Craig Everett Lyles v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ( 2024 )

Affirm and Opinion Filed October 28, 2024
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00383-CR
CRAIG EVERETT LYLES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-83595-2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Kennedy
Opinion by Justice Molberg
A jury found appellant Craig Everett Lyles guilty of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon (a firearm) and assessed punishment at seven years’ confinement.
Lyles appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain non-expert
testimony regarding bullet trajectory, (2) there is legally insufficient evidence to
support his conviction, and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed
verdict. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in this memorandum opinion. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
Lyles was charged by indictment in November 2020. The indictment states
that, on or about April 6, 2020, Lyles “[d]id then and there intentionally and
knowingly threaten Samuel Head with imminent bodily injury and did then and there
use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, during the commission of said
assault.” Lyles pleaded not guilty. The case was tried to a jury in March 2023.
Generally, the case involves shots fired onto property where Samuel Head,
the complainant named in the indictment, lived with his father Joe and other family
members.1 Six witnesses testified during the guilt/innocence phase, including
Samuel, along with five others who were members of law enforcement or who had
some connection to the investigation of the offense.
Around April 2, 2020, after noticing bullet holes on a recreational vehicle
(RV) and a truck on the property, Samuel called the police, photographed the
damage, and set up a trail camera. He noticed more bullet holes on the RV in the
days that followed.
Samuel and his dad, Joe, worked together to try to find out where the shots
were coming from, including by using a laser to try to get a trajectory. Samuel
testified they “took a pointer lens through some of the existing bullet holes from the
interior of the camper to see if we could kind of line up and . . . see where they’re
coming from” and “also used CB antenna through the holes from the outside to kind
1
Because they share the same surname, for clarity, we will refer to Samuel and Joe by their first names.
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of figure [it] out.” Samuel testified the laser hit on the apartment building reflected
in State’s exhibit 6 and pointed between the third and fourth floors to the right of the
brick section and to a direction higher than the third floor.
On April 6, 2020, Samuel and one of his friends inspected the latest damage
to the RV. As they stood by the front passenger side, Samuel “hear[d] a break of
wind and then air move under [his] neck . . . and a bullet str[uck] in front of the RV.”
Samuel testified “it was close” and “scared the hell out of” him and said the shot
came from the direction of area apartments. He also testified that no one was
walking or driving on that street at the time. When police responded, they
investigated apartment 410 because Samuel had noticed that its balcony door was
frequently open, but they ruled that out after discovering an older woman with no
guns lived there.
Later on April 6, 2020, while Samuel was outside, he noticed a man he had
never seen before walking by, and photos of the man were captured on the trail
camera. The man ignored Samuel’s greetings and seemed intent on looking at the
damage to the RV. Also later that evening, another shot occurred, after dark.
Samuel saw the same man on the balcony of apartment 310 on April 7, 2020,
one of the many days when shots were fired. At trial, Samuel identified Lyles as the
man he had seen walking by his house on April 6, 2020, and sitting on the balcony
on April 7, 2020. Beginning on April 7, 2020, Samuel began noticing a pattern that
when shots were fired, the door of apartment 310 was open.
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More shots occurred on April 8 and 9, 2020, and the same pattern continued.
On April 9, 2020, 911 was called, and Detective James Burson, who was not
in uniform, arrived in an unmarked vehicle. As Detective Burson stood outside, off
of the front porch as he talked with Samuel and his father, he heard a gunshot whiz
by his ear. Detective Burson was advised of the pattern Samuel had noticed, and
after the shot, Detective Burson then witnessed that pattern himself, testifying that
he saw the open patio door of a specific apartment, a white male coming out onto
the patio balcony, look around, go back inside, and close the door. Detective Burson
called for backup and directed law enforcement to go to apartment 310.
Law enforcement personnel attempted to contact the resident inside apartment
310, but that person did not immediately come out. Law enforcement personnel then
treated that person as a barricaded person, and crisis negotiators attempted to
communicate with the person inside through various means, including by cell phone
call and text and by loud hailing with a helicopter and drone. None of those methods
worked. After several hours, police made contact with the person’s father, and the
person, identified at trial as Lyles, came out of apartment 310.
Police obtained a search warrant and entered apartment 310. Among other
things, police found a large amount of firearms that included both handguns and
rifles; a large amount of ammunition, including .22 long rifle ammunition and other
loose ammunition around the apartment; a small folding-type table in the middle of
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the living room floor; and some evidence of bullet strikes on a railing inside the
apartment, as well as some bullet fragments on the balcony.
