In the Matter of the Marriage of James Vaughn IV and Amber Vaughn v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  •                                             IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-21-00167-CV
    IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
    JAMES VAUGHN IV AND AMBER VAUGHN
    From the 369th District Court
    Leon County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CV20-0222
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In six issues, James Vaughn IV (James), acting pro se, appeals from the final decree
    of divorce that dissolved his marriage with Amber Vaughn (Amber) following a bench
    trial. 1
    Issue One
    In his first issue, James contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of this
    matter because Amber had not been a resident of Leon County for the ninety days before
    the suit was filed.
    1   Because the parties share the same surname, we will refer to them by their first names for clarity.
    AUTHORITY
    Section 6.301 of the Family Code provides:
    A suit for divorce may not be maintained in this state unless at the time the
    suit is filed either the petitioner or the respondent has been:
    (1)   a domiciliary of this state for the preceding six-month period; and
    (2)   a resident of the county in which the suit is filed for the preceding
    90-day period.
    TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.301. “Although section 6.301 is not itself jurisdictional, it is akin
    to a jurisdictional provision because it controls a party’s right to maintain a suit for
    divorce and is a mandatory requirement that cannot be waived.” In re Green, 
    385 S.W.3d 665
    , 669 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, orig. proceeding); accord Stallworth v. Stallworth,
    
    201 S.W.3d 338
    , 345 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 
    86 S.W.3d 272
    ,
    276 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
    The question of residency is a fact issue for the trial court to determine, and a trial
    court’s finding regarding residency will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of
    discretion. Green, 
    385 S.W.3d at 669
    ; Stallworth, 
    201 S.W.3d at 345
    . Admissions in
    petitions for divorce stating that the residency requirements of divorce are satisfied “are
    considered judicial admissions in the case in which the pleadings are filed, and no
    additional proof is required of the admitted fact.” Barnard v. Barnard, 
    133 S.W.3d 782
    , 785
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); see Hous. First Am. Sav. v. Musick, 
    650 S.W.2d 764
    , 767 (Tex. 1983) (“Assertions of fact, not pled in the alternative, in the live pleadings
    of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions. Any fact admitted is conclusively
    established in the case without the introduction of the pleadings or presentation of other
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                   Page 2
    evidence.”). Additionally, “[t]here are no limits on the number of residences that a party
    may maintain at any one time.”        Stallworth, 
    201 S.W.3d at
    345 (citing McAlister v.
    McAlister, 
    75 S.W.3d 481
    , 485 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied)).
    DISCUSSION
    Here, Amber filed her original petition for divorce in Leon County on July 13, 2020.
    She stated in the petition that she had been “a resident of this county for the preceding
    ninety-day period.” James then filed a counterpetition for divorce on August 26, 2020, in
    which he stated: “This suit is properly maintained in this county because . . . [Amber]
    has been a resident of this county for the past ninety (90) days.” Both James and Amber
    therefore admitted the necessary residency requirements in their pleadings. See Barnard,
    
    133 S.W.3d at 785
    . Furthermore, during the final hearing, Amber reaffirmed that she was
    a resident of Leon County for the ninety-day period preceding the filing of her petition
    for divorce.
    James argues in his brief that the children attended school in Freestone County.
    James also testified as follows during the final hearing:
    Q.     And was [Amber] a resident of Leon County for at least 90
    days before she filed for a divorce?
    A.     As far as I - - I guess she lived in Leon County, we did, but
    she didn’t use that address. She used the Freestone County address. Still
    does, I believe.
    Q.   It’s possible that she was a resident, and she’s in fact testified
    she was. Would you agree with that, then?
    A.     Yes.
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                               Page 3
    But even if James’s testimony is some evidence that Amber maintained a residence in
    Freestone County, nothing prevents her from maintaining a residence in both Freestone
    and Leon counties at the same time. See Stallworth, 
    201 S.W.3d at 345
    .
    Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that at the
    time of the filing of the suit, Amber had been a resident of Leon County for ninety days.
    James’s first issue is overruled.
    Issue Two
    In his second issue, James contends that the trial court disregarded its own local
    rules at certain times during this case.
    James first complains that the local rules required that a standing temporary
    restraining order be served on him with the initial service in this case but that the
    standing temporary restraining order was not included in the initial service of process.
    See generally LEON CNTY. (TEX.) DIST. CT. LOC. R. 4.7(B) (“The clerk of this court shall attach,
    to each citation to be served, a copy of the Standing Temporary Restraining Order.”).
