warn other drivers that there’s something going
on, you may have an emergency.” According to Lieutenant Garret, Baker should
have been using his hazard lights while driving on the tollway, and if he had, it would
have given Hurtado “extra time to observe” the slow-moving Cruze. Lieutenant
Garret was questioned extensively about the light bulb he retrieved from the Cruze
and the basis for his opinion that the light was not in use when the crash occurred.
Lieutenant Garret also testified about the damage sustained by the Cruze.
According to Lieutenant Garret, the rear left door frame of the Cruze collapsed
downward, and J.B. was sitting in the back seat of the Cruze, on the left side of the
vehicle behind the driver. The right side of the Cruze, where T.B. had been sitting
behind Hatton’s seat, also sustained collateral damage. Lieutenant Garret did not
know whether the driver’s seat had broken as a result of the crash. He also testified
that unlike Baker’s driver’s seat, Hatton’s front seat was not reclined, and T.B., who
was seated behind Hatton, survived the collision. Lieutenant Garret testified that the
Cruze’s right side, where T.B. had been sitting in the backseat, had sustained more
damage than the left side of the car where J.B. had been sitting.
Lieutenant Garret reviewed a download of Hurtado’s cell phone records for
5:28 p.m., the time of the crash, and he “found no evidence that Mr. Hurtado was
18
either on the phone, [or] texting at the time of the accident.” Lieutenant Garret
testified that he checked Hurtado’s eyes at the scene, but he did not perform any field
sobriety tests on Hurtado. He contacted Baker the day after the crash and Baker
fully cooperated with the investigation. He also obtained videos of the Porsche, the
Cruze, and the truck at the toll plaza and still photos of the Porsche and truck. He
was questioned about the lack of a still photo of the Cruze.
Lieutenant Garret was also questioned about his preparation of the crash site
diagram and the contents of the crash report. He confirmed that his diagram
indicated “there [were] 134 feet between the Cruz[e] and the Porsche SUV” and he
considered that to be a safe distance given the speed the two vehicles were traveling.
Lieutenant Garret testified that his role was to determine how the crash happened,
not who was at fault. He does, however, “document contributing factors” and he
admitted “those are factors that cause the crash.”
When questioned about the crash report he prepared, which was admitted into
evidence as State’s Exhibit 8, Lieutenant Garret testified that one contributing factor
to the crash was Hurtado’s “failure to control speed.” According to Lieutenant
Garret, “[f]ailure to control speed in Texas means that the driver failed to bring that
vehicle to a stop before striking the vehicle in front of him. . . [it] has nothing to do
with speeding.” Lieutenant Garret testified that Hurtado was “over the speed limit
and he failed to bring the vehicle to a stop before striking the vehicle in front of
19
him.” He also testified that, in his opinion, no one involved in the crash was
impaired.
On redirect examination, Lieutenant Garret testified that Baker, Hatton, and
the children had been taken to the hospital before he arrived at the scene, and he was
not able to perform any field sobriety tests on Baker or obtain a blood sample from
him. He obtained a blood sample from Hurtado and the sample tested negative for
alcohol and drugs. When Lieutenant Garret reviewed the toll plaza video he did not
see “any indication that [the Cruze’s] hazard lights were on when [Baker] went
through the toll plaza.” Lieutenant Garret testified that when he walked around the
Cruze and the Porsche at the scene, he “smelled the strong odor of marijuana coming
from the vehicles.”
On recross examination, Lieutenant Garret testified that he did not find any
physical evidence of drug use inside the Cruze, and although he did not mention the
smell of marijuana in his crash report, it was not necessary for him to do so because
there was “nowhere on the report for that.”
6. Ryan Musil
Ryan Musil is a Deputy with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office’s vehicular
crime’s division. Deputy Musil has extensive training in accident investigation and
reconstruction, including accreditation in accident reconstruction by the
Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstructionists. Deputy Musil
20
testified regarding the type of records he reviews to perform an accident
reconstruction.
Based on his review of the records in this case, Deputy Musil concluded Baker
was at fault. When asked how he reached this conclusion, Deputy Musil testified
that it generally takes a driver 1.5 seconds to perceive a hazard and react to it. A
person’s perception and reaction time, however, may be longer or shorter depending
on the circumstances. According to Deputy Musil, it is more difficult to recognize
a hazard when approaching a slower moving vehicle and he added 0.3 seconds to
Hurtado’s perception and reaction time because the slow-moving Cruze was not
providing any “visual clues” indicating that it posed a hazard to other motorists.
Deputy Musil testified that he was able to determine whether Hurtado had
enough time to perceive and react to the Cruze as a hazard by calculating the distance
between the Cruze and the truck after the SUV in front of Hurtado switched lanes,
Hurtado’s possible reaction times, and the amount of time Hurtado would have
needed to avoid the collision. According to Deputy Musil, the data indicated
Hurtado “react[ed] to the collision between one and a half seconds by steering and
applying the brake” and this “supports [that] when that SUV moved over, he
perceived this as an immediate hazard.” Deputy Musil testified that the truck’s
driving behavior indicated Hurtado was “an attentive driver” and that even in the
best-case scenario, there was not enough time for Hurtado to have avoided the crash.
21
According to Deputy Musil, the distance between the Porsche and Cruze probably
would not have made a difference in the crash unless the Porsche was substantially
further ahead. In that scenario, the second collision between the Porsche and Cruze
“would be less likely.”
When asked if it is “considered failing to control your speed if you’re severely
below the [speed] limit,” Deputy Musil testified that a driver has an “obligation not
to drive so slowly on the roadway where he’s interfering or impeding with a normal
or reasonable flow of traffic.” According to Deputy Musil, someone who is
interfering or impeding the normal flow of traffic, like Baker, is also failing to
properly control their speed.
Deputy Musil also was questioned about the rules of the road in Texas and
what drivers should do when their car experiences mechanical problems. According
to Deputy Musil, in the event of a breakdown, drivers are supposed to activate the
emergency flashers and “move off the edge of the roadway.” Deputy Musil testified
that every licensed Texas driver has this information because it is included in the
Texas Driver’s Handbook. According to Deputy Musil, hazard lights are important
and should be used when a driver is driving 18 to 20 miles-per-hour because such a
driver would be a danger to himself and others. Deputy Musil testified that “failing
to activate your emergency equipment in situations when you’re going dangerously
slow” is “reckless behavior” capable of causing serious injury or death. Based on
22
the video taken at the toll plaza, Deputy Musil concluded that Baker was not
operating his emergency equipment properly because he was not using the Cruze’s
hazard lights. Deputy Musil testified that in addition to not activating the Cruze’s
hazard lights, Baker was also driving in a “moving lane of travel” and “those two
factors are very dangerous by themselves.”
Deputy Musil testified about the lack of child safety seats in the Cruze.
According to Deputy Musil, child safety seats protect children from outside forces,
keep them from moving around inside the vehicle, and prevent them from being
ejected from the vehicle in the event of a collision. A child safety seat could also
protect a child who gets “whacked with the seat from ahead of them.” Deputy Musil
testified that both J.B. and T.B. should have been using some type of child safety
seat, which would have provided them with additional protection during the
collision.
Deputy Musil testified that the crash was “absolutely” avoidable. When asked
for the basis of his opinion, Deputy Musil testified:
The main factor is there was an intentional decision, once this vehicle
that was experiencing a mechanical or tire malfunction, to not only get
back on the road, to realize there would still be a problem. But to pull
off and get back on the road again at a much higher speed limit, that by
itself is a reckless act.
....
So that’s – that’s the main point of my analysis, that that vehicle should
not have been on the road. There were other alternatives that they had.
23
There was an open seat in the Chevy Cruz[e], if they needed to leave
that vehicle to arrange for it to be towed to a safe location. There were
– there was other alternatives to driving on the tollway that day.
Deputy Musil faulted Baker for not leaving the children at home when he went to
help his sister fix her flat tire. He also testified that there were multiple tire shops
between the parking lot off Highway 6 where Baker fixed the Porsche’s flat tire and
the toll road and “those would have been much safer alternatives to leave the car
there.” Deputy Musil testified that driving well below the speed limit is dangerous
and is likely to result in a fatality. He did not know who chose the route to the tire
shop.
On cross-examination, Deputy Musil testified about the materials he reviewed
when reconstructing the crash and the assumptions he made as part of his analysis.
With respect to a driver’s perception and reaction time, Deputy Musil agreed that
being distracted, tired, or using a phone would lengthen the driver’s perception and
reaction time. A driver’s perception and reaction time also increases if there are no
visual indications of a dangerous condition, such as flashing hazard lights, and
Deputy Musil assumed for purposes of his analysis that the Cruze’s hazard lights
were not activated prior to the collision. Deputy Musil testified that he took
Hurtado’s statements about the SUV driving in front of him at face value. He was
also cross-examined about the type of child safety seat J.B. should have been using.
24
Deputy Musil was also questioned at length about the speed at which Hurtado
was traveling and whether the speed had been a contributing factor in the crash.
