Marcus Lance Hattenbach v. the State of Texas ( 2024 )

Opinion filed October 3, 2024
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-23-00219-CR
__________
MARCUS LANCE HATTENBACH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 118th District Court
Howard County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 16495
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Marcus Lance Hattenbach, was convicted by a jury for
unauthorized use of a vehicle, a state jail felony. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.07 (West 2016). Appellant elected for the jury to assess his punishment. After
Appellant was also charged by a separate indictment with the first-degree felony offense of
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aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against the same victim; the cases were consolidated for trial. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West Supp. 2023). The jury found him not guilty of that offense.
considering the punishment evidence, the jury found the two enhancement
allegations to be “true,” and assessed Appellant’s punishment at imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for twenty years
and a $10,000 fine. Id. § 12.425(b) (West 2019). The trial court sentenced Appellant
accordingly.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Victoria Gale Golleher testified about her relationship with Appellant, which
began in September 2022. At that time, Golleher was living in Big Spring, Texas,
and Appellant was living in Ruidoso, New Mexico. Golleher, who owned a Toyota
4Runner and a Dodge pickup, testified that she and Appellant would use one of her
vehicles on the multiple occasions that they traveled between Big Spring and
Ruidoso. Regarding Appellant’s use of her vehicles, Golleher recalled permitting
Appellant to drive her Toyota to Ruidoso when she was sick, and to drive her pickup
without her on one occasion when he helped her move furniture.
Golleher testified that on October 22, 2022, Appellant was staying at her home
in Big Spring. That evening, they visited an acquaintance, Frederick Heckler, at his
house. According to Golleher, Appellant and Frederick had been drinking that night.
When Appellant and Golleher left Frederick’s house, Appellant, despite having
consumed alcohol, “insisted” that he drive Golleher home in her pickup. Appellant
initially drove to Golleher’s home; however, later that evening, Appellant told
Golleher that he wanted to “drive around” in her pickup. Golleher reluctantly rode
with Appellant for “three or four hours” while he consumed “multiple beers.”
Golleher testified that as they drove around, she “kept telling [Appellant] to take
[her] home”; he eventually did so around 2:00 a.m. When they returned to
Golleher’s home, Appellant told her that “[h]e wanted to leave . . . to get more beer.”
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Golleher then told Appellant that he was not allowed to drive her pickup and
demanded her keys. Appellant threw the keys at her, then attacked her with a “red-
handled” razor-blade knife. At some point during the altercation, Golleher escaped
and ran to her neighbor’s house, leaving the keys to her vehicles behind.
Meredith Skaggs, Golleher’s neighbor, testified that at around 6:00 a.m. on
October 23, she was awakened by Golleher ringing her doorbell. When Skaggs
opened the front door, Golleher was calling 9-1-1 on her cell phone. Golleher told
Skaggs that “she’d been beaten up,” and Skaggs observed multiple cuts and other
visible injuries on Golleher’s body. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement and
emergency medical personnel arrived at Skaggs’s residence and treated Golleher’s
injuries. Golleher was then transported to the hospital in Big Spring for further
treatment.
Howard County Sheriff’s Deputy Richard Dyer testified that he inspected
Golleher’s home and noticed that several vehicles were parked in front of the home,
including Golleher’s pickup. Deputy Dyer later interviewed Golleher at the hospital,
and Golleher told him that Appellant had assaulted her from 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
that morning. Several law enforcement officers from the Howard County Sheriff’s
Office, including Deputy Dyer, Deputy Dominic Rocha, and Sergeant Ralph Rollins,
met Golleher at her home after she was released from the hospital that afternoon.
When they arrived there, Deputy Dyer observed that the pickup he had seen in
Golleher’s driveway earlier that day was gone. Golleher told Deputy Rocha that
“[Appellant] had stolen the [pickup] and that he had no permission to have taken the
[pickup].” Deputy Rocha then contacted dispatch to report that Golleher’s pickup
had been stolen.
Approximately three or four hours after Golleher’s pickup had been reported
stolen, Deputy Rocha and Sergeant Rollins located the stolen pickup at Brian
Heckler’s residence, the son of Frederick Heckler. Sergeant Rollins testified that he
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saw three males standing by this house, two of whom he knew “by the last name of
Heckler.” The officers then asked the third male to identify himself, but he refused.
Believing that the unidentified male was Appellant, the officers arrested him for
outstanding warrants. The officers then searched the interior of the pickup and found
a wallet that contained identification belonging to Appellant. The officers later
returned the stolen pickup to Golleher.
Frederick Heckler and Christopher Newton testified about Appellant’s use of
Golleher’s pickup. Frederick testified that Appellant drove up to his house in a
pickup with a female on October 22, and that he did not believe the pickup belonged
to Appellant. Frederick also testified that Appellant drove up to his house again the
following day in the same pickup, but Appellant was alone. Newton testified that
he and Appellant helped Golleher move furniture on October 13, and he
recalled Appellant driving the pickup that day with Golleher’s consent. Newton
confirmed that the stolen pickup was the same pickup that he saw Appellant drive
on October 13.
