Michael Rooney and Yvonne Nacu v. City of Austin; Kirk Watson, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Austin; Shay Roalson, in Her Official Capacity as Austin Water Director; And Denise Lucas, in Her Official Capacity as City of Austin Development Department Services Director ( 2024 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-23-00053-CV
Michael Rooney and Yvonne Nacu, Appellants
v.
City of Austin, Kirk Watson, in his Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Austin;
Shay Roalson, in her Official Capacity as Austin Water Director; and Denise Lucas in her
Official Capacity as City of Austin Development Department Services Director, Appellees1
FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-GN-20-000519, THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael Rooney and Yvonne Nacu, appearing pro se, sued the City of Austin (“the
City”) and Kirk Watson, in his Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Austin; Shay Roalson, in
her Official Capacity as Austin Water Director; and Denise Lucas, in her Official Capacity as City
of Austin Development Department Services Director (collectively, “the City Officials”) seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief related to Rooney’s attempts to obtain a certificate of occupancy
for a residence located in the Glenlake Subdivision in Travis County. After a bench trial, the
1
Pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, current City of Austin
Mayor Kirk Watson has been automatically substituted for former Mayor Steve Adler and
current Austin Water Director Shay Roalson has been automatically substituted for former
Director Greg Meszaros.
trial court dismissed Rooney’s claims against the City and the City Officials with prejudice. We
will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Rooney purchased Lot 73 of the Glenlake Subdivision, 3704 Ranch Creek Drive,
in 2013 (“the Property”) with the intent of building a house on the vacant lot. The Property is
platted by a plat that includes Plat Note 4, which states that “no dwelling on this subdivision shall
be occupied until connected to a community water system approved by the Texas State Health
Department.” The plat further provides that this restriction may be modified only with the City’s
specific approval. The public water system serving Glenlake Subdivision Phase 2 was installed in
the early 1980s. A portion of the Property is within 100 feet in horizontal distance of the City’s
state-licensed public potable water system. A City-owned water tap is located at the Property to
benefit the Property and the adjacent lot. In 2015, Rooney contracted to have a well drilled on the
Property. The well was initially installed as an irrigation well.
The City of Austin Code of Ordinances incorporates the provisions of the Uniform
Plumbing Code (UPC) but also provides some local amendments to the UPC, which are found in
Code of Ordinances Section 25-12-153. Relevant here is local amendment 601.1.1, which
provides:
601.1.1 Water system connection required. If any part of a lot or tract that
contains a house or building is located within 100 feet in horizontal distance
(measured based on the closest practicable access route) of a state licensed public
potable water system, the water system of the house or building must be separately
and independently connected to the public water system. The water system is not
required to be connected if:
1. the property owner received a denial of service in writing from the owner or
governing body of the public water system;
2
2. the property owner received a written determination from Austin Water that it
is not feasible for the building to be connected to a potable water system; or
3. the property is served by an existing private potable water system and Austin
Water determined the private potable water system may continue to be used based
on factors such as the type of building served; the age, condition, and capacity of
the private potable water system; the quality of the water; and the availability of
records related to the system, changes to the system, or the system demand.
Austin, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 25-12, art. VI, § 25-12-153 sec. 601.1.1 (“the Connection
Requirement”). In January 2017, Rooney sought a waiver from the Connection Requirement,
which was denied by Austin Water Assistant Director Kevin Critendon. Rooney appealed the
denial to then Austin Water Director Greg Meszaros, who affirmed the denial, noting that the well
did not exist when the public water system began providing service and the well was not currently
providing any potable water to any home or building on the Property.
In March 2017, Rooney sought to construct a residence on the Property and applied
for a building permit from the City. Rooney requested to have the Property served by well
water rather than by Austin Water as an alternative means of compliance with the Connection
Requirement. City Building Official Carl Wren denied the request. Rooney appealed the denial
of that request to the City’s Mechanical, Plumbing, and Solar Board, which affirmed the denial.
Rooney then appealed the denial to the City Council, which also affirmed the denial. The City
never advised Rooney that it was not feasible for the Property to be connected to the existing public
potable water system that served the Glenlake Subdivision nor did the City determine that the
Property was served by an existing private potable water system the Property could continue to
use based on factors such as the type of building served; the age, condition, and capacity of the
private potable water system; the quality of the water; and the availability of records related to the
system, changes to the system, or the system demand.
3
Rooney proceeded to construct a residence on the Property. When construction
was completed in January 2020, Rooney sought to obtain a certificate of occupancy for the
residence but was unable to do so because of noncompliance with the Connection Requirement.