    James also argues in this issue that the trial court “gave unfair advantage and
    consideration” in this case by granting Amber a separate, “unwarranted” temporary
    restraining order.
    Temporary restraining orders are not appealable. In re Off. of Att’y Gen., 
    257 S.W.3d 695
    , 698 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Newton, 
    146 S.W.3d 648
    ,
    652 (Tex. 2004).     Additionally, the divorce decree here is final, and the temporary
    restraining orders have expired; therefore, any complaints regarding the temporary
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                 Page 4
    restraining orders are moot. See In re Marriage of Hernandez, No. 10-09-00136-CV, 
    2011 WL 3821995
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 10, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    James next argues in this issue that the local rules required that this case be
    dismissed on January 3, 2021, but that the trial court “disregarded its own timelines.”
    The original petition for divorce in this case was filed on July 13, 2020. The trial court
    held the final hearing on February 25, 2021, and signed the final decree of divorce on
    April 15, 2021.
    Rule 4.2 of the Local Rules of the District Courts of Leon County, entitled “Time
    Standards for Family Law Case Disposition,” provides:
    Cases shall be tried or dismissed within 6 months from the appearance date
    or within 6 months from the expiration of the waiting period provided by
    the Family Code where such is required, whichever is later. Cases not
    concluded within these time periods will be placed on the Dismissal For
    Want of Prosecution Docket.
    LEON CNTY. (TEX.) DIST. CT. LOC. R. 4.2. But throughout the entire pendency of this case
    in the trial court, all 254 counties in the State of Texas had been declared a state of disaster
    by the Governor of Texas “in response to the imminent threat of the COVID-19
    pandemic.” See Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 
    629 S.W.3d 897
    , 897 (Tex. 2021); Thirty-Third Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of
    Disaster, 
    629 S.W.3d 179
    , 179 (Tex. 2021); Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-
    19 State of Disaster, 
    629 S.W.3d 863
    , 863 (Tex. 2020); Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord. Regarding
    COVID-19 State of Disaster, 
    609 S.W.3d 135
    , 135 (Tex. 2020); Twenty-Second Emergency Ord.
    Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 
    609 S.W.3d 129
    , 129 (Tex. 2020); Eighteenth
    Emergency Ord. Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 
    609 S.W.3d 122
    , 122 (Tex. 2020).
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                 Page 5
    Therefore, while this case was pending in the trial court, emergency orders issued by the
    Texas Supreme Court were in place and provided:
    Subject only to constitutional limitations, all courts in Texas may in any
    case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court staff, parties,
    attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant’s consent . . .
    modify or suspend any and all deadlines and procedures, whether
    prescribed by statute, rule, or order . . . .
    Thirty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 897; Thirty-Third Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at
    179–80; Twenty-Ninth Emergency Ord., 629 S.W.3d at 863; Twenty-Sixth Emergency Ord., 609
    S.W.3d at 135; Twenty-Second Emergency Ord., 609 S.W.3d at 129; Eighteenth Emergency
    Ord., 609 S.W.3d at 122–23. Thus, the trial court did not err in modifying the deadlines
    in this case.
    James’s second issue is overruled.
    Issues Three and Five
    In his third and fifth issues, James contends that the trial court erred in its
    determination of his custody and visitation rights to his children. As part of these issues,
    James also complains about the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions
    of law; however, the record shows that the trial court filed findings of fact and
    conclusions of law on May 27, 2021.
    AUTHORITY
    We will reverse a trial court’s order on custody, control, possession, and visitation
    matters only if we determine, from reviewing the record as a whole, that the trial court
    abused its discretion. Patterson v. Brist, 
    236 S.W.3d 238
    , 239–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2006, pet. dism’d); see Gillespie v. Gillespie, 
    644 S.W.2d 449
    , 451 (Tex. 1982). A trial
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                 Page 6
    court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to
    any guiding rules or principles. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d at 240.
    In matters of conservatorship, possession, and access, the public policy of this State
    is to:
    (1)   assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with
    parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the
    child;
    (2)   provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and
    (3)   encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their
    child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.
    TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a).          The best interest of the child is the primary
    consideration when determining issues related to conservatorship and possession of and
    access to the child. Id. § 153.002.
    When both parents are appointed as the child’s managing conservators, the trial
    court specifies the rights and duties that are to be exercised by each parent. Id. § 153.071.