Appellant testified that he began a relationship with Golleher in September
2022, and that Golleher visited him in Ruidoso around September 16. Appellant
confirmed that he and Golleher drove back and forth from Ruidoso and Big Spring
on multiple occasions. Appellant also testified that he drove Golleher’s vehicles
during the time they were together, and that he had Golleher’s permission to drive
her vehicles, including her pickup, without her being present.
Appellant’s version of what occurred on October 22 differed from
Golleher’s and Frederick’s testimony. Appellant recounted that, around 1:00 p.m.
on October 22, he and Golleher “kicked around the house,” and he “worked on her
house some.” Around 4:00 p.m., Appellant “went for a ride around Big Spring,” and
he brought a friend to Golleher’s home around 7:00 p.m. Appellant and Golleher
then drove to the grocery store around 10:00 p.m. Around midnight, Appellant asked
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Golleher if she wanted to go for a ride; she agreed, and they drove around Big Spring
in her pickup—Appellant drove. Appellant testified that they had been drinking and
he initiated a conversation about them ending their relationship as they drove around.
After this conversation ended, Appellant and Golleher returned to Golleher’s home
around 1:00 a.m., and he went to sleep.
Appellant testified that he woke up around 6:00 a.m. on October 23 to find
Golleher lying in bed next to a “pile of pills.” Because he believed that Golleher had
overdosed on prescription medication, he intended to drive Golleher to the hospital
in one of her vehicles. At some point as he was moving Golleher from her house to
“her car,” she fled. Appellant testified that he then went inside her house and was
there when the officers knocked on the front door. After the officers left, Appellant
drove away in Golleher’s pickup. Appellant testified that he did not leave Golleher’s
house with the intent of driving her pickup without her permission; rather, he stated
that he was waiting for Golleher to call him to pick her up.
II. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v.
State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912,
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915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667
S.W.3d at 762 (“[A] reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.”). “This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Therefore, if the
record supports conflicting inferences, we presume the factfinder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443
U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762.
We treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally under this standard.
Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ruiz v. State, 631
S.W.3d 841, 851 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the
evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence
can alone be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414
S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. Each fact need not point directly
and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances
is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence
must be considered cumulatively, we may not use a “divide and conquer” strategy
for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446,
448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Rather, we must consider the cumulative force of all
the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
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Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of
the charged offense as defined by the hypothetically correct charge for the case.
Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether
the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence
adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out
the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s
burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support his conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle, because
nothing shows that he knowingly operated Golleher’s pickup without her consent.
In support of his argument, Appellant contends that circumstantial evidence shows
his lack of knowledge because: (1) he and Golleher were in a relationship and he had
driven Golleher’s pickup on multiple occasions—both when she was and was not
present; (2) his personal possessions were at Golleher’s house when he was arrested;
and (3) in light of his acquittal of the aggravated-assault offense, the jury could not
have reasonably believed Golleher’s testimony that Appellant operated her pickup
without her permission.
As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the offense of unauthorized use
of a vehicle if the person intentionally or knowingly operates a motor vehicle without
the effective consent of the vehicle’s owner. PENAL § 31.07. The accused must be
aware that the operation of the vehicle is without the owner’s consent. Gardner v.
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State, 780 S.W.2d 259, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Edwards v. State, 178
S.W.3d 139, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Thus, operating a
vehicle is unlawful only if the accused is aware that his operation of the vehicle is
without the owner’s consent. McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989). Evidence that a vehicle owner did not consent to the accused operating
the owner’s vehicle can be sufficient to support a finding that the accused knew he
did not have consent to do so. Id. at 604–05.
Here, Golleher testified that she did not give Appellant permission to operate
her pickup on October 23. Deputy Rocha testified that Golleher also told law
enforcement that Appellant did not have permission to operate her pickup on
October 23—the day she reported it stolen. This evidence, without more, is
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant knew that he operated the
pickup without Golleher’s effective consent. See id.; Brumfield v. State, 641 S.W.3d
568, 574–75 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet. ref’d). Nevertheless, additional evidence
supports the jury’s finding of guilt and Appellant’s conviction.
Golleher testified that after she and Appellant left Frederick’s house on
October 22, she repeatedly told Appellant to “take [her] home” and “[that] he didn’t
need to be driving.” Around 2:00 a.m. on October 23, she told Appellant he was not
allowed to drive her pickup, and she asked Appellant to give her the keys to her
vehicles. Although Appellant testified that he had Golleher’s “implied” consent to
operate her vehicles without her presence on multiple occasions—including on
October 23—in this case, as in all cases, the jury may believe all, some, or none of
any witness’s testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992); Reyes v. State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d)
(citing Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)); see Winfrey,
393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. As the trier of fact, it is the jury’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
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reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319, 326; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. As such, while
the jury may not have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed
aggravated assault against Golleher, the jury was free to believe the testimony of
Golleher and others concerning Appellant’s unauthorized use of her pickup. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326.
We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict, and we conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from
which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant committed the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle as
charged in the indictment. See PENAL § 31.07; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
October 3, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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