On January 29, 2020, Rooney sued the City and the City Officials. First, Rooney alleged that the
Connection Requirement did not apply to his residence because it was not “a structure served by
the City’s water utility” as required by Code of Ordinances section 25-1-2(A)(5). See id. § 25-1-
2(A)(5). Section 25-1-2, titled “Applicability of Regulations,” includes a provision that Chapter
25-12 Article 6, which includes the Connection Requirement, applies to “a structure served by the
City’s water utility.” Rooney asserted that, because he had never connected the residence to the
City’s public potable water system, the residence was not subject to any of the provisions of the
Uniform Plumbing Code incorporated into the City’s Code of Ordinances or to any of the local
amendments, including the Connection Requirement. Thus, Rooney alleged, then Austin Water
Director Greg Meszaros had “no jurisdiction and acted beyond his legal authority” and “failed to
provide a purely ministerial act” that would allow Rooney to complete construction of his
residence.2 Rooney further alleged that any attempt to apply the Connection Requirement to the
Property violated his “contractual, property, and constitutional rights.” Rooney also asserted that
Meszaros’s denial of his request for a waiver of the Connection Requirement was “arbitrary,
capricious, and an abuse of his possession of discretionary power.” Finally, Rooney asserted that
any actions by Austin Water to require him to connect to the public potable water system violated
his “personal property and basic contractual rights under Texas State Law.”
2
We presume that the “purely ministerial act” referred to is removing a building permit
requirement that the residence be connected to the public potable water system so that Rooney
could obtain a certificate of occupancy for the residence.
4
Rooney’s petition sought declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act; specifically, a declaration of his “legal rights, status, duties, and or privileges
under the Austin City Code” and a declaration that Meszaros’s denial of his request for a waiver
constituted a “Proprietary Function of his office as Director of Austin Water Utility.” See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 37.001-.011 (UDJA). Rooney also sought injunctive relief ordering
the Austin Water Utility to remove the Connection Requirement from his building permit to allow
him to complete final inspections and obtain a certificate of occupancy for the residence.
The City and the City Officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that Rooney’s
claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The City and the City Officials argued that Rooney
failed to establish a waiver of immunity because the UDJA “does not waive immunity against
claims seeking a declaration of the claimant’s statutory rights or an interpretation of an ordinance”
as it relates to that claimant. See Tabrizi v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.3d 290, 296-97 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that UDJA did not waive immunity for claim asserting that certain
City of Austin Code of Ordinances provisions did not apply to claimant’s property). After a
hearing, the trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction but gave Rooney an opportunity to
replead.
Rooney then filed an amended pleading in which he again sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the City and the City Officials. The factual allegations in the amended
petition are consistent with those in the original petition, including the history of unsuccessfully
seeking a waiver of the Connection Requirement and the allegation that the City and the City
Officials “acted without legal statutory authority in applying” the Uniform Plumbing Code and the
Connection Requirement to the Property. Specifically, Rooney alleged, as the basis for his claims
against the City and the City Officials, that:
5
• Austin Water Assistant Director Critendon’s denial of Rooney’s request for a
waiver of the Connection Requirement “was based entirely on his application and
interpretation of [the Connection Requirement];”
• the Connection Requirement did not apply to the Property because the Property
did not have a “structure served by the City’s water utility,” which, by virtue of
Code of Ordinances section 25-1-2(A)(5), was a prerequisite to application of the
Uniform Plumbing Code and the Connection Requirement;
• the City Officials engaged in ultra vires conduct by applying the Uniform
Plumbing Code and the Connection Requirement to the residence on the Property;
and
• the City and the City Officials collected fees, allowed building permits to be
issued, conducted inspections, and “allowed [Rooney] to effectively complete a
very expensive construction project and then refused to perform the final
inspections,” thereby causing financial harm to Rooney.
Based on these allegations, Rooney asserted causes of action for: (1) violating his right to liberty
and due course of the law provided by Article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution; (2) violating
rights secured by the privileges or immunities guarantee in Article 1, section 19 of the Texas
Constitution; and (3) violating 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by, under color of an ordinance, depriving him of
rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution. Each of these causes
of action is based on Rooney’s assertion that the City Officials acted ultra vires when they required
him to comply with the Connection Requirement, an ordinance that, in his view, did not apply to
the residence constructed on the Property. The relief Rooney requested was an injunction directing
the City Officials to remove from the building permit the requirement that he comply with the
Connection Requirement before he could obtain final inspections and a certificate of occupancy
for the residence.