    “The court may limit the rights and duties of a parent appointed as a conservator if the
    court makes a written finding that the limitation is in the best interest of the child.” Id. §
    153.072.
    Regarding possession of the child, “[i]t is the policy of this state to encourage
    frequent contact between a child and each parent for periods of possession that optimize
    the development of a close and continuing relationship between each parent and child.”
    Id. § 153.251(b). The guidelines in the standard possession order are intended to guide
    courts as to the minimum possession of a child by a parent named as a joint managing
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                 Page 7
    conservator. Id. § 153.251(a). And there is a rebuttable presumption that the standard
    possession order provides the reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent
    named as a joint managing conservator and that the order is in the child’s best interest.
    Id. § 153.252.
    When, however, sufficient evidence rebuts this presumption, the trial court may
    order possession that deviates from the standard possession order. In re N.P.M., 
    509 S.W.3d 560
    , 564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.256.
    When deviating from the standard possession order, the trial court must be guided by
    the guidelines established by the standard possession order and may consider: (1) the
    age, developmental status, circumstances, needs, and best interest of the child; (2) the
    circumstances of the managing conservator and of the parent named as a possessory
    conservator; and (3) any other relevant factor. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.256. If the trial
    court deviates from the standard possession order, the trial court shall, upon timely
    request, state in writing the specific reasons for the deviation from the standard order.
    Id. § 153.258. A reviewing court’s holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion
    implies that the evidence contained in the record rebutted the presumption that the
    standard possession order was reasonable and was in the child’s best interest. N.P.M.,
    
    509 S.W.3d at 564
    .
    DISCUSSION
    Here, James and Amber were appointed joint managing conservators of the
    children, with Amber having the exclusive right to determine the children’s primary
    residence. James’s possession and access were in line with a standard possession order,
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                             Page 8
    but the trial court specified that all James’s “possession, visitation, and access shall be
    under the supervision of [his mother].” In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
    trial court stated its reasons for the deviation from the standard order as follows:
    James Roy Vaughn, IV is entitled to periods of possession with [the
    children] pursuant to the Standard Possession Order. The Court further
    found that it would not be in the best interest of the children for James Roy
    Vaughn, IV’s periods of possession to be unsupervised based upon the
    following factual evidence received: the Court received evidence and
    testimony during a temporary orders hearing on October 29, 2020, that
    James Roy Vaughn, IV was discharged from the Air Force on or about
    October 2019 related to abusing illegal narcotics, namely, heroin and other
    illegal narcotics, and further that he had been arrested in September 2020
    for possession of methamphetamine. That based upon this behavior of
    James Roy Vaughn, IV that he may be a danger to [the] physical and
    emotional well-being of the children and that visitation with the children
    would not be in the children’s best interest unless his visits are supervised
    by his mother . . . . The Court received evidence and testimony during the
    Final Hearing on February 25, 2021 that James Roy Vaughn, IV had further
    engaged in assaultive behavior on Christmas 2020 against Amber Vaughn.
    The court found that based upon drug use in the recent past and his
    assaulting behavior recently that the visits of James Roy Vaughn, IV with
    his children should remain supervised by his mother . . . .
    James essentially argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s
    deviation from the standard order.
    First, we must address the evidentiary value of the testimony presented during
    the October 29, 2020 temporary orders hearing. “In order for testimony from a prior
    hearing or trial to be considered in a subsequent proceeding, the transcript of that
    testimony must be properly authenticated and entered into evidence.” Abila v. Miller, 
    683 S.W.3d 842
    , 849 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.) (quoting Guyton v. Monteau, 
    332 S.W.3d 687
    , 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)). The transcript of the testimony
    from the October 29, 2020 temporary orders hearing was not authenticated and entered
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                               Page 9
    into evidence at the February 25, 2021 final hearing in this case. Accordingly, the trial
    court should not have relied on such testimony to support its deviation from the standard
    possession order, and we cannot consider such testimony in our determination of
    whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s deviation from the
    standard order. See 
    id.
     Compare, e.g., B.L.M. v. J.H.M., No. 03-14-00050-CV, 
    2014 WL 3562559
    , at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin July 17, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Although the
    trial court expressly took judicial notice of testimony and evidence admitted at prior
    hearings—and to the extent the court took judicial notice of factual assertions in
    documents filed with the court—that is not evidence we can consider as part of an
    evidence-sufficiency review.”), with A.C. v. M.B., No. 01-20-00294-CV, 
    2021 WL 3729106
    ,
    at *7 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We may
    consider the testimony from the temporary orders hearing in our sufficiency review
    because the transcript of the temporary orders hearing was admitted into the evidence at
    the termination hearing.”).