Deputy Musil testified that the crash report listed Hurtado’s “failure to control
speed” as a contributing factor and when asked if he “would consider that at fault as
well,” Deputy Musil testified, “If that’s the ultimate cause of it, yes.” Deputy Musil
denied that Hurtado was at fault in the crash. He admitted that his opinion that
Hurtado could not have prevented the collision assumed Hurtado was “not
distracted, not using his phone” or tired. Deputy Musil likewise was cross-examined
regarding the requirements of Texas law with respect to Baker and Hurtado. Deputy
Musil was asked whether Hurtado was driving at a speed greater than was reasonable
and prudent under the circumstances and failed to control his speed as necessary to
avoid colliding with another vehicle, both of which would violate Texas law. With
respect to Baker, Deputy Musil testified that although Texas law permits a driver to
drive at a reduced speed if a special hazard exists, Deputy Musil disagreed with
Baker’s counsel statement that the “whole entire flat tire situation” was a special
hazard that would allow Baker to drive slowly.
7. Mariane Beynon
Dr. Mariane Beynon, the assistant medical examiner at the Harris County
Institute of Forensic Sciences, performed the autopsy on J.B. She testified that J.B.
had sustained more than a dozen blunt force injuries to his head, neck, torso, and
25
extremities, and laceration on the back of his head. He also sustained extensive
internal injuries to his head, neck, and torso. According to Dr. Beynon, the manner
of J.B.’s death was an “accident,” and the cause of his death was “multiple blunt
force injuries.” On cross-examination, Dr. Beynon acknowledged she was offering
no opinion as to what would have happened to J.B. had he been properly restrained.
8. Matt Levan
Sargent Matt Levan with the Sugar Land Police Department is a digital
evidence examiner. Sargent Levan secured Baker’s phone records which reflected
that Baker was on a phone call from 5:22 p.m. until about 5:50 p.m. the day of the
crash. He also downloaded data from Hurtado’s phone which showed Hurtado made
a phone call at 5:28 p.m.
9. Felicia Baker
Felicia Baker is Bakers’ stepmother and J.B.’s and T.B.’s step-grandmother.
Felicia testified that she was the owner of the Cruze and she consented to the retrieval
of data from the car’s air bag module. She identified a picture of J.B., and the
defense stipulated that J.B. was the child who died in the crash. Felicia testified that
T.B., who was sitting behind the front passenger seat, sustained a brain injury and
his leg was severely injured in the collision. According to Felicia, T.B.’s leg
required multiple medical procedures, and he spent months in the hospital and a
26
rehabilitation center where “[s]peech is one of the things that I think he had to work
on. Of course, with the legs, walking.”
E. Motion for Directed Verdict
After the State rested its case, Baker moved for a directed verdict on the
element of recklessness arguing the State had presented no evidence to establish he
had the requisite mens rea as to any of the four manners and means alleged in the
indictment.6 According to Baker, there was no evidence Baker appreciated and
consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk. Baker also moved for a directed
verdict as to the manner and means of following too closely because Lieutenant
Garret testified that “Baker’s allegedly following too close behind the Porsche had
nothing to do with the death” of J.B, and thus “there is no evidence where the jury
can conclude that that was an actual cause of [J.B.’s] death.”
The State countered that Baker was not entitled to a directed verdict because
there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting each element of the charged
offense. The trial court denied Baker’s motion for directed verdict.
6
The indictment alleged the following four manners and means: (1) failing to control
speed, (2) following too closely, (3) not using proper emergency devices, and (4)
not properly restraining the complainant.
27
F. Defense Witnesses
1. Andrew Erwin
Andrew Erwin was Baker’s expert accident reconstructionist. Erwin
inspected the Cruze and Hurtado’s truck and trailer, and he conducted a FARO scan7
of the vehicles. He reviewed the owner’s manual for the Cruze, the crash report, and
the photos and videos obtained by law enforcement, including photos and videos
from the toll plaza. According to Erwin, the Cruze’s rear taillight housings have
four light bulbs and the light bulb Lieutenant Garret inspected, which was admitted
into evidence, illuminates when the Cruze’s brakes are applied and when the head
lamps are turned on, not when the hazard lights are activated. Erwin separately
testified that based on the evidence provided to him, he determined the Porsche’s
hazard lights had been activated when the crash occurred.
Erwin testified there was no posted minimum speed limit on the toll road. He
also testified about Texas traffic laws. According to Erwin, drivers may “drive at
reduced speeds if [they are] handling or responding to emergency situations or . . .
encounter situations that might require reduced speeds for vehicle safety.” Drivers
are also prohibited from “impeding normal and reasonable flow of traffic” and
7
According to Erwin, “FARO scans are a laser mapping procedure where both the
scene and the vehicles and the trailer were laser mapped to a degree that is quite
accurate, to less than a quarter of inch of accuracy. That information was used to
analyze and reconstruct the accident.”
28
driving on an “improved shoulder.” According to Erwin, the right lane is the toll
road’s “slow lane” and “slower traffic would be expected to be there.”
Erwin testified that the Porsche and Cruze were driving northbound in the
right lane of the toll road. The Cruze, which was behind the Porsche, was traveling
approximately 19 miles per hour. Hurtado’s truck, which was pulling a trailer, was
traveling approximately 74 miles per hour as it approached the Cruze from behind.
According to Erwin, three-quarters of a second before impact, Hurtado applied the
truck’s brake, disengaging the truck’s cruise control which was set at 74 miles per
hour. Hurtado steered left at approximately the same time, but his truck did not
“move left very much and it ha[d] a center impact into the rear of the Chevrolet
Cruz[e].” According to Erwin, the Cruze accelerated from 19 miles per hour to 62
miles per hour within one-tenth and two-tenths of a second due to the impact, causing
the Cruze to collide with the back of the Porsche.
Erwin testified that the impact of the truck “crushe[d] the back of the
Chevrolet Cruz[e] forward so much that the rear [seats were] getting pushed forward
relative to where they used to be.” The impact also caused the driver’s seat in the
Cruze, where Baker was sitting, to recline so far back that its headrest touched the
car’s backseat.
When asked if “a reasonably attentive driver, driving at the posted speed limit,
maintaining a proper following distance, who reacts in the same way Mr. Hurtado
29
reacted in this wreck, [could] have avoided this collision,” Erwin testified “he would
have.” Driver inattention and fatigue can slow a driver’s reaction time. However,
according to Erwin, “it’s not a question of perception or response, it’s just
mathematics,” and he explained why the collision would not have occurred under
those circumstances. Erwin also testified regarding a proper child safety seat for J.B.
On cross-examination, Erwin testified he did not have an opinion regarding
whether the Cruze was operating at a dangerously slow speed, but he could say
“traveling at 19 in a 65-zone creates a hazard in the roadway. It does. But I also
understand there’s descriptions that that hazard was marked as a slow moving
vehicle with hazard lights.” He testified Hurtado’s evasive action was an
“appropriate response.” Erwin also explained how he conducted his evaluation, the
formulas and equipment he used, the evidence he relied on, and his certifications.
He also testified:
Q. And I guess if I heard you correctly, Mr. Erwin, really the only
thing that you disagree with the deputies in this case with regards
to reconstruction is that the crash could have been avoided if
[Hurtado] were doing 65 instead of 70—almost 74?
A. Mr. Hurtado, yeah, if they think that it would not have been, then,
mathematically I would demonstrate that’s incorrect. But, you
know, if he does the same things and his speed decreases the
same way as it was from 74 and then he hits the brakes and steers,
he’s going to miss that car.
30
Erwin testified that a driver’s perception and reaction time can increase when they
are “in a situation with other moving vehicles,” but it does not always and “some
reactions can be quicker to situations that are dramatic.”
Erwin testified that while “there are situations where operators can drive on
the improved shoulder legally,” the driver should only do so if they “want to bring
it to a stop” because the law “does not allow you to just get over there [on the
shoulder] and drive.” Erwin also testified that drivers may also “drive on an
improved shoulder to allow another vehicle traveling faster than [them] to pass,” and
there are “super limited situations” when drivers may drive on the shoulder to pass
another vehicle.
Erwin agreed that no one in the Cruze was restrained and “anyone transporting
a child younger than 8, unless they are taller than 4-foot-9, []should be in some sort
of child safety restraint.” According to Erwin, J.B. was shorter than 4-foot-9 and he
did not know how tall T.B. was, but he had a copy of the child’s medical records and
he could determine that information.
2. Mike Stone
Mike Stone is the chief operating officer of Mike Stone Associates, which
operates and manages the Fort Bend County Toll Road System. Stone testified about
the camera and video equipment used at the toll plaza to record vehicles passing
31
through the toll plaza. According to Stone, Deputy Garret requested video and still
photographs of the Porsche, the Cruze, and the truck the day of the crash.
G. Jury Charge
The jury was charged with manslaughter and the lesser included offense of
criminally negligent homicide. The charge instructed the jury that “a person
commits the offense of manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an
individual.” With respect to recklessness, the charge states that:
A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise as viewed
from the Defendant’s standpoint.