In response to the amended petition, the City and the City Officials again filed a
plea to the jurisdiction asserting that Rooney’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and,
alternatively, he had not pleaded a valid ultra vires claim against the City Officials. The trial court
6
denied the plea to the jurisdiction and subsequently denied the City and the City Officials’ motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Rooney’s claim that the City and the City Officials
erroneously applied the Connection Requirement to the Property, causing violations of his
constitutional rights, failed as a matter of law. The case was then tried to the bench. After trial,
the court signed an order dismissing Rooney’s claims against the City and the City Officials with
prejudice and rendering judgment in the City and the City Officials’ favor. Rooney then perfected
this appeal. In three issues, Rooney asserts that the trial court erred by concluding that: (1) the
Uniform Plumbing Code, including the Connection Requirement, applied to the Property; (2) if
the Connection Requirement did apply to the Property, the trial court erred in concluding that
the City Officials had the authority to deny his request for a waiver; and (3) the Connection
Requirement, as applied to the Property, is unconstitutional. The City and the City Officials
counter that: (1) Rooney’s claims brought under the UDJA are barred by sovereign immunity;
(2) Rooney has not pleaded a valid ultra vires claim against the City Officials; and (3) the
Connection Requirement does not violate Rooney’s constitutional rights.
DISCUSSION
We first address Rooney’s claim, raised in his first issue, that the trial court
incorrectly concluded that the Uniform Plumbing Code, including the Connection Requirement,
applied to the Property and, therefore, erred in denying his request for a declaration that the
Property was not subject to the Connection Requirement. For the following reasons, we conclude
that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, and it should have been
dismissed for want of jurisdiction as requested by the City and the City Officials in their plea to
the jurisdiction.
7
When it applies, governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the
State, including cities, from suit. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694
n.3 (Tex. 2003). A governmental unit’s immunity implicates a trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Brothers, Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. 2017).
Governmental immunity generally applies to municipalities when they are performing
governmental as opposed to proprietary functions. Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville,
489 S.W.3d 427, 439 (Tex. 2016); City of Austin v. Utility Assocs., Inc., 517 S.W.3d 300, 307-08
(Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied). Providing water and sewer service is a governmental
function. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.0215(a)(32) (municipality’s provision of water
and sewer service constitute governmental functions). As it did here, a governmental unit may
raise its immunity through a plea to the jurisdiction. Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004). As plaintiff, Rooney had the burden to demonstrate that the
trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley,
104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003).
Rooney contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a declaration
under the UDJA that the Uniform Plumbing Code, including the Connection Requirement, does
not apply to the Property and cannot be enforced with regard to it. The UDJA expressly allows
for a “person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . municipal
ordinance . . .[to] have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”
UDJA § 37.004. The UDJA, however, is not a waiver of governmental immunity; it is “merely a
procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction.” Texas Ass’n of Bus. v.
Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993); see Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik,
8
355 S.W.3d 618, 621-22 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam) (observing that Texas Supreme Court has
consistently stated that UDJA “does not enlarge the trial court’s jurisdiction but is merely a
procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction”). The UDJA is not a
general waiver of sovereign immunity and only waives immunity for certain claims. McLane Co.
v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 514 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet.
denied) (citing Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011)).
Instead, the UDJA only “waives sovereign immunity in particular cases.” Sefzik, 355 SW.3d
at 622. “For example, the state may be a proper party to a declaratory judgment action that
challenges the validity of a statute.” Id. However, “the UDJA does not waive the state’s sovereign
immunity when the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or other law.”
Id. at 621.
Here, Rooney does not seek a declaration concerning the validity of a City
ordinance. Instead, he seeks a declaration of his rights under the ordinance; i.e., that it does not
apply to the Property. The requested declaration could also be considered as a “bare statutory
construction” claim seeking to confirm the scope of the relevant City ordinances. The UDJA does
not waive the City’s governmental immunity with respect to either such claim. See id.; Tabrizi,
551 S.W.3d at 297-98 (holding that UDJA did not waive immunity from claim seeking declaration
that City’s municipal land use regulations did not apply to landowner’s subdivision application);
McLane, 514 S.W.3d at 876 (holding that UDJA did not waive immunity for claim seeking to
construe Texas Public Information Act). The trial court did not err in denying Rooney’s UDJA
claims, which were barred by governmental immunity.