Stefani Campbell, a criminalist with the Carrollton Police Department, did a
gunshot residue (GSR) collection on both of Lyles’s hands. On cross-examination,
she agreed it was a best-practice protocol to bag the hands of a potential suspect and
testified Lyles’s hands were not bagged before she did the GSR collection. She did
not do a GSR collection on any guns, on Lyles’s clothes, on a railing, or on the
backseat of the patrol car where Lyles had been sitting before she conducted the
GSR collection. David Spence, a trace evidence examiner for the Southwestern
Institute of Forensic Sciences, conducted testing on the GSR collection taken from
Lyles’s hands. After doing so, Spence issued a report confirming the presence of
five particles characteristic of primer GSR, with four particles on the sampling from
Lyles’s left hand, and one particle on the sampling from his right. Spence testified,
and his report indicated, that the presence of these particles on Lyles’s hands could
be due to his firing a firearm, being in the proximity of a firearm when it was fired,
or handling a firearm, a firearm component, or an object with primer GSR.
Campbell attempted to do a trajectory analysis but was unable to do so
because she lacked the necessary equipment, as the bullet holes were smaller than
the trajectory rods her department had at the time. The photographs she took were
to establish a line-of-sight direction, not a trajectory to establish that a projectile
came from apartment 310.
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Lyles was arrested after the search of apartment 310.
At trial, after the State rested in the guilt/innocence phase, Lyles moved for
directed verdict, arguing, in part, that the evidence was legally insufficient because
there was “no evidence that anyone saw [Lyles] with a firearm, that he used the
firearm or that he exhibited a firearm in this case . . . to threaten” Samuel.
The trial court denied the motion. Lyles called no witnesses during the
guilt/innocence phase. The jury was charged, and after counsel made closing
arguments, the jury deliberated and found Lyles guilty. After the sentencing phase,
the jury assessed his punishment at seven years’ confinement and no fine. The trial
court pronounced his sentence, certified his right to appeal, and signed the judgment
at issue. Lyles timely appealed.
ISSUES & ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We first consider Lyles’ second and third issues because, if we find the
evidence legally insufficient to support Lyles’ conviction, we must reverse and
render a judgment of acquittal.2 Also, because his second and third issues involve
the same review standards, we consider them together. See Canales v. State, 98
S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (considering an appellant’s argument that
2
See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (“Since . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes
a second trial once a reviewing court has found evidence legally insufficient, the only ‘just’ remedy
available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.”); Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 774
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (after concluding evidence was insufficient, court reversed judgment of the court
of appeals, rendered judgment of acquittal, and cited Burks as requiring the remedy of appellate acquittal
on grounds of evidentiary sufficiency).
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the trial court erroneously overruled his motion for a directed verdict as a challenge
to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction); Rice v. State, 195
S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (“A challenge to the trial
judge’s ruling on a motion for an instructed verdict is in actuality a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.”).
Under the Due Process Clause, a criminal conviction must be based on legally
sufficient evidence. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979)). When assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court considers all of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the jury was rationally
justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–
19; Witcher v. State, 638 S.W.3d 707, 709–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Further, an
appellate court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations
because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight
assigned to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326; Witcher, 638 S.W.3d
at 710. An appellate court will consider all evidence when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted,
or submitted by the prosecution or defense. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
In this case, by finding Lyles guilty of the charged offense, the jury found that,
on or about April 6, 2020, Lyles “[d]id then and there intentionally and knowingly
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threaten [Samuel] with imminent bodily injury and did then and there use or exhibit
a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, during the commission of said assault.” See
TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a).3
On appeal, Lyles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to only one
aspect of the offense: his identity as the perpetrator. He argues the State’s evidence
was insufficient to allow any rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and states, “Specifically, the evidence establishes that no person
observed [Lyles] with a firearm at any time during the period when the shootings
occurred.” But “the law does not require an eyewitness to prove identity[,]” see
Middleton v. State, No. 05-22-01144-CR, 2023 WL 7634396, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Nov. 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), and
“[i]dentity may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by
reasonable inferences from the evidence.” Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018).4
Lyles also argues the State could have conducted a more thorough
investigation. As one example, Lyles argues:
3
A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in Texas Penal Code
§ 22.01 and either causes serious bodily injury to another, or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the
commission of the assault. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a). Among other things, a person commits assault
under § 22.01 if the person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly threatens another with imminent bodily
injury.” Id. § 22.01(a)(2).