The charge further stated:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on
or about the 4th day of August, 2020, in Fort Bend County, Texas,
[Baker] did then and there unlawfully, recklessly cause the death of J.B.
. . . by failing to control speed, following too closely, not using proper
emergency devices, and not properly restraining [J.B.], while driving
his motor vehicle that was occupied by [J.B.] and causing it to collide
with another motor vehicle, then you will find [Baker] guilty of
manslaughter, as charged in the indictment.
The jury was instructed that unless they found from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, or if they had a reasonable doubt thereof, or were unable to agree,
they were to consider whether Baker was guilty of the lesser offense of criminally
negligent homicide. The charge provided that a “person commits the offense of
32
criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of an individual by criminal
negligence.” It stated:
A person acts with “criminal negligence,” or is “criminally negligent”
with respect to the result of his conduct, when he ought to be aware of
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise as viewed from the Defendant’s standpoint.
Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
on or about the 4th day of August, 2020, in Fort Bend County, Texas,
the Defendant, Rickel Tonio Baker, Jr., did then and there unlawfully,
with criminal negligence cause the death of J.B., a minor child and
hereafter called the Complainant, by failing to control speed, following
too closely, not using proper emergency devices, and not properly
restraining Complainant, while driving his motor vehicle that was
occupied by the Complainant and causing it to collide with another
motor vehicle, then you will find the defendant guilty of criminally
negligent homicide.
The jury was charged on the law of concurrent causation. The abstract and
application paragraphs of the charge stated:
A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred
but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another
cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the
result and the conduct of the defendant clearly insufficient.
Therefore if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the death of J.B., a minor child, would not have occurred but for
[Baker’s] conduct, as charged in the indictment, operating either alone
or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was
clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant
clearly insufficient, you will find [Baker] criminally responsible.
Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a
33
reasonable doubt thereof, then you will find [Baker] not criminally
responsible and say by your verdict “Not Guilty.”8
H. Closing Arguments
The State began its closing arguments by discussing the offenses of
manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. After explaining the definition of
recklessness required by the manslaughter charge, the State addressed the concurrent
causation portion of the charge:
Further, I want to discuss the criminal responsibility part of this charge.
I anticipate that there might be some arguments from Defense counsel
that this crash was Daniel Hurtado’s fault. But what you’ve heard from
the witnesses before you that anybody could have been Daniel Hurtado
that day. This crash was unavoidable.
A person’s criminally responsible unless there’s a completely different
cause that would have taken away the responsibility of that person,
unless there was -- Daniel Hurtado being the sole reason of this crash.
But what we heard is that he wasn’t. What we heard was that it was the
defendant’s recklessness that was the reason for this crash.
Also I want to bring to your attention that there are four different ways
that we’ve alleged that the defendant was reckless. Okay? And it’s
important for you understand that you don’t have to agree on all four.
You can agree on a combination. You can agree it was all four or you
can agree it was two. You can agree it was three. You can agree it was
one.
But the important thing is that you’re agreeing that there was reckless
conduct.
8
The jury charge also contained a special issue asking the jury to determine whether
Baker used or exhibited a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle, in the
commission of the offense, but only if they first found Baker guilty of manslaughter
or criminally negligent homicide.
34
Referring to a Russian roulette example the State gave the jury during voir
dire to illustrate the issue of recklessness, the State argued:
Every single act that is alleged as recklessness in this case is another
bullet in that chamber. The moment the defendant put his kids in that
car without a car seat, bullet in the chamber.
The moment he decided to get on the Fort Bend County Tollway where
the speed limit is 65 and do[es] 18 miles an hour in a moving lane,
another bullet in the chamber.
The moment he decided to put the kids in the car without the car seats,
get on the toll road doing 18, and not use his hazards, another bullet in
the chamber.
The moment he decides to put the kids in the car seat without the car -
- or put the kids in the car without the car seats, get on the tollway doing
18, no hazard lights, and following too closely to his sister, another
bullet in the chamber.
Four bullets in this chamber, Russian roulette -- playing Russian
roulette with his kids’ lives that day, and he lost. It’s not him that lost.
It was [J.B.]
You heard from the witnesses today -- or throughout this trial that any
of those acts on its own could have caused that death, but we have four.
And I submit to you that we’ve proven all four of those beyond a
reasonable doubt.
...
We all know that every single thing that [Baker] did was reckless. And
we know that because of his decision he is guilty of the very sad
manslaughter of [J.B.].
In his closing, Baker’s counsel began by discussing recklessness:
Now, in the jury charge it talks about Mr. Baker’s conduct. Was he
aware of and did he consciously disregard a substantial and
35
unjustifiable risk that his son would die? Was that -- was what he did
a gross deviation as viewed from Mr. Baker’s standpoint?
Baker’s counsel argued the jury needed to “look[] at the charges here from the
standpoint of Mr. Baker” when assessing whether he was reckless. Counsel also
discussed the circumstances leading up to collision, which he described as an
“emergency situation.” Among other things, counsel argued that Baker was only
driving on the toll road that day because he was following his sister to the tire shop,
Carolyn had chosen the route, there is no evidence Baker knew Carolyn’s speed
would be restricted, and Baker was driving in the “right-hand slow lane” with his
hazard lights on. He also argued there was no evidence Baker knew “Hurtado was
coming from behind him in a 20,000-pound commercial motor vehicle, cruise
control speeding; distracted by his two loads and probably on his phone and in broad
daylight smashing in the back of the Cruz[e].”
With respect to the manners and means by which Baker was alleged to have
been reckless, Baker’s counsel stated the State was “alleging that Mr. Baker did all
four of these things at the same time together.” The State objected to this statement
as a misstatement of the law and the court sustained the objection. Baker’s counsel
continued, “When you read the charge it says he was -- the controlling speed,
following too closely, not using emergency devices, and no[] proper restraint. So it
says ‘and.’ They’re saying it’s all four together.” The State also objected to this
36
statement as misstatement of the law and the court sustained the objection.9 When
he argued that based on the State’s charge, the State had to “prove that [Baker]
caused his car to make contact with the truck that rear-ended him, the State objected,
and the trial court sustained the objection.
Baker’s counsel further argued:
Now, the State has to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. In
their -- in terms of the speeding and the following close and the
emergency devices, that all has to do with who caused the crash.
Now, following too close, y’all heard from Deputy Musil and Deputy
Garret who testified [Baker] wasn’t following too close.
....
Flashers. Not only did the State not prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he didn’t have them on, we proved to y’all they were on. I think
we proved that to y’all. We don’t have any burden of proof. That’s our
law in our country.
Cross off the flashers. That’s two down.
Defense counsel also argued the jury could “cross off the list speeding” because the
“only evidence y’all heard about Mr. Hurtado was that he was speeding and that was
a contributing factor of this crash.”
9
Although the charge listed the alleged manners and means in the conjunctive, Baker
and the State agreed at oral argument that the charge should be evaluated as though
it was submitted in the disjunctive because it was explained to the jury during
closing arguments that they did not have to find all four manners and means to find
Baker guilty of manslaughter.
37
Baker’s counsel then discussed the fourth manner and means alleged by the
State, the lack of proper restraints.
This one’s a little more difficult. And on page -- of your charge, ladies
and gentlemen -- 3, it says -- I wrote those words in there, restraint.
Okay?
So this says: A person -- a person is criminally responsible if the result
would not have occurred but for his conduct. At this point, you know,
I’m only talking about the restraints because I don’t think we even get
here for the other three charges causing the crash.
So here we’re talking about the lack of restraint. What is the conduct
that’s been charged? It’s lack of restraint.
....
So they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no proper
restraints is a cause of the death. A person is criminally responsible if
the result – that’s the death -- would not have occurred but for his
conduct not having the restraint.
So they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that if [J.B.] was in a
proper restraint his death would not have occurred.
The State objected to this statement as misstatement of the law and the court
sustained the objection. Defense counsel stated:
[A] person is only criminally responsible if the result would not have
occurred but for their conduct. So they have the burden beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Prosecution brought you no expert witness or
any evidence whatsoever that if [J.B.] was in a proper restraint his death
would not have occurred.
The State objected to this statement as a misstatement of the law and the court
sustained the objection.
38
With respect to J.B.’s cause of death, Baker’s counsel argued that the only
witness who testified about J.B.’s cause of death was the medical examiner and her
report “told y’all what this case is about, a rear-end truck accident.”10 According to
Baker’s counsel, the report determined J.B.’s cause of death was blunt force trauma
and the medical examiner testified that each of J.B.’s blunt force trauma injuries was
“consistent with the seat crush striking the boy and pushing him backward towards
the rear structure of the car.” Counsel reiterated that under the circumstances,
Baker’s failure to put J.B. in a child safety seat could not have caused his death:
A seat crushed him back. A seat slammed into him, blunt force here,
blunt force when he gets hit back from the seat collapsing due to truck
rear-end strike. No restraint can protect you when you are crushed like
that.
....
His brother [T.B.], who was not restrained and in the same crash
survived because his mom’s seat did not collapse on him.