We next consider Rooney’s claim that the City Officials acted ultra vires in
applying provisions of the City’s plumbing ordinance, including the Connection Requirement, to
9
the Property. Sovereign immunity extends to state officials acting in their official capacity. See
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 369-70 (Tex. 2009). An exception to sovereign
immunity applies when a party alleges that the government officer acted “without legal authority
or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” Id. at 372. To fall within this exception to immunity,
however, “a suit must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather
must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform
a purely ministerial act.” Id. If the plaintiff alleges or ultimately can prove only acts within the
officer’s legal authority and discretion, the claim seeks “to control state action” and is barred
by sovereign immunity. Id.; KEM Tex., Ltd. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., No. 03-08-00468-CV,
2009 WL 1811102, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). To determine
whether Rooney’s pleadings allege facts demonstrating that the City Officials acted outside their
authority we construe the relevant statutory provisions and evaluate whether the acts alleged are
outside the statutory authority granted to the City Officials.
Rooney contends that the trial court erred in determining that the City Officials had
the authority to apply the Uniform Plumbing Code, including the Connection Requirement, to the
Property. Rooney maintains that, by their own terms, the relevant ordinances do not govern or
apply to the Property and, consequently, the City Officials’ application of those ordinances was
ultra vires. Specifically, Rooney relies on City Code of Ordinances Section 25-1-2, titled
“Applicability of Regulations,” and its provision that states that Chapter 25-12 Article 6, which
includes the Connection Requirement, applies only to “a structure served by the City’s water
utility.” See Austin, Tex., City Code of Ordinances ch. 25-12, art. VI, § 25-1-2(A)(5). Rooney
reasons that, because the residence constructed on the Property had never been connected to the
public potable water system, it was not “a structure served by the City’s water utility” and could
10
not be subject to any of the provisions of Chapter 25-12 Article 6, including the Uniform Plumbing
Code and the Connection Requirement. Put differently, Rooney asserts that he could not be subject
to the Connection Requirement because he was not connected to the City’s public potable water
system. The linchpin of Rooney’s argument is that only a structure that is actually connected to
the public potable water system can constitute “a structure served by the City’s water utility.”
Otherwise, according to Rooney, the structure is not “served” by the City’s water utility and is not
subject to the regulations in the City Code of Ordinances related to plumbing, including the
Connection Requirement and other provisions of the Uniform Plumbing Code. This argument
requires that we construe section 25-1-2(A)(5), specifically the meaning of the phrase “served by
the City’s water utility.”
We apply rules of statutory construction to construe municipal ordinances. Houston
Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 164 (Tex. 2016). Statutory
construction is a question of law that we review de novo. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs,
258 S.W.3d 627, 632 (Tex. 2008). Our primary objective in construing statutes is to give effect to
the legislature’s intent. Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867
(Tex. 2009). The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a
different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or unless
the plain meaning would lead to absurd or nonsensical results that the legislature could not have
intended. City of Rockwell v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625-26 (Tex. 2008). We look to the entire
act in determining the legislature’s intent with respect to a specific provision. Taylor v. Firemen’s
& Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n, 616 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. 1981); Northwest Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Austin, 274 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied).
“Texas courts favor the ‘textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the
11
document’s purpose.’” In re Dallas County, __S.W.3d__, No. 24-0426, 2024 WL 3908122, at *12
(Tex. Aug. 23, 2024) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 63 (2012)). “If the ‘language is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will
carry out and the other defeat [its] manifest object,’ courts should apply ‘the former construction.’”
Id.Here, the purpose of the Connection Requirement is to ensure that structures on
property that is “located within 100 feet in horizontal distance (measured based on the closest
practicable access route) of a state licensed public potable water system” are “separately and
independently connected to the public water system.” Reading “served by the City’s water utility”
to mean “connected to” the public potable water system would violate the above-stated principles
of statutory construction by exempting from the Connection Requirement any structure not already
connected to the public water system and thereby defeating the ordinance’s “manifest object” of
requiring structures within 100 feet of a public potable water system to connect to it. In essence,
no future building would ever have to comply with the Connection Requirement or any other
provisions of the Uniform Plumbing Code. Instead, the better construction of the phrase “served
by” is that the potable water system is available for connection to the structure for the provision of
water service to the structure. By requiring connection only if a water system is located within
100 horizontal feet of any part of a lot or tract, the City’s ordinance further refines the term “a
structure served by” to include only structures located on property reasonably proximate to a public
water system. This construction is consistent with the City Code of Ordinances’ definition of a
“service connection,” which for water service is “the City-owned pipes connecting the City’s
12
distribution facilities to a property owner’s cut-off valve.” See Austin, Tex., City Code of
Ordinances ch. 15-9, art. 1 § 15-9-1(14)(b) (defining “service connection”).3
Applying this construction of “a structure served by the City’s water utility,” it is
plain that the residence Rooney constructed on the Property falls within the scope of City Code of
Ordinances Chapter 25-12 Article 6, which includes the Connection Requirement. We therefore
conclude that the City Officials did not act ultra vires in requiring Rooney to comply with the
Connection Requirement. We overrule Rooney’s first issue.
