State v. Alvaro Aguilera ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-16-00615-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
ALVARO AGUILERA, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
The State perfected an appeal from the county-court-at-law’s judgment denying its
plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). By two issues, the State contends that: (1) the county
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a judicial appeal originating in the
justice of the peace court; and (2) the county court erred in denying the State’s plea to
the jurisdiction. We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Justice Court
The State filed an action for disposition of a 2016 Mercedes Benz under chapter
47 of the code of criminal procedure (chapter 47 hearing) in the Justice of the Peace
Court, Precinct 1 Place 1 (JP court), identifying appellee Alvaro Aguilera as an interested
party. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 47.01a(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st
C.S.). Aguilera appeared as an interested party at the chapter 47 hearing. On August
26, 2015, the JP court heard the matter and rendered a judgment in favor of the State,
ordering for the State to retain possession of the vehicle as the rightful owner of the
property was unknown. See id. The JP court gave Aguilera five days to appeal and
provide information supporting his claim of ownership, but Aguilera did not appeal.
Instead, Aguilera filed a motion for new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 505.3(c). It was
automatically denied as a matter of law as of 5:00 p.m. on the 21st day after the day the
judgment was signed. See id. R. 505.3(e).
B. Bill of Review
Thereafter, Aguilera filed a bill of review on March 3, 2016 in the original JP court,
asserting the value of the vehicle was outside the jurisdictional limits of the JP court and
therefore the JP court’s judgment was void as a matter of law. On April 8, the State filed
its original answer and plea to the jurisdiction asserting that under Article 47 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, the valuation of the vehicle is irrelevant to the jurisdiction of
the JP court because in a chapter 47 proceeding the role of the JP court is that of a
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magistrate. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 47.01a(a). The JP court subsequently
denied Aguilera’s bill of review.
C. County Court Appeal
On May 4, Aguilera filed a notice of appeal and posted the required bond
challenging the JP court’s denial of the bill of review, which was assigned to the county
court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.3 (providing that matters appealed to the county court are
tried de novo). On August 5, the State filed its plea to the jurisdiction and motion to
dismiss and asserted the following grounds for dismissal:
1. Aguilera failed to perfect his appeal as required by [a]rticle 47 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Aguilera failed to give an oral
notice of appeal at the conclusion of the hearing, which is required
under the appeal procedures set forth in [a]rticle 47.
2. Aguilera further failed to perfect his appeal as he failed to post an
appeal bond by the end of the next business day as required by
Article 47.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. [The] State of Texas (County of Hidalgo), is immune from suit and
Aguilera’s claims do not come within any limited waiver of immunity
allowed by law. Moreover, Aguilera failed to establish any waiver of
immunity on the face of his pleadings.
With both parties present, the county court asked the State for additional briefing
in support of the State’s plea and motion to dismiss. The State filed a brief in support of
its plea and motion to dismiss and included an additional ground for dismissal asserting
that Aguilera failed to meet the statutory requirements of a bill of review. Aguilera
responded that article 59 of the code of criminal procedure governed the issue. As such,
the district court was the only court which had jurisdiction to render a judgment
determining ownership of the vehicle. According to Aguilera, the JP court’s judgment was
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void as a matter of law and should be set aside and vacated. The county court granted
the State’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss.
D. Post-judgment Motions
In response to the county court’s ruling granting the State’s plea, Aguilera filed two
post-judgment motions. First, he requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Next,
he requested that the county court set aside its previous order granting the State’s plea
to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. On October 12, 2016, the county court granted
Aguilera’s motion to set aside its previous order granting the State’s plea to the
jurisdiction.
The State filed an order resetting a hearing for its plea to the jurisdiction and motion
to dismiss. However, the county court entered a separate order denying the State’s plea
to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss. The State now brings this interlocutory appeal.
II. JURISDICTION
By its first issue, the State contends that the county court “lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal of the denial of Aguilera’s [p]etition for [bi]ll of [r]eview by the [j]ustice
[c]ourt.” A party may appeal a judgment from a justice of the peace court to a county
court at law. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(a). “An
appeal is perfected when a bond, cash deposit, or statement of inability to pay is filed in
accordance with this rule.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(h). “[I]t is well-settled that perfection of
an appeal to county court from a justice court for trial de novo vacates and annuls the
judgment of the justice court.” Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69–70 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
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Here, the JP court denied Aguilera’s bill of review. Aguilera then appealed that
decision to the county court and posted the required bond. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(i)
(“The appellant must pay the costs on appeal to a county court in accordance with Rule
143a.”). The State asserts that Aguilera failed to perfect his appeal as required by article
47.12 of the code of criminal procedure and, as such, the county court is without
jurisdiction to hear Aguilera’s appeal. However, the State’s reliance on article 47.12 is
misplaced. Article 47.12 sets forth specific procedures by which an interested person
may perfect an appeal from a justice court’s chapter 47 disposition of property judgment,
but Aguilera is not appealing the JP court’s judgment of the chapter 47 hearing. 1 TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 47.12(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Instead,
Aguilera is appealing the JP court’s denial of the bill of review. 2 Because a party may
appeal a judgment from a justice of the peace court to a county court at law, we conclude
that the county court had jurisdiction to entertain Aguilera’s appeal challenging the JP
court’s denial of his bill of review. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a);
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(a). Accordingly, we overrule the State’s first issue.
III. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
By its second issue, the State contends that the county court erred in denying its
plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss because the county court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. In its brief in support of its plea to the jurisdiction, the State asserted
1 We note that if Aguilera were appealing the JP court’s judgment of the chapter 47 hearing, he
would be barred from doing so as he did not timely perfect his appeal by giving either oral notice at the
conclusion of the hearing or posting an appeal bond as required by 47.12(c). TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ art. 47.12(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
2 Moreover, the issue before us is whether the county court had jurisdiction to entertain Aguilera’s
appeal of the JP court’s denial of his bill of review—not whether the JP court should have granted or denied
the bill of review.
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that the county court should have dismissed Aguilera’s appeal as a matter of law for the
following reasons:
1. Aguilera’s pleadings fail as a matter of law as the original action was
proper and within the jurisdiction of the [j]ustice of [the] [p]eace as a
magistrate under Article 2.09 in conjunction with Article 47.01(a) of
[the] Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Aguilera’s pleading[s] fail as a matter of law to establish that he is
entitled to a [b]ill of [r]eview, as he has not plead[ed] any specific
meritorious defense or claimed that he was prevented from
exercising that defense due to official mistake/fraud, accident, or any
wrongful act by the opposing part.
3. Aguilera failed to perfect his appeal as required by Article 47 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Aguilera failed to give an oral
notice of appeal at the conclusion of the hearing, which is required
under the appeal procedures set forth in [a]rticle 47.
4. Aguilera further failed to perfect his appeal as he failed to post an
appeal bond by the end of the next business day as required by
Article 47.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
5. To the extent Aguilera is seeking money damages by way of this
appeal, the State of Texas (County of Hidalgo), is immune from suit
and Aguilera’s claims do not come within any limited waiver of
immunity allowed by law. Moreover, Aguilera failed to establish any
waiver of immunity on the face of his pleadings.
A. Standard of Review
“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a
cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law; therefore, when the determinative facts are undisputed, we review the trial court’s
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Id. While reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction,
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a court should limit itself to the jurisdictional issue at hand and avoid considering the
merits of claims made by the plaintiff. Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554. “The purpose of a dilatory
plea is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to establish a
reason why the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims should never be reached.” Id. The
reviewing court should confine itself to the evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issues
raised. Id. at 555.
B. Discussion
1. Jurisdiction of JP court
In his bill of review to the JP court, Aguilera argued that the JP court’s chapter 47
judgment is void because the value of the vehicle exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the
JP court. The State filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that Aguilera’s pleadings fail as
a matter of law because the JP court had jurisdiction to render a chapter 47 disposition
of property judgment. The JP court denied the bill of review, and Aguilera appealed that
decision to the county court. In the State’s plea to the jurisdiction to the county court and
in the State’s interlocutory appeal here, the State argues that Aguilera’s pleadings fail as
a matter of law because the JP court had jurisdiction to render a chapter 47 disposition
of property judgment.
The State asserts that the county court lacks jurisdiction because the JP court had
jurisdiction to render a chapter 47 judgment. 3 However, whether the JP court had
jurisdiction touches on the merits of Aguilera’s bill of review and has no bearing on the
county court’s jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a) (“In a case
tried in justice court in which the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $250 . . . a
3 Conversely, it is Aguilera that is challenging the JP court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
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party to a final judgment may appeal to the county court.”). In other words, even if the
State’s argument prevails and the JP court indeed had jurisdiction to render a chapter 47
judgment, that does not divest the county court of jurisdiction to hear Aguilera’s appeal of
the JP court’s denial of his bill of review. See id. Whether the JP court was acting as a
magistrate or whether the JP court exceeded its civil court jurisdictional limit is irrelevant
to whether the county court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Aguilera’s bill of review
appeal of the JP court’s denial of his bill of review. Bland, 34 S.W.3d. at 555. Accordingly,
we hold the county court did not err in rejecting the State’s argument that it was entitled
to a plea to the jurisdiction on this basis.