Baker’s counsel argued:
A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred
but for his conduct. Number 4, conduct they’re charging is a lack of
restraint. The result this is referring to is the death. Y’all can use your
common sense and apply that language.
You can also use your common sense and read plain English, which
says: Therefore, if you find from the evidence—it has to be beyond a
reasonable doubt—that the death of [J.B.] would not have occurred but
for the fact that there was not a proper restraint.
10
The State objected to this statement as well as being outside the evidence.
39
Please apply plain English when you’re deliberating and decide
whether or not any kind of restraint could have saved [J.B.]
Baker’s counsel also criticized Lieutenant Garret’s investigation and challenged the
credibility of the officers and Hurtado.
In its final closing argument, the State argued that Baker had acted recklessly
when he “chose to put his children and the mother of his children in a car with no
restraints” and his recklessness was compounded by his decisions to drive on the toll
road at 18 miles per hour instead of taking a safer road, and not using his hazard
lights. The State also discussed the conflicting evidence as to whether the Cruze’s
hazard lights were on when the crash occurred, and it addressed the other three
alleged manners and means:
We have to base our decision on what we know. So we know that the
defendant was doing 18, 19 miles an hour at the time of this crash. We
know that is inherently dangerous. We know that child was not in a car
seat, either one of them. We know that that is fatal. Right?
You had experts come in here -- medical experts and reconstruction
experts come in here and tell you that. The only time they’ve ever seen
fatalities in children are when they’re not in a car seat.
The State also explained to the jury that they did not have to find that Baker was
reckless by engaging in all four alleged manners and means. The State explained:
[J]ust want to remind because it’s a little unusual, while the Defense
wants to sit on this word “and.” “And” is how the case is pled.
Cases are always proven in the dy[i]junctive, meaning ‘or,” which then
means what y’all can do is if three or four of y’all believe that the
recklessness -- this is what all these different means are for. Right?
40
If three or four of y’all believe recklessness was failure to control speed
and three or four of y’all believe that it was no car seat issue and three
or four of y’all believe that it is the lack of the emergency equipment,
right, the hazard lights, y’all all can be different in your decision as to
how the defendant was reckless. But as long you believe at least one
of them beyond a reasonable doubt, we have then proven reckless to
you.
And selectively as a group, all you have [to] believe is one thing is
reckless and one thing is not, y’all all are unanimous as to the reckless
element.
....
So just because you guys might not agree on which part of this crime is
reckless, if you believe there is one, then you can be unanimous in
believing that there was a reckless act. Okay?
The State then addressed the issue of causation, including whether Hurtado
could have avoided the crash:
Remember what Deputy Musil told us? It doesn’t matter what car
you’re in, whether it’s a heavy car or regular car, an SUV, a four-door
car, this crash still happens, no matter what.
No matter who was in the driver’s seat of that truck and no matter what
vehicle that person is driving, it happens. And it happens because of
the actions of the defendant, not anybody else.
And if you take the evidence as a whole, we know that the only
evidence y’all have is evidence to support that, what happened, in that
order, right? We know the truck was doing 67 miles per hour prior to
the crash when it went under the gantry camera. We know that Mr.
Hurtado slammed on his brakes. We know that he tried to take evasive
action to the left. And remember he explained that to us, right?
He told us: As soon as I saw that car, I thought it was stalled out. And
when you have a stalled-out car, that means there are pedestrians on the
shoulder, and I didn’t want to hurt anybody so I steered left.
41
Now, that is -- that is a man who cares and who attempts at every point
to be a safe driver, not a person who chooses to put a child unrestrained
in the back seat of a car.
Now, I didn’t really think this could be accurate until I listened to what
Felicia Baker told us. So you guys have seen this wreck. It’s bad. It’s
terrible. It is fatal. Now, remember, [T.B.], Ms. Felicia Baker told us,
he suffered really bad injuries. So for the Defense to come up here –
....
For the Defense to come here and try to insinuate or intimate to all of
you that [T.B.] is just fine, is just not right. Felicia Baker told you he
had a brain injury. He had to learn how to speak again. He broke his
legs. He had to learn how to walk again. That’s bad. And he lost his
little brother because of things his dad.
This wreck is bad. It’s horrible. But, you know what, you know who
didn’t get injured? The people in the front seat. I guess that’s a
coincidence. I don’t know. But we know that someone died in this
car.
....
Now, we don’t know what caused [J.B.’s] head injuries. We don’t. The
Medical Examiner told us he had blunt force trauma to the back of the
head. So something hit him and/or he hit something. So we don’t know
if it was in the car, if it was out of the car. You don’t. All you know is
that’s how he died. The Medical Examiner couldn’t even tell us if he
suffered or not.
The State also addressed briefly whether Baker used a deadly weapon. The
State argued:
As parents we are supposed to protect children. As people in a
community we’re supposed to protect the future of your community.
The defendant didn’t do it. He knew he didn’t do it and he didn’t care.
Those are choices that show you that he knew that there was a risk and
he just said: Screw it. I’m going to help my sister change a tire halfway
42
across town, way more important than making sure my kids are
strapped in.
....
What do regular people do when they’re in the defendant’s position and
did the defendant act the same way? We all know the answer to that,
right? No. Because regular people are not reckless. Regular people do
not put children who need to be in car seats not in car seats.
....
Regular people do not put their own children in danger, do not drive 18
miles an hour on the freeway, do not—make sure they have emergency
equipment on, if that actually happened. Of if your car broke down,
you turn your flashers on and get on the side of the road. That’s what
you do. That’s what a regular person does. Not a reckless person. Not
a person who chooses to disregard what may or may not happen.
That’s what a regular person does. Not a reckless person. Not a person
who chooses to disregard what may or may not happen.
The State concluded by telling the jury that “the only evidence you have shows us
that [Baker] was reckless and his recklessness caused the death of [J.B.].”
On June 17, 2022, the jury acquitted Baker of manslaughter and the lesser
included offense of criminally negligent homicide. Ten days later, on June 27, 2022,
the State indicted Baker for injury to a child against T.B. (trial court cause number
22-DCR-099972) and it reindicted Baker for aggravated assault against a family
member causing serious bodily injury against T.B. (trial court cause number 20-
DCR-92879B). The indictment charging Baker with injury to a child against T.B.
alleges that that on or about August 4, 2020, Baker
43
did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause serious
bodily injury to [T.B.] … by failing to use proper restraints, operating
his vehicle at an unsafe speed, failing to use proper emergency
equipment, or by impeding traffic, while driving his motor vehicle that
was occupied by [T.B.] and cause it to collide with another motor
vehicle.
did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission
cause serious bodily injury or serious mental deficiency, impairment or
injury to [T.B.] … by failing to use proper restraints, operating his
vehicle at an unsafe speed, failing to use proper emergency equipment,
or by impeding traffic, while driving his motor vehicle that was
occupied by [T.B.] and causing it to collide with another motor vehicle,
and the defendant had assumed care, custody or control of the child.
And the indictment charging Baker with aggravated assault against a family member
causing serious bodily injury against T.B. alleges that on or about August 4, 2020,
Baker
did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause serious
bodily injury to [T.B.] by failing to use proper restraints, operating his
vehicle at an unsafe speed, failing to use proper emergency equipment,
or by impeding traffic, while driving his motor vehicle that was
occupied by [T.B.] and causing it to collide with another motor vehicle,
and the defendant used a deadly weapon, to-wit: motor vehicle, during
the commission of said assault.
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Baker filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus in which he
argued the doctrine of collateral estoppel embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee against double jeopardy barred the State from prosecuting him for the
indicted offenses against T.B. According to Baker, collateral estoppel applies
because when the jury acquitted him of manslaughter and criminally negligent
44
homicide in the first trial, the jury “necessarily and rationally concluded [that] Baker
did not cause the motor vehicle collision in which he and his family were rear-ended
by Hurtado who was driving the 20,000 pound truck-trailer combination,” and
causation is an essential element of the offenses of injury to a child and aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. While Baker acknowledged that recklessness was
also an element the jury had to determine in the manslaughter trial, he argued that
recklessness was not “a rational path to acquittal” because the State “focused its case
on the issue of who caused the collision.” He argued that he never contested the
children were not restrained or that he was traveling 18 miles an hour on the toll
road. And thus, the “jury simply could not have rationally acquitted [him] on the
issue of recklessness.”
Baker also argued that the State was estopped or had waived its right to try
him for the offenses against T.B. based on the prosecutor’s pretrial statement to the
trial court during the manslaughter case that it was not “the State’s position that we
will have two criminal trials. Our intention is to go forward on the criminal trial on
the manslaughter . . . We’re not asking for a second criminal trial later.”
After conducting a hearing on Baker’s pretrial application for writ of habeas
corpus, the trial court denied relief on the merits. This appeal followed.
45
Collateral Estoppel
In his first issue, Baker argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial
application for habeas corpus relief because the jury necessarily decided the issue of
causation in his favor, and causation is an essential element of the injury to a child
and aggravated assault charges the State now seeks to prosecute against him.
