Conrad Diaz v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. ( 2024 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-23-00481-CV
___________________________
CONRAD DIAZ, Appellant
V.
CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., Appellee
On Appeal from the 96th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 096-327005-21
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
In three issues, Appellant Conrad Diaz complains that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence at trial over his discovery-related objections. Because
the record does not reflect an abuse of discretion, we affirm.
II. Background
In July 2021, Appellee Capital One Bank (U.S.A.), N.A. sued Diaz, alleging that
he had an outstanding credit card debt of $10,302.281 and obtained a default
judgment in October 2022. Diaz filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court
granted. Diaz answered with a general denial, and Capital One then timely served its
discovery responses—required initial disclosures and responses to Diaz’s
interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production—in January and
February 2023. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.2 (requiring a party to make initial disclosures
within 30 days after the filing of the first answer or general appearance unless
otherwise agreed or ordered).
1
To its original petition, Capital One attached Diaz’s July 11, 2020 billing
statement showing his account as “past due” with a balance of $10,302.28. The same
document was included in Capital One’s evidence at trial, along with Diaz’s preceding
billing statements since September 8, 2018.
2
In its initial required disclosures, in addition to listing Diaz himself as a person
with knowledge of the relevant facts,2 Capital One stated,
Persons who have knowledge of relevant facts may include all parties to
this action, their agent, servants, and/or employees of Plaintiff or
Plaintiff’s counsel. Further, Plaintiff’s witness, whose identity is
unknown at this time, would be an authorized representative of the
Plaintiff who is familiar with the books and records as kept in the
normal course of business and could testify as to the status of the
account and its balance.
Capital One gave a similar response to Diaz’s interrogatory asking it to identify each
person it expected to call to testify at trial or summary judgment, whether live or by
affidavit, stating,
Plaintiff may call any of the parties to this action, their agent, servants,
and/or employees of Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel. Further, Plaintiff’s
witness, whose identity is unknown at this time, would be an authorized
representative of the Plaintiff who is familiar with the books and records
as kept in the normal course of business and could testify as to the status
of the account and its balance.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1 (stating that a party responding to written discovery “must
make a complete response, based on all information reasonably available to the
responding party or its attorney at the time the response is made”).
A bench trial was set for November 20, 2023. On October 16, 2023, Capital
One timely provided its pretrial disclosures to Diaz. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.4(b)
(requiring pretrial disclosures at least 30 days before trial).
2
Capital One also referred Diaz to its production of his credit card’s periodic
billing statements, the customer agreement, and his credit card application.
3
In its required pretrial disclosures, Capital One added the following to its
original disclosure about other persons with knowledge: “These witnesses may be
contacted through Plaintiff’s counsel at [law firm’s phone number]. Plaintiff may call
these witnesses if the need arises. The representatives will testify by and through
business records filed with the Court.” Capital One further added, “Alexis Moran may
offer testimony through affidavit. This witness may be contacted through Plaintiff’s
counsel at [law firm’s phone number]. This representative may provide testimony
regarding the Defendant’s credit card account with Capital One. Plaintiff may call this
witness if the need arises.” Capital One also listed its attorneys as potential witnesses
for attorney’s-fee testimony (although it did not pray for and did not receive an award
of attorney’s fees) and included both the law firm’s phone number and mailing
address.
Two days after filing its pretrial disclosures, Capital One timely filed a business
records affidavit signed by Moran to sponsor 85 pages of records.3 See Tex. R. Evid.
3
In her affidavit, Moran averred that she was over 18 years old, was competent
to testify “to the matters set forth herein,” was a Capital One employee, and was
“authorized by Capital One to testify to the matters set forth herein.” She stated that
her job responsibilities as Litigation Support Representative “provide[d] [her] with
access to all relevant systems and documents of Capital One needed to validate the
below information” and that “[a]s a result of the scope of [her] job responsibilities,
[she had] personal knowledge of the manner and method by which Capital One
create[d] and maintain[ed] certain business books and records, including computer
records of customer accounts.” Moran also stated that the 85 pages of records
attached to her affidavit were from Capital One regarding Diaz’s credit card account
and that they were
4
803(6), 902(10). Until Capital One offered Moran’s business records affidavit and the
attached documents at trial, Diaz did not object to the information supplied in Capital
One’s required disclosures, in its interrogatory and other discovery responses, or in its
pretrial disclosures,4 and there is no indication that he sought to compel any
additional information. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2–.3.