2. Bill of Review
The State contends that “the appeal to the [c]ounty [c]ourt of the denial of the bill
of review by the justice court should be dismissed” because “Aguilera failed to plea[d] or
prove elements required to be entitled to a bill of review.”
Generally, appeals may only be taken from final judgments or orders. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.); Thomas v.
Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. 2006). Here, the State’s interlocutory appeal
challenges the trial court’s order denying the State’s plea to the jurisdiction on the basis
that Aguilera did not meet the bill of review requirements. However, the record shows
that the county court did not explicitly deny, or even rule on, Aguilera’s bill of review.
Thus, the county court did not reach the merits of Aguilera’s appeal of the JP court’s
denial of the bill of review. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the
record show the trial court ruled on a request, objection, or motion, either expressly or
implicitly. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A). Because the record here does not contain an
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order granting or denying the bill of review and because section 51.014(a) does not
explicitly provide for appellate review on that basis, we conclude that we do not have
jurisdiction to address this claim. See Thomas, 207 S.W.3d at 338; see also In re Estate
of Boren, 268 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied) (holding that it
is fundamental error for an appellate court to assume jurisdiction over an interlocutory
order when it is not expressly authorized by statute to do so). Accordingly, we conclude
that this ground for dismissal is not appealable absent a ruling from the county court. 4
See Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep’t v. Rubio, 483 S.W.3d at 797, 799 (Tex. App—El Paso
2016, no pet.) (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the trial court’s order
did not reach the merits of defendant’s claim).
3. Perfected Appeal
According to the State, the county court should have granted the State’s plea to
the jurisdiction because Aguilera failed to perfect his appeal. But as we previously noted,
Aguilera is appealing the JP court’s denial of his bill of review. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.001(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.1(a) (“A party may appeal a judgment
from a justice of the peace court to a county court at law.”). He is not appealing the JP
court’s original chapter 47 judgment as the State suggests. Thus, the procedures set
forth in article 47.12 for perfecting an appeal are inapplicable here, and the State’s plea
to the jurisdiction was properly denied.
4 Without a ruling on the bill of review from the county court, the State has failed to show that we
have jurisdiction to decide this controversy.
Nonetheless, a party making a collateral attack on a judgment does not need to meet the
requirements of a bill of review. Zarate v. Sun Operating Ltd., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied). Here, Aguilera’s bill of review served as a collateral attack on the JP court’s
judgment because he claims the judgment was void as a matter of law. Id. Thus, he did not need to meet
the requirements of a bill of review as the State suggests. Id.
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4. Sovereign Immunity
Lastly, the State argues that the county court should have granted the State’s plea
to the jurisdiction because “Aguilera has not plead and/or claimed that the allegations fall
within any waiver of sovereign immunity afforded by any such law.”
“Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over lawsuits in which the
state or certain governmental units have been sued, unless the state consents to suit.
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 636 (Tex. 2012). As a
result, immunity is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Id. “In general, the
State of Texas retains sovereign immunity from suit.” See Univ. of Tex. at Austin v.
Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
224). However, if the governmental entity injects itself into or chooses to engage in
litigation to assert affirmative claims, the entity will presumably have made a decision to
expend resources to pay litigation costs. Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d
371, 375 (Tex. 2006). “A determination that a governmental entity’s immunity from suit
does not extend to a situation where the entity has filed suit is consistent with the policy
issues involved with immunity.” Id. “[I]t would be fundamentally unfair to allow a
governmental entity to assert affirmative claims against a party while claiming it had
immunity as to the party’s claims against it.” Id. Therefore, the decision by a
governmental entity to file suit for damages “encompassed a decision to leave its sphere
of immunity from suit for claims against it which are germane to, connected with and
properly defensive to claims the [governmental entity] asserts.” Id. at 377.
Here, Aguilera claimed ownership of the vehicle. The State initiated a disposition
of property proceeding for the vehicle and obtained a judgment awarding the vehicle to
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the State. Aguilera then filed a bill of review, seeking to vacate that judgment and render
a judgment that the vehicle be returned to him. Because the State initiated a chapter 47
proceeding and the bill of review was filed in an attempt to vacate that proceeding, we
hold that sovereign immunity does not bar Aguilera’s suit. See Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 377;
see also State v. Gonzalez, No. 04-06-00133-CV, 2006 WL 2134643 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Aug. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that because the State initiated
forfeiture proceedings against a defendant and the defendant filed a bill of review in an
attempt to vacate those proceedings, sovereign immunity did not bar defendant’s suit).
We overrule the State’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all the State’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the
State’s plea to the jurisdiction.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Delivered and filed the
15th day of November, 2018.
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