According to Baker, the “issue of ultimate fact [the jury decided during the first trial]
was a causation decision concerning whether Baker’s conduct was clearly
insufficient to cause the result and whether Hurtado’s conduct was clearly
sufficient,” and the jury necessarily resolved this issue in Baker’s favor. He argues
this is the “only rational basis for the jury’s decision” to acquit him. Baker argues
that the “jury’s necessary conclusion that Hurtado’s actions were the sole and clear
sufficient cause of J.B.’s death, necessarily means that it was also the sole sufficient
cause of the injuries to T.B. that the State seeks to relitigate” in a second trial for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and injury to a child.11
The State argues that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because Baker
disputed both recklessness and causation at trial and the jury could have acquitted
11
Baker’s argument on appeal is somewhat different than the argument he raised in
his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. In his pretrial application for a
writ of habeas corpus, Baker argued that by acquitting him of manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide, the jury necessarily decided that Baker did not cause
the motor vehicle collision resulting in J.B.’s death. On appeal, Baker argues the
jury necessarily found that his conduct was clearly insufficient, and Hurtado’s
conduct clearly sufficient, to cause “the result”—J.B.’s death.
46
him on either basis. If there are two bases on which a jury could have reached a
verdict, the State argues “collateral estoppel does not bar a subsequent trial.” The
State also argues that the facts and legal issues from the first trial for manslaughter
and criminally negligent homicide are not identical to the facts and legal issues that
will be involved in the second trial for aggravated assault and injury to a child in part
because the offenses are “result of conduct” offenses for which the required mens
rea for recklessness differs.12 The State argues that a “rational jury could have found
[Baker] was not reckless in that it could have found he did not perceive a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that J.B. would die, and yet still rationally find that he did
perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that T.B. would sustain serious bodily
injury.”
A. Standard of Review
The writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy. Ex parte Perry, 483
S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A collateral estoppel claim that alleges a
12
There are three categories of criminal offenses: “result of conduct” offenses, “nature
of conduct” offenses, and “circumstances of conduct” offenses. Young v. State, 341
S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A “result of conduct” offense focuses on
the result, regardless of the specific manner used to accomplish the result. See id.;
see also Ramos v. State, 407 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating
“manslaughter is a ‘result of conduct’ crime where the ‘focus’ or gravamen is the
‘death of the individual’”). The gravamen or focus of a “nature of conduct” offense,
however, is the act or conduct itself regardless of any result. See Young, 341 S.W.3d
at 423. A “circumstances of conduct” offense “prohibit[s] otherwise innocent
behavior that becomes criminal only under specific circumstance.” Id.47
double jeopardy violation is one of the limited circumstances in which a defendant
can seek pretrial habeas relief. See id. at 895–96; see also Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d
617, 619–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial
application for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion. Ex parte Wheeler, 203
S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d 292, 297
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d). In conducting our review, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to the trial
court’s findings of fact supported by the record. See Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d
at 324; Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 297. We also defer to the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts if resolving the ultimate question turns on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ex parte Paxton, 493 S.W.3d at 297.
If resolving the ultimate question turns on applying legal standards, we review
the trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus de novo.
See State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (recognizing that
although “[c]ollateral estoppel deals only with specific factual determinations, not
legal claims or legal conclusions,” de novo review is nevertheless appropriate when
“[a] decision to apply collateral estoppel is a question of law, applied to the facts”)
(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
48
B. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person
shall be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Embodied within the guarantee against double jeopardy is
the principle of collateral estoppel. Ex parte Adams, 586 S.W.3d at 4 (citing Ashe
v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970)). Collateral estoppel “stands for an extremely
important principle in our adversary system of justice.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443. It
“means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a
valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties.” Id.“[C]ollateral estoppel requires that the precise fact[s] litigated in the first
prosecution have arisen in the same transaction, occurrence, situation, or criminal
episode that gave rise to the second prosecution.” Murphy v. State, 239 S.W.3d 791,
795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When assessing whether collateral estoppel applies to
bar a subsequent criminal trial, courts must first ascertain what facts were necessarily
decided in the first proceeding and then determine whether those necessarily-decided
facts constitute essential elements of the charged offense in the second trial. Ex parte
Rion, 662 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); see also Ex parte Watkins, 73
S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Before collateral estoppel will apply to
bar relitigation of a discrete fact, that fact must necessarily have been decided in
49
favor of the defendant in the first trial.”). “Where a previous judgment of acquittal
was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a
court to examine the record of a prior proceeding,” taking into account the pleadings,
evidence, jury charge, arguments of counsel, and other relevant matters, “and
conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other
than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Ashe, 397
U.S. at 443 (“The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to
all the circumstances of the proceeding”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 896–97 (same); Ex parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d 434,
442 (Tex. 2002) (“Generally, then, the scope of the facts that were actually litigated
determines the scope of the factual finding covered by collateral estoppel.”); Ex
parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d at 268 (“In applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
courts must first determine whether the jury determined a specific fact, and if so,
how broad—in terms of time, space and content—was the scope of its finding.”).
For collateral estoppel to apply, a court must conclude that “it would have
been irrational for the jury to acquit in the first trial without finding in the defendant’s
favor on a fact essential to a conviction in the second.” Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d
at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted). Collateral estoppel is restricted to cases
in which the legal and factual situations are identical. Id. “[T]here are no hard and
fast rules concerning which factual issues are legally identical and thus barred from
50
relitigation in a second criminal proceeding.” Ex parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d 434, 442
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“If an ordinary person would expostulate, ‘But that’s a
different issue,’ probably it is.”) (quoting 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, 24 § 4417
at 440).
Collateral estoppel does not preclude a second prosecution simply because it
is unlikely—or even very unlikely—that the original jury acquitted without finding
the fact in question. Ex parte Richardson, 664 S.W.3d 141, 143 (Tex. Crim. App.
2022). The mere possibility that a fact may have been previously determined is
insufficient to bar re-litigation of that same fact in a second trial. Ex parte Watkins,
73 S.W.3d at 268. A fact is not necessarily decided if the jury could have acquitted
the defendant on a different basis. See Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 898 (stating “if
the jury could have acquitted [the defendant of manslaughter] based on either
[recklessness or causation] then collateral estoppel would not apply”). The
defendant has the difficult burden to establish that the facts at issue in the second
trial were necessarily decided in his favor in the first trial. Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at
795; see also Ex parte Adams, 586 S.W.3d at 5; Stone v. State, 635 S.W.3d 763, 774
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (recognizing collateral estoppel
“test is demanding”).
51
When deciding whether collateral estoppel applies, courts must avoid taking
a “hypertechnical and archaic approach,” and instead apply the test “with realism
and rationality.” Id. at 444. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Ashe,
The inquiry “must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to
all the circumstances of the proceedings.” Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575, 579, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180. Any test more technically
restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of
collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where
the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.
397 U.S. at 444; see also Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 794–95 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at
444).
C. Manslaughter - Recklessness and Causation
Article 19.04 of the Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits the
offense of manslaughter “if he recklessly causes the death of an individual.” TEX.
PENAL CODE § 19.04(a). To convict Baker of manslaughter, the State thus had to
prove that Baker recklessly caused the death of J.B.
A person acts “recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). “The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor’s standpoint.” Id. Section 6.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code, which defines
52
causation for purposes of criminal responsibility, states that “a person is criminally
responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either
alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly
sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” See
id. § 6.04(a).13
To convict a defendant of manslaughter, the State must prove the existence of
a “but for” causal connection between the defendant’s reckless conduct and the
result—the complainant’s death. See Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (“Under § 6.04(a) a ‘but for’ causal connection must be
established between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting harm.”). If there is
more than one “but for” cause of the complainant’s death, the defendant is still
criminally responsible if (1) his conduct was sufficient by itself to have caused the
complainant’s death, or (2) the defendant’s conduct and the other cause together
were sufficient to have caused the complainant’s death. See Robbins, 717 S.W.2d
at 351 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(a)); Cyr v. State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022) (“Where two or more causes satisfy ‘but for’ causation, a criminal
defendant remains liable if her conduct was either sufficient to have caused the result
alone ‘regardless of the existence of a concurrent cause,’ or both causes ‘together’
13
“Another cause” is one in addition to the actor’s conduct, “an agency in addition to
the actor.” Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 557 (quoting Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 n.2).
53
were sufficient to cause the result.”) (quoting Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351 (emphasis
in original)). A defendant is not criminally responsible if another “but for” cause
was clearly sufficient by itself to cause the complainant’s death and the defendant’s
conduct by itself was clearly insufficient. Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained the concept of concurrent
causation:
To illustrate: Two arsonists each light fire to the same house, one on
the east side and one on the west side, both of which are independently
sufficient to burn the house to the ground. Neither arsonist is entitled to
an instruction on concurrent causation and both are criminally liable.