At trial, however, Diaz’s counsel complained that because Moran’s phone
number and address were not included in the disclosures, he could not “verify that
she is who she says she is; therefore, she should not be able to testify.” Capital One’s
counsel pointed out that Capital One had indicated in its pretrial disclosures that
Moran could be “contacted in care of our law office.” He also argued that an
kept in the regular course of business, and [that] it was in the regular
course of business of Capital One for an employee or representative of
Capital One, with knowledge of the act, event, condition, opinion, or
diagnosis, recorded to make the record or to transmit information
thereof to be included in such record; and the record was made at or
near the time or reasonably soon thereafter. The records attached hereto
are the original or exact duplicates of the original.
4
The purpose of the name, address, and telephone requirement is to allow the
opposing party to easily locate, interview, and depose the proposed witness.
$23,900.00 v. State, 899 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no
writ). There is no indication that Diaz sought to depose a corporate representative or
anyone else from Capital One during the case. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 181 (“Either party to
a suit may examine the opposing party as a witness, and shall have the same process
to compel his attendance as in the case of any other witness.”), 199.2(b)(1) (stating
that if an organization is named as the witness, the organization must designate one or
more individuals to testify on its behalf); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Ceasar, 670 S.W.3d
577, 588 (Tex. 2023) (“The existence of the missing documents came to light during
the deposition of Schindler’s corporate representative.”).
5
undisclosed corporate representative could testify at trial “because, in essence, they are
the party.” The trial court overruled Diaz’s objections and then awarded $10,302.28 in
damages plus court costs to Capital One after reviewing Markham v. Citizens Bank,
N.A., No. 04-22-00246-CV, 2023 WL 5418316 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 23,
2023, no pet.) (mem. op.),5 a case relied upon by Capital One to support its
admissibility argument.
III. Discussion
In three issues, Diaz complains that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting Moran’s business records affidavit because she was improperly disclosed
under Rules of Civil Procedure 193.1, 194.2(b)(5), and 194.4 and that the evidence
should have been excluded under Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 because Capital One
did not meet the exceptions for failing to amend or supplement its discovery
responses. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1, 193.6, 194.2(b)(5), 194.4. Diaz further argues that
5
In Markham, a bank’s corporate representative testified as custodian of records
at trial, and on appeal, Markham complained that the bank had not properly made
disclosures when it had merely stated that its “custodian of records” would have
sufficient knowledge of relevant facts and did not specifically identify the corporate
representative and custodian of records. 2023 WL 5418316, at *1. She asserted that
the trial court had abused its discretion by overruling her objections to the corporate
representative’s testimony and to the business records affidavit introduced during that
testimony. Id. The court ruled against her, reasoning that Rule of Civil Procedure
193.6 does not require a named party to be designated as a witness and that when a
corporate representative acts on behalf of a corporate entity, that act is the act of the
corporation (the party) itself. Id. at *2.
6
the trial court incorrectly relied on Markham because there was no corporate
representative or other witness present at trial.6
Capital One responds that the trial court correctly admitted the evidence and
lists several bases to affirm the trial court’s judgment, including that Moran was
properly disclosed as records custodian and that Diaz was not unfairly surprised or
prejudiced.
A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding
rules or principles—that is, if its act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry,
221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex.
2004). We must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if the record shows any
legitimate basis for the ruling. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35,
43 (Tex. 1998).
Under Rule 194.2(b)(5), within 30 days after the first answer is filed or general
appearance made, a party is required to provide to other parties the name, address,
and telephone number of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, and a brief
statement of each identified person’s connection with the case. Tex. R. Civ. P.
