Michael Timothy Caffey v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )


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  •                     In the
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-24-00057-CR
    MICHAEL TIMOTHY CAFFEY, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 115th District Court
    Upshur County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 19675
    Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    An Upshur County jury convicted Michael Timothy Caffey of the first-degree murder1 of
    his father, and in accordance with the jury’s assessment, the trial court sentenced him to life
    imprisonment. On appeal, Caffey asserts that the trial court erred when it (1) denied his motion
    to suppress, (2) admitted testimony that was unfairly prejudicial, and (3) admitted testimony
    regarding the contents of an autopsy report by a forensic pathologist who did not prepare the
    report. He also asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative harm of these
    errors. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    I.         Caffey’s Motion to Suppress
    In his first issue, Caffey contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
    his motion to suppress evidence of his blood-spattered shoes because law enforcement seized the
    shoes from him without a search warrant and, according to Caffey, in the absence of exigent
    circumstances. Prior to trial, the trial court denied the motion to suppress after an evidentiary
    hearing.
    Generally, to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present to the trial
    court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if
    not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Further, the trial court must have
    “ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly,” or the complaining
    party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule.           TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).
    “Preservation of error is a systemic requirement on appeal. If an issue has not been preserved for
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(2), (c) (Supp.).
    2
    appeal, neither the court of appeals nor [the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] should address the
    merits of that issue. Ordinarily, a court of appeals should review preservation of error on its own
    motion.” Douglas v. State, 
    489 S.W.3d 613
    , 628–29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.)
    (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. State, 
    305 S.W.3d 530
    , 532–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
    “An adverse ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress evidence will ordinarily suffice to
    preserve error on appeal, and a defendant need not specifically object to the evidence when it is
    later offered at trial.” Thomas v. State, 
    408 S.W.3d 877
    , 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
    Powers v. State, 
    456 S.W.2d 97
    , 98–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (per curiam)). However, if a
    defendant “affirmatively indicate[s] that he has ‘no objection’ to the evidence that he challenged
    in his pretrial motion to suppress when it is later offered at trial,” he may waive “the right to raise
    on appeal the error that was previously preserved.” 
    Id.
     at 881–82 (citing Boykin v. State, 
    504 S.W.2d 855
    , 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
    Nevertheless, the “‘no objection’ waiver rule” should be applied “with comparable
    flexibility,” and any “forfeit[ure] [of] earlier-preserved error is context-dependent.” 
    Id. at 885
    .
    As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Thomas,
    an appellate court should not focus exclusively on the statement itself, in
    isolation, but should consider it in the context of the entirety of the record. If the
    record as a whole plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did
    the trial court construe, his “no objection” statement to constitute an abandonment
    of a claim of error that he had earlier preserved for appeal, then the appellate court
    should not regard the claim as “waived,” but should resolve it on the merits. On
    the other hand, if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply cannot tell
    whether an abandonment was intended or understood, then, consistent with prior
    case law, it should regard the “no objection” statement to be a waiver of the
    earlier-preserved error. Under the latter circumstances, the affirmative “no
    objection” statement will, by itself, serve as an unequivocal indication that a
    waiver was both intended and understood.
    3
    