    However, when we have a complete transcript of the proceedings before us, we
    do not view the trial court’s written findings as conclusive. See Lucas v. Tex. Dep’t of
    Protective & Regul. Servs., 
    949 S.W.2d 500
    , 502 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied),
    disapproved of on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
     (Tex. 2002). Instead, we review
    the entire record and will not reverse an otherwise correct judgment simply because of
    an erroneous finding. In re Marriage of Bonner, No. 10-10-00011-CV, 
    2010 WL 4409704
    , at
    *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Nov. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Lucas, 949 S.W.2d at 502).
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                               Page 10
    We will affirm the trial court’s judgment even if its finding lacks sufficient evidentiary
    support if the record contains sufficient evidence to do so. Id.
    The record here shows that the following relevant evidence was presented during
    the February 25, 2021 final hearing in this case. Amber testified that at that time, James’s
    mother was supervising James’s visits with the children. Amber further stated that some
    of James’s visits with the children had been “a little bit unstable.” Amber explained that
    during one visit in January, “[James’s] mom had to make him leave due to him kicking a
    LEGO box across the house and breaking it, and screaming and yelling at his parents in
    front of our children, scaring our children.” Amber also explained that in December, on
    the Saturday after Christmas, James’s mother wanted to bring the children to Amber’s
    house and drop them off but that James refused to let his mother do so. James’s mother
    therefore told Amber that she needed to come and pick up the children. Amber stated
    that when she arrived to pick up the children, James wanted to talk to her, but she could
    tell that he was “enraged.” Amber thus told James that she would speak to him at another
    time and that she was just going to get the children and leave. Amber testified that James
    replied, “No, you’re not,” and then told her that he was “going to beat the F out of [her].”
    At that time, James slammed her up against the car by her throat and nearly punched her
    in the face. Amber explained that James did not punch her only because his mother came
    outside and had him get off her. Amber stated that she waited to call the authorities
    about the incident until the next day because the children came outside directly after the
    incident, and she had to “put on a smile” and go home with them.
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                             Page 11
    Additionally, James testified at the final hearing about a text message that he had
    sent to Amber on December 31 before he went to Montana to see someone that he knew
    from the military. In the text message, James stated, “[T]here is something messed up in
    my head.” James explained at the final hearing that that “something” was addiction.
    James went on to testify that he had “not really had a big issue” but that he would
    sometimes still “get the trigger, the itch, or whatever.” James stated that after having his
    children “kept from [him] and [his] money stolen from [him], the trigger started
    happening more,” so he decided to go to Montana to help fix the issues that he was
    having.
    Considering the foregoing evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
    discretion by deviating from the standard possession order. See Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d at
    451 (“The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor
    child.”); N.P.M., 509 S.W.3d at 564–65 (explaining that trial court is given wide latitude
    in determining child’s best interest because it is in better position to determine what will
    be in child’s best interest since it faced parties and their witnesses, observed their
    demeanor, and had opportunity to evaluate claims made by each parent). James’s third
    and fifth issues are therefore overruled.
    Issue Four
    In his fourth issue, James contends that the trial court’s conduct brought into
    question the impartiality and fairness of the proceeding.
    As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must
    show that, among other things, the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                             Page 12
    request, objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling sought from the trial
    court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the
    specific grounds were apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Even
    constitutional complaints must be raised in the trial court for them to be preserved for
    appellate review. In re L.M.I., 
    119 S.W.3d 707
    , 710–11 (Tex. 2003); In re K.A.S., 
    131 S.W.3d 215
    , 230–31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
    Amber notes that James never filed any motion to recuse the trial judge before
    entry of the final decree of divorce in this case. See David v. West, 
    433 S.W.3d 101
    , 107–08
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (holding complaint that trial judge
    should have been recused was waived by failing to raise it in trial court). Nor have we
    found anything in the record showing that, before entry of the final decree of divorce,
    James made any objection about the trial judge’s conduct.
    But there is an exception to the preservation rules for certain “fundamental”
    errors, including “those instances in which error directly and adversely affects the
    interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared by the statutes or Constitution
    of our State.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 
    206 S.W.3d 572
    , 577 (Tex. 2006). Accordingly,
    the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that, in jury trials, claims of judicial bias would
    not be waived by a failure to object in the trial court if “the conduct or comment cannot
    be rendered harmless by proper instruction.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 
    46 S.W.3d 237
    ,
    241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (citing State v. Wilemon, 
    393 S.W.2d 816
    , 818 (Tex. 1965)).