In his second issue, Rooney asserts that the trial court erred by not granting his
request for declaratory relief on the ground that the City Officials improperly denied him an
exemption to the Connection Requirement. As previously stated, the City Officials are immune
from this UDJA claim unless Rooney demonstrates that the City Officials acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. If Rooney
complains only about the City Officials’ exercise of discretion, his UDJA claim does not fall within
the exception to governmental immunity. Id. We have already determined that the City Officials’
application of the relevant ordinance to the Property was not ultra vires. We next consider whether
their decision to deny Rooney an exemption from the Connection Requirement was an ultra vires
act. To answer this question, we need look no further than the text of section 601.1.1, which allows
for an exemption to the Connection Requirement if City Officials “determine” that a private
potable water system may continue to be used. The text of the ordinance plainly provides that the
City Officials have discretion to grant an exemption based on the determination of whether a
private potable water system may continue to be used. An ultra vires claim may not complain of
3
We note that in his pleadings Rooney alleges that “the water service tap [the Property
shares with its adjacent lot] constitutes a ‘a service connection’ to the City’s water system.”
13
a government official’s exercise of discretion. Id. And to the extent Rooney asserts that the City
Officials acted ultra vires by failing to base their determination on the factors listed in section
601.1.1 (the type of building served; the age, condition, and capacity of the private potable water
system; the quality of the water; and the availability of records related to the system, changes to
the system, or the system demand) we note that the statute does not require that the City Officials
consider only those factors, but rather directs them to consider factors “such as” those listed. The
City Officials’ discretion is not so limited as to render the determination to deny Rooney an
exception to the Connection Requirement ultra vires. We overrule Rooney’s second issue.
We next consider Rooney’s as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the city
ordinances requiring that he connect to the City’s water utility. The Texas Constitution guarantees
that “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities,
or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const.
art. I, § 19.4 Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, and a party asserting they are not
bears a high burden of demonstrating otherwise. Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regul.,
469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015). The proponent of an as-applied challenge under section 19’s
substantive due course of law requirement must demonstrate that either (1) the statute’s purpose
could not arguably be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest; or (2) when
considered as a whole, the statute’s actual, real-world effect as applied to the challenging party
could not arguably be rationally related to, or is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the
governmental interest. Id. On appeal, Rooney states, with no supporting authority, that the
4
Rooney acknowledges that the protections afforded by the Texas Constitution’s Due
Course of Law Clause and the United States Constitution’s Due Process Clause “are generally
the same.” See Lindquist v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 238 (5th Cir. 2012). Consequently,
we do not address the alleged Due Process Clause violations independently.
14
ordinance is unconstitutional because it has no rational relation to a legitimate governmental
interest. At trial, however, Critendon testified that the water-connection requirement helps ensure
public health and safety and that one of a public utility’s obligations is to ensure that potable water
is safely delivered to all customers in its service area. He further testified that requiring properties
to connect to the City’s public water system helps to ensure that every property in the City has
access to clean, safe water that meets all state and federal safety regulations. Critendon stated that
building a community water system requires a significant investment of public dollars, and it is
“done on the assumption that people will connect to the system.” Critendon stated that public
policy supports ensuring that a community investment is protected and returned, and that if
residents of a neighborhood with a fully developed public water infrastructure could opt out and
avoid paying associated fees, the burden of paying for the comprehensive system would fall on the
remaining customers and taxpayers.
“[G]overnment action comports with substantive due process if the action is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of
Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1996). Critendon’s testimony provides evidence of that
legitimate governmental interest; one that has been accepted by other courts in other contexts.
See, e.g., Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding mandatory water hookup
ordinance as applied to plaintiffs against substantive due process challenge, stating that “regulating
the water supply is a basic and legitimate governmental function”). Rooney has failed to
demonstrate that the Connection Requirement’s purpose could not arguably be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest.
Nor has Rooney demonstrated that application of the Connection Requirement to
him has a real-world effect that is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of the government
15
interest in providing and maintaining a safe, reliable source of water to the City’s residents.
Rooney points only to a requirement that he become an Austin City Water customer despite his
desire not to. Rooney does not explain how this consequence of complying with the Connection
Requirement is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of the government’s rational interest in
regulating the public water supply. Rooney has not demonstrated that the Connection Requirement
violates his substantive due process rights under either the Texas or United States Constitutions.
We therefore overrule his third issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Rooney’s three issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: September 26, 2024
16