    Id.
     at 885–86. The record in this case supports a conclusion that Caffey waived his earlier
    preserved claim that the trial court erred in not suppressing the blood-spattered shoes. At trial,
    Caffey affirmatively stated that he had “[n]o objections” to the admission of photographs of the
    shoes and other clothing worn by Caffey. Later, when the shoes were offered into evidence,
    Caffey again affirmatively stated that he had “[n]o objection.” Further, Caffey affirmatively
    stated that he had “[n]o objections” to the admission into evidence of the DNA laboratory report
    that indicated that the DNA found in a blood sample taken from one of the shoes came from the
    victim. Also, at trial, Caffey did not question the officer who seized the shoes about the seizure
    or about any constitutional irregularities in the seizure process. Caffey also did not request a jury
    instruction under Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and none was given.
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (“In any case where the legal evidence raises an
    issue” that evidence was obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of
    the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States
    of America, “the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the
    evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the
    jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.”).
    Based on this record, we find that Caffey abandoned his claim of error that he had earlier
    preserved for appeal. As a result, Caffey forfeited his complaint regarding the trial court’s denial
    of his motion to suppress. We overrule this issue.
    4
    II.     Caffey’s Rule-403 Complaint
    Caffey complains in his second issue that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence
    that he claims was unfairly prejudicial. In the argument section of Caffey’s brief, he does not
    specify which witness’s or witnesses’ testimony he believes was unfairly prejudicial. However,
    in the statement-of-facts section, he details portions of the testimony of Joan Caffey, the victim’s
    widow, and of Krystal Stevens, which he characterizes as prejudicial. We construe his complaint
    to encompass both of these witnesses.
    Early in Joan’s direct testimony, the following exchange occurred:
    Q.     [(By the State)] When you were married -- as you were married to
    your husband, Tim, did the defendant, his son, Michael Caffey, live with you and
    your husband?
    A.       Yes, sir, off and on.
    Q.      Did you get a very good impression and understanding of the
    relationship that existed between your husband and his son, Michael Caffey?
    A.       Yes, sir.
    Q.       What type of relationship was it?
    A.       Very rocky.
    At that point, Caffey asserted a Rule-4032 objection, advised the trial court that he assumed that
    the witness “and some other witnesses” would testify to Caffey’s and his father’s very bad
    relationship, and argued that the testimony would be unfairly prejudicial.                       The trial court
    overruled the objection.
    2
    TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
    danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
    needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
    5
    Caffey did not ask to voir dire Joan, identify the “other witnesses,” or provide the trial
    court with any details regarding what testimony he anticipated Joan and the other witnesses
    would provide.3 He also did not obtain a running objection to any testimony regarding the
    relationship between Caffey and his father, and he did not assert any objections to that portion of
    Joan’s testimony or to the portion of Stevens’s testimony that he complains about on appeal.4
    The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that,
    [t]o preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must make a proper objection
    and get a ruling on that objection. In addition, a party must object each time the
    inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection. An error [if any]
    in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in
    elsewhere without objection.
    Lane v. State, 
    151 S.W.3d 188
    , 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting
    Valle v. State, 
    109 S.W.3d 500
    , 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). Because Caffey did not provide
    the trial court with the details of the anticipated objectionable testimony of Joan and the other
    witnesses, did not obtain a running objection to Joan’s and the other witnesses’ testimony
    regarding the relationship between Caffey and his father, and did not assert repeated objections
    to Joan’s testimony, and because he did not assert any objections to Stevens’s testimony, he
    failed to preserve this complaint for our review. We overrule Caffey’s second issue.
    III.     Testimony Regarding the Autopsy Report
    In his third issue, Caffey complains that a forensic pathologist who did not perform the
    victim’s autopsy and did not prepare the autopsy report was allowed to testify about the contents
    3
    As Caffey states in his brief, “In the instant case, there [was] no proffer of what the evidence was going to be, [and]
    no bill of exception as to what the testimony was going to be . . . .”
    On appeal, Caffey does not contend that Joan’s testimony that Caffey and his father’s relationship was very rocky
    4
    was prejudicial.
    6
    of the autopsy report and its accompanying photographs. Caffey argues that allowing that
    testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him under the Confrontation Clause.
    See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
     (2004).
    “Generally, in order to preserve error, there must be a timely and specific objection to the
    complained-of evidence.” Davis v. State, 
    313 S.W.3d 317
    , 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). “Confrontation Clause claims are subject to this preservation
    requirement.” 
    Id.
     (citing Anderson v. State, 
    301 S.W.3d 276
    , 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). The
    record shows that the autopsy report and its accompanying photographs were admitted without
    objection and that the forensic pathologist testified regarding the contents of the autopsy report
    and the photographs without objection. As a result, Caffey did not preserve his complaint under
    the Confrontation Clause for our review. See 
    id.
     We overrule Caffey’s third issue.
    IV.    Cumulative Harm
    Caffey’s fourth issue complains that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s alleged
    errors described above caused him sufficient harm to justify the reversal of the trial court’s
    judgment and remand for a new trial. To make a finding of cumulative harm from multiple
    errors, we must find that the trial court erred. See Buntion v. State, 
    482 S.W.3d 58
    , 79 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2016) (finding “no cumulative harm” because the “appellant . . . failed to prove error
    concerning each of [his] claims separately”); Uptergrove v. State, 
    881 S.W.2d 529
    , 531 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 1994, pet. ref’d) (“claim of cumulative error must fail” if no error found).
    Because Caffey failed to preserve each of his claims of error separately, his claim of cumulative
    harm from these alleged errors must also fail. We overrule his fourth issue.
    7
    V.    Disposition
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Charles van Cleef
    Justice
    Date Submitted:      October 22, 2024
    Date Decided:        October 24, 2024
    Do Not Publish
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-24-00057-CR

Filed Date: 10/24/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2024