194.2(b)(5). Under Rule 194.4(a)(1), in addition to Rule 194.2’s initial disclosures, a
party must provide to the other parties and promptly file the following information
about the other-than-solely-for-impeachment evidence that it may present at trial:
6
Diaz did not and does not challenge the business records’ authenticity or the
affidavit’s compliance with Rule 902(10)’s requirements.
7
“the name and, if not previously provided, the address, and telephone number of each
witness—separately identifying those the party expects to present and those it may
call if the need arises.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 194.4(a)(1). Under Rule 193.1, a party must
timely respond to written discovery in writing and “must make a complete response,
based on all information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at
the time the response is made.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.1.
Rule 193.6 sets out a consequence for noncompliance with the above discovery
rules, stating,
[a] party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery response,
including a required disclosure, in a timely manner may not introduce in
evidence the material or information that was not timely disclosed, or
offer the testimony of a witness (other than a named party)[7] who was not
timely identified, unless the court finds that:
(1) there was good cause for the failure to timely make, amend, or
supplement the discovery response; or
(2) the failure to timely make, amend, or supplement the discovery
response will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a) (emphasis added). Rule 193.6’s purposes are to prevent trial by
ambush, to promote the responsible assessment of settlement, and to give the other
party the opportunity to prepare rebuttal to expert testimony. Insignia Hosp. Grp., Inc. v.
“By filing a pleading, a party indicates at least a potential awareness of facts
7
that bear on the merits of a claim or defense.” Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89,
90 (Tex. 1992). However, a party cannot disregard procedural rules and still insist
upon an absolute right to testify in all circumstances. Id.8
Jalaram Guru, LLC, No. 07-19-00057-CV, 2020 WL 2786676, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo May 27, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
The record reflects that Capital One identified its “agent, servants, and/or
employees” in its initial required disclosures as persons with knowledge of relevant
facts and in its interrogatory response as persons it expected to call to testify at trial,
whether live or by affidavit. Capital One also specified that it would have “an
authorized representative” who would be familiar with the company’s books and
records. “[A] corporation or other business entity, as a fictional legal person, cannot
literally appear in the flesh,” requiring it to operate through its agents. Norvelle v. PNC
Mortg., 472 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). In its required
pretrial disclosures, Capital One stated that its corporate witnesses could be contacted
through its counsel and provided the law firm’s phone number, stated that its
corporate representatives would testify by and through business records filed with the
court, and specifically identified Moran as potentially offering testimony through an
affidavit “regarding the Defendant’s credit card account with Capital One” and how
to contact her via Capital One’s counsel. Two days after identifying Moran, Capital
One filed her business records affidavit.
Because Moran, who did not testify at trial, was the authorized agent of Capital
One, a named party, and Capital One identified her in its pretrial disclosures and
provided her business records affidavit ahead of trial in compliance with Rule of
Evidence 902(10), as well as a means to contact her, the trial court did not abuse its
9
discretion by overruling Diaz’s objections. 8 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a); Norvelle,
472 S.W.3d at 448; see also Fox v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 14-15-00955-CV,
2017 WL 626628, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 14, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding record supported implied finding of no unfair surprise or
prejudice when bank did not disclose business records affiant’s identity 30 days before
trial but had provided defendant with the same account statement attached to its
business records affidavit as had been attached to its petition when it served him with
the lawsuit over six months before the bench trial). But cf. Gibbs v. Bureaus Inv. Grp.
Portfolio No. 14, LLC, 441 S.W.3d 764, 765, 767–68 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no
pet.) (concluding trial court abused its discretion by allowing witness to testify at trial
when company identified only itself as a fact witness but did not name its “legal lead”
in its discovery responses or on its witness list, and defendant could not have been
aware of the substance of the witness’s testimony before trial). We overrule Diaz’s
three issues.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Diaz’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
8
Further, there is no indication in the record that Diaz attempted to contact
Moran through Capital One’s counsel. See $23,900.00, 899 S.W.2d at 316–17 (holding
no failure to disclose witness’s identity and location when State identified officer as
potential witness and provided an address and phone number where he could be
reached even though it did not provide his residential address or phone number).
10
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: October 24, 2024
11