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Barch Interests LP v. TitleMax of Texas, Inc. ( 2024 )


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  • Dismiss and Opinion Filed October 7, 2024
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-24-00143-CV
    BARCH INTERESTS LP, Appellant
    V.
    TITLEMAX OF TEXAS, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 003-00135-2024
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Carlyle
    Opinion by Justice Nowell
    In this interlocutory appeal, Barch Interests LP challenges the trial court’s
    temporary injunction in favor of TitleMax of Texas, Inc. In two issues, Barch asserts
    the county court at law lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this landlord-tenant
    dispute and abused its discretion by issuing a vague temporary injunction. We
    reverse the trial court’s order denying Barch’s plea to the jurisdiction, vacate the
    temporary injunction, and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Barch, as a landlord, entered into a commercial lease with TitleMax, as a
    tenant. The Lease states it is for a term of five years and two months, beginning on
    November 1, 2018, and ending on December 31, 2023. However, TitleMax alleges
    that delivery and possession of the premises was delayed while Barch remediated
    asbestos, and Barch agreed to extend the lease term. Accordingly, TitleMax alleges,
    the parties adjusted the commencement date of the Lease to December 13, 2018, and
    the expiration date to February 29, 2024.
    The Lease provides TitleMax with two options to extend the term of the Lease
    for an additional sixty months. To exercise either option, TitleMax had to deliver
    written notice to Barch no earlier than 120 days before and no later than 90 days
    before the expiration of the original lease term or the extension of the term. TitleMax
    asserts it provided written notice exercising its option to renew the Lease for an
    additional sixty-month term on November 7, 2023, which it alleges was within the
    renewal window after accounting for the delay in TitleMax taking possession.
    However, also in November 2023, Barch sent a letter to TitleMax stating Barch had
    not received a written notice to extend the Lease, and the Lease would expire on
    December 31, 2023. The letter also stated TitleMax was in default of the terms of
    the Lease and offered TitleMax two options: vacate the premises on or before
    December 31, 2023, or renegotiate terms for a new lease.
    –2–
    On January 12, 2024, TitleMax filed its original petition and application for a
    temporary restraining order and permanent injunction in the county court.
    TitleMax’s pleading states it feared that Barch would take possession of the premises
    and lock out TitleMax in breach of the Lease and its rights of possession on or after
    January 1, 2024. Addressing the jurisdiction of the county court at law, TitleMax
    pleaded:
    Actions to recover possession of leased premises, in the nature of
    forcible detainer, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice of
    [the] Peace, see Tex. Property Code § 24.004(a), with follow-on appeal
    to this [County Court at Law]. The dispute between Barch, as Landlord,
    and TitleMax, as Tenant, with respect to the Expiration Date of the
    Lease, the renewal of the Lease, and claimed defaults under the Lease,
    is to be decided as a matter of first instance in the court of the Justice
    of the Peace.
    However, it alleged, because a justice of the peace could not enjoin Barch from
    performing a lock out, TitleMax asked the county court to issue an injunction
    requiring Barch to maintain the Lease term during the pendency of a forcible detainer
    proceeding. In response, Barch filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the justice of
    the peace had exclusive jurisdiction to determine which party had the right to
    immediate possession. The county court denied the plea to the jurisdiction.
    Following a hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining
    Barch from: (1) interfering with TitleMax’s use and possession of the Premises, or
    (2) taking possession of or expelling TitleMax from the Premises, changing or
    modifying the locks, or otherwise preventing TitleMax from accessing the Premises.
    –3–
    PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
    In its first issue, Barch argues the trial court erred by denying its plea to the
    jurisdiction because the justice of the peace has exclusive jurisdiction over a non-
    title-related landlord-tenant dispute about a party’s right to immediate possession,
    and the only issue in this case is which party has the right to immediate possession
    of the premises. In response, TitleMax argues it lacks an adequate remedy in the
    justice of the peace court because the justice court has no jurisdiction to enjoin Barch
    from performing a lock out while it determines the right to immediate possession,
    and the county court’s injunction preserves the justice of the peace court’s
    jurisdiction by preventing an eviction.
    A.     Standard of Review
    Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the court’s power to decide a case.
    Klumb v. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys., 
    458 S.W.3d 1
    , 8 (Tex. 2015). The
    existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that can be challenged
    by a plea to the jurisdiction, as it was here. 
    Id.
     We review de novo the trial court’s
    disposition of a plea to the jurisdiction. 
    Id.
    B.     Jurisdiction of Justice of the Peace
    Chapter 24 of the Texas Property Code grants justice courts “jurisdiction in
    eviction suits,” including suits for forcible entry and detainer (FED) and forcible
    detainer. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a). Eviction suits are designed to provide “a
    summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for the determination of who is entitled
    –4–
    to possession of the premises.” Westwood Motorcars, LLC v. Virtuolotry, LLC, 
    689 S.W.3d 879
    , 883 (Tex. 2024) (quoting McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 
    672 S.W.2d 231
    , 232
    (Tex. 1984)); see also Miller v. Miller, No. 05-21-00422-CV, 
    2022 WL 1260183
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (pursuant to chapter 24 of
    the property code, “justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear eviction
    cases.”). Eviction suits are limited in scope and effect, with the “sole focus” being
    “the right to immediate possession of real property.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Shields Ltd. P’ship
    v. Bradberry, 
    526 S.W.3d 471
    , 478 (Tex. 2017)); see Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San
    Antonio, 
    198 S.W.3d 782
    , 785 (Tex. 2006) (“The only issue in a forcible detainer
    action is the right to actual possession of the premises.”).
    Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 510.3, which governs eviction cases, identifies
    “the right to actual possession” as the “[o]nly [i]ssue” in an eviction case and
    specifies that claims “not asserted because of this rule can be brought in a separate
    suit in a court of proper jurisdiction.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e). Section 24.008 of the
    Property Code states that “[a]n eviction suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages,
    waste, rent, or mesne profits.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.008. The supreme court has
    concluded, then, that an eviction suit in justice court is “not exclusive, but
    cumulative, of any other remedy that a party may have,” and matters beyond “the
    justice court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction” may be brought in another “court
    of competent jurisdiction.” Virtuolotry, LLC, 689 S.W.3d at 883 (quoting
    McGlothlin, 672 S.W.2d at 233). Under this scheme, an eviction suit in justice court
    –5–
    “may run concurrently with another action in another court” without issue—even if
    the two proceedings “overlap” and “the other action adjudicates matters that could
    result in a different determination of possession.” Id. That is because the justice
    court’s judgment “is a determination only of the right to immediate possession and
    does not determine the ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy
    relating to the realty in question.” Id. at 884
    C.     TMC Medical, Ltd. v. Lasaters French Quarter Partnership
    Our sister court considered a jurisdictional issue similar to the one before us
    in TMC Medical, Ltd. v. Lasaters French Quarter Partnership. In that case, the
    appellant, a commercial lessee, sued the appellee, the lessor, seeking a declaratory
    judgment that an exchange of letters before the expiration of the lease constituted
    the formation of a new lease. 
    880 S.W.2d 789
    , 790 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, writ
    dism’d w.o.j.). The appellant filed the suit just before the original lease expired and
    obtained a temporary restraining order precluding the appellee from executing any
    conflicting lease on the disputed premises or evicting the appellant. See 
    id.
    Thereafter, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing before denying the appellant’s
    request for an injunction. See 
    id.
     On appeal, the appellant argued the trial court erred
    by refusing to grant its requested relief. See 
    id.
    The court of appeals stated the justice court alone has jurisdiction to determine
    the parties’ possessory rights and issues pertaining to possession of a leasehold, and
    the parties’ dispute should initially be asserted in the justice court. Id. at 792. The
    –6–
    court of appeals concluded the trial court did not err by refusing the temporary
    injunction requested by the appellant. Id. at 791.
    On rehearing, the appellant argued it was “illogical that a court having
    jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment lacks the authority to issue orders
    necessary to preserve the status quo pending final judgment.” Id. at 791-92. The
    court responded that the complained-of result was “the clear consequence of the
    holdings” in prior supreme court opinions and “such allocation of jurisdiction is not
    illogical inasmuch as the state’s jurisprudence includes the provision for an
    expeditious resolution of disputes going to immediate possession.” Id. at 792. The
    court reiterated in its opinion on the motion for rehearing that it adhered to its
    “original opinion regarding the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to enter the requested
    [injunction].” Id. at 792.
    D.     Analysis
    We consider TMC Medical persuasive. Through its request for a temporary
    injunction, TitleMax asked the county court at law to determine which party had the
    right to immediate possession of the property at issue. The right to immediate
    possession of a property is determined through an eviction suit. Virtuolotry, LLC,
    689 S.W.3d at 883. And the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear eviction
    cases where, as here, the issue of immediate possession of the property is not
    intertwined with title issues. See Miller, 
    2022 WL 1260183
    , at *2. TitleMax’s effort
    to enjoin Barch from interfering with its claimed right to immediate possession of
    –7–
    the property is the same as the appellant’s request for a temporary injunction in TMC
    Medical. We, like the court in TMC Medical, find TitleMax’s effort unavailing. We
    conclude the county court at law erred by denying Barch’s plea to the jurisdiction
    because the justice court has exclusive jurisdiction over this non-title-related
    landlord-tenant dispute about which party has the right to immediate possession. We
    sustain Barch’s first issue.
    TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
    In its second issue, Barch argues the trial court abused its discretion by issuing
    the temporary injunction. In light of our resolution of Barch’s first issue, we need
    not consider Barch’s second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court erred by denying Barch’s plea to the jurisdiction. We vacate
    the trial court’s February 7, 2024 Temporary Injunction, and we dismiss TitleMax’s
    action for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
    240143f.p05                                 /Erin A. Nowell//
    ERIN A. NOWELL
    JUSTICE
    –8–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    BARCH INTERESTS LP, Appellant                On Appeal from the County Court at
    Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas
    No. 05-24-00143-CV          V.               Trial Court Cause No. 003-00135-
    2024.
    TITLEMAX OF TEXAS, INC.,                     Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
    Appellee                                     Justices Reichek and Carlyle
    participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial
    court’s February 7, 2024 Temporary Injunction, and we DISMISS TitleMax of
    Texas, Inc.’s action for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
    It is ORDERED that appellant Barch Interests LP recover its costs of this
    appeal from appellee TitleMax of Texas, Inc.
    Judgment entered this 7th day of October, 2024.
    –9–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-24-00143-CV

Filed Date: 10/7/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/9/2024