4
See also Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“Evidence as to the identity of
the perpetrator of an offense can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.”); Gardner v. State, 306
S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The State may prove the defendant’s identity and criminal
culpability by either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that
evidence.”) (citing Earls, 707 S.W.2d at 82).
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[T]he State failed to collect evidence that could have included or
excluded [Lyles] as the shooter. The State could have attempted to
collect samples from the tray table or balcony railing—areas that they
used to support their narrative that [Lyles] committed this offense—
but, they failed to do the minimum amount of work to provide
conclusive evidence in this case.
Lyles does not explain how the alleged inadequacy of the State’s investigation
impacts our sufficiency review but seems to suggest that the State did not present
sufficient evidence simply because the State could have sought and presented more
evidence than it did. To the extent he makes that argument, we reject it. See David
v. State, 663 S.W.3d 673, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).5
Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we conclude any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Lyles committed the charged offense based upon the circumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences from it. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Witcher, 638
S.W.3d at 709–10 (both describing review standards); see also Ingerson, 559 S.W.3d
at 509 (“Identity may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by
reasonable inferences from the evidence.”).
We overrule Lyles’s second and third issues.
5
David involved an appeal of a conviction for felony tampering with physical evidence. 663 S.W.3d
at 675, 681 (referring to David’s act of tampering as “dumping loose marijuana into a toilet bowl filled with
water and human waste”). In that case, when challenging the State’s evidence, the appellant argued about
steps that law enforcement could have taken to further investigate, such as collecting and testing the
marijuana. Id. at 681. In addressing that argument, the court stated, “Just because the agents could have
collected the marijuana, dried it, and tested it, does not mean that the agents had to collect the marijuana,
nor does it mean that the evidence is somehow ‘less sufficient’ because they did not.” Id. Similar reasoning
applies here. Just because the State could have done more to investigate the offense does not mean that the
State failed to present enough evidence.
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B. Non-Expert Testimony
In his first issue, Lyles argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain non-expert testimony regarding bullet trajectory, specifically, testimony by
Samuel regarding certain actions he and his father took to try to determine where the
shots to their property were coming from. The State argues no error occurred, and
even if it did, it was harmless.
At trial, Samuel testified on two different days. During the first day of his
testimony, the following exchange occurred during his direct examination, without
any objection by Lyles:
[PROSECUTOR]: And all of these days leading up to April 6th, had
you and your dad, Joe, had you been kind of working together
collaborating to try to find out where these shots were coming from?
[SAMUEL]: Yes, we were.
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you at one point even use your own laser to try
to get a trajectory?
[SAMUEL]: Yes, we did.
[PROSECUTOR]: Did you actually think at one point – um, or were
you able to kind of narrow down an area?
[SAMUEL]: Yes, we did. Um, so we took a pointer lens through some
of the existing bullet holes from the interior of the camper to see if we
could kind of line up and you see where they’re coming from. We also
used CB antenna through the holes from the outside to kind of figure
out.
On the next day of his testimony, and during his continued direct examination,
the State questioned Samuel about this again in this exchange, this time prompting
Lyles to object:
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[PROSECUTOR]: This is State’s Exhibit 6. Now, yesterday you talked
about . . . April 6th of 2020, . . . that same day that you were shot at and
felt that bullet under your neck. Did you and your father actually try
to do some trajectory?
[SAMUEL]: Yes, we did.
[PROSECUTOR]: And what were the different ways you tried to do
that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, Your Honor, I’m going to object as to
any testimony in regards to trajectory from a lay witness. That requires
more specialized and expert training. It’s just –
THE COURT: Response?
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, this witness, I believe he can talk
about his experience. They just ran a laser through the holes and can
testify about their experience and what they observed.
THE COURT: I’ll let you lay groundwork first, before I admit it.
[PROSECUTOR]: Sam, what did you and your dad do?
[SAMUEL]: So from my – from inside the RV, we ran a laser through
the damage to see where the laser would hit.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, again, I’m going to object as to
any testimony in regards to the determining a laser trajectory from a lay
witness. It requires specialized training. They’re not trained. There’s
no foundation that’s been laid from what the conclusion that they’re
seeking.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[PROSECUTOR]: Sam, could you describe that again?