The same result is reached if both fires would independently be
insufficient to burn the house to the ground, but the combined force of
the east fire and the west fire causes such a result. Only where the east
arsonist can produce evidence that his fire was clearly insufficient to
burn the house to the ground, and the west arsonist’s clearly sufficient
acting alone, would the east arsonist be entitled to an instruction on
concurrent causation and potentially escape liability for the full extent
of the damage caused under concurrent causation.
Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 557.
D. Analysis
Baker argues that collateral estoppel applies and bars the State from
prosecuting him for aggravated assault and injury to a child against T.B. because the
jury in his manslaughter trial necessarily decided the issue of causation in his favor,
and causation is essential to a conviction for aggravated assault and injury to a child
against T.B. According to Baker, “the jury necessarily had to have decided that [his]
conduct was clearly insufficient to have caused the result and Hurtado’s conduct was
54
clearly sufficient to have caused the result,” and this “is the only rational basis for
the jury’s decision” to acquit him. Baker argues that the focus of his manslaughter
trial was on the issue of causation and that although “the defense challenged the
alleged manner and means alleged in the indictment,” it did so “to demonstrate that
[his] alleged actions were clearly insufficient to cause the result and Hurtado’s
actions were clearly sufficient.” In other words, Baker argues that causation was the
primary issue in his manslaughter trial, and to the extent the issue of recklessness
was before the jury, the jury could not rationally have acquitted him on that basis.
Relying on the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Ex parte Rion, the State
argues that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because Baker disputed
both recklessness and causation at trial and the jury could have acquitted him on
either ground. See Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 898 (stating “the State had to prove
both causation and recklessness for the jury to convict Appellant, and it is true that
if the jury could have acquitted based on either of those grounds then collateral
estoppel would not apply”). According to the State, the jury in Baker’s manslaughter
trial could have found that Baker did not have the required mens rea because he did
not perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that J.B. would die as a result of his
conduct, and thus acquitted Baker of manslaughter on this basis.
In Ex parte Rion, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that collateral estoppel
did not bar the State from prosecuting Rion for aggravated assault following his
55
acquittal for the offense of manslaughter arising from the same car collision. Ex
parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 898. Rion, who drove his car seventy-one miles per hour
in a forty-mile-per-hour zone, lost control of his car causing it to cross the median
and strike an SUV driven by Claudia Loehr. Loehr was seriously injured in the
collision and Parnell, a passenger in the SUV, sustained life-threatening injuries and
died four days later. Rion was charged with manslaughter for Parnell’s death and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for Loehr’s injuries. Id. at 893. Rion
moved to consolidate both cases into a single trial, but the motion was opposed by
the State and denied by the trial court. Id. Rion’s defensive theory at his
manslaughter trial was that he had a mental break when he was driving, and thus he
lacked the requisite mens rea for manslaughter. In other words, Rion was not
reckless by driving thirty miles per hour over the speed limit and losing control of
his vehicle causing it to cross the median because, due to his altered mental state, he
did not consciously disregard a substantial and unjustified risk that such conduct
would result in someone’s death. Id. at 896. The jury acquitted Rion of manslaughter
and the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. Subsequently, the
State sought to prosecute Rion for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based
on Loehr’s injuries. Rion filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus
arguing that collateral estoppel prohibited the State from prosecuting him for
56
aggravated assault because the first jury necessarily had decided that Rion had not
acted recklessly. Id. The trial court denied Rion’s application. Id.
On appeal, the State argued collateral estoppel did not apply because, among
other reasons, the jury could have acquitted Rion based on causation and not
recklessness, thus the jury had not necessarily decided the issue of recklessness in
Rion’s favor. Id. at 897. The court explained that “the State had to prove both
causation and recklessness for the jury to convict” Rion of manslaughter and “if the
jury could have acquitted based on either [causation or recklessness] then collateral
estoppel would not apply.” Id. at 898. The court concluded, however, that the
“jury’s not guilty verdict could not have been rationally based on a finding that [Rion
had] not cause[d] the accident or that Parnell’s death was not caused by the accident”
because “the defense did not attempt to dispute that [Rion] caused the accident or
that Parnell dies as a result,” and thus the jury had not necessarily decided the issue
of causation in favor of Rion and acquitted him on that basis. See id. at 899. In
reaching this conclusion, the court observed that Rion had not disputed he caused
the crash or that Parnell died as a result. Rather, Rion expressed remorse to Parnell’s
family during his testimony and through his statements, the court determined, Rion
“took responsibility” for causing the accident that resulted in Parnell’s death. Id. at
899. The court noted that the testimony from Rion’s witnesses did not raise any
questions of causation and Rion’s counsel did not attempt to elicit any testimony on
57
cross-examination of the State’s witnesses regarding whether Rion caused the crash
or whether the crash caused Parnell’s death. The court also remarked that the State’s
closing argument was focused on recklessness. The court noted that the State
understood that recklessness was the primary issue for the jury to decide, not
causation, because the State had brought up the issue of causation only once during
20 pages of argument. See id. 899 (“The lack of argument regarding causation
indicates the State was not concerned that the jury would acquit Appellant on a
finding that the State failed to prove that element.”). In its closing argument, the
defense acknowledged that Rion had caused the crash and, like the State, focused on
the issue of recklessness. The defense reiterated its theory that the accident occurred
when Rion had a mental break, and argued the State had not presented any evidence
Rion was aware of and consciously disregarded a risk that someone would die as a
result of his conduct. Id. at 895–96.
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the jury necessarily
had decided facts in favor of Rion as to recklessness in the manslaughter trial, the
court nonetheless concluded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the
facts necessarily decided in Rion’s manslaughter trial as to recklessness, including
whether Rion had the mens rea required to convict him of manslaughter for Parnell’s
death, were not facts essential for a conviction in the second trial for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon involving Loehr’s injuries, because the required mental
58
states for the offenses are not the same. See id. at 900–01. The court explained that
the offenses of manslaughter, assault, and aggravated assault are “result of conduct”
offenses. See id. at 900. To convict Rion of manslaughter, the jury thus had to find
that Rion was aware of a risk that death would occur as result of his conduct, whereas
the jury in the second trial for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon would have
to find that Rion was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that bodily injury
would occur as result of his conduct. See id. at 900–01. Because the recklessness
issues in the two trials were “not precisely the same,” collateral estoppel did not
apply. Id. at 901.
Baker argues that Ex parte Rion is materially different because in the
manslaughter case, “all of the methods alleged to be reckless or negligent were hotly
disputed” and the case had “substantial evidence that the actual cause of death was
the result of Hurtado’s manner and circumstance of driving.” He also argues that
the jury was instructed that it was “required to find Baker not guilty it if concluded
that, or had a reasonably doubt about, whether Hurtado’s actions were clearly
sufficient to cause the result and Baker’s actions were clearly insufficient.” And
while “recklessly or negligently causing death may be different than recklessly or
negligently causing injury in some circumstances,” Baker argues “the opposite is
true in the instant case because the jury’s necessary conclusion that Hurtado’s
actions were the sole and clear sufficient cause of J.B.’s death, necessarily means
59
that it was also the also the sole sufficient cause of the injuries to T.B.—an issue he
argues the State seeks to “relitigate” in a second trial.
The fatal flaw in Baker’s analysis is that his argument presupposes that the
only issue the jury considered or the only rational basis on which the jury could have
acquitted him of manslaughter in the first trial is causation. Based on our review of
the entire record, we do not reach that same conclusion. The issues of causation and
recklessness both were present throughout Baker’s manslaughter trial, from opening
statements to closing arguments. Although Baker’s main defensive theory was that
Hurtado caused the crash, and most of the arguments and testimony presented at trial
concerned whether Baker or Hurtado caused the crash that resulted in J.B.’s death,
and whether Baker could be held criminally responsible for J.B.’s death under
concurrent causation, Baker acknowledges that he disputed both recklessness and
causation at trial and that “all of the methods alleged to be reckless or negligent were
hotly disputed.” Indeed, in his closing, Baker’s counsel began by discussing
recklessness:
Now, in the jury charge it talks about Mr. Baker’s conduct. Was he
aware of and did he consciously disregard a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his son would die? Was that -- was what he did
a gross deviation as viewed from Mr. Baker’s standpoint?
Baker’s counsel argued that the jury needed to “look[] at the charges here from the
standpoint of Mr. Baker” when assessing whether he was reckless.
60
The record also reflects that the State, which discussed both recklessness and
causation in its opening statement, presented testimony supporting all four alleged
manners and means of recklessness and expert testimony that Baker’s recklessness
had caused the crash that resulted in J.B.’s death. Baker’s counsel also elicited
testimony regarding recklessness and causation on direct and cross examination.
Among other testimony regarding recklessness, Deputy Musil testified that every
licensed Texas driver has the Texas Driver’s Handbook and the handbook instructs
drivers that in the event of a breakdown, the driver should activate his emergency
flashers and move off the edge of the roadway. According to Deputy Musil, “failing
to activate your emergency equipment in situations when you’re going dangerously
slow” is “reckless behavior” capable of causing serious injury or death. He also
testified that based on the video taken at the toll plaza, Baker had not activated the
Cruze’s hazard lights prior to the crash. On cross-examination, Deputy Musil
testified that a driver may drive at a reduced speed if a special hazard exists, but he
disagreed with Baker’s counsel that a special hazard existed that allowed Baker to
drive 18 miles an hour on the tollway.