    Additionally, in some circumstances, a complaint regarding judicial conduct during a
    bench trial may also be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., In re L.S., No. 02-17-
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                               Page 13
    00132-CV, 
    2017 WL 4172584
    , at *20 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
    op.) (holding that trial court’s “conduct, as clearly shown on the face of the record,
    revealed a level of bias and partiality that harmed Father by depriving him of his right to
    a fair trial before an impartial fact-finder and constituted fundamental error”). Therefore,
    even though James failed to object about the trial judge’s conduct in the trial court, we
    must address his complaint about such conduct if such conduct constituted fundamental
    error. See id.; see also In re A.T.M., No. 13-21-00008-CV, 
    2021 WL 2584402
    , at *18–19 (Tex.
    App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    James complains about the following conduct of the trial judge in this case. First,
    James asserts that during the trial, the trial judge “made four vocalizations in the nature
    of stating he knew where the information was headed and he need not hear more on the
    matter.” The record shows that Amber testified first at trial and that Amber then called
    James to testify. During Amber’s counsel’s examination of James, the following exchange
    took place:
    [Amber’s Counsel]: Your Honor, if I can, again, I’m going to share
    an exhibit real quick. It’s going to be Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. I’m skipping 2
    intentionally at this point.
    THE COURT: Okay. Let’s pick it up, [Amber’s Counsel], but go
    ahead.
    [Amber’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: I’ve got the gist of where you’re going.
    [Amber’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                Page 14
    Thereafter, during James’s counsel’s examination of James, the following exchange took
    place:
    [James’s Counsel]: And, Judge, I’m going to ask for permission to
    share my screen, again, if you don’t mind.
    THE COURT: Okay. Yes, go ahead. You’ve still got it. Let’s pick it
    up a little bit, [James’s Counsel].
    [James’s Counsel]: Yes, sir.
    Once James had finished testifying, the following exchange then took place:
    THE COURT: [Amber’s Counsel], any other witnesses?
    [Amber’s Counsel]: I’m going to call Mrs. Vaughn, again for just a
    brief rebuttal, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. I’ve got a - - Counsel, I’ve got a gist of the
    issues in this case, so let’s make it very brief, [Amber’s Counsel].
    [Amber’s Counsel]: I will make it very brief, Your Honor.
    James next complains that the trial judge prevented him from calling a witness
    “with a state certification and ample experience” to testify and that the trial judge only
    “allotted a predetermined time of 10 minutes for testimony between both sets of counsel.”
    The record shows, however, that once Amber rested, the following exchange took place:
    THE COURT: [James’s Counsel], do you rest?
    [James’s Counsel]: Judge, I have my client’s mother, whose role is
    supervising visits, ready to testify. I understand the Court wants to speed
    these proceedings along. So, if the Court wants to hear her testimony, she’s
    ready. If not, then I would also rest.
    THE COURT: Okay. The gist of her testimony is that she’s still
    willing to supervise the visitations. Is that it?
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                Page 15
    [James’s Counsel]: No, Your Honor. The gist of her testimony
    would be to rebut the need for them to be supervised.
    THE COURT: I’m going to allow ten minutes, for purposes of the
    record. . . .
    James’s mother testified, and the trial court then inquired whether James had any other
    witnesses. James’s counsel replied, “No, Your Honor. At this time, we rest.” Therefore,
    the record does not show that James was prevented from calling a witness to testify.
    Finally, James asserts that he “had already lost all confidence in the judicial
    integrity of this case” because after the initial court hearing, the trial judge “stated
    something to the effect of ‘I am sorry for the circumstances that led us to this decision’,
    after asking [him] about the time he served in the military.” The record shows that at the
    temporary orders hearing, testimony was elicited from James that in May 2019, he was
    serving in the Air Force at the rank of Staff Sergeant. James admitted, however, that
    around that time, he had used heroin, was arrested, and was demoted to the rank of
    Airman Basic. James nevertheless testified that in December 2019, after serving for
    approximately six years, he received a general discharge from the Air Force under
    honorable conditions.
    Subsequently, just before the trial court made its ruling on the temporary orders,
    the following exchange occurred between the trial court and James:
    THE COURT: Thank you, [James’s counsel]. Mr. Vaughn, what did
    you do in the Air Force?