[SAMUEL]: So, um, green-colored laser, we shined it through the
bullet holes from inside of the trailer and see where it would hit the
building or just kind of get a general direction where they came from.
[PROSECUTOR]: So did you go – to make sure I understand you
correctly, you went inside your RV, your camper, correct?
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[SAMUEL]: Correct.
[PROSECUTOR]: And you found a hole, a bullet hole, and you took a
green laser and put that directly through a bullet hole?
[SAMUEL]: Correct.
[PROSECUTOR]: To shine the laser in the direction of that hole?
[SAMUEL]: Yes.
[PROSECUTOR]: And is there a certain location where it, um, ended
up?
[SAMUEL]: Between the third and fourth floors to the right of the
brick section.
[PROSECUTOR]: So, did it hit on this apartment building that we have
here in State’s Exhibit 6?
[SAMUEL]: Yes, it did.
Later, during cross-examination, Samuel admitted he has no specialized
training regarding trajectory.6
6
Samuel testified:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Now, you did your trajectory, your laser thing, right?
[SAMUEL]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And it was – it was pointed in a direction that was actually higher
up than the third floor, was it not?
[SAMUEL]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Um, and you’re not trained in trajectory, are you?
[SAMUEL]: No, I’m not. But I understand how a bullet will fly.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, that kind of takes some specialized training as well, does
it not?
[SAMUEL]: Yeah, I would agree.
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Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires a timely, specific objection
and a ruling by the trial court to preserve a complaint for appellate review. TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a). To be timely, a complaint must be made as soon as the grounds for
complaint is apparent or should be apparent. Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819,
822 (Tex. 2021).
We review the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.
Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Henley v. State, 493
S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “Under this standard, the trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld as long as it was within the
‘zone of reasonable disagreement.’” Beham, 559 S.W.3d at 478.
Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of Evidence states, “If a witness is not testifying
as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a)
rationally based on the witness’s perception; and (b) helpful to clearly understanding
the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue.” In this case, although
Lyles argues Samuel’s testimony was not rationally based on his perception, he
makes no argument regarding whether Samuel’s testimony was helpful. “The
perception requirement of [rule of evidence] 701 is consistent with the personal
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you have any specialized training?
[SAMUEL]: No.
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knowledge requirement of [rule of evidence] 602.”7 Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d
895, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Based on the record before us, we conclude Lyles failed to timely object to
Samuel’s testimony regarding trajectory and thus failed to preserve error. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d at 822. Specifically, Lyles waited to
object until the second day of Lyles’ testimony, after Lyles had already testified,
without objection, that he used a laser to try to get a trajectory, “took a pointer lens
through some of the existing bullet holes from the interior of the camper to see if
[he] could kind of line up and you see where they’re coming from,” and “used CB
antenna through the holes from the outside to kind of figure [it] out.”
Moreover, even if we presume for purposes of appeal that Lyles made a timely
objection and also presumed that Samuel’s testimony constituted an opinion, we
conclude his testimony was based on perceptions gained from his own
contemporaneous actions and was thus based on his own personal knowledge as
required by rule of evidence 701. In Wade v. State, 663 S.W.3d 175, 187–88 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022), the court stated:
Perceptions refer to a witness’s interpretation of information acquired
through his or her own senses or experiences at the time of the event.
Thus, the witness’s testimony can include opinions, beliefs, or
inferences as long as they are drawn from his or her own experiences
7
Texas Rule of Evidence 602 states:
A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony. This rule does not apply to a
witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.
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or observations. An opinion is rationally based on perception if it is
one that a reasonable person could draw under the circumstances.
Finally, to the extent Lyles argues Samuel’s testimony was harmful because
it amounts to improper expert testimony, we reject that argument. See Cherry v.
State, 488 S.W.2d 744, 756–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (concluding witness who
was not allowed to testify regarding the trajectories of bullets but who was allowed
to “explain the strings running from the bullet holes” was “properly allowed to
express the methods he had utilized” and stating “the matters about which he was
permitted to testify did not constitute expert opinion testimony”).
We overrule Lyles’s first issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Ken Molberg/
KEN MOLBERG
230383f.u05 JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
CRAIG EVERETT LYLES, On Appeal from the 199th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 199-83595-
No. 05-23-00383-CR V. 2020.
Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Molberg. Justices Nowell and
Kennedy participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 28th day of October, 2024.
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