Although his testimony pertained primarily to the issue of causation,
Lieutenant Garret also testified that the Cruze was traveling 18-19 miles per hour
which is a “a very unsafe speed” and “equally dangerous” as driving 105 miles per
hour. Lieutenant Garret also testified that he had inspected one of the bulbs from
61
the Cruze and he determined that the Cruze’s hazard lights were not on when the
crash occurred. According to Lieutenant Garrett, Baker should have been using his
hazard lights when he was driving on the tollway, and if he had, it would have given
Hurtado “extra time to observe” the slow-moving Cruze.
On cross-examination, Baker’s counsel also questioned Lieutenant Garret at
length about the light bulb he obtained from the Cruze and the basis of his conclusion
that the Cruze’s hazard lights were not activated when the crash occurred. Erwin,
Baker’s accident reconstruction expert, also testified extensively about whether
Baker had activated the Cruze’s hazard lights. Erwin testified that contrary to
Lieutenant Garret’s testimony, Baker had activated the Cruze’s hazard lights prior
to the crash. According to Erwin, the light bulb Lieutenant Garret obtained from the
Cruze was not a hazard light, and thus provided no evidence that the hazard lights
were not in use prior to the crash. Erwin also testified that he reviewed the video
taken by the toll plaza’s cameras and the video showed the Cruze’s hazard lights
were activated when it drove past the toll plaza. Ervin also discussed Baker’s
decision to drive at a reduced speed in the right lane, as opposed to driving on the
shoulder of the road, in light of Texas law.
In its closing argument, the State discussed the evidence of the four alleged
manners and means of recklessness and argued that Baker had engaged in each
alleged act. The State also argued that Baker, alone, was responsible for causing the
62
crash and that there was nothing Hurtado could have done to avoid striking the back
of the Cruze. While Baker’s closing argument focused on the issue of causation, the
defense also discussed the manners and means of recklessness and argued that Baker
had not followed too closely, had not failed to activate the Cruze’s hazard lights, and
had not failed to control his speed. Baker did not dispute that he had failed to restrain
J.B. in the backseat of the Cruze. Rather, the defense argued that Baker’s failure to
restrain J.B. had not caused J.B.’s death. Thus, while causation may have been a
heavily litigated issue at Baker’s manslaughter trial, the issue of Baker’s
recklessness was also put before the jury.
Baker bore the difficult burden of proving the jury necessarily decided the fact
of causation in his favor at the manslaughter trial and acquitted him on that basis.
Murphy, 239 S.W.3d at 795; see also Ex parte Adams, 586 S.W.3d at 5; Stone, 635
S.W.3d at 774 (recognizing collateral estoppel “test is demanding”). A fact is not
necessarily decided if the jury could have acquitted the defendant on a different
basis. See Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 898 (stating “if the jury could have acquitted
[the defendant of manslaughter] based on either [recklessness or causation] then
collateral estoppel would not apply”). Even if it is highly unlikely that the jury
would have acquitted Baker absent a finding of causation in his favor (in other
words, finding he did not cause J.B.’s death), this is not enough to render the doctrine
of collateral estoppel applicable. Collateral estoppel does not preclude a second
63
prosecution simply because it is unlikely—or even very unlikely—that the original
jury acquitted without finding the fact in question. Ex parte Richardson, 664 S.W.3d
at 143 (stating collateral estoppel does not preclude second prosecution when it is
every unlikely original jury acquitted defendant without finding fact in question).
Given the conflicting evidence in the record as to whether Baker engaged in
the alleged manners and means, the extensive trial testimony regarding recklessness,
and the arguments of counsel, including whether Baker had the required mens rea
for manslaughter, the jury could have found that Baker was not reckless, and
rationally acquitted him on that basis. We thus cannot say it would have been
irrational for the jury to acquit Baker of manslaughter without finding in favor of
Baker on the issue of causation.
Moreover, even if we conclude that the jury necessarily found that Baker’s
conduct was clearly insufficient to cause J.B.’s death and Hurtado’s conduct was
clearly sufficient to cause his death, as Baker argues, that does not end the inquiry.
Collateral estoppel does not apply unless we also conclude that the facts decided in
the first trial are essential to convict Baker of aggravated assault causing serious
bodily injury and injury to a child with regard to T.B. in a second trial See Ex parte
Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 896 (stating collateral estoppel applies when fact necessarily
decided in defendant’s favor in first trial are essential to conviction in second trial).
64
According to Baker, the “jury’s necessary conclusion that Hurtado’s actions
were the sole and clear sufficient cause of J.B.’s death, necessarily means that it was
also the sole sufficient cause of the injuries to T.B. that the State seeks to relitigate”
in a second trial for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and injury to a child.
Relying on Ex parte Rion, the State argues that it is not barred by collateral estoppel
from trying Baker for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and injury to a child
against T.B. because the facts and legal issues to be litigated for those offenses are
not identical to the facts and legal issues litigated in the first trial for manslaughter.
Baker alleges that his conduct, Hurtado’s conduct, and the facts surrounding
the collision will be the same in both trials. But the critical difference is that in the
manslaughter case, the question was whether Baker was criminally responsible for
J.B.’s death, and the question in the aggravated assault and injury to a child trial will
be whether Baker is criminally responsible for T.B.’s injuries. See id. at 900 (stating
manslaughter, assault causing bodily injury, and aggravated assault causing bodily
injury are “result of conduct” offenses and gravamen of assault and aggravated
assault offense is bodily injury); see also Ramos v. State, 407 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (stating “manslaughter is a ‘result of conduct’ crime where the
‘focus’ or gravamen is the ‘death of the individual’”); Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d
711, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (indicting injury to a child is result of conduct
offense). Although the State had the burden of proving that Baker caused the result
65
in the first manslaughter trial and will bear the same burden in the second trial for
aggravated assault and injury to a child, the results of Baker’s conduct, or omissions,
are different and thus the legal issue of causation is different. See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 19.04(a) (stating person commits offense of manslaughter “if he recklessly causes
the death of an individual”); id. § 22.01(a)(1) (stating person commits assault if
person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury”); id. §
22.02(a)(1) (stating person commits aggravated assault “if the person commits
assault as defined in § 22.01” and “causes serious bodily injury to another”); id. §
22.04(a)(1) (stating person commits injury to a child if person “intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child. . . serious bodily injury”).
Whereas the State had to prove in the manslaughter trial that Baker’s conduct caused
J.B.’s death, the State would have to prove in the second trial that the same conduct
caused T.B.’s injuries. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.04(a) (manslaughter),
22.01(a)(1) (assault causing bodily injury); id. § 22.02(a)(1) (aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury); id. § 22.04(a)(1) (injury to a child).
There are also significant factual differences involving J.B. and T.B. at the
time of the collision, including their location in the Cruze when the accident occurred
and the extent of the injuries each child sustained due to the collision. Although
both J.B. and T.B. were sitting unrestrained in the backseat of the Cruze, J.B., who
66
died in the collision, sat directly behind the driver’s seat and T.B. sat directly behind
the front passenger seat. The record reflects that, unlike the front passenger seat, the
driver’s seat collapsed backwards during the collision, striking or crushing J.B. T.B.,
who was sitting directly behind the passenger seat, sustained serious, but less severe,
injuries than J.B., even though the passenger side of the car where T.B. was sitting
sustained more damage than the driver’s side of the car where J.B. had been sitting.
According to Baker, “while recklessly or negligently causing death may be
different than recklessly or negligently causing injury in some circumstances, the
opposite is true in the instant case because the jury’s necessary conclusion that
Hurtado’s actions were the sole and clear sufficient cause of JB’s death, necessarily
means that it was also the sole sufficient cause of the injuries to TB that the State
seeks to relitigate” in the second trial for aggravated assault causing serious bodily
injury and injury to a child. In other words, Baker argues that the jury necessarily
found that Hurtado’s conduct was “clearly sufficient to produce the result [T.B.’s
injuries] and the conduct of [Baker] clearly insufficient” to produce T.B.’s injuries.
See generally TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(a) (stating “a person is criminally
responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either
alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly
sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient”).
67
We disagree that the jury in the first trial necessarily found that Hurtado’s
conduct was “the sole sufficient cause of the injuries to TB,” as Baker argues. Even
if the jury had found that Baker’s conduct was clearly insufficient to cause J.B.’s
death and Hurtado’s conduct was clearly sufficient to cause his death, and thus
“Hurtado’s actions were the sole and clear sufficient cause of JB’s death,” this does
not necessarily mean that Hurtado’s conduct was the only sufficient cause of T.B.’s
less severe injuries, as Baker argues. While such a finding may suggest that
Hurtado’s conduct was clearly sufficient to cause T.B.’s less severe injuries, it says
nothing about the sufficiency of Baker’s conduct. Conduct by Baker that is
insufficient on its own to cause J.B.’s death, may nevertheless be sufficient to cause
T.B.’s less severe bodily injuries, particularly under the facts presented here. See
generally Ex parte Rion, at 901 (observing death is “the ultimate form of bodily
injury”). In other words, a jury could find that Hurtado’s conduct and Baker’s
conduct were both sufficient to cause T.B.’s less severe bodily injuries, and under
such circumstances, Baker would be criminally responsible for T.B.’s injuries. See
generally TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(a) (stating “a person is criminally responsible if
the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or
concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient
to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient”).
68
In light of the differences in the severity of T.B.’s and J.B.’s injuries and the
facts surrounding their injuries, including their locations in the Cruze, the extent of
damage to the car where the children were seated, and the fact that the driver’s seat
collapsed on J.B., whereas the passenger seat did not collapse on T.B., we conclude
that while Baker’s first trial for manslaughter against J.B. and his second trial for
aggravated assault and injury to a child against T.B. would, as Baker argues, involve
“all of the same witnesses and arguments,” the legal and factual issues in the two
trials are “not precisely the same.” Ex parte Rion, 662 S.W.3d at 901; see also Ex
parte Taylor, 101 S.W.3d at 442 (“If an ordinary person would expostulate, ‘But
that’s a different issue,’ probably it is.”) (internal quotations omitted).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel thus does not bar the State from prosecuting
Baker for aggravated assault and injury to child against T.B. because the legal and
factual issues to be decided in the second trial are not precisely the same as the legal
and factual issues litigated in Baker’s manslaughter trial. See Murphy, 239 S.W.3d
at 795 (stating “collateral estoppel requires that the precise fact[s] litigated in the
first prosecution have arisen in the same transaction, occurrence, situation, or
criminal episode that gave rise to the second prosecution”); Ex parte Watkins, 73
S.W.3d at 268 (“Before collateral estoppel will apply to bar relitigation of a discrete
fact, that fact must necessarily have been decided in favor of the defendant in the
first trial.”).
69
We thus hold that because the jury could have acquitted Baker of
manslaughter based on either recklessness or causation, collateral estoppel does not
apply. Furthermore, even if the jury had resolved the issue of causation in Baker’s
favor by finding that although Baker was reckless, Baker’s conduct was clearly
insufficient to cause J.B.’s death and Hurtado’s conduct was clearly sufficient to
cause his death, collateral estoppel still would not apply because whether Baker’s
conduct was clearly insufficient to cause J.B.’s death and Hurtado’s conduct was
clearly sufficient to cause his death are not facts essential to convict Baker of
aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and injury to a child with regard to
T.B.
Baker bore the difficult burden of proving that the jury necessarily decided a
fact in his favor at the manslaughter trial that is essential for a conviction for the
offenses for which the State intends to prosecute him in the second trial. Murphy,
239 S.W.3d at 795; see also Stone, 635 S.W.3d at 774 (recognizing collateral
estoppel “test is demanding”). Because Baker did not meet his difficult burden of
proving that collateral estoppel applies, the trial court did not err by denying his
pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus. See id.
We overrule Baker’s first issue.
70
Estoppel or Waiver of Right to Try Baker for Offense Against T.B.
In his second issue, Baker argues that the State is estopped or has waived its
right to try Baker for the offenses of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury
and injury to a child based on the acceptance of benefits doctrine. According to
Baker, the State elected to try him on the manslaughter offense against J.B. only and
refused to proceed to trial on all other pending offenses against T.B., as Baker
requested. Relying on a statement the prosecutor made during a pretrial hearing in
the manslaughter trial, Baker argues the State “accepted the benefits of a single trial
by representing to the trial court that there would not be a second trial as its argument
for obtaining the benefit of not having to try the aggravated assault case and
manslaughter case together.” In his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus,
however, Baker argued that the State was barred from trying him for the offenses of
aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and injury to a child against T.B.
because the State had judicially admitted that it would only try Baker once.
To preserve error, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) requires a
complaining party to make a specific objection or complaint and obtain a ruling on
it before the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Wilson v. State, 71
S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ex parte James, Nos. 01-05-00282-CR,
01-05-00480-CR to 01-05-00485-CR, 2005 WL 1540791, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
71
(“[A]ppellant did not preserve th[e] issue for [appellate] review because he did not
raise th[e] complaint to the [trial] court in his applications for writs of habeas corpus
or at the hearing.”). And issues on appeal must track the arguments made in the trial
court. See Wright v. State, 154 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet.
ref'd); see also Ex parte Letizia, No. 01-16-00808-CR, 2019 WL 610719, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 14, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding appellant did not preserve argument for appellate review
because he did not raise it in trial court in his application for writ of habeas corpus).
“Where a trial [complaint] does not comport with the issue raised on appeal, [an]
appellant . . . preserve[s] nothing for review.” Wright, 154 S.W.3d at 241; see also
Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (stating appellate court
should not address merits of issue not preserved for appeal); Ex parte Evans, 410
S.W.3d at 485 (declining to consider argument applicant did not raise in application
for writ of habeas corpus in trial court). Because Baker did not argue in his
application for a writ of habeas corpus that the acceptance of benefits doctrine barred
the State from trying him for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury and
injury to a child against T.B., we hold Baker did not preserve his second issue for
our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Ex parte Perez, 536 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“In reviewing an order denying habeas
relief, an intermediate court of appeals only reviews issues that were properly raised
72
in the habeas petition and addressed by the trial court.”); Ex parte Bui, 983 S.W.2d
73, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d).
And even had he preserved the issue for review, Baker would not prevail.
Section 3.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code states that a criminal defendant “may be
prosecuted in a single criminal action for all offenses arising out of the same criminal
episode.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.02(a). A defendant, however, “does not have a right
to consolidate offenses committed in the same criminal episode.” Nelson v. State,
846 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis in original); see also Mock
v. State, 848 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d) (“Since [§
3.02(a)] is not mandatory, an accused is not entitled to consolidation of offenses, as
a matter of right, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant
Appellant’s motion to consolidate.”) Baker has not cited any authority for the novel
proposition that if the State elects to try offenses arising out of the same criminal
episode separately or opposes a defendant’s request to consolidate those offenses for
trial, and the State tries the defendant for one offense, the State is barred, based on
principles of equity or otherwise, from later prosecuting the defendant for the
unconsolidated offenses.
Moreover, the “acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is a fact-dependent, estoppel-
based doctrine focused on preventing unfair prejudice to the opposing party.”
Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 213 (Tex. 2017); see also id. at 217 (stating
73
estoppel “prevents litigants from taking contradictory positions as a means of
gaining an unfair advantage from the inconsistency”); Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots
Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008) (“Estoppel . . . generally prevents one party
from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own
benefit.”); see generally Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tex. 2021) (stating
doctrine of acceptance of benefits “arises out of equity’s aversion to a claimant who
seeks to exploit irreconcilable positions”). During the pretrial hearing in Baker’s
manslaughter trial, the prosecutor informed the court that the State elected to proceed
with the manslaughter charge against J.B. only. Baker objected to the “piecemeal”
nature of the proceedings and requested that the manslaughter charge against J.B.
and the aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury charge against T.B. be
consolidated and tried together because the offenses arose from the same motor
vehicle collision. The State disagreed that the charges should be tried together and
stated that it was “not the State’s position that we will have two criminal trials. Our
intention is to go forward on the criminal trial on the manslaughter . . . We’re not
asking for a second criminal trial later.” The prosecutor also stated that the State
was not dismissing the aggravated assault causing bodily injury charge at that time.14
14
Baker was not charged by indictment with injury to a child against T.B. until one
week after the pretrial hearing.
74
The trial court overruled Baker’s objection and trial commenced on the
manslaughter case.
During trial, the court held a hearing on Baker’s motion in limine “concerning
the injured child [T.B.] who is no longer part of the Prosecution.” Baker’s counsel
stated:
Baker: Remember the State is not moving forward on the indictment
as to the injured child [T.B.]. This case is only about the
deceased child [J.B.].
We would move for a limine on talking about anything about
the injured child under grounds of relevance and undue
prejudice and time needed and efficiency of trial. There’s no
charge in this particular trial for that child.
....
Baker: Judge, this trial has nothing to do—this trial is—the defendant
is charged with recklessly causing death of the 4-year-old
[J.B.]. There’s no charge in this trial for the 8-year-old [T.B.].
There might—maybe later, I don’t know, but there’s no trial
for the 8-year-old here.
The record thus reflects that Baker was not mislead by the prosecutor’s earlier
statements and understood there was still a possibility he could be prosecuted in the
future for any charges arising from the bodily injuries T.B. sustained in the collision.
See Ulico Cas. Co., 262 S.W.3d at 778 (“Estoppel . . . generally prevents one party
from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own
benefit.”); see also Kramer, 508 S.W.3d at 217 (stating estoppel “prevents litigants
75
from taking contradictory positions as a means of gaining an unfair advantage from
the inconsistency”).
We overrule Baker’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Baker’s pretrial application for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
76