    [James]: I worked with explosives.
    THE COURT: DOD?
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                            Page 16
    [James]: And I worked on munitions, all the way from bullets up to
    bombs, that went on airplanes.
    THE COURT: Very well. I was Security Forces for six years. I got
    out as a Staff Sergeant.
    [James]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: I’m sorry about your situation with the Air Force. You
    may have a seat.
    . . . The United States Supreme Court . . . has determined that
    “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
    partiality motion,” and opinions the judge forms during a trial do not
    necessitate recusal “unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
    antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial
    remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
    even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support
    a bias or partiality challenge.” Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555, 
    114 S.Ct. 1147
    , [1157,] 
    127 L.Ed.2d 474
     (1994)). Further, “[n]ot establishing bias
    or partiality . . . are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance,
    and even anger. . . .           A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom
    administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts
    at courtroom administration—remain immune.” [Id.] at 555–56, 114 S.Ct.
    [at 1157]. In short, a trial court has the inherent power to control the
    disposition of cases “with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel,
    and for litigants.” Landis v. N[.] Am. Co., 
    299 U.S. 248
    , 254, 
    57 S.Ct. 163
    , [166,]
    
    81 L.Ed. 153
     (1936).
    Similarly, Texas courts have held that “the discretion vested in the
    trial court over the conduct of a trial is great.” Schroeder v. Brandon, 
    141 Tex. 317
    , [325,] 
    172 S.W.2d 488
    , 491 (1943); see Metzger v. Sebek, 
    892 S.W.2d 20
    , 38
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). A trial court has the
    authority to express itself in exercising this broad discretion. Bott v. Bott,
    
    962 S.W.2d 626
    , 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
    Further, a trial court may properly intervene to maintain control in the
    courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it considers to be a
    waste of time. Hoggett v. Brown, 
    971 S.W.2d 472
    , 495 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Great Glob[.] Assurance Co. v. Keltex Props., Inc.,
    
    904 S.W.2d 771
    , 777 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi[–Edinburg] 1995, no writ).
    Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240–41 (citations omitted).
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                     Page 17
    Applying these principles to this case and considering James’s allegations against
    the trial judge in the context of the entire record, we conclude that the trial judge’s
    conduct was proper and did not amount to “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
    would make fair judgment impossible.” See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. at 1157.
    James’s fourth issue is therefore overruled.
    Issue Six
    James states his sixth issue as follows: “Are criminal laws and judgment orders
    being violated currently?” James goes on to complain in the “Argument” section of his
    appellant’s brief about “ongoing interference” by the trial court and “court
    administration.”
    We liberally construe both the rules of appellate procedure and the briefs of pro se
    parties. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9; Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex–Tex, Inc., 
    150 S.W.3d 423
    ,
    427 (Tex. 2004). But we may not speculate as to the substance of the specific issues
    asserted by an appellant. Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 
    126 S.W.3d 676
    , 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    2004, pet. denied). And we may not perform an independent review of the record and
    the law to determine if the trial court erred. Valadez v. Avitia, 
    238 S.W.3d 843
    , 845 (Tex.
    App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as
    licensed attorneys. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 
    573 S.W.2d 181
    , 184–85 (Tex. 1978).
    An appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the
    contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R.
    APP. P. 38.1(i). Here, James’s brief does not contain any citations to the record to support
    his sixth issue, nor does his brief contain any citations to specific authority through which
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                               Page 18
    we might review this issue. In fact, we cannot identify from appellant’s brief the specific
    ruling(s) by the trial court of which James complains in this issue. We therefore hold that
    James has waived this issue by inadequately briefing it. See Valadez, 
    238 S.W.3d at 845
    .
    Pending Motions
    James’s “Motion for Ex Parte Temporary Protective Order,” included in his
    appellant’s brief, is dismissed as moot.
    Amber’s “Motion to Require Payment of Costs Pursuant to Rule 145 of the Texas
    Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 20 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,” filed on
    November 19, 2021, is denied to the extent that it seeks different relief from the orders
    that have already been issued in this appeal.
    Conclusion
    In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.
    MATT JOHNSON
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray*,
    Justice Johnson, and
    Justice Smith
    *(Chief Justice Gray concurs.)
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed October 24, 2024
    [CV06]
    In re Marriage of Vaughn                                                                 Page 19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-21-00167-CV

Filed Date: 10/24